FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-075
Wednesday
18 April 1990

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-90-075 CONTENTS *18 April 1990*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

Perfilyev 17 Apr Briefing on World Issues 1
    Upcoming Li Peng Visit *[TASS]* 1
    Mongolia Ties *[TASS]* 1
    Israeli Settlement in Gaza *[TASS]* 1
    Talks With India *[TASS]* 1
    Power Transfer in Nicaragua *[TASS]* 1
    TASS Summary 2
Shevardnadze Interviewed on Germany, Presidency *[NEW TIMES No 15]* 2
Shevardnadze Discusses Summit, Li Peng Visit *[PRAVDA 18 Apr]* 4
Petrovskiy Cites Lessons To Be Learned From UN *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 15]* 5
USSR To Become Member of Interpol *[IZVESTIYA 18 Apr]* 6
Europeans Adopt Economic Cooperation Codex *[IZVESTIYA 12 Apr]* 6
Belgian Bid for Change Causes NATO 'Irritation' *[IZVESTIYA 15 Apr]* 8

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Cheney Interview on Strategic Arms Talks Cited *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Apr]* 9
U.S. Position on Tactical Nuclear Arms Unchanged *[TASS]* 9
Mitchell Cited on Gorbachev Meeting, Lithuania *[TASS]* 9
More on Primakov Meeting With Senator Mitchell *[IZVESTIYA 15 Apr]* 10
Bermuda Meeting Seen as 'Important' for Thatcher *[PRAVDA 16 Apr]* 10
Bush Adviser Boskin Examines USSR Reforms *[IZVESTIYA 17 Apr]* 11
Progress Toward Trade Accord With U.S. Viewed *[PRAVDA 16 Apr]* 11
Science, Technology Delegation Visits Washington *[TASS]* 12
USSR-U.S. Narcological Center Opens in Moscow *[TASS]* 12

China

Reportage on Upcoming Visit of Premier Li Peng 12
    'Fundamental Importance' Cited *[TASS]* 12
    Normalized Relations Viewed *[Moscow International]* 13
    Expansion of Friendly Ties *[Moscow International]* 13
PRC Parliament Emphasizes Stability *[PRAVDA 10 Apr]* 13

Northeast Asia

Soviet Media Articles Anger DPRK Authorities *[TRUD 13 Apr]* 15
Rogachev Meets With DPRK Charge d'Affaires *[Moscow International]* 15
Japan, ROK Urge Free Economic Zone Decision *[IZVESTIYA 17 Apr]* 15
Talks Resume With Japan on Fishing Regulations *[TASS]* 15

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Philippines' Laurel Received at Foreign Ministry *[IZVESTIYA 15 Apr]* 16
Solomon's Recent Visit to Manila Viewed *[Aleksandrov on Moscow International]* 16
Vietnamese Deny U.S. Return to Cam Ranh *[IZVESTIYA 17 Apr]* 17
Phomvihan Details 'Laotian Perestroyka' *[IZVESTIYA 10 Apr]* 17

Near East & South Asia

Moscow Reports Afghan Denial of Executions *[Moscow International]* 19
Keshtmand Pledges Afghan Help for POWs' Release *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]* 19
'Subversive Activities' of M. Gul Described *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 14]* 19
Faysal al-Husayni 'Unexpectedly' Visits Moscow 20
    Addresses Forum on Aliyah *[Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 17 Apr]* 20
    Interviewed on Emigration Roundtable *[Moscow TV]* 20
    Holds News Conference on Emigration *[TASS]* 21
    Vorontsov Receives Al-Husayni *[TASS]* 21
Polyakov, 'Arafat 'Unanimous' on Israeli Actions *[TASS]* 22
Saudi-Iranian Pilgrimage 'Dispute' Reported *[Radio Peace and Progress]* 22
Andreyev Views Iranian-Egyptian Relations *[Moscow International]* 22
Egyptian Ambassador Received at Foreign Ministry *[IZVESTIYA 14 Apr]* 23
CPSU Group in Bangladesh First in 18 Years *[PRAVDA 13 Apr]* 23

Sub-Saharan Africa

U.S. Renewal of Somali Port Lease Criticized *[Moscow International]* 24
Commentary on RSA Talks, Mandela's UK Visit *[Moscow International]* 24

East Europe

Bulgarian Students Show Support for Lithuania *[TASS]* 25
Party of Slavs Offers Military Aid to Lithuania *[Warsaw PAP]* 25
Anticommunist Demonstration in Prague Condemned *[PRAVDA 11 Apr]* 25
CSFR Scientists Visit To Review 1968 Events *[Prague CTK]* 26
Document Signed With SFRY Chamber of Commerce *[TASS]* 26
Vorontsov Meets Hungarian Foreign Minister *[TASS]* 26
Japanese Fact-Finding Group Visits Hungary *[Budapest MTI]* 27
Yazov Meets With Romanian Counterpart 9 Apr *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 11 Apr]* 27
Central European Leaders' Forum Viewed *[PRAVDA 12 Apr]* 27

West Europe

Italy's De Michelis Concludes Talks in Moscow 28
    Holds Talks With Shevardnadze *[TASS]* 28
    Speaks at News Conference *[TASS]* 29
    Discusss Issues With Gorbachev *[PRAVDA 18 Apr]* 29
    Comments on Meeting With Gorbachev *[Paris AFP]* 30
Yakovlev Receives West Germany's Egon Bahr *[TASS]* 30
FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg Interviewed *[IZVESTIYA 13 Apr]* 30
'No Unity of Opinion' on Unification in FRG *[IZVESTIYA 10 Apr]* 30
FRG Debate on Future of Nuclear Weapons Viewed *[PRAVDA 14 Apr]* 31
France's Schmitt Views Military Hardware *[TASS]* 32
Finnish President Calls for 'Restraint' on Baltic *[IZVESTIYA 12 Apr]* 32
Finnish Center Party Delegation Holds Talks *[PRAVDA 13 Apr]* 33
CPSU Greets Danish Communists' Congress *[PRAVDA 12 Apr]* 33
Supreme Soviet Delegation Ends Visit to Cyprus *[IZVESTIYA 13 Apr]* 33
Public 'Concerned' Over Hunger Strike in Turkey *[PRAVDA 12 Apr]* 34

Latin America & Caribbean

Soviet-Cuban Commission Signs Payments Protocol *[TASS]* 34
'Collapse of Communism' in East Bloc Condemned *[IZVESTIYA 12 Apr]* 34
Cuban Chief of General Staff To Visit USSR *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Apr]* 35
Cuba Tests Jamming System for Marti Stations *[TASS]* 35
Petrov Comments on Nicaraguan Government Changes *[TASS]* 35
Komplektov Meets Nicaragua's De Chamorro *[TASS]* 35
Central American Presidents' Meeting Assessed *[PRAVDA 10 Apr]* 36

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet Session

Reportage From 18 Apr Gdlyan, Ivanov Discussions 37
  Deputies Support Conclusions *[TASS]* 37
  Gdlyan, Ivanov Statements Condemned *[Moscow Radio]* 37
  'Final Decision' Postponed *[Moscow Radio]* 37
Moscow TV Carries 17 Apr Supreme Soviet Session 38
  Lukyanov Chairs Session 38
  Debate Continues on Gdlyan-Ivanov Case 38
  Accused of 1930's Investigation Methods 39
  Evidence of Criminal Activity Cited 40
  Certain Deputies Defend Gdlyan, Ivanov 41
  Deputies Vote To End Discussion 41
  Medvedev, Sukharev Answer Questions 42
  Voting on Commission's Report Begins 43
Gdlyan, Ivanov Cited for Serious Violations *[TASS]* 43
  Gdylan, Ivanov Discussion Viewed *[Moscow Radio]* 44
  Resignation of Prosecutor General Demanded *[TASS]* 45
17 Apr Speakers Address Gdlyan, Ivanov Case 45
  Medvedev Addresses Parliament *[Moscow Radio]* 45
  Yeltsin Criticizes Politburo *[Moscow TV]* 46
  KGB's Kryuchkov Urges Charges *[TASS]* 47
Gdlyan Calls for Parliamentary Hearing *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 15]* 47
Pavlov Speaks on Taxation Law 16 April *[Moscow TV]* 48
Deputy Assails 55 Percent Profit Tax *[Moscow TV]* 53
Tarazevich on Devolving Powers to Republics *[PRAVDA 16 Apr]* 54
Supreme Soviet Body Views Ingush Problems *[IZVESTIYA 14 Apr]* 55

Political & Social

50,000 Attend Moscow Rally Over Gdlyan, Ivanov *[Moscow TV]* 56
Shishlin on Gorbachev Aim 'To Kill' Old System *[London ITV]* 56
Press Secretary Maslennikov Describes Duties *[IZVESTIYA 14 Apr]* 56
Resolution on Regional Economic Ties Law *[IZVESTIYA 17 Apr]* 57
Christian Democratic Movement Platform Outlined *[TASS]* 58
AUCCTU Congress Preparations Previewed *[TASS]* 58
Creation of Trade Union Confederation Suggested *[TASS* 59
New AUCCTU Chief Yanayev Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 59
Komsomol Issues Statement on Direction *[TASS]* 59
New Weekly Newspaper To Be Distributed Abroad *[Moscow Radio]* 60
Legislation on Employment Under Way *[Moscow International]* 60
Draft Legislation on Unemployment Discussed *[PRAVDA 6 Apr]* 60
Andreyeva Discusses Perestroyka, Communism *[Budapest Radio]* 61
Russian Amnesty International Report Issued *[TASS]* 62
Burlatskiy Urges Solzhenitsyn Citizenship *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 15]* 62
Pensioning Off of Aging Politburo Members Urged *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 13 Apr]* 63
Conference in Ulyanovsk Discusses Leninism *[Moscow Radio]* 63
'Secret' Documents on CPSU Faction Cited *[Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER 10 Apr]* 64
Pros, Cons of Multiparty System Examined *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 29 Mar]* 65

Economic

Pricing Committee Chairman Explains New Measures *[TASS]* 68
More on Abalkin 9 Apr Remarks on Market Reform *[Moscow TV]* 68
Defense Industry Conversion Fair To Be Held *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 12 Apr]* 72

Scientific

- 'Cosmos-2073' Satellite Launched 17 Apr *[TASS* 73
- Cosmonauts Continue Mission, Operations *[TASS]* 73

Military

- Yazov To Attend Red Square Military Parade 9 May *[TASS]* 73
- Moiseyev Chairs Armed Forces Development Meeting *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]* 73
- Obituary of Marshal of Aviation Savitskiy *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Apr]* 74

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

- Soviet Reinforcements Reportedly Arrive in Vilnius *[Belgrade Radio]* 75
- Vilnius Radio Carries 18 Apr Council Session 75
  - Draft Response Debated 75
  - Draft Editing Group Established 75
  - Economic Conditions Discussed 75
  - Food Shortage Discussed 76
- Landsbergis Addresses 18 Apr Supreme Council *[Vilnius Radio]* 76
- TASS Reports No Halt in Oil, Gas Supply 77
- Lithuanian Fuel Supply Situation Detailed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 18 Apr]* 77
  - More on Energy Supply *[Vilnius International]* 77
- Prunskiene on Moscow's 'Blockade,' Oil Supplies *[Vilnius International]* 78
- Lithuanian Fuel Minister on Petrol Situation *[Vilnius Radio]* 78
- Belorussia Reduces Gas Shipments to Lithuania *[Belgrade TANJUG]* 79
- Lithuanian Parliament Discusses Reply to Gorbachev *[TASS]* 79
  - Text of Draft Reply *[Vilnius Radio]* 79
- Reply to Letter, Landsbergis Remarks Cited *[IZVESTIYA 18 Apr]* 79
- Landsbergis Says Lithuanian Decisions Irrevocable *[PRAVDA 18 Apr]* 80
- Lithuanian Leaders on Response to Gorbachev *[Moscow International]* 80
- Landsbergis Addresses 17 Apr Council Session *[Vilnius Radio]* 81
- Landsbergis on Economic Threat to Lithuania *[Warsaw RZECZPSPOLITA 12 Apr]* 86
- Correspondent Reports on Lithuanian Situation *[Moscow Radio]* 87
- Commission Chairman on Possible Concessions *[Moscow TV]* 88
- Defense Ministry on Lithuanian Call-Up Decision *[TASS]* 88
- Moves Against Military Society Criticized *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 15 Apr]* 89
- Article Urges Compromise on Lithuania *[Moscow International]* 90
- Reportage on Pro-Moscow Lithuanian CP Congress 90
  - Shved on Preparations *[TASS]* 90
  - Shved Interviewed *[Moscow Intervational]* 91
  - Committee Member Interviewed *[Moscow TV]* 91
- Landsbergis Adviser on West's 'Indifference' *[Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA 12 Apr]* 91
- Congress Urged To Respect Union's Internal Laws *[Moscow International]* 92
- Plane Hijacked to Vilnius, Hijacker Arrested *[Vilnius Radio]* 93
- Lithuanian Enterprise Signs Textile Protocol *[Vilnius Radio]* 93
- Shevardnadze on Introducing Confederate Relations *[Belgrade TANJUG]* 93
- UN Statement Says Lithuania 'Domestic Affair' *[TASS]* 93
- Belorussian Lithuanians Request Protection *[Moscow Radio]* 93
- Lithuanian Officials Said To Have Criminal Records *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 25 Mar]* 94
- Lithuanian Social Democrat Views Independence *[Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET 12 Apr]* . 94
- Estonian Premier Savisaar Interviewed *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 15]* 95
- More on Latvian Independent CP Congress *[PRAVDA 15 Apr]* 96
- Latvian CP Factions Prepare for Congress *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 1 Apr]* 96
- Latvians Report on Meeting With Gorbachev *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 23 Mar]* 98
- Latvian Independence Negotiators Listed *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 21 Mar]* 99
- Anti-Draft 'Incitement' in Latvia Deplored *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 13 Apr]* 99
- New Latvian KGB Chief Biographic Data *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 8 Mar]* 100
- Latvian Deputies Elected 18 March Listed *[SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA 23 Mar]* 100

RSFSR

Disputes Mark First Day of Moscow Soviet Session *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 17 Apr]* 106
First Round of RSFSR Elections Summarized *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 13 Mar]* 106
Khodyrev Elected Chairman of Gorkiy Oblast *[Moscow Radio]* 107
Chechen-Ingush People's Deputies Meet 30 Mar *[Moscow Radio]* 107
Buryat Oblast Party Committee Chairman Elected *[Moscow Radio]* 107
Stavropol People's Deputies Hold First Session *[TASS]* 107
Stavropol Kray Soviet Elects Leadership *[Moscow Radio]* 107
Volgograd Obkom Elects First Secretary *[Moscow Radio]* 108
Kemerovo Party Obkom Retains First Secretary *[Moscow Radio]* 108
Ufa Water Supply Contaminated With Phenol *[Moscow TV]* 108
Nalchik Ammonia Leak Kills 6; Investigation Begins *[Moscow Radio]* 109

Western Republics

Ivashko Meets With Ukraine KGB Officials *[Kiev Radio]* 109
Vote-Rigging Alleged in Donetsk *[Kiev International]* 109
Mironov Confirmed Donetsk Oblast Party Chief *[Moscow Radio]* 109
New Leader of Lvov Oblast Elected *[Moscow Radio]* 110
Lvov Party Plenum 'Far from Easy' *[Moscow TV]* 110
Kiev Party Committee, Democratic Platform Meet *[Kiev International]* 110
Ukrainian Communist Party Issues Resolutions 110
    On Interethnic Relations *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 24 Feb]* 110
    On Military Ties *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 24 Feb]* 111
Belorussian Bureau Discusses 'Democratic Platform' *[IZVESTIYA 8 Apr]* 111
Moldavian Interethnic Roundtable Ends in Accord *[IZVESTIYA 18 Apr]* 112

Caucasus

Armenian CP Economic Aktiv Meets 17 Apr *[Yerevan Radio]* 112
Baku City Party Committee Holds Plenum *[Baku Radio]* 112
Fugitive Azerbaijani Soldiers Return to Units *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 17 Apr]* 113
Tbilisi Commemoration Events Termed 'Ambiguous' *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 10 Apr]* 113
Gumbaridze Gives Plenum Speech on Renewing Party *[ZARYA VOSTOKA 6 Feb]* 114

Central Asia

Uzbekistan Cuts Off Supplies to USSR *[TASS]* 122

Perfilyev 17 Apr Briefing on World Issues

Upcoming Li Peng Visit

LD1704140290 Moscow TASS in English 1352 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The Soviet Union regards the forthcoming official visit to the USSR by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng as an important step in extending Soviet-Chinese dialogue, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here on Tuesday.

Li Peng will visit the USSR from April 23 to 26 at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Describing the Soviet-Chinese relations on the whole, Vadim Perfilyev said that "over the time that has passed since Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China, the diverse links between our countries have been marked by dynamism and an atmosphere of mutual understanidng, and develop in di different areas."

Mongolia Ties

LD1704143490 Moscow TASS in English 1409 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The Soviet Union positively assesses Mongolia's desire to develop normal relations, irrespective of ideological differences, with all interested countries, especially with neighbors in East Asia, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here today. Vadim Perfilyev was commenting on the recent statement by Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister Khoumbagiyn Olzvoy on the principles of his country's foreign policy.

Perfilyev said Olzvoy's statement was the final in a series of the Mongolian leadership's steps aimed at restructuring international relations on the principles of new political thinking. They include upholding the priority of national interests, ensuring the country's security by political and diplomatic means, promoting openness to the world community, and active participation in the non-aligned movement, the world and regional division of labor.

Having expressed satisfaction with the state of Soviet-Mongolian cooperation in the foreign policy sphere, Perfilyev voiced conviction that "reorienting Mongolian diplomacy to meeting the country's national interests and real needs will further strengthen the foundations of foreign policy interaction between the Soviet Union and Mongolia."

Israeli Settlement in Gaza

LD1704152890 Moscow TASS in English 1502 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The launching of preparatory work to establish an Israeli settlement in the north of the Gaza strip "provokes concern", Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev said at a briefing here today.

"This decision shows that some circles in Israel continue to deliberately raise obstacles to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, demonstrating disrespect for the rules of international law and world public opinion," he stressed.

The Soviet Union resolutely denounces the non-constructive stand taken by the Israeli leaders in Middle Eastern affairs and expresses confidence that provocative actions by Israeli authorities will provoke a similar appraisal throughout the world, the spokesman said.

Talks With India

LD1704153590 Moscow TASS in English 1519 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—Soviet-Indian consultations on the Asian-Pacific region, which recently ended in New Delhi, revealed similarity or proximity of the sides' views on the most important international problems, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vadim Perfilyev told a briefing here today.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev and Indian First Deputy Foreign Minister Shilendr Kumar Singh participated in the consultations.

During the consultations, Igor Rogachev was received by Indian Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral. The sides discussed a Cambodian settlement and the Afghanistan situation, Perfilyev said.

They also expressed readiness to develop good-neighbourly relations with China. Rogachev and Singh favoured a settlement of the Kashmir problem peacefully on the basis of the Simla Agreement.

Power Transfer in Nicaragua

LD1704162890 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The Soviet Union believes that despite difficulties in the course of the transfer of power in Nicaragua, this process will be completed within the established timeframe, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here today.

For this purpose, Vadim Perfilyev continued, there are good internal and external prerequisites, including the protocol on the transfer of presidential power, signed by represenatives of the coalition and the Sandinist Front, the Toncontin Agreement on disbanding the Contras, and the Montelimar declaration endorsed by Central American presidents. It is important, the spokesman stressed, that these documents are based on the desire of the overwhelming majority of Nicaraguans for peace, national reconciliation and accord, which they expressed during the elections.

"We hope that the will of the people will be implemented on the basis of a search for mutually acceptable compromises and the unconditional rejection by the sides of attempts to hamper the peaceful transfer of power," Perfilyev stressed.

Asked by TASS about the Soviet position on Daniel Ortega's statement on a possible delay in the official transfer of power in the country if the Contras are not disarmed by April 25, the spokesman said that "in our view, the transfer of power in Nicaragua will meet the established deadline and conform with the obligations undertaken by the sides under the relevant protocol."

He stressed the need for good will and a well-considered approach by all leading political forces of the country.

The situation that has arisen in recent days, the spokesman continued, has again highlighted the negative impact which the huge stocks of arms in the hands of various warring groups have on the internal political situation in Nicaragua and in most other Central American countries.

Awareness of this is also growing among the states of the region, whose leaders stated in Montelimar the need to speed up talks on security, observance, control and arms reductions in the region. It is not accidental that the protocol, signed by representatives of the opposition National Union and the Sandinist National Liberation Front, provides for reducing the armed forces to a level sufficient for ensuring the country's defence, and for fostering a situation when weapons will be held only by the professional army and law enforcement agencies.

TASS Summary

LD1704173990 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The Soviet Union regards the forthcoming official visit to the USSR by Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng as an important step in extending Sino-Soviet dialogue, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here on Tuesday.

Li Peng will visit the USSR from April 23 to 26 at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

Describing Sino-Soviet relations, Vadim Perfilyev said that "Over the time that has passed since Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to China, the diverse links between our countries have been marked by dynamism and an atmosphere of mutual understanding, and develop in different areas."

The Soviet Union believes that despite difficulties in the course of the transfer of power in Nicaragua, this process will be completed within the established timeframe, a Soviet spokesman told a briefing here today.

For this purpose, Perfilyev continued, there are good internal and external prerequisites, including the protocol on the transfer of presidential power, signed by representatives of the coalition and the Sandinista Front. The Toncontin agreement on disbanding the contras, and the Montelimar Declaration endorsed by Central American presidents. It is important, the spokesman stressed, that these documents are based on the desire of the overwhelming majority of Nicaraguans for peace, national reconciliation and accord, which they expressed during the elections.

"We hope that the will of the people will be implemented on the basis of a search for mutually acceptable compromises and the unconditional rejection by the sides of attempts to hamper the peaceful transfer of power," the spokesman stressed.

Perfilyev said that Vladimir Polyakov, member of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Collegium is now in Tunisia where he met Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) chief Yasir 'Arafat, and other Palestinian leaders.

These talks, Perfilyev pointed out, are connected with the development of the situation in the Middle East and the elaboration of prospects for joint actions of the Soviet Union and the PLO towards a Middle East settlement.

In answer to a journalist's question, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said that the Soviet Union's principled stand on the Taiwan question remains unchanged. Taiwan is an integral part of China, one of China's provinces, he emphasised.

The Soviet side does not allow actions leading to the creation of "two-Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" situations and refrains from any official contacts with Taiwan.

The spokesman described as "yet another invention" reports by the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation about an allegedly continued presence of Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan.

"There have not been and are no Soviet military advisors in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops," he stated.

The Soviet Union paid attention to the Urbi et Orbi message by Pope John Paul II, Perfilyev said. A number of ideas expressed in the mesage "are consonant with our notions of the development of human civilisation on the threshold of the 21st century," he said.

The spokesman voiced hope that the message by the pope will promote the assertion of the principles of justice, tolerance, nonviolence, and the consolidation on universal human principles of all believers.

Shevardnadze Interviewed on Germany, Presidency

PM1704163090 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 15, 10-16 Apr 90 pp 12-13

[Report on 2 April Moscow interview with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, by Aleksandr

Pumpyanskiy: "Presidential Council: A Safeguard of Democracy. The Foreign Minister's Unscheduled Interview"]

[Text] It has long been noticed in world affairs that mutual interests are usually materialized. The leaders of Time-Warner Inc. flew into Moscow on April 1 on their own plane, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was to leave for Washington on 3 April for talks with President Bush and Secretary of State Baker. Theoretically, a meeting between Eduard Shevardnadze and the Time-Warner leaders could take place on April 2, and it did take place, though no preliminary agreement had been made.

However, nothing happens of its own accord. A sponsor is needed for the success of an enterprise. Time-Warner Inc. found such a sponsor in Moscow. It was the magazine NEW TIMES. At a meeting with Eduard Shevardnadze we had a modest part—that of observers rather than participants in the talk. We listened to the minister and watched our colleagues from TIME. The interview with the Soviet foreign minister will appear in the next issue of that magazine.

The conversation began with the question about the agenda of Shevardnadze's coming talks in Washington and how Moscow assessed President Bush's stand on the Lithuanian question. The agenda includes the same questions as before, with priority to be given to disarmament, the foreign minister replied. There is a principled agreement to draw up and initial a treaty on a 50 per cent reduction of strategic armaments. Rather complex issues remain unsolved, Shevardnadze said. They will be discussed at my meeing with Baker and at another meeting with him in the beginning or middle of May. I hope we shall be able to achieve success at these meetings, the minister stressed. It will be a major breakthrough if we succeed.

The second question concerned the state of affairs at the Vienna talks. We shall discuss the matter in principle and shall be able to draw final conclusions after consultations with our allies, Eduard Shevardnadze said.

European affairs, including the German question, are another subject of our talks in Washington, the foreign minister said. And, certainly, he stressed, we are going to achieve progress in our bilateral affairs. He added that the situation in this respect was not bad.

As usual, Shevardnadze noted, we shall exchange information at these meetings. The president and the secretary of state have always shown interest in our country. And we are not indifferent to what is taking place in the United States either. This is so because domestic policy also determines the external image of a country.

It seemed to us that the American guests would like to hear more about Lithuania. President Bush, they argued, is under strong pressure to take a more aggressive stand. The TIME magazine wanted to know the Soviet reaction to the president's policy in the Lithuanian question.

"What are we counting on in the given situation?" We are counting on the wisdom of the Lithuanian people. I am sure that the people will finally decide how to live further. We are doing our best to avoid unpleasant things. We have always favoured a political solution, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, in relation to any people, to any nationality.

American guests told Eduard Shevardnadze that President Bush does not want the Lithuanian question to become a subject of discord between the Soviet Union and the United States. They asked what the minister thought about the president's line in this question.

"I wouldn't assess this line now", Shevardnadze said. "I am sure that the president is not interested in an aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union. I do not doubt that the president is interested in the success of perestroyka. The same can be said about the state secretary and all sensible politicians. It is real politics."

It is often said that "there is no alternative to perestroyka." Perhaps it is not an exact expression. There is an alternative. If perestroyka fails, a dictatorship can be installed.

It is now said in our country and abroad: "A strong hand is needed to restore order." This is associated with dictatorship. We are all interested in the success of perestroyka, democratization and renewal. It can be said without exaggeration that this will be in the interests of civilization as a whole. For this reason actions detrimental to perestroyka must not be encouraged. I think this is understood by the U.S. Administration.

On hearing the question about Germany and the Soviet Government's position on possible relations between a united Germany and NATO (the euphemism for Germany's possible entry into NATO), Eduard Shevardnadze smiled and said:

"I already noted at a press conference in Africa that we are a hospitable nation and invite a united Germany to join the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Why not? Perhaps it is not an orthodox decision. But is it bad? I was told that this does not suit the West. I think we must look for decisions that would suit everyone. Why can't a future Germany remain out of blocs? It is said that neutrality is not for Germany. Why? Austria is a neutral state in central Europe, a status acceptable to all. It is also possible to imagine some unexpected variant of Germany's responsibility before NATO and the WTO. There are variants. It is necessary to sit down and discuss them. I am convinced in one thing: A united Germany must feel that it is a full-fledged member of the European community, and it is necessary to find a solution that would secure a for a united Germany a worthy place in the European community. A united Germany must become a considerable factor of stability."

The last question was put to Eduard Shevardnadze as a member of the Presidential Council. The American guests wanted to learn about the functions of the new body, the division of labour between it and other bodies, such as the Political Bureau of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers.

"Presidential power, the presidential form of government in our country, is in the process of making," Shevardnadze explained. "It is in the process of differentiation of functions. The Political Bureau will be busy with purely political, party affairs and, as any other party, the CPSU will influence the course of events through its members, just as the Republican or the Democratic Party does in the United States. The government's functions are known to everyone. They have been defined in the Constitution. Presidential power does not limit the government's functions. The president is responsible for the general state of foreign and domestic policies and takes decisions on most important, cardinal questions. The members of the council act as advisers. It is an advisory body. Each member is responsible for his own field. As a member of the council, I am responsible for foreign policy in the first place.

"I have advocated presidential power since the very beginning of perestroyka," Eduard Shevardnadze stressed. "I was in the minority then, and today the general conclusion is that the presidency is a very necessary institution. The main task of the Presidential Council is to defend democracy. It needs to be protected. Everyone has realized this now."

The American guests did not conceal that a meeting with Shevardnadze was a great honour for them. As for us, we were interested in nuances. Jason McManus, editor-in-chief of Time-Warner Inc., noted the foreign minister's pronouncements on the Germany question. Henry Muller, managing editor of the TIME magazine, saw in these pronouncements the minister's straightforwardness and lack of desire to engage in artificial polemics, and such a quality as emancipated imagination. Henry Muller and Reginald Brack, president of TIME Inc. Magazines, described as unexpected Shevardnadze's judgements about the dictatorship and democracy and the future of perestroyka.

For our part, we would like to note that the small joint venture of the NEW TIMES and TIME magazines is bringing fruits.

Shevardnadze Discusses Summit, Li Peng Visit

PM1704191790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition pp 1,5

[A. Karpychev "First Hand" report: "Meeting the Minister at Smolensk Square"]

[Text] Sitting on the seventh floor of a tall building in Smolensk Square and listening to Soviet Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze, I remembered the not-so-distant years when thunder and lightning would rain down on newspaper editorial offices from this floor if journalists dared to edit the dull texts prepared here or to change their boring headlines. Today the situation has changed, the minister and his aides meet with journalists like good old friends whose work they respect.

It seems that meetings with the minister are becoming a constant and effective event. This is a good thing. The Foreign Ministry is an inexhaustible source of information, and the more often we are welcomed at the foreign policy department, the more open its activities will be.

It is slightly more than a month since the last meeting. The minister has been to Africa and then to Washington for talks with Baker—so he has been out of Moscow for around 20 days. The meeting started with the Washington trip.

"The discussion in Washington was useful," "the talks with President Bush covered the whole range of problems"—the assessments were optimistic. The minister talked about the immense importance of the "summit" due in six weeks' time, and about the continuation of the Malta line.

What impressions had he gleaned from his Africa trip? "We need to thoroughly restructure our relations with the 'Third World,'" E.A. Shevardnadze noted. "We must learn the art of cooperation with developing countries." He was referring to cooperation in the sphere of economics, as well as in the scientific sphere. The countries the minister visited often train specialists at the best Western universities. But after their training the youngsters do not return home. The brain drain costs millions of dollars. It is more advantageous to cooperate with our country in this area—all the more so as our scientific achievements are considerable.

In Africa there were many talks with politicians. "They are very interesting people," the minister said. "They have their own view of things, their own philosophy, and their own appreciation of problems—and we cannot fail to take account of this."

My question for E.A. Shevardnadze concerned the forthcoming visit to the USSR by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council.

"The visit is of fundamental importance," the minister replied. "I consider the normalization of relations with the PRC to be an enormous asset. As you know, this was promoted by M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. We are now putting accords into practice. I would highlight two or three aspects in this area. The first is economic cooperation between our countries. We cannot fail to be interested in China's experience in the economy. Cooperation could open up unlimited opportunities. The second aspect is to finally overcome military confrontation. Confrontation has cost both countries dear. I believe these problems will occupy an important place in the Sino-Soviet talks. We will also be discussing the state of affairs in the world and the Asia-Pacific region. It is planned to sign a number of agreements."

...Both previous summits and this summit have discussed events in the countries of East Europe. Can they be called allies today? I asked the minister this question, since our readers are asking about it.

"All the commitments made by them remain in force. Not least with regard to the Warsaw Pact. Today we are striving to base our relations on a new footing, including trust. It is in the light of that trust that we view the transfer of documents on Katyn to the Polish side. The Foreign Ministry too has done a great deal of work in this area. As far as we are aware the handover of the Katyn documents has been greeted with approval in Poland."

...The discussion was over. That same evening I heard a report on it on the radio. The recording was impassive and I was sorry that it concealed a very good feature of the discussion—its "trusting" nature. All the more so as the minister's aides confirmed as we parted that the same trust is used in dealings with them.

Petrovskiy Cites Lessons To Be Learned From UN

90UF0073A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 15, 14-20 Apr 90 p 4

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister V. Petrovskiy, by correspondent D. Makarov; date and place not specified: "Experience of the World Intellect"]

[Text] [Petrovskiy] Our approach to the United Nations and international organizations as a whole has changed appreciably. Today we proceed from the fact that the United Nations and its system of specialized institutions is not a propaganda machine, as we believed earlier, but a multilateral forum of interaction and cooperation created by the collective efforts of all states. A kind of pivot around which the work of the entire organization is built is its charter, which has imbibed the principles of states' civilized behavior and dealings.

[Makarov] We published in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 3 a table that compared various countries in terms of distribution of GNP per capita and in terms of personal consumption. It was ascertained that in 1985 our country was in 68th and 77th position respectively. The situation has deteriorated even more since then. The USSR economy is in a state of most profound crisis. So could we solicit emergency financial assistance from specialized UN institutions?

[Petrovskiy] I believe that such a formulation of the issue is simply wrong. First of all, according to the UN classification we pertain to the group of developed countries of the world, while assistance programs are oriented primarily toward underdeveloped countries. And is it realistic that anyone other than ourselves could feed 300,000 persons and provide them with shoes and clothing? Our economic potential must help us solve our problems ourselves. In addition, we have considerable achievements in many fields of science and technology. Merely a fundamental reorganization of the system is needed for all this to begin to work properly.

And it is here that the United Nations could prove highly useful. We could, for example, join international economic organizations of which we have not been members. The USSR Foreign Ministry is currently working at the practical level on affiliating our country to the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT.

[Makarov] Does it mean that, having joined the international economic organizations you have listed and with their assistance become part of the world market, we could quickly extricate our economy from its lamentable state?

[Petrovskiy] Although membership of GATT, the IMF, and the World Bank should have a positive impact on our economy, this alone will not solve our economic problems. We will only be able to fully become a part of the world economy when we have restored free market relations within the country and have made our ruble a freely convertible currency. And this will be only a start. Applying international standards automatically in our country in the meantime would simply be unrealistic. We must do this gradually, participating increasingly actively also in such organizations as the UN Economic Commission for Europe and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; the appropriate Soviet republics could be incorporated in the orbit of their activity.

[Makarov] However, the majority of our republics, except the Ukraine and Belorussia, are not represented in the United Nations individually. We should, perhaps, for a start request for each of them the right of individual representation in this organization?

[Petrovskiy] The question of the participation of the USSR and the union republics was studied very closely at the time the United Nations was created. During the war, when the process of its formation was under way, the Soviet Government raised precisely this question. In response the U.S. Government brought up the matter of the individual representation in the United Nations of all the states. As a compromise, we proposed that the Soviet republics which had been the first to suffer from German aggression—the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania—be represented in the United Nations. But ultimately agreement was reached at the Yalta Conference in 1945 merely on the two republics.

The question of representation of all our republics in the United Nations would require changes to the UN Charter. Currently, practically all states are unanimous that the UN Charter should not be touched. They are apprehensive about the convening of a general conference to revise the UN Charter and about this opening a Pandora's Box, when other countries might wish for other changes in the charter, as a result of which the United Nations could disintegrate.

[Makarov] How, incidentally, are financial relations between the USSR and the United Nations currently organized? In the past the Western press would from time to time write about some Soviet debt to this organization.

[Petrovskiy] Our contribution to the United Nations is divided into two parts, as it were. The regular contribution to its annual budget constitutes approximately $80 billion or 11.5 percent of its budget. For comparison I should say that the United States pays 25 percent. We have always paid this part of the contribution regularly.

The second part is composed of the contribution for the upkeep of UN forces for special operations. These forces have in the past by decisions of the organization been dispatched to various parts of the world, and are currently operating in Cyprus, the Near East, and Namibia.

We have pursued a dual policy in respect of these forces.

On the one hand we did not object to their formation, voting neither for nor against, but subsequently declared that the UN forces were formed illegally and that for this reason we would refuse to pay for their upkeep. As a result we ran up a debt in past years of the order of $125 million, the bulk of which ($72 million) we have since 1987 paid off in installments.

[Makarov] Our readers frequently ask in this connection: Could UN forces not be used to settle our interethnic conflicts, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, for example?

[Petrovskiy] The United Nations is an interstate organization and, according to its charter, may not interfere in the internal conflicts of individual countries. However, the methodology by which the United Nations contributes to the solution of interstate conflicts could be taken into consideration in our country also.

[Makarov] How efficiently is our country making use of the experience accumulated in the United Nations and its specialized institutions?

[Petrovskiy] This is, perhaps, the main question of our discussion. Now, when the question of the USSR's integration in the world economic order and the creation of a democratic state based on the rule of law has been squarely posed, one has the impression that many of our politicians and economists are totally unfamiliar with the experience accumulated by the international community. This experience does not belong to any one specific country, but is a kind of quintessence of world intellect and the best that it has accumulated. It needs to be used, of course, with regard for the specifics of each country individually.

A code of behavior of officials at times of social unrest has been drawn up, for example. Have we heard about this in our republic and local authorities? In a word, there are for each of life's contingencies general recommendations which should facilitate the search for and finding of the correct solutions.

[Makarov] Blame for the lack of information concerning UN activity surely lies primarily with your ministry?

[Petrovskiy] You are probably right. As of this year the USSR Foreign Ministry plans each year to present a report on the work of the Soviet delegation in the United Nations to the Supreme Soviet and to distribute the most important documents of the United Nations and specialized bodies to the appropriate committees and commissions.

The activity of the Soviet UN Assistance Association, a public organization of which there have long been counterparts in many countries and which, I believe, will help disseminate the necessary information among those interested, is currently being reorganized.

USSR To Become Member of Interpol

PM1704193190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "USSR Will Become Interpol Member"]

[Text] An official government decision has been made on our country joining the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol).

As PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK No. 16 reported, the resolution adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers opens up the way to arrange our country's membership of that organization. The USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] has been given all the powers to proceed. The resolution envisages the creation within the ministry of an Interpol National Central Bureau in the USSR. The MVD is to submit proposals on sending certain bureau staffers to Interpol Headquarters in the French city of Lyons. They will work at the Interpol Secretariat General. IZVESTIYA will publish details on the USSR's entry into Interpol in the near future.

Europeans Adopt Economic Cooperation Codex

PM1804092190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[IZVESTIYA own correspondent Ye. Bovkun Bonn dispatch: "Europe's Economic Codex"]

[Text] A conference on economic cooperation in Europe was at work in Bonn for three weeks. Economists from the CSCE member countries working in the practical sphere exchanged experience and determined priorities and they were joined in so doing at the concluding stage by politicians and government officials.

Not everything went smoothly. At times regional problems assumed more prominence than all-European ones. Poland and Hungary demanded, for instance, special pledges that aid would be given to debtor countries. Malta and Yugoslavia attached chief importance to pledges regarding the developing countries. The United States insisted on the inclusion in the final document of its own catalog of principles of economic cooperation on the basis of private ownership. Argument frequently became bogged down in questions of style. What should one write: "market economy" or "market oriented economy," "the publication" of balance of payments "data," or "information regarding" balance of payments data?

The draft document submitted by the delegations of the neutral countries and approved by all back on Monday was edited into its final form only on the last day of the conference's work. The wording "respect for all forms of ownership, including private ownership" was the most vivid example of compromise. It enshrined the readiness of the participants to respect the distinctive features of other countries' social development in the interests of all-European economic integration and the development of cooperation.

The delegates confirmed their intention to shape a new order of peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe based on the comprehensive and balanced concept of the Helsinki Final Act, recognizing that democratic institutions and economic freedom drive social progress. In the participants' opinion, the process of economic reforms and structural perestroyka—with broader reliance on market forces—will increase the return from the economy and boost the efficiency of the state sector, thereby promoting the establishment of a more open world trading system. The document reflects in detail the interconnection between political pluralism and the market economy.

It has been decided to create favorable conditions for the harmonious development and diversification of economic relations based on internationally agreed norms and practice, to improve the terms of deals and the material base for the cooperation of firms on the basis of the freedom to create enterprises, and to encourage contracts at all levels of trade, industrial production, and consumption.

The participating states pledged to exchange comparable and timely economic, commercial, and demographic information and the results of economic research, and to establish cooperation between statistical services. They also agreed to encourage cooperation between small and medium enterprises and to stimulate trade development measures, including advertising, consultation, and the organization of seminars and exhibitions.

In the sphere of industrial cooperation priorities have been determined for the protection of the rights of industrial commercial and intellectual property [punctuation as published], the improvement of financial intruments, and the free movement of capital and profits.

The document defines the basic directions of cooperation in certain specific spheres including energy- and resource-saving technologies, the ecology, and the conversion of military production.

A most important component of the economic reforms and an essential step toward the attainment of currency convertibility is deemed to be the introduction of undistorted prices on the domestic market. The participant states agreed that capital from private sources will gradually become the main source of external finance.

The Bonn meeting's final document reflected the change in the character of East-West relations but also, at the same time, the shaping of new notions of security.

Helsinki "baskets" one and three (security and human rights) were formerly of overwhelming significance and used to influence economic ties. Now, in the opinioin of FRG President R. von Weizsaecker, the role of "feedback" is increasing: The broader economic cooperation is, and the more dependent on each other Europeans become, so the guarantees of a peaceful future become all the more reliable.

"Europe now has a chance to overcome the split in the economic sphere too and to move stage by stage toward the creation of the kind of economic system that would rely on the sociopolitical convictions of a socially and ecologically oriented market economy," said President R. von Weizsaecker when addressing the closing of the conference.

"Observation of the course of discussions has led me to the conviction that the final document is not a compromise for the attainment of which each of the participants had to sacrifice something, but is rather a synthesis of their interests."

"Is that so?" I asked E. Ye. Obminskiy, leader of the Soviet delegation and USSR deputy foreign minister.

"The results of the conference," E. Ye. Obminskiy said, "can be assessed from the viewpoint both of economic policy and also economic practicalities. In the first case the final document assumes fundamental significance. Indeed, it is no so much a compromise formula as a well weighed aggregate of propositions as to how to put pan-human tasks into practice which, on the philosophical plane, have already acquired a general thrust in the context of the CSCE process.

"Helsinki 'basket' two remained for a long time as a repository for individual problems which it seemed impossible to compare. It used to be easy for the Soviet participants in trade and economic cooperation with the West to say what they wanted to get rid of, but at the same time more difficult to define what kind of route to take so as to progress further. There was a shortage of daring in taking independent decisions. Although they were partners, the Europeans remained disunited.

"The final document creates the preconditions for the development of completely new relationships which are not limited to buying and selling and which take account of the process of our political system's democratization.

"The significance of the final document for our country lies primarily in the fact that we have adopted the general 'rules of the game' and this gives us the opportunity to become part and parcel of the world economy rather than just being in contact with it through the narrow corridors of trade operations.

"By signing the document (let me mention in passing that many of our ideas were taken into consideration), we have pledged to move in the direction of the market. It is also important that the document does not simply enshrine an attitude to the market economy, but also defines specific opportunities for cooperation under the conditions of the market economy."

[Bovkun] "Will Europe's new economic codex exert an influence on the development of economic relations in our country?"

[Obminskiy] "I think that the adoption of such an important document which is of pan-European significance, will spur on and accelerate the reform process.

"If one bears in mind the introduction to market principles then the success of the reforms will, it seems to me, depend to a great extent on something that we have to understand: It is not so much the state that bears responsibility for our well-being as we ourselves."

Belgian Bid for Change Causes NATO 'Irritation'

PM1804085790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[B. Moskvichev dispatch: "Belgium: NATO's 'Unruly Child'"]

[Text] Brussels—For the last few years Belgium has been getting itself a reputation as NATO's "unruly child." Suffice it to recall the Belgian Government's reserved—to put it mildly—stance with regard to the siting of U.S. intermediate-range missiles on the territories of European bloc members. Belgian National Defense Minister Guy Coeme's statement regarding plans to cut the country's military spending and withdraw Belgian troop units deployed in the FRG did not go unnoticed either.

NATO circles reacted pathologically to the Belgian initiatives. But Belgium's stance remains unchanged. The decision to withdraw Belgian units from the FRG has already begun to be put into effect. On Sunday 1 April LA LIBRE BELGIQUE announced that some subunits had arrived in Belgium from West Germany.

But the day before the Easter holiday National Defense Minister Guy Coeme once again, to use LE SOIR's graphic expression, "put the cat among the Atlantic alliance pigeons." In a letter addressed to NATO Secretary General M. Woerner, he said that the time has come to review the alliance's nuclear strategy. Not wishing his colleagues to accuse him of taking them by surprise—as happened in October 1988 in a suburb of The Hague when he unexpectedly opposed the modernization of NATO's "Lance" missiles—Guy Coeme sent his message in advance of the impending NATO Nuclear Planning Group session scheduled for 9-10 May in Canada.

The Belgian Government's stance consists in a proposal to review NATO's "flexible response" strategy, deeming it untenable in the current situation, following the changes in East Europe, to use nuclear artillery and shorter-range missiles in the future since they could only hit the territory of friendly countries.

Guy Coeme's letter caused irritation within the NATO Secretariat. People there said frankly that the North Atlantic alliance is not ready to abandon the "flexible response" strategy, based on the use of nuclear weapons, for possible alternative doctrines. There can only be some easing in the current doctrine, nothing more.

As for NATO Secretary General M. Woerner himself, he has refused to comment on this document altogether. In turn a spokesman for NATO headquarters has accused Guy Coeme of leaking information, stressing that it is not usual to divulge the elements of a discussion at such an early stage. The Belgian minister has also been reproached for publishing the letter before acquainting M. Woerner with it.

In the current situation it is amazing that the Belgian minister's proposal has provoked such an irritable reaction at bloc headquarters, when in principle it by no means undermines the foundations of NATO but merely calls for the question of a possible amendment of the doctrines that took shape during the cold war period to be discussed.

United States & Canada

Cheney Interview on Strategic Arms Talks Cited

PM1704200590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Secretary Opposed"]

[Text] New York, 17 Apr—U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney has spoken out against the inclusion of the question of sea-launched missiles on the agenda for the next round of Soviet-U.S. strategic arms reduction talks. In an interview published in THE NEW YORK TIMES the head of the U.S. military department stressed that the George Bush administration will insist on limiting only land-based ICBM's.

According to information reaching the press, the plan proposed by the administration envisages banning the siting of land-based mobile MIRVed missile launchers [ustanovki]. "This step could be taken within the framework of a strategic arms treaty," THE NEW YORK TIMES points out. "The second step would be to finally eliminate all land-based MIRVed missiles within the framework of a second strategic arms reduction treaty, talks on which will start once the first treaty has been concluded."

Observers are pointing out that this plan will contain a clear unilateral advantage for the United States, whose nuclear missile potential is predominantly sited aboard submarines and on strategic bombers equipped with long-range cruise missiles. "That is why, certain critics are stating, the Bush administration's proposal looks too one-sided and will probably not be attractive to Moscow," the newspaper stresses.

"Certain Democrats in the Senate are trying to show that the United States should state to Moscow its readiness to reduce missiles sited aboard submarines and bombers along with land-based missiles within the framework of the next phase of arms reduction," the newspaper notes. "President Bush's proposal to ban land-based MIRVed missiles is a step in the right direction," THE NEW YORK TIMES states, quoting the opinion of J. Biden, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs. "But we should go further and strive for reductions across the whole spectrum not only with a view to making the proposal more attractive to Moscow but also because we simply don't need so many strategic arms. We also should not move the arms race into the sphere of air- and sea-launched systems."

U.S. Position on Tactical Nuclear Arms Unchanged

LD1704082290 Moscow TASS in English 0720 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 17 TASS—The United States Administration has not changed its position on the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in Western Europe, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater told a briefing here on Monday.

Answering journalists' questions, he said that the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons was discussed at a meeting between U.S. President George Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on the Bermuda Islands. No new statements about or reassessments of policy were made, Fitzwater said.

Assessing the U.S. position on Lance nuclear tactical missiles, Fitzwater said that it remains true to NATO'S decision—the U.S. favours the modernization.

Asked about the possibility of initiating an agreement on strategic offensive weapons at the Soviet-U.S. summit, Fitzwater said that the U.S. hopes that President Gorbachev favors progress at negotiations on strategic offensive weapons and that existing problems can be resolved.

Mitchell Cited on Gorbachev Meeting, Lithuania

LD1804014490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0037 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Washington, 18 Apr (TASS)—George Mitchell, the Democratic majority leader in the Senate, having completed a journey to the USSR recently, today met President Bush in the White House and informed him of the results of this journey. During a brief meeting with journalists, Senator Mitchell remarked that the meeting with the President had been "interesting and productive." "We began the meeting with a report on our journey and talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders," he noted. "We also discussed the circumstances related to these talks." "We informed the President," the leader of the Senate Democratic majority indicated further, "that Mikhail Gorbachev requested that President Bush be given his best wishes and his anticipation of the meeting with him."

G. Mitchell further pointed out that during the talk "the Lithuanian situation was discussed," and also "events which have taken place since my meeting with Gorbachev." Answering a question on what actions could be taken by the United States in the present circumstances, Senator Mitchell noted that the President "has a broad spectrum of possibilities at his disposal." For their part, the senators had recommended that the administration "work out a stance on the issue of what appropriate measures can be taken in response to further events in the Soviet-Lithuanian situation." "We did not give specific recommendations," he stated. "There are several issues on which talks between the United States and the USSR are proceeding. They concern agreements on taxes, on investments, on the environment, and a number of others. It behooves the administration to examine the situation at these talks and to bring forth a judgement on what actions it does or does not wish to take with regard to these issues, depending on how the situation develops." In response to one journalist's question on "the possibility of U.S. aid to Lithuania," Mitchell replied: "This question was not a subject of discussions with the President." "Was this question not brought up at all?", insisted the journalist. "No," Mitchell replied categorically.

More on Primakov Meeting With Senator Mitchell

PM1704091390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Conversation With Senators"]

[Text] Ye.M. Primakov, member of the Presidential Council, received the U.S. Senate delegation headed by Senator G. Mitchell 13 April.

During a thorough and frank exchange of opinions the state of Soviet-U.S. relations in various spheres and a number of international problems of mutual interest were discussed.

Ye.M. Primakov briefed the guests on progress in implementing reforms in the economic and political spheres in the USSR and specific features of the current stage in Soviet society's development.

Members of the delegation expressed their gratitude for the opportunity to deepen their knowledge of the perestroyka processes and stressed that the questions connected with the establishment of new organs of state power and changes in the Soviet Union are attracting great interest in the United States.

Bermuda Meeting Seen as 'Important' for Thatcher

PM1704154190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Dispatch by Aleksandr Lyutyy under the rubric "Correspondent Comments": "Bermuda Meeting: View From London"]

[Text] London, 15 Apr—Hamilton (Bermuda Islands) was the venue for a meeting between British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. President George Bush. Although it was not an extraordinary meeting and was held within the framework of the regular consultations among the Western countries in connection with the changing situation in Europe, there was extraordinary interest in the talks both in Britain and in the United States.

The point is that recently both the press and political observers have increasingly often begun to speak of a cooling in the traditional close "special relationship" between London and Washington. While President Reagan did not conceal his sympathies with Thatcher and shared her political and economic philosophy, Bush has begun to pay much more attention to relations with the other West European countries—above all France and the FRG—since he realizes that they now play a key role in the process of West European integration. Moreover, Thatcher's domestic problems, the record low popularity of the head of the cabinet among her compatriots, have caused feelings of uncertainty in Washington regarding the fate of the present British Government.

How will the "special relationship" look after the meeting in Hamilton? Will it vanish into the mysterious "Bermuda Triangle"? Those were the kind of questions that the press here was asking ahead of the meeting.

The two leaders' press conference at the end of the talks and what spokesmen for the White House and Downing Street disclosed about their content prompted a sigh of relief among supporters of preserving the "special relationship." Publicly at least, its immutability was confirmed. Bush declared: "The friendship between the United States and Britain is such that it does not even need to be described in words." Thatcher summed up: "We discussed essentially everything, and I think we reached consensus on practically all issues."

Indeed, both leaders showed mutual restraint in assessing recent events in the USSR and primarily in Lithuania, expressing the wish that the problems be solved through dialogue. Bush supported the British premier's ideas concerning the strengthening of the Helsinki process and described them as "promising."

The participants in the talks were also united in the opinion of the need to preserve the NATO bloc and to make a united Germany a full member of it. The results of the discussion of the question of nuclear arms on German soil are rather less clear. It is well known that Bush views with some understanding the position of West German Chancellor Kohl, who, given the intensifying antinuclear sentiments in his country, is inclined toward the maximum reduction or even elimination of short-range missiles. Taking this point into account, Thatcher, it was learned, privately assured Bush that she is no longer pressing for the modernization of the "Lance" nuclear missiles stationed on German territory. At the same time she expressed the conviction that Europe will continue to need a "combination of conventional and nuclear arms." But the question of the quantitative parameters of both the former and the latter must be resolved by the NATO countries according to the outcome of the Vienna talks on conventional arms.

In this way, observers stress, Thatcher sought to appear before Bush as a flexible figure capable of reconsidering her stance. All the indications are that this did not pass unnoticed on the U.S. side.

Thus everything was done in Hamilton to stress the close nature of the dialogue between Britain and the United States. Time will tell whether Bermuda is going to become the venue for regular consultations between the U.S. and British leaders, as it was for many years until the early seventies. It will also settle the issue of the "special relationship" as a whole. But at the present stage I think that the expression of mutual support and solidarity was far more important for Thatcher than it was for Bush. In saying to the U.S. President "I have never felt better," Margaret Thatcher was essentially addressing her critics at home, intimating that it is too soon to write her off either as an authoritative international figure or as an effective leader of Britain.

Bush Adviser Boskin Examines USSR Reforms

PM1704160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Ivanko report: "Avoiding Mistakes"]

[Text] Michael Boskin, chairman of the U.S. President's Economic Council, has been a guest of Moscow for a few days. He had talks with Academicians L. Abalkin, O. Bogomolov, S. Shatalin, and other eminent economists and department leaders. Before leaving, M. Boskin met with a small group of Soviet journalists and answered their questions.

"The main aim of my visit is to explain what the real potential is for developing technical cooperation in the economic, financial, and commercial spheres. I have tried to understand your priorities on these matters in the context of Soviet-U.S. relations and the forthcoming summit."

How could the United States provide active assistance to us right now? Boskin stated that this applies first and foremost to improving the activity of statistical organs, preparing agreements on trade and investment, and granting the Soviet Union most-favored-nation status. In M. Boskin's words, however, this last point depends on the adoption of the law on entry to and exit from the country. Only then could the Jackson-Vanik Amendment—which links economic cooperation between our countries with the situation with regard to emigration from the USSR—be repealed. The council chairman was informed that the law on entry to and exit from the country will most likely be adopted by the Supreme Soviet in May.

The journalists were interested in the guest's view of the changes in the East European countries and the prospects for integrating their economies into the general European economy.

[Boskin] Most Americans are positive about the idea of creating a common European home. I think that the integration process will be least painful in East Germany if it is united with West Germany. That way it will immediately become an EEC member. The other East European countries are too far behind West European countries in their development. That is why it is too early to talk about their integration.

[Question] Mr. Boskin, how do you view the prospects for the USSR's joining GATT, and what is your attitude to the existing Cocom [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls] restrictions?

[Boskin] President Bush has repeatedly stressed that he supports the USSR's being granted observer status within GATT. This matter is currently under active discussion. As for the Cocom restrictions, they exist in spheres where U.S. national security interests are involved. In our country these restrictions are considered entirely justifiable, since, after all, we are still aiming missiles at each other. Whether we need to review the list of products whose export is restricted, periodically updating it by reducing the number of such items, is another matter.

[Question] What advice will you give the President on your return to the United States?

[Boskin] I'll tell him about my meetings and about the impressions your economic advisers made on me—they really are looking for ways to switch to a market economy. This is a complex process... On certain questions, including the preparation of antimonopoly legislation, we can help you to avoid our mistakes.

Progress Toward Trade Accord With U.S. Viewed

PM1804091990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[A. Shabashkevich report on interview with Yu.N. Chumakov, USSR deputy minister of foreign economic relations, under the rubric "From Competent Sources": "Presidents Will Put the Finishing Touches"]

[Text] The fourth round of talks to prepare the text of a trade agreement between the United States and the USSR is to be held in late April. The agreement is to be signed during the upcoming meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush.

It is presumed that as a result the USSR will be granted most-favored-nation status in trade. This will mean that U.S. tariffs drop to the same level as in relations with other trade partners. Today duties on some Soviet goods are several times higher than this level.

Yu.N. Chumakov, USSR deputy minister of foreign economic relations, comments on the situation:

Three rounds of talks have been held at the level of experts from the two countries. As a result the general structure of the document has been elaborated. Over half the provisions have been agreed, and this has taken a comparatively short time when you consider that government consultations were required on certain problems.

Of course, there are also rather complex points. Above all, there is the difference between principles of price formation and currency exchange. Or the problem of protecting rights to intellectual property, which arises also in trade.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all the difference between approaches, there is a conviction of the sides' mutual interest. A basis is being created for long-term mutually advantageous economic cooperation. Moreover, the terms of the agreement will increase U.S. firms' competitiveness on the Soviet market. The U.S. Government will be able to support businessmen by relaxing export controls and credit policy.

Science, Technology Delegation Visits Washington

LD1704014190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1827 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] Washington, 17 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondnet Vladimir Matyash reports: A delegation of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology, headed by N.P. Laverov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, is in the United States at the invitation of the U.S. Government. It consists of eminent Soviet scientists and specialists in various spheres of science and technology.

The Soviet delegation will take part in the work of the conference to open on Tuesday in Washington on scientific and economic studies related to global changes, and also in the first session of the joint Soviet U.S. commission on cooperation in fundamental scientific studies. Meetings will also be held at the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, the National Scientific fund, NASA, the Department of Geology, and at the Environmental Protection Agency.

Within the framework of the visit, the delegation made a trip to New Orleans and St. Louis, where they had talks with the machine tool building firm "McDermott," as well as with the heads of the "Monsanto" company, a major U.S. company, involved in fundamental research in biotechnology.

"The meetings between the leaders of the United States and the USSR, which have become regular, have imparted a new political impulse to the further development of U.S.-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation," Richard Mahoney, chairman of the board of directors of the "Monsanto" company, told the TASS correspondent in an interview. "The present stage in Soviet-U.S. cooperation is marked by a move beyond the framework of purely bilateral interests; inherent in it is an increasing focus on resolving global, universal tasks. This corresponds both to the national interests of the two countries, which are sincerely interested in expanding scientific and technical ties, as well as corresponding to the interests of the world community."

USSR-U.S. Narcological Center Opens in Moscow

LD1604223690 Moscow TASS In English 2146 GMT 16 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—A Soviet American training and information exchange narcological centre is now operating in Moscow. The centre's tasks include training Soviet specialists in methods of prevention and treatment of drug addiction and rehabilitation of patients developed and used in the United States and other countries, Moscow's chief narcologist Eduard Drozdov told TASS.

Drozdov, who is also president of the foundation "No to Alcoholism and Drug Addiction" told TASS that the centre plans to encourage exchanges of specialists, information, equipment and technologies in the field of narcology with the Pacific Research and Assessment Institute.

The first specialist exchanges have shown how great is the interest in the Soviet Union in American methods of treating people suffering from narcological afflictions, said Director of the International Health Institute Programme Andrey Danilenko.

After the first steps were taken in this direction, an idea arose to create a coordinating centre to handle exchanges. The idea was received with understanding and support at the U.S. Pacific Institute.

At present an American instructor in group therapy works on a permanent basis at the 17th narcological clinic. He also conducts sessions with Alcoholics Anonymous at the clinic and elsewhere.

Experts in the rosen-method have been to the Soviet Union four times to teach a crash two-week course in the application of the method.

The question is now being contemplated of establishing a treatment centre based on the American model in the Soviet Union—this model allows considerable cuts in the staff—it requires a few nurses, all the other functions are performed by convalescent alcoholics.

After the model is tested in Moscow, the experience will be transferred to other regions of the Soviet Union, Danilenko said.

China

Reportage on Upcoming Visit of Premier Li Peng

'Fundamental Importance' Cited

LD1804085190 Moscow TASS in English 0834 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—"The forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union of China's Premier Li Peng is of fundamental importance," Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said in an interview with PRAVDA, published in the newspaper today.

He highly assessed the normalization of relations with China, conduced by President Gorbachev's visit to Beijing. Shevardnadze stressed that the achieved agreements were being implemented.

The Soviet foreign minister noted that the Soviet side was definitely interested in China's experience in economy and that economic cooperation between the two countries could open up unlimited prospects.

"The second aspect," Shevardnadze said, "is that military confrontation has been fully overcome. Both states paid heavily for it. I believe the mentioned problems will be on the agenda of the Chinese-Soviet talks. We shall also discuss world affairs and the situation in the Asian-Pacific region. It is planned to sign several agreements."

Normalized Relations Viewed

OW1804022090 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] At a press briefing in Moscow on Monday, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze touched on the question of Chinese Premier Li Peng's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union, in addition to other issues. Shevardnadze said: The Soviet-Chinese summit in Beijing last spring normalized the relations between the two countries. I consider the normalization of relations with the PRC the greatest achievement in restructuring our country's international relations. At present, we are taking concrete steps to put into practice the accords reached with regard to the relations between our two countries.

Shevardnadze concluded: I believe that specific topics will be economic development, cooperation in science and technology, and removal of military confrontation. Much has been done in these respects. Solutions to world problems (shi jie wen ti) and issues of mutual concern in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole will also be discussed.

Expansion of Friendly Ties

OW1804103490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Li Peng, premier of the Chinese State Council, will begin his official visit to the Soviet Union on 23 April. Our station commentator Nikolayev writes:

During a recent meeting in Beijing with a delegation of Soviet journalists, the head of the Chinese Government stressed that China wishes to expand its relations of friendship and good neighborliness with the Soviet Union. Li Peng said: These relations have great significance in maintaining peace and development in the Far East and the world. The peoples of our two countries should get along peacefully and amiably.

It is also the wish of the Soviet people to get along peacefully and amiably with China. I am not mistaken when I say that all the conditions for this are present. The Soviet-Chinese summit in May last year marked an end to the unpleasant past in our relations. Using the words of the Chinese people, it signified an end to the past and the opening of the future.

In a press conference on 16 April, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated that the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations is the most important achievement in the restructuring of international relations. Behind these words, I see the nonideological nature of Soviet-Chinese relations. Historic experience and present realities tell people that relations between the Soviet Union and China will be built more solidly and reliably upon the basis of the mutually recognized principle of peaceful coexistence. This is a precondition for avoiding all kinds of misunderstandings and abnormal incidents in the future.

Li Peng, premier of the Chinese State Council, also spoke very clearly about this. He noted: Even if the Soviet people were to no longer consider socialism ideal for the Soviet Union, we would still maintain normal state relations with your country on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

We have not abandoned socialism. Like the People's Republic of China, which will not discard socialism, our two countries are embarking on a similar mission of consolidating and reforming socialism, and improving it in order to meet the demands of our time.

The Soviet Union and China have different timetables, but this should not be an obstacle for expanding the relations of good neighborliness and cooperation. In our bilateral contacts, we are fulfilling the agreement reached during the summit last May.

In his press conference, the Soviet foreign minister said: In general, this will help to expand economic and technological cooperation, overcome military antagonism, and resolve border problems, and will lead to the possibility of discussion on mutual cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region and the world. Soviet-Chinese meetings are the correct path towards better understanding of each other's experiences and views on international issues of mutual interest.

The visit to Moscow by the head of the Chinese Government will advance the development of Soviet-Chinese relations—about this there is no doubt.

PRC Parliament Emphasizes Stability

PM1104153090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[PRAVDA political observer Vsevolod Ovchinnikov article: "Beijing: Emphasis on Stability"]

[Text] The annual session of the National People's Congress [NPC] has taken place in Beijing. This was the third time that the deputies of the present convocation of parliament had met in the capital, and the first since the dramatic events in Tiananmen Square. The student disturbances that rocked China last spring reflected social tension that became acute as the second decade of reforms began. Unprecedentedly rapid price rises hit city dwellers with fixed incomes hard and made such by-products of the transition to a mixed economy as the increase in corruption, speculation, and abuses of official positions particularly intolerable. The fact that political reforms lag behind economic reforms became clear.

At first the student demonstrations' demands were justified: stop the degeneration of the party and state apparatus, remember the people's education, which was neglected, and speed up the democratization of society.

But experience has confirmed that all these problems can only be resolved successfully in an atmosphere of political stability, with regard for constitutional norms. You cannot establish democracy by flouting the law. The raging mob can easily become an instrument of alien and malicious forces.

It is hard to relate the inspired young faces which I saw in Tiananmen Square at the beginning of May to the burning, overturned buses that stuck in my mind on the way to the airport two weeks later, on the eve of the imposition of martial law in Beijing. On returning to Moscow then, I remember, I wrote that the use of force to preserve public order is a method as drastic as amputating a sick man's leg. It is always undesirable, always painful, but sometimes necessary in order to save someone's life. The question of the extent to which such a measure is necessary is a matter for the surgeon's conscience.

There is no doubt that last year's events in Tiananmen Square profoundly traumatized Chinese society. The consequences of this shock can still be felt. The unique nature of the present moment also determined the thrust of the government report to parliament. The report of Li Peng, premier of the State Council, was headed: "Fighting for the further stable political, economic, and social development of China." The emphasis on stability was a distinctive feature of this session of the NPC and a recurrent theme of the decisions it adopted.

After two weeks of debate, the 2,713 deputies of the Chinese parliament adopted a resolution on the report on the government's work. Preserving the country's stability, it stresses, is now a matter of paramount importance. Attention must be focused on economic building and it is necessary strictly to adhere to the four basic principles (the socialist way, the democratic dictatorship of the people, the leading role of the CPC, Marxism-Leninism and the ideas of Mao Zedong) and consistently to pursue the policy of reforms and openness. The principle of combining a planned economy with market forces should continue to be implemented, socialist democracy should be further developed, and socialist law and order strengthened. Those are the main political principles formulated by the highest organ of state power. People in Beijing believe that the time has come to "tighten the reins" in both the economic and the ideological sphere.

The Chinese parliament described this year as an important stage in the cause of economic rectification and recovery and in the cause of deepening reforms. Efforts must be focused on agriculture, the capital investments front must be narrower, and price rises must slow down. It was noted from the session platform that excessive emphasis on decentralization and expansion of economic autonomy sometimes has negative side-effects, generates group and regional egotism, and deprives the budget of the necessary contributions and therefore of effective levers for the implementation of economic strategy at state level. At this stage it is deemed expedient to extend the sphere of centralized planning, postpone price and wage reforms, and step up control of private enterprise.

The time to "tighten the reins" has come in the ideological sphere, too. There is intensive criticism of "bourgeois liberalism," and the self-sacrificing spirit of the revolutionary years is extolled. Party propaganda has once again taken up the feat of political instructor Lei Feng, who sacrificed his life to save public property. The program of political reforms outlined by the 13th CPC Congress remains in force. But its implementation has, so to speak, been pushed into the background and given way to concern for social stability. The Communist Party's leading role in Chinese society is emphasized. At the same time there is talk of the need to "improve the system of multiparty cooperation and political consultations under the CPC's leadership and step up the participation of social organizations in the country's political life." (Since the formation of the PRC there have been several political parties in existence in the country, forming a united front with the CPC and acknowledging its leading role.)

Restructuring of the cadre system was identified at the session as a component of the political reforms. A proposal to end the practice whereby party and state posts were occupied virtually for life was put forward by Deng Xiaoping as long ago as the early eighties. But the problem of lowering the average age of leading cadres remains acute. Last fall Deng Xiaoping resigned his powers as chairman of the CPC Military Council. And this NPC session granted his request to retire from his last state post—as chairman of the PRC Central Military Commission. His place was taken by Jiang Zemin, now general secretary of the CPC Central Committee. His election to these two posts, the head of government noted, will ensure party control of the Army and promote political stability in the country.

The strengthening of national unity was a recurrent theme at the Third NPC Session. And this idea had strictly practical relevance for one of the items on the agenda. The deputies discussed and adopted the fundamental law of the special administrative district of Hong Kong in connection with the forthcoming handover of this British colony to China's sovereignty. "The return of a kidnapped child to its own family"—that is how deputy Pu Ze, younger brother of Pu Yi, the last Chinese emperor, described this event, due in 1997, at the session. The "mini-Constitution" for Hong Kong has already been discussed in PRAVDA, a week ago. I will only add that the NPC defined the procedure for electing a Hong Kong legislative council of 60 members and the head of the administrative authority, who will replace the British governor. The government's commitment to Chinese-British and Chinese-Portuguese agreements on Hong Kong and Macao was reaffirmed from the platform at the session, and the hope was expressed that the nineties will advance the cause of the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the motherland.

Discussing the government's work, the Chinese parliamentarians, as usual, touched on international problems, too. To pursue an autonomous, independent foreign policy, to maintain and develop friendly relations with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, to make efforts to create a new international political and economic order and ensure universal peace—that is how the session formulated the PRC's main aims in the world arena.

Last year's Beijing meeting of the leaders of the PRC and USSR was assessed highly from the parliamentary platform. It was noted that the normalization of Chinese-Soviet relations and their development along the path of good-neighborliness meets the vital interests of the two countries' peoples and promotes peace in Asia and throughout the world. In an interview with Soviet journalists Li Peng, premier of the State Council, expressed the hope that his visit to Moscow in the near future will give new impetus to bilateral ties, which, since their normalization, have been developing in the right direction but could, in Li Peng's opinion, advance even more quickly. It is a question of all aspects of relations: politics, economics, culture, science, and technology, and also of lowering the level of military confrontation in the border regions. Socialism, the premier concluded, has no universal model. The Soviet Union has its own practice, and so does China. But it is useful for our states and our parties to exchange opinions on how to proceed along the socialist path.

Indeed, in the conditions of the revolutionary renewal of society it is more important than ever to study the experience of neighbors in West and East—not only positive experience, but also the negative experience of difficulties and failures, so as to prevent emergencies which could jeopardize our socialist choice.

Northeast Asia

Soviet Media Articles Anger DPRK Authorities

PM1304120390 Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 3

[Unattributed report under general headline: "Zigzags"]

[Text] Soviet journalists in the DPRK have found themselves in an extremely strange situation: For some two months now their requests for meetings with officials have not been met. And without such authorization these meetings are impossible. The reason? "Write good articles in support of our revolution, and then your requests will be satisfied"—these were the precise terms laid down for TASS' correspondent by Pang Chong-nam, head of a sector of the DPRK Foreign Ministry's Information Department.

As TASS correspondent A. Zhebin remarks, virtually all articles about the DPRK in Soviet central newspapers or journals arouse the displeasure of the local authorities. The Korean side has repeatedly requested that the Soviet Embassy "take measures."

Rogachev Meets With DPRK Charge d'Affaires

SK1704033090 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 16 Apr 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship" program]

[Text] On 13 April, Igor Rogachev, Soviet vice minister of foreign affairs, met Kim Hui-sun, DPRK charge d'affaires ad interim to the Soviet Union. A conversation on a series of international issues of mutual concern took place between the vice minister and the charge d'affaires.

Japan, ROK Urge Free Economic Zone Decision

PM1704132190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Yuriy Balakirev report: "Ready for Businesslike Cooperation"]

[Text] Vladivostok—The first tripartite meeting devoted to economic cooperation between the Sea of Japan countries has been held in Vladivostok.

Delegations from the USSR, Japan, and South Korea took part in the meeting.

Opportunities for developing coastal and border trade, joint ventures, tourism, transportation, and collaboration in the sphere of resource processing and the training of cadres for foreign economic activity were discussed. In particular, our partners showed considerable interest in setting up a free economic zone in the Nakhodka region. However, Japanese and South Korean specialists are making no secret of their confusion over our slowness in responding.

"Prospects in the Far East are great, but the time for talking about opportunities is already over," Professor K. Ogawa, director of the Japanese Society for Trade Development With the USSR and East European Countries (SOTOBO), noted in conversation with your correspondent. He believes that specific decisions are needed—and as quickly as possible—from the Soviet side to set up a joint enterprise zone.

The Far Easterners passed on to the foreign participants lists of plans for probable cooperation.

Talks Resume With Japan on Fishing Regulations

LD1704173390 Moscow TASS in English 1727 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The conservation and rational utilisation of salmon are the focus of attention at the sixth session of the Soviet-Japanese Commission for Cooperation in Fisheries. The session resumed here today.

The session was interrupted in Tokyo in March owing to differences over the quota for the Japanese catch of salmon that propagates in the rivers of the USSR.

Regarding the catching of salmon in the open sea as irrational, and aiming to end it by 1992, the Soviet side insists on reducing the 1990 quota for Japanese fishing boats down to 10,000 tonnes. This is one-third less than last year's quota.

At the same time, taking into account the interests of Japanese fishery workers, Soviet organisations express readiness to give them an opportunity to catch 8,000 tonnes of salmon within the Soviet Union's 200-mile economic zone, provided they participate in the restoration of salmon stocks.

During the first round of negotiations, the Japanese side demanded that the sea fisheries of salmon be kept at a higher level.

According to the USSR Ministry of Fisheries, Soviet specialists do not regard these differences as an impasse and believe that the two sides will succeed in finding mutually acceptable solutions.

The Soviet-Japanese negotiations are always intensive, since they deal with matters that involve the long-term interests of the two countries' fishery workers.

Other items on the session's agenda are compensation the Japanese side will pay for the restoration of salmon stocks and the signing of a programme for joint research into the sea fauna in the north-western Pacific.

The possibility of regulating fish catches in the open part of the Bering Sea will also be touched upon.

The unregulated catch of Alaska pollack in the area adversely affects fish stocks in the Bering Sea and arouses the concern of Soviet and American fishery workers.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Philippines' Laurel Received at Foreign Ministry

PM1804083990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Announcements"]

[Text] I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, met Philippine Vice President S. Laurel, who was taking part in the World Mass Media Conference in Moscow, 13 April.

Solomon's Recent Visit to Manila Viewed

HK1604074390 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 15 Apr 90

[Commentary by Anatoliy Aleksandrov on the just-concluded visit of U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Solomon to Manila]

[Text] President Corazon Aquino met with Richard Solomon. The newspapers gave the meeting a lot of publicity, because earlier Mrs. Aquino had stated that she would never hold meetings with any U.S. ranking official after the incident with Richard Cheney, the U.S. defense secretary, during his visit to the Philippines. The single reason for these visits by U.S. officials is the issue of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines.

The cold shoulder treatment of the Aquino administration toward Cheney was due to the U.S. Congress' move to reduce Washington's financial obligations by $97 million for the use of the military facilities in Manila. Consequently, the talks between the two countries in mid-May will focus on the financial issue. This could be the reason for the meeting of President Aquino with Solomon.

During their meeting, the U.S. official expressed readiness to settle the financial matter. This is not surprising, because retaining its bases is more important to the United States than any monetary considerations. According to studies, the transfer of the military bases would involve millions of dollars. The search for another venue for the bases continues. Some U.S. legislators are conducting a search for a new site and have gone to Singapore for this purpose. But it is viewed as a political gain because of the upcoming talks between Manila and Washington.

Unexpected arguments are surfacing, i.e. Solomon said that the Soviet threat is not the reason for the increasing miltary ties between the United States and the Philippines. This is essential information, because with the USSR currently reducing its military forces, the United States' adherance to the old line of thought is disgusting.

Many share this point of view, as the United States refuses to heed Mikhail Gorbachev's appeal to close down the military bases in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam as well as the Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines.[as heard] The USSR, nonetheless, continues with its plan to complete its withrawal from Vietnam.

Putting these considerations against Solomon's statement, it is obvious that the intention is to brainwash the Filipinos. This is why several proposals on security among the United States and its allies, including the Philippines, are being discussed.

Serious work would accompany the upcoming talks. Experts on military diplomacy are needed. This is why Richard Armitage, who is skillful in military and political strategy abroad, was appointed to head the U.S.

panel in the talks. It is of great importance to know that Armitage was responsible for the downfall of the Marcos regime, which was one of Washington's strategies.

Armitage is also involved in carrying out U.S. strategies in connection with military assistance to other countries. The same strategy will have a great influence in the upcoming talks.

Vietnamese Deny U.S. Return to Cam Ranh

PM1704131790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
17 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "SRV Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Refutation"]

[Text] The Vietnamese central press has published a statement by an SRV Foreign Ministry spokesman refuting the reports from certain foreign mass media that Vietnam is prepared to allow the United States to use the port of Cam Ranh. These reports, the Foreign Ministry spokesman stresses, are entirely unfounded.

Phomvihan Details 'Laotian Perestroyka'

90UF0059A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Kaysone Phomvihan, general secretary of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee and chairman of the Lao People's Democratic Republic Council of Ministers, by IZVESTIYA correspondent B. Vinogradov: "The Laotian Alternative"]

[Text] Vientiane—[Vinogradov] The LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] recently celebrated its 14th anniversary. How do you evaluate the path that has been trod in this time? Have there been stages on the path which are now being interpreted critically?

[Phomvihan] This has been a period of accumulating experience and simultaneously of strenuous work on the Laotian land. There have been difficulties enough. And they have been connected with the extremely low socioeconomic development of the country, the consequences of the war, natural disasters, and hostile subversive activity. However, despite everything we have succeeded in achieving the first results, securing us a base for progress. We have some things to be proud of. But we have things to think about also. For example, in the initial stage of development we created state enterprises, nationalized the private sector, and imposed strict control on market activity and commodity circulation. And this entire policy was implemented mainly by administrative methods. After a certain time we saw for ourselves that such transformations and this method of management were impeding the development of production and making the life of the working people more difficult. It was necessary to reexamine the situation and study the actual situation in greater depth. Practice has shown that premature anticipation is impermissible and that transition to socialism merely on the paths of eliminating the old economic basis is impossible. As full-fledged economic structures within the framework of the new system, the private and individual structures are essentially capable of feeding the whole country. Consequently, they also must receive support and enjoy development within the framework of the people's democratic system.

At the fourth party congress in 1986 we summed up the experience of the first 10 years and declared firmly that, despite the difficulties and certain mistakes, we had been able to progress in our development and in the stabilization of life and had avoided chaos and stagnation phenomena. And all this thanks to the fact that we were able to map out a number of transitional intermediate steps.

Our country is at a stage in its development where subsistence and semi-subsistence farming predominate and where there are no prerequisites as yet for the direct building of socialism. The main thing for us now is the development of the productive forces and the transition from a subsistence economy to real production. We cannot automatically transfer onto our soil the experience of other countries but nor can we treat Marxist-Leninist principles in a voluntarist fashion. We are endeavoring to independently conduct a search and implement transformations primarily in the economic sphere, applying Marxist-Leninist methodology creatively.

[Vinogradov] A little more detail about this experience, please, considering the processes currently occurring in East Europe. What are the salient features of "Laotian perestroyka," if it may be so called?

[Phomvihan] The changes in the LPDR have their particular features and depend on socioeconomic conditions. Our purposeful transformations confront precise tasks: While observing equality in all spheres and introducing new forms of work we will pay particular attention to party building, personnel training, and the mobilization of the Laotian people for extensive participation in the restructuring processes. We aspire to the development of democracy geared to the inculcation in the Laotian people of the sense of proprietor. It should develop under the leadership of the party. Democracy should be inseparably connected with responsibility, discipline, and centralism. In turn, centralism should be based on an expansion of democracy, be free of bureaucratism and command methods of administration, and be close in spirit to the people's masses and the people's interests.

[Vinogradov] Elections were held in Laos last year to the Supreme People's Assembly—the country's highest legislative body. How are relations taking shape between the parliament and the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party], which is the leading force of Laotian society?

[Phomvihan] The LPRP is building its relations with the Supreme People's Assembly in accordance with the tasks and goals determined in the party rules. The leading role of the LPRP is geared to a broadening of the deputies' rights and the creation in the country of a state system based on the rule of law. Operating via members of parliament who are party members, the LPRP aspires to be closer to the people's masses and considers the people's needs and aspirations in the shaping of its policy.

[Vinogradov] We know that in the last year or two the Supreme People's Assembly has also adopted several enforceable enactments concerning economic activity. The certain revitalization of business activity in Laos is obviously connected with this. One is struck in the markets by the abundance of goods. New joint firms, banks, and enterprises are opening everywhere. There have been periods when the rate of inflation has been practically zero. With what is this connected? Does the party have a long-term program in this sphere? What is your attitude toward state capitalism?

[Phomvihan] The changes occurring in Laos are the creative application of the new economic policy formulated by Lenin with regard for the particular features and actual conditions of our country. Operating in accordance with the basic principles of the NEP [New Economic Policy], we are endeavoring in practice to develop commodity-money relationships and a diversity of economic forms and structures in the transitional period. We support an expansion of all sectors of the economy and believe that they are all equal and bear equal responsibility before the law. All economic structures closely interact with one another. And the state sector, what is more, is the pivot, as it were, of the whole economy. We advocate an expansion of all economic forms if they are efficient and contribute to the development of the productive forces.

The state is retaining merely the sectors which are of strategic significance. That is, the state will no longer concern itself with the development of production but will merely regulate economic activity. In other words, the state will control the macrostructure and regulate economic processes with the help of one concession or another, regulations, financial measures, the taxation system, bank interest, credit, and so forth. Simultaneously with the use of all structures we will pursue a policy of uniform prices, a uniform exchange rate and free commodity-money circulation. As far as inflation is concerned, we consider it a natural consequence of the introduction of market relations. It is important here not to let it slip from state control and to control it mainly by economic levers.

[Vinogradov] Laos is an agrarian country. What can be said about the development of this sector? Has the policy of forming the peasantry into cooperatives justified itself? What types of ownership are there now in agriculture?

[Phomvihan] Agriculture is the main sector of our economy. We attach paramount significance to it. In recent years it has developed rapidly, but not always in stable manner. After the war the cooperative system, implemented in the form of the creation of partnerships for working the land, played its part in the restoration of agrarian production and the improvement of the life of the population. However, it subsequently became clear that the forced collectivization, socialization of the land, insufficient attention to local conditions and inadequate support on the part of the state had damaged the cause to a certain extent. At the time this policy was adopted account had not been taken of the level of management and development of the productive forces in the provinces and the specific features of our country. Earlier we had assumed that it was possible with the aid of the state and collective farms to have done with subsistence production. But this strategy proved unsuccessful.

The fourth LPRP Congress concluded that the transformations in the countryside needed to begin with the family, that is, it was necessary to strive for its incorporation in small-scale commodity production. Now the task is, on the one hand, to update the cooperatives and, on the other, to encourage the private farms. Particular significance is attached here to the policy of distribution of land, which is the property of the whole nation. Given the availability of vast vacant areas with low population density, almost all the peasants have sufficient allotments. They may be inherited. In addition, there are family contracts for land use on a contractual basis, leasing, and concessions for businessmen with sufficient working capital.

[Vinogradov] You recently visited China. The whole world received with satisfaction the restoration of normal relations between Laos and the PRC. How do you evaluate the significance of this event?

[Phomvihan] Laos and China are two neighboring countries. They have long-standing relations and frequently assisted one another in the past. The normalization of relations is one further step in the development of Lao-Chinese relations in keeping with the wishes and interests of both countries and also the trends taking shape in the modern world.

[Vinogradov] And, finally, what can you say about Soviet-Laotian relations? What needs to be done to enhance the efficiency of our cooperation?

[Phomvihan] The assistance and support of the Soviet Union are characterized by their broad scale and high efficiency. This is an important factor contributing to the successful accomplishment of tasks pertaining to the defense and development of the LPDR. In addition, our relations, which are based on the principles of socialist internationalism, are of a long-term and diverse nature. It is necessary to restructure the mechanism, methods, and forms of our interaction in order to enhance its efficiency and expand bilateral and multilateral economic relations between departments of the two states on the basis of the principles of equality and mutual benefit.

In conclusion I would like, via IZVESTIYA, to express profound acknowledgments and sincere gratitude to the party, government, and great people of the Soviet Union, which has constantly rendered us great and inestimable assistance and support.

Near East & South Asia

Moscow Reports Afghan Denial of Executions

LD1704221690 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] The Afghan Government has denied rumors that two former Afghan ministers have been executed for involvement in the abortive coup last March. The report about the execution was circulated by foreign agencies quoting diplomatic sources in Pakistan.

Keshtmand Pledges Afghan Help for POWs' Release

PM1704150390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Contribution to Noble Cause"]

[Text] Kabul, 12 Apr—Sultan Ali Keshtmand, member of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Republic of Afghanistan Council of Ministers Executive Committee, has received recently released Soviet Army serviceman Aleksey Tikhonov and his mother, L.G. Tikhonov.

S.A. Keshtmand expressed satisfaction at the imminent return home of yet another Soviet internationalist serviceman. We hope, he pointed out, that joint efforts will yield even more fruitful results and enable other Soviet people to return home. The Afghan Government will continue to do everything to promote this humane and humanitarian process. President Najibullah and the entire Afghan leadership intend to make whatever contribution they can to this noble cause since they understand Soviet people's concern at the problem of the release of servicemen hitherto held captive by the opposition, S.A. Keshtmand stressed.

In the course of a conversation with S.A. Keshtmand Nadezhda Committee Chairman I. Andronov said that the Afghan side's active role in the release of former servicemen has already enabled several Soviet soldiers to return home. He noted that there are dozens of Soviet prisoners of war on Afghan territory in opposition-controlled areas, and the Afghan Government's aid and assistance in measures to secure their release is invaluable.

B.N. Pastukhov, USSR ambassador to the Republic of Afghanistan, expressed profound gratitude to the country's leadership for its active participation in securing the Soviet prisoner of war's release.

'Subversive Activities' of M. Gul Described

90UF0039A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 14, 4 Apr 90 p 9

[Article by Igor Belyayev: "Who Is Hiding Round the Corner?"]

[Text] **First I want to remind you of Mikhtiyar Gul, a Pashtun, born in Pakistan and a resident of Peshawar. And I also want to note here that his brothers of the same blood—Pashtuns—live on both sides of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.**

In 1985 M. Gul was recruited by an officer of the Pakistani counter intelligence service, Abid Sharif, who also served as a military adviser for G. Khekmatiar's "Islamic Party of Afghanistan." He began by gathering information about the Afghan armed opposition located in Pakistan. In autumn of 1988 M. Gul joined the military operations on the Afghan territory. That was where he had his first contact with people from the CIA.

From the very first military lesson he was trained to use underwater explosives. What was the purpose of that? He received an answer to that question some time later—in the "Al-Fatkh" camp for saboteur training, situated near Peshawar. An American showed up there once. Though they called him Karim Abdul Khakim, the name, of course, was false. He spoke beautiful Dari, a language spoken in Tajikistan, he knew very well the tasks and purposes of the special groups that had been trained in the camp. However, he always abstained from participating in any concrete operations. Among other instructors there was a Turk from Istanbul, Abu-Bakr Tanak, and... some Arabs.

Last spring the officers of Pakistani special services described their future assignments as follows:

—They were to blow up the "Bridge of Friendship" across the Amu Darya between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Afghanistan by putting explosive devices on its supports (that was why they had had to learn how to use underwater explosives);
—they were to mine Soviet vessels;
—they were to explode certain objects in the port of Shir Khan;
—they had to shoot rockets at Soviet territory.

The very group that had been trained in the Al-Fatkh camp attempted to fulfill the assignment in all details. The group penetrated into Afghanistan from Pakistan last summer and found shelter in the area of Tugyan-Guzar. From that location the group members were photographing objects on the territory of the Soviet Union.

Recently a scandal worth noticing flared up in Washington. All of a sudden the history of the CIA operations in Afghanistan became public knowledge. According to some of the published materials, the agreement between the United States and Pakistan about cooperation with the Pakistani intelligence service ISI had not been carried

out as actively as the United States wished. So, as Bob Woodward described in the WASHINGTON POST, the then military ruler, Zia ul-Haq, who recently died in a plane crash, allowed the Americans to install strategic equipment for electronic eavesdropping. Supposedly, it was placed in either Gilgit or Chitral in the Northern Pakistan. The equipment helped to spy on the launches of Soviet intercontinental ballistic and other missiles. They insist that the equipment is still there and continues to be employed.

Let us return, however, to the group of M. Gul. It was instructed to do the following:

—to reconnoiter and study the operational situation on both sides of the Amu Darya;
—to photograph the Soviet border regions as well as our military and cargo vessels;
—to study the hydrological situation on the Amu Darya and also to find possible ways of river crossing;
—to reconnoiter small islands on the river;
—to find possible locations for setting mines for the purpose of destroying Soviet Navy and cargo vessels;
—to locate areas and objects from which successful shelling of the Soviet territory can be conducted, involving all types of artillery shells and rockets.

Mikhtiyar Gul was captured by the Afghan military authorities. During the investigation he confirmed that Pakistan, the United States, and some other countries—including some Arab ones—continue their subversive activities in spite of everything. These operations are most active at the Afghan-Soviet border. I want to emphasize here once again that the rumors about the revival of the new basmak movement on the territory of our middle Asian republics are growing stronger. So it is rather upsetting that the current leaders of Pakistan pretend that nothing of the kind is taking place.

One more problem seems quite crucial. According to the officials of the interagency intelligence administration in Pakistan, attempts are also made to use Afghan territory for subversive actions against the USSR. And here I would like to emphasize that this kind of policy, realized with the help of generous financial handouts from the CIA, can only lead to increased tensions around Afghanistan. And Moscow is trying to relieve the tensions, even now.

Faysal al-Husayni 'Unexpectedly' Visits Moscow

Addresses Forum on Aliyah

TA1704101790 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 17 Apr 90 pp 1, 12

[Report by Moscow-based correspondent Amnon Kapeliuk]

[Excerpt] Faysal al-Husayni arrived unexpectedly in Moscow yesterday to participate in a symposium at the Hammer Center on the subject of aliyah. Al-Husayni is to meet with high-ranking Soviet Foreign Ministry officials today.

Al-Husayni declared at the symposium: "The emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel has aroused grave fears among the Palestinians. The immigration wave has rekindled the Israelis' past dreams. The danger now is that they will attempt to use this human resource for a renewed assault against the Arabs. The superpowers must exert pressure to prevent the solution of the Jewish problem at the expense of the Palestinians."

All the Palestinian speakers, including Bi'r Zayt University Professor 'Azmi Bishara, condemned anti-Semitism which, they contended, encourages emigration to Israel. [passage omitted]

Interviewed on Emigration Roundtable

LD1704183190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Apr 90

[from the "Vremya" newscast; video report by V. Beletskiy]

[Text] Increasing emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel. What is it—the result of their anxiety and uncertainty over their future and the future of their children in our country, or a plot against the Arabs and Palestinians? Who is to blame, and are there any culprits at all? What attitude should one adopt toward this phenomenon? These are just some of the questions that were discussed during a roundtable meeting which took place in Moscow in the International Trade Center:

[Beletskiy] Soviet and Palestinian public figures, scholars, journalists, prominent representatives of the Jewish and Soviet public, and also a group of U.S. diplomats who are involved in problems of emigration from the USSR, took part in it. [Video shows extensive views of participants seated at tables at meeting]

This roundtable is the first direct dialogue of its kind between Palestinian leaders and leaders of the Jewish national movement in the Soviet Union. It was organized every day by the Al HAYAT Arab newspaper, which is published in London and distributed in Europe. Among the participants in this meeting is Faysal al-Husayni, director of the Center for Palestinian Research in Jerusalem, a prominent Palestinian political figure: [video shows correspondent taking to talks to Al-Husayni]

[Begin video interviews] [Al-Husayni in Arabic with superimposed Russian translation] Our position is as follows: We are not only not against, but also we are all for any person in the world being able to freely leave his country and return to it when he wishes to. It is necessary that he should have the possibility of travelling where he wants. Unfortunately the countries in the West, and first and foremost the United States, have closed the doors to these emigrants, Jews from the Soviet Union, and in this way they have in essence deprived them of the right to choose, forcing them to go to Israel. So we would like the United States and other countries to admit them to their country. As far as those emigrants who arrive in Israel are concerned then we say to them: Settle, but not on the West Bank of the river Jordan, not in the Gaza Strip, not in East Jerusalem, because these are occupied territories in which we Palestinians would like to resolve our problems, the problems of our refugees. In addition we fear that immigration on such a scale will inflame [word indistinct] extreme rightwingers in Israel and they will not feel the need to return the occupied territories to the Palestinians.

[Video shows correpsondent talking to A.M.Vasilyev, deputy director of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, identified by screen caption] [Vasilyev] Among the Soviet participants there is a wide spread of opinion on the emigration of Jewish citizens from the Soviet Union to Israel. However, the common viewpoint consists of the fact that there cannot be any discrimination in the Soviet Union regarding the departure abroad from the Soviet Union of citizens of any nationality. This also concerns Jewish emigration. At the same time the situation of israel in the Near East is special. The Arab-Israeli conflict is not yet settled. Problems of the occupied territories have not yet been resolved and any act directed at changing the demographic nature of the occupied territories goes against the norms of international law. [end video interviews]

Holds News Conference on Emigration

LD1704183690 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—By TASS correspondent Sergey Postanogov:

"The Palestinians are an ethnic group, not refugees or the population of a definite territory. This is what the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) proceeds from with an eye to the Middle East settlement process," Faysal al-Husayni, director of the Arab Research Centre in Jerusalem, told a news conference here today.

All programmes, put forward by Israel earlier, for a settlement of the problem did not regard the Palestinians as an ethnic group and were obviously doomed to failure, Al-Husayni, director of the Arab Research Centre in Jerusalem, told a news conference here today.

All programmes, put forward by Israel earlier, for a settlement of the problem did not regard the Palestinians as an ethnic group and were obviously doomed to failure, Al-Husayni said.

Touching upon the Jewish emigration issue, Al-Husayni pointed out that the settlement of emigrants on the occupied Arab territories creates new obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

"Individual emigration is the right of every person and does not affect the interests of other peoples. However, massive emigration poses great problems." This is especially true as the United States and some European countries by closing the door to emigrants do not leave Jews any other choice but leave for Israel, he said.

Israel, by settling emigrants in the occupied territories, tries to change the demographic situation there and crowd the Palestinian people out of their age-old lands.

"The PLO proposed a peace initiative based on the recognition of the principle of the existence of two states in the Middle East, Israeli and Palestinian, and is prepared for a search for mutually acceptable solutions," Al-Husayni said.

"We believe that a settlement of the Middle East problem in many respects depends on how strong and efficient a new Israeli Government will be. We want such a government to emerge there and are prepared for a dialogue with such a government," Al-Husayni said.

Vorontsov Receives Al-Husayni

LD1704184190 Moscow TASS in English 1824 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Vorontsov today met Faysal al-Husayni, director of the Arab Research Centre in Jerusalem.

The two officials exchanged views on the Middle East situation and prospects for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Al-Husayni noted that the aim of the peaceful Palestinian uprising on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which has already lasted three years, is to end the Israeli occupation and to realise the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination.

The two sides condemned Israeli repressions against the Palestinian civilian population. Special attention was given to Israel's unlawful settlement of immigrants, including from the Soviet Union, on Palestinian territory, including Eastern Jerusalem.

It was stressed that Israel should immediately end such actions and assure the world community that immigrants arriving in Israel will no longer be used for the purpose.

Vorontsov confirmed that the Soviet Union supports the just struggle of the Palestinian people laid by the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

He stressed that the establishment of a durable peace in the Middle East is only possible within the framework of a universal settlement of the Arab-israeli conflict, including the just solution to the Palestinian problem, on the basis of a balance of interests of all parties concerned and through the convocation of an international conference under UN auspices.

Al-Husayni praised the principled Soviet Approach to the Middle East and favoured the Soviet Union's active involvement in the peace process.

Polyakov, 'Arafat 'Unanimous' on Israeli Actions

LD1804103190 Moscow TASS in English 0925 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Tunis April 18 TASS—Member of the Soviet Foreign Ministry collegium Vladimir Polyakov has visited Tunis from April 15 to 17. He was received by Yasir 'Arafat, president of the state of Palestine, and had talks with members of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation within the frameworks of a meeting of the Soviet-Palestine committee on the Middle East.

The sides expressed their desire to further promote political interaction in the interests of achieving an early and comprehensive Middle East settlement and a fair solution of the Palestinian issue. Particular attention was devoted to the situation on the Israel-occupied Arab territories. The sides are unanimous that Israel's actions as regards these territories, including the plan to settle immigrants there, contradict the norms of international law, United Nations resolutions, provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention and put up obstacles to peace in the region.

Polyakov also met General Secretary of the Arab League Chedli Klibi to discuss the existing situation in the Middle East and questions of coordinating the Soviet Union's actions with the Arab League.

Saudi-Iranian Pilgrimage 'Dispute' Reported

NC1704141690 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Station commentary]

[Text] With the period for the Hajj pilgrimage approaching, the dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia over pilgrimage to the Ka'ba in Mecca is intensifying. [Word indistinct] Majlis deputies published an open letter to King Fahd criticizing the violation of Iran's pilgrimage rights. This letter followed a statement issued by official Saudi circles on their readiness to review the Hajj quota for each Islamic country. Our commentator writes:

The dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia has been going on for three years. It was in the summer of 1987 that Saudi police were compelled to resort to force to crush disturbances started by Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. Since then, Iran's quota of pilgrims has been reduced from 150,000 to 45,000. Iran assesses this sharp reduction as a trampling on holy rights by Riyadh.

However, this is not the only issue. The dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia is more political than religious in nature. [Word indistinct] the Saudis are accusing the Iranians of wanting to use Islam to promote their political objectives. The Iranians insist that political struggle is a clear Islamic right.

I believe that these remarks are only a mask for the political-religious conflict between the two countries. The two countries are competing for leadership in the Islamic world. The Saudis regard Iran's claims to leadership in the Persian Gulf with great concern. The (?activities) by pro-Iranian Shiite groups in Lebanon and other Arab countries also cause them concern. The Iranians are upset at the ever increasing Saudi intervention in Afghanistan's domestic affairs. The Saudis, in conjuction with the United States, are supporting opposition groups which are trying to reduce the domination of the so-called Iranian-backed mujahidin in Afghanistan. Moreover, the absence of a solution to the Iran-Iraq conflict is also exacerbating the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

If the differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia are not solved (?effectively), thousands of Iranian pilgrims will be unable to perform their religious duties. Who should these people blame? Should they blame the former Iranian leadership which instigated the Iranians to carry out extremist acts in holy Mecca? Should they blame the [word indistinct] for the strict suppressive measures implemented in response to the extremist acts? Each side is presenting clear [word indistinct] to justify its acts. However, all this does not change the fact that several thousands of pilgrims have become victims of politicking and that religious [word indistinct] has become the victim of political ambitions. Naturally, it is not right to use religion to gain political ends. There are other kinds of policies. If what happened in Mecca did not have political (?objectives), then it would not have led to bloodshed in Mecca because (?religion) guides people toward peace and compromise. A policy in accordance with (?new thinking) cannot insult Muslims, Christians, or Buddhists since this kind of policy gathers together the good features of these religions.

I think that Tehran and Riyadh can, by resorting to new political thinking, reach an agreement. This also applies to the determination of the quota for pilgrims.

Andreyev Views Iranian-Egyptian Relations

NC1804103090 Moscow in Persian to Iran 1100 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Yuriy Andreyev commentary]

[Text] Morteza Sarmadi, Iranian Foreign Ministry official spokesman, has refuted a statement by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak on Tehran's wish to resume relations with Egypt. According to Morteza Sarmadi, Iran's stand on this issue has not changed. He also pointed out that for some time now Cairo has been trying to pave the way for talks with Iran through third countries.

Our analyst Yuriy Andreyev comments on this report: In 1971 an incident took place in Tehran which appeared to have far-reaching repurcussions on Iranian-Egyptian relations. Tehran Municipality decided to declare Cairo and Tehran sister cities, but after a few years, these sisters turned into uncompromising enemies and started a strong confrontation on the international scene. Thus, yet another historic irony—plentiful in our eventful twentieth century—was recorded.

An ancient adage says that someone who sows thorns cannot harvest grapes. This, incidentally, fully applies to the history of Iranian-Egyptian relations during the past decade. In July 1979 diplomatic relations between Iran and Egypt were officially severed, caused by the then Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat's decision to grant political asylum to the former Shah of Iran. Some time later, the Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the separate peace between Cairo and Tel Aviv and expelled the Egyptian diplomats from Tehran.

Al-Sadat's death did not have great impact on Iranian-Egyptian relations. Cairo, which was always very hostile toward Imam Khomeyni's fundamentalist ideas and Iran's wish to adopt the leadership role in the Persian Gulf, supported Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq war. Not only did the Egyptian Government provide extensive military and material assistance to Iraq, but also sent a large number of volunteers to the Iran-Iraq war front. For example, according to the Cairo press, Iran continues to hold 13,000 Egyptians as captives.

Naturally Iran, too, specific reciprocal steps. On several occasions Egypt condemned Iran for interfering in its domestic affairs and for extending financial assistance to the extremist Shiite groups. One of these, the al-Aqsa group, has even condemned Egyptian President Husni Mubarak to death.

Last year Egypt's security forces discovered a large underground Shiite organization which intended to overthrow the Egyptian Government and to form an Iranian-style Islamic rule. Forty were arrested and were accused of disseminating Shiite propaganda, for possessing banned literature, and for training paramilitary groups. Actually the officials were declaring the closure of the office which defended Iranian rights in Egypt. This office had been established after the severence of official diplomatic relations between the two countries. Thus, the feeling was that a political confrontation between Iran and Egypt had reached its zenith.

However, it now seems that currently the situation is gradually changing and both sides are slowly trying to seek ways to approach each other—especially since the necessary basis for the resumption of talks between Iran and Egypt exists today. First, the Iran-Iraq war has stopped, and as a result one of the main obstacles confronting Cairo and Tehran has been removed. Moreover, the Iranian Government is refraining from the policy of overt isolation on the international scene and has made compromising gestures to Egypt. For example, in March Tehran released a 20-man group of Egyptian POW's and sent them home.

It seems that Egypt also is willing to establish closer relations with the Islamic Republic. Egypt's AL-WAFD reported that early this year an Iranian Foreign Ministry delegation paid a secret visit to Egypt and held talks on opening the Iranian Consulate in Cairo. Meanwhile, it is clear that unofficial contacts between Iran and Egypt are facing serious difficulties. The refutation of the statement by Egyptian President Husni Mubarak by the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman illustrates this. He informed correspondents that Tehran is willing to revive its relations with Egypt. It seems that Iran's officials are trying to thus display their decisiveness in solving the differences in Iranian-Egyptian relations.

The primary issue is the destiny of 13,000 Egyptian POW's in Iran as well as financial problems, namely the $1.5 billion loan that the former Shah of Iran had given to Egypt. In short, a delicate political game is being played and both sides are trying to benefit from their maximum potentials.

Egyptian Ambassador Received at Foreign Ministry

PM1704094990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the rubric: "Official Information"]

[Text] USSR First Deputy Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh received A. Mahir al-Sayyid, Egyptian ambassador to the USSR, 13 April at the latter's request. In the course of the conversation they touched on certain current international problems and also questions of the development of bilateral relations.

CPSU Group in Bangladesh First in 18 Years

PM1704123390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report]

[Text] Dhaka, 12 Apr—Meetings have taken place between the leadership of the Communist Party of Bangladesh and a CPSU delegation, here at the invitation of the Communist Party of Bangladesh Central Committee. The delegation of Soviet Communists comprises A.S. Kamay, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, and F.N. Yurlov, group leader in the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

During the discussions, which took place in a warm and friendly atmosphere, a detailed and frank exchange of opinions was held on a wide range of questions. S.A. Manik, general secretary of the Communist Party of Bangladesh Central Committee, emphasized the importance of the first official visit by a CPSU delegation to the country for 18 years, which allowed the two parties' positions on fundamental contemporary problems to be collated and clarified.

Sub-Saharan Africa

U.S. Renewal of Somali Port Lease Criticized

EA1604180090 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 15 Apr 90

[From "East Africa and the Past Week" program]

[Text] The prevailing situation in the world based on the confrontation of the West and East was highlighted last week, when the U.S. Department of Defense decided to continue leasing the Berbera military base on the Somali coast. The extension of the agreement between the United States and Mohamed Siad Barre's government had not been expected for some months. The United States has on several occasions indicated its willingness to stop leasing the base, thus showing America's disapproval of Somalia's violation of human rights and democratic principles.

The Somali Government did not want to lose the enormous benefits it has derived from leasing Berbera Port to the United States. Therefore, the Mogadishu government has desperately tried to please the Western world. The Somali Government invited a delegation from Amnesty International to see for itself the far-reaching changes taking place in Somalia on the question of human rights and the democratization of the country's political program. But it was not this that convinced the United States to remain in Berbera.

Berbera Port is strategically situated. It is the gateway to the Red Sea. Opposite Berbera, the important issue of Yemeni unification is being played out. The policies of the united Yemeni state are currently being worked out. The united Yemen's political principles will be based upon Islamic fundamentalism. It is suspected that the U.S.'s political fear of the latter might have greatly influenced them to continue leasing Berbera Port.

There is another important issue which might also have influenced the United States to continue leasing Berbera without taking into consideration the general policies to reduce confrontation between the two superpowers in the Horn of Africa. It had been hoped for some time that these two nations were planning to agree to cease their interference in the region; but now the United States has decided to remain in Berbera, and U.S. interests in neighboring Ethiopia can be safeguarded by her political ally, Israel.

Commentary on RSA Talks, Mandela's UK Visit

MB1704111190 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 16 Apr 90

[(Oleg Shidrov) commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] On 16 April, Wembley Stadium, in London, is the scene of festivities devoted to the release of the outstanding South African antiapartheid activist, Nelson Mandela.

This is the key event of Mandela's informal visit to London. Mandela's previous visit to Britain took place in 1962, when he came for the purpose of explaining why the African National Congress [ANC], one of whose leaders he was, had decided to wage an armed struggle against the Pretoria regime. Later, he was put behind bars, where he spent 27 years.

It is hard to say what was the major reason for setting Mandela free earlier this year, either the years-long international campaign of protest or the policy of gradual dismantling of apartheid, followed by the government of President F.W. de Klerk, or probably both.

In any case, that was an epical event, even though Nelson Mandela himself is more than cautious in assessing the president's practical steps, designed to recoil from the theory and practice of apartheid. He believes that, so far, all those [words indistinct] only good intention. Nevertheless, he views President de Klerk as an honest politician, with whom it is possible, and necessary, to hold a dialogue. He said so during his conversation with the Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, that took place in Windhoek in the course of festivities to celebrate Namibia's independence. The dialogue promises to be difficult since neither the white nor the black community have reached a consensus on it. The continued communal violence hinders the meeting of a major demand advanced by the ANC, that the state of emergency in South Africa be lifted. Under the circumstances, an important role can be played by the stand taken by Nelson Mandela. Despite his willingness to enter into negotiations with President de Klerk, Mandela firmly stands for the maintenance of sanctions against South Africa. The easing of sanctions on the part of the British government was the reason why Mandela declined to meet with prime minister Margaret Thatcher during his trip to London.

[Begin Mandela recording] We would like to move away from the situation of [word indistinct] and confrontation. If we still call upon the world to intensify sanctions, and for the continuation of the armed struggle, it is because the government had given us no other option. If some fundamental and irreversible development is made, we will review the present strategies, and concentrate on those that are going to promote a process of negotiation. [end recording]

It seems that this dilemma is recognized by most countries persisting in their sanctions against South Africa. The hope that such sanctions will be lifted together with the dismantling of the apartheid system looks real. To see this happen is in everyone's interest.

East Europe

Bulgarian Students Show Support for Lithuania

LD1704192790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1838 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Sofia, 17 Apr (TASS)—The Federation of the Bulgarian Independent Students' Associations has staged a meeting in the vicinity of the USSR Embassy building in support of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet's decision about the declaration of Lithuanian independence. Between 250 and 300 people participated in the meeting.

Speakers made sharp attacks on the national policy of the Soviet Union, which was difficult to assess in any other way than as a rude intervention in the USSR's affairs.

The meeting was held under the banner and symbols of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces, in which the Federation of the Independent Students' Associations is a member. It was clear from the character and content of the speeches that it was used for pre-election purposes by the opposition forces. Characteristically, slogans and appeals directed against the Bulgarian Socialist Party were voiced there repeatedly.

Some of the speakers slandered Bulgarian-Soviet ties, which is inconsistent with the feelings of friendship toward the Soviet Union widely held in the country.

Immediately after the meeting telephones started ringing in the USSR Embassy. Bulgarian citizens declare that they do not agree with the attacks on the Soviet Union.

Party of Slavs Offers Military Aid to Lithuania

LD0104201590 Warsaw PAP in English 1843 GMT 1 Apr 90

[Text] Warsaw, April 1—Granting the request of the National Club of Lithuania's lovers, Bishop Wladyslaw Miziolek officiated a mass for that country's independence at St. Alexander's Church here today.

The bishop recalled that Lithuania had lost its independence together with Poland, when fully annected [as received] by tzarist Russia and expressed a wish that it regain its independent existence on the road of peaceful dialogue.

In a special statement, the Presidium of the National Coordinating Commission of solidarity of Handicraft expressed words of support for the people of Lithuania.

During a rally organized by the Polish Independence Party in Gdansk, members of the Federation of the Fighting Youth called for support for Lithuania's independence while the Universal Party of Slavs and allied nations, having an unspecified number of members, offered military assistance to Lithuania.

Andrzej Pietruczanis, 24, continues his hunger strike started on March 27 in front of the U.S. Embassy here, thus appealing to the U.S. Administration to recognize Lithuania's independence.

Anticommunist Demonstration in Prague Condemned

PM1204124590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

[Dispatch from own correspondent S. Vtorushin under general heading: "Eastern Europe: Topic of the Day"]

[Text] **Following Old Recipes**

Prague, 10 Apr— Anticommunist slogans have reappeared in the streets of the Czechoslovak capital. On Thursday of last week a demonstration attended by many thousands of people and organized by the "Civic Forum" of the CKD-Semiconductor Plant was held in the Old Town Square.

Its participants demanded that Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] property be handed over to the government. However, the main purpose of the demonstration was something else—to kindle anticommunist sentiments among the people, discredit the CPCZ, and drive it into a corner even before the election campaign gets under way. This was borne out by the slogans carried by some of the demonstrators. They read: "Communists, return to the underground!", "Give back what you have stolen!" and so forth.

The question concerning CPCZ property arose immediately after its removal from power. A certain share of the blame for this falls on the former party leaders. During their time at the helm of party and state power they attached no importance to the legal aspects of property rights acquired by the party. Many party district and regional committee buildings were handed over to the CPCZ by the government for indefinite use or were built at the state's expense. While the party was in power no one paid any attention to this. However, as soon as the party ceded its leading position in the political arena, the question of property rang out loud and clear. It emerged that the CPCZ owned not only quite a few buildings, political education centers, district committees, but also the Central Committee building.

A parliamentary commission was set up to clarify what was the property of the CPCZ and what was not, and a people's control committee addressed this question. The new leadership of the party also attended to this issue. On its decision many buildings belonging to CPCZ institutions were handed over to national committees. In order to rule out possible speculation, RUDE PRAVO and the Bratislava PRAVDA published a list of real estate acquired or built for CPCZ funds. The party also gave up the Central Committee building which has passed to the Ministry of Transport and Communications. It would seem that there no longer is a basis for any claims against the Communists. However, the Civic Forum organized the demonstration and demanded that the CPCZ be put on a par with other parties in terms of property ownership. Unless this is done, it is planned to hold a general warning strike 11 April.

A session of the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee was held in Prague on Saturday. Among other questions the situation which is taking shape around the party property ownership was discussed. The Executive Committee dispatched a letter to the Civic Forum coordination center. It says in part: The CPCZ Central Committee adopted a decision to hand over a large part of its real estate to the state, including property which belongs to the party. Last week alone party property in excess of 230 million crowns was handed over to the state... While in no way denying the right to strike, we believe that the strike scheduled for 11 April would not be conducive to mutual understanding and a fair settlement of this question. Especially, as it might be used for calls to ban the Communist party which would be at variance with the laws adopted by the new composition of the Federal Assembly.

A "roundtable" session was held 9 April, attended by representatives of the CPCZ and the Civic Forum. In addition to the repeated demand that party property be returned to the state without delay, an attempt was made at the session to blame all the mistakes of the past on the present members of the party. This proved once again that the material assets currently in the possession of the CPCZ are by no means the issue. Certain political forces cannot accept that depite the truly grave mistakes of the past and a serious internal crisis, the party has not split but has, on the contrary, embarked on a process of consolidation. It also still has quite a few supporters in society. More than 13 percent of the voters are prepared to vote for it. This is why an attempt is being made to defeat the CPCZ even before the elections. And since it is impossible to achieve this by democratic methods, old tried and tested methods of defamation and strong-arm pressure are being resorted to.

CSFR Scientists Visit To Review 1968 Events

LD1204223590 Prague CTK in English 1805 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 12 (CTK correspondent)—Chairman of the commission of the Czechoslovak Government for the analysis of the 1967-70 historical events Vojtech Mencl and chairman of the executive committee of the 'Revival' Club Milos Hajek ended today their three-day visit to Moscow, the aim of which was to agree upon possibilities of cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Soviet scientists in reviewing the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia.

The visit took place at the invitation of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

Vojtech Mencl said in an interview for CTK that they conferred with directors of the Institute of General History and the Institute of Slavonic Sciences who promised to talk with representatives of the Brezhnev leadership and to give the interviews at the disposal of the Czechoslovak side. The possibilities of Soviet scientists to obtain archive materials are quite limited as in harmony with a still valid Soviet law no document can be taken from an archive for 30 years, Vojtech Mencl said.

The Czechoslovak scientists appreciated the attitude of the Soviet historians to the problems of the year 1968 in Czechoslovakia and underlined their interest in real truth. Milos Hajek pointed out that in all discussions the Soviet representatives condemned the Soviet interference in 1968 and apologized for it. All of them spoke sincerely and openly, he added.

Document Signed With SFRY Chamber of Commerce

LD1304200190 Moscow TASS in English 1902 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Text] Belgrade April 13 TASS—The third Soviet-Yugoslav conference of representatives of the two countries' business circles ended here today. It was attended by 350 directors of industrial enterprises and foreign trade firms, economic management specialists, staff members of ministries and other institutions, as well as economists.

The conference focused on prospects of trade and economic cooperation in conditions of economic reforms. It was pointed to the need to develop new forms of economic cooperation, specifically, to expand direct production ties and to create joint enterprises, whose number will soon reach 35. The sides exchanged views on the transfer to account-settling in freely convertible currency which begins next year, and on tackling the problem of reduced trade turnover, which emerged recently.

Talks were held within the framework of the conference between two countries' businessmen, trade and economic agreements and contracts were signed. The Soviet delegation visited some Yugoslav enterprises and firms.

The Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Yugoslav Economic Chamber signed a final document on the results of the conference, which deals with their further cooperation. The next conference is planned to be held in 1991.

Vorontsov Meets Hungarian Foreign Minister

LD1304201190 Moscow TASS in English 1744 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest April 13 TASS—Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn met Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minster Yuliy Vorontsov here today.

They discussed topical international problems and bilateral Soviet-Hungarian cooperation.

The conversation was held in a constructive atmosphere and was characterised by mutual understanding.

Japanese Fact-Finding Group Visits Hungary

LD1604174990 Budapest MTI in English 1629 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 16 (MTI)—Under an agreement reached by the Hungarian and Japanese prime ministers early in the year, Japan sent a 66-member fact-finding delegation to Hungary. In addition to Japanese Government representatives, the large delegation includes leaders of Sanyo, Daihatsu, Asahi, Mitsubushi, Hitachi, Toshiba and Panasonic.

During their Hungarian visit, the delegation will be collecting experience on Hungarian possibilities for Japanese capital investment.

As reported earlier, Japan pledged to grant a 500 million dollar government loan as well as train 100 managers a year over a five-year period. It has also offered a government guarantee for a further 400 million dollar loan.

The Japanese experts are to make thorough investigation in prospective fields of investment. In the second stage of preparing investment projects, negoiating delegations will arrive in Hungary to carry out specific talks in possession of information processed by economic strategists.

The first item on the delegation's itinery was a visit to the Salgotarjan Fibreglass PLC [public limited company] on Monday. The Hungarian-Japanese joint venture makes high-tech isolation material with the use of Japanese technology and production management. The company has continuous process on Easter Monday.

The nearby Salgotarjan plate-glass factory has also learnt a lot from Japan: They make drawnplate glass by Asahi technology. And they have further joint projects in the pipeline with Japan. This would involve setting up a public limited company for the manufacture with Japanese capital involvement, as well as for quality plate glass.

During its Hungarian stay, the Japanese delegation will pay a visit to Videoton of Szekesfehervar, the machine-tool manufacturing PLC of Csepel and the pharmaceutical works of Kobanya.

Yazov Meets With Romanian Counterpart 9 Apr

PM1604121390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "On a Working Visit"]

[Text] Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, met 9 April with Colonel General V. Stanculescu, Romania's national defense minister, who is in Moscow on a working visit. They talked about questions of mutual interest.

V. Sandru, Romania's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the USSR, and Captain 1st Rank N. Dragnya [name as transliterated], military, naval, and air attache at the Romanian Embassy in the USSR, took part in the meeting.

Central European Leaders' Forum Viewed

PM1704120790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Article by A. Krushinskiy under the rubric "International Remarks": "Forward-Looking, Not Backward-Looking"]

[Text] The international forum held in Bratislava Castle 9 April was highly unusual in terms of those taking part: three presidents, three heads of government, six foreign ministers...

Indeed by European yardsticks this meeting can also be regarded as unusual: After all, the leaders of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—neighboring states in which such serious political changes have taken place recently that each of the three has already ceased to call itself socialist—were taking part in it. If you consider that the theme of the meeting was "Return to Europe," then the fears voiced by a number of observers are not surprising—they wondered whether it did not mark the creation of an "opposition bloc" within CEMA and the Warsaw Pact (or even the restoration of the anti-Soviet "cordon sanitaire?")

The fullest idea of the nature of the meeting can be derived from the speech delivered by Czechoslovak President V. Havel, the meeting's initiator. He stressed that it is by no means a case of going backward—"not to the Europe of the past, but to the Europe of the future." He suggested embarking on the creation of a European security commission and reaching agreement that the "Helsinki-2" conference examine a historic task: laying the foundations of a new Europe as a friendly community of independent peoples and democratic states. "Within the limits of existing European borders," Havel clarified his idea, "we should build what President M. Gorbachev calls the European home."

Turning then to regional problems, the Czechoslovak leader raised the following questions: Will we be able to find a joint approach to the solution of our ecological, social, cultural, economic, and political problems and problems of security, ensure respect for human rights in the broadest sense of the word, and crate for all peoples and national minorities conditions in which they could freely develop their own identity?

And so the Bratislava meeting made it possible to discuss not only what unites the three neighboring states but also what has long led to alienation—the nationalities question, without whose solution it is difficult to ensure an atmosphere of mutual trust as the basis for cooperation. In particular it was decided to institute a Hungarian-Czechoslovak commission for problems of national minorities.

A number of V. Havel's positions on global problems failed to meet with support among the meeting's participants. Thus, while as a whole he assessed highly the "great cause of renewal" in the Soviet Union, he voiced fears that "perestroyka in the USSR is losing the necessary tempo, vigor, and boldness," while Polish President W. Jaruzelski said that, in voicing one's attitude toward the events taking place in the USSR, it is essential to display tact. We must be aware of the complexities of the situation and renounce our didactic tone and attempts to criticize M.S. Gorbachev's policy, he stressed. Hungarian acting president M. Szuros expressed himself against the discussion of problems of a global nature, including the definition of a course with regard to China and the "third world" countries, and urged the meeting's participants to pay more attention to specific European problems.

The Bratislava meeting ended without the adoption of a final document: It merely reached agreement on the creation of an editorial group which in the very near future will formulate the text of a declaration on cooperation and joint actions by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But on the basis of existing materials it is possible to conclude that as a whole this forum (in which the leaders of the foreign policy departments of Austria, Italy, and Yugoslavia also took part) in my view reflected the desire of small and medium states to play an increasingly active part in the building of the all-European home. It is merely important that the "inhabitants" of this home should not shut themselves away in their own doorways and apartments.

West Europe

Italy's De Michelis Concludes Talks in Moscow

Holds Talks With Shevardnadze

LD1704183790 Moscow TASS in English 1822 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and his visiting Italian counterpart Gianni de Michelis were held today.

The talks focused on the situation in Europe. The sides agreed that the current processes on the continent promote the rapprochement of its Eastern and Western parts. It is important for it to fit organically into the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process and to promote peace and stability in Europe.

A thorough exchange of views on the problem of German unity was held. Shevardnadze stressed that German unification is possible only if three main conditions are met: It must take place in a phased, peaceful and democratic way, take into account the interests of all sides and the unconditional preservation of the balance of forces and the inviolability of existing frontiers, and be in full harmony with the Helsinki process.

The Soviet side believes that a peace treaty is the more correct form of peaceful German settlement. It must determine the military-political status of Germany and draw a line under the past war. German membership of NATO is unacceptable to the Soviet Union, the country's public opinion and the Soviet people.

The ministers agreed that the situation in Europe has changed so dramatically that a new European approach to security and cooperation is imperative. An important prerequisite of such an approach is a combination of the unification of two German states with an extention of the general European process, and a marked reduction of the armed forces and armaments in Europe. A conviction was expressed that a 35-nation CSCE summit meeting in 1990 will mark an important stage on this way.

Note was taken of the growing significance of the Helsinki process for the development of general European cooperation and stronger stability on the continent. Both sides expessed the conviction that the summit meeting of CSCE nations must become a major step in strengthening European security and bring results reflecting the realities of Europe's modern development.

The two ministers agreed that the summit meeting should reaffirm the inviolablity of Helsinki principles, stress growing cooperation between East and West, sign an agreement on confidence-building measures, as well as to outline areas of further cooperation in these areas, to explore the possible means and mechanisms capable of ensuring more intensive political consultations at various levels.

Shevardnadze and Gianni de Michelis paid much attention to the state of and prospects for Soviet-Italian cooperation, primarily in the light of realisation of agreements reached in November-December 1989 during Mikhail Gorbachev's state visit to Italy. The ministers expressed satisfaction with the general level and extent of Soviet-Italian interaction. At the same time an urgent need was stressed to give more dynamism to bilateral relations.

At the end of talks Shevardnadze and Gianni de Michelis signed a protocol of the 15th session of the Mixed Commission on the Implementation of Cultural Agreement between the USSR and Italy, which will regulate Soviet-Italian ties and contacts in this field in the next three years. The sides, in particular, agreed to study the question of the possible participation of Italian specialists in the restoration of buildings, which have historical and artistic value, built in Russian cities on designs of prominent Italian architects.

On the same day the Italian foreign minister left the Soviet Union.

Speaks at News Conference

LD1704153890 Moscow TASS in English 1523 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The preparation and organization of the Helsinki-2 conference is acquiring top importance in relations between European countries, as well as those with the United States and Canada, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis said at a press conference here today. He pointed out that preparations for the next all-European meeting had featured prominently in his talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze.

According to De Michelis, the sides discussed a possible future set-up in Europe. Dwelling on European security problems, he pointed out that both the USSR and Italy believed that the creation of a single European security system, based on the defense sufficiency doctrine and the system of institutions exercising control and settling conflicts, is the final objective in this sphere.

The relationship between the reunification of Germany and all-European integration was another important issue discussed at the talks, De Michelis continued. He expressed confidence that "the reunification of two Germanys can only take place within the framework of the all-European process and the Atlantic Alliance". At the same time, he pointed to the Soviet foreign minister's opposition to a united Germany belonging to NATO.

The sides called for the continuation of the quest for a political solution to these problems, the Italian foreign minister added. He pointed to the need for guaranteeing as much security as possible for the European continent, including the security of European borders after German reunification.

Touching upon Lithuania, De Michelis said that "it is necessary to continue the logic of a political dialogue in the settlement of this delicate problem and to avoid the dramatic development of events". According to De Michelis, Shevardnadze told him that the Soviet Government is going to take to the path of political dialogue, on condition that Vilnius does not go further with unilateral decisions and measures.

De Michelis said that he had also discussed with the Soviet foreign minister the situation in the Mediterranean region and the Middle East and stressed the need for convening as soon as possible a conference on cooperation and security with the participation of all Mediterranean and Middle East countries, as well as the Soviet Union and the United States.

Discusss Issues With Gorbachev

PM1804090590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "USSR President Receives Gianni de Michelis"]

[Text] M.S. Gorbachev received Italian Foreign Minister G. de Michelis 17 April. The USSR president gave a high appraisal of relations with Italy, its government, and the Italian people and noted the great significance of Soviet-Italian political dialogue on all the problems of our dynamic time.

M.S. Gorbachev gave his thoughts on the interconnection between the perestroyka policy and the formation of the new international relations. De Michelis supported this idea and stressed that in Italy there is a deep understanding that the success of perestroyka meets the interests of Europe and the whole world.

It was unanimously stated that the building of the new Europe, based on mutual understanding, cooperation, trust, and a balance of interests of all states, is the natural continuation of the process begun in Helsinki. De Michelis said in this connection that Italian foreign policy may be summarized in concentrated form by the formula: imagination, realism, goodwill.

M.S. Gorbachev welcomed this formula and noted that we in the Soviet Union see Italy and its leadership as people of like mind in the building of new relations on the European Continent.

The problem of German unification was touched on in this connection. M.S. Gorbachev particularly highlighted the need for the all-European process and the creation of new security structures in Europe to be synchronized with German unification. The solution to the problem of German unification, he said, must not cause concern to other states or peoples or upset the atmosphere of trust created in recent years by joint efforts.

De Michelis agreed with this approach. He said that Italy regards the USSR's security interests with understanding and intends to make its specific contribution to peaceful all-European cooperation.

M.S. Gorbachev assessed the present stage of perestroyka and in response to De Michelis' question broached the Lithuanian question. A solution is possible, the USSR president stressed, only within the framework of the constitutional process and on the basis of the mandate elaborated by the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

At the end of the conversation M.S. Gorbachev noted the great significance of De Michelis' visit from the viewpoint of the advancement of Soviet-Italian relations in all areas. He conveyed warm greetings to President Cossiga and to G. Andreotti, head of the Italian Government.

The conversation was held in the spirit of openness and mutual amicability traditional in Soviet-Italian relations.

E.A. Shevardnadze; F. Salleo, Italian ambassador to the USSR; and B. Bottai, secretary general of the Italian Foreign Ministry, were present.

Comments on Meeting With Gorbachev

AU1704163490 Paris AFP in English 1605 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 17 (AFP)—President Mikhail Gorbachev understands "the Lithuanians' aspiration to independence" but does not approve of their "precipitation" in declaring sovereignty, Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis said Tuesday following a meeting with the Kremlin leader.

Mr. Gorbachev also underscored his determination to stick by his presidential mandate which dictates that he defend the union, the minister told journalists here.

The Soviet president "also expressed the hope however that a political settlement could be found without undue turmoil," Mr. De Michelis added.

Mr. De Michelis also said that, at an earlier meeting Tuesday, Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze had denied the Soviet Union would impose "sanctions" on Lithuania, saying any measures would be in line with those affecting supplies to member countries of Comecon, the East European common market.

"We will not leave Lithuania without essential needs. There is no question of a total cut off of supplies" to the breakaway republic, Mr. Shevardnadze was reported to have said.

Yakovlev Receives West Germany's Egon Bahr

LD1704175590 Moscow TASS in English 1739 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—Soviet Communist Party Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev today received Egon Bahr, member of the Presidium of the Board of the West German Social Democratic Party.

They had a friendly meeting, during which they discussed a wide range of issues concerning the situation in Europe, Soviet-West German relations and the further developments of ties between the two parties.

FRG Defense Minister Stoltenberg Interviewed

PM1704141190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Balandin: "There Is No Threat From the East, But..."]

[Text] Bonn—"I cannot see any present danger from the Russians." These words were spoken by FRG Defense Minister G. Stoltenberg during an interview with West Germany's STERN magazine. If truth be said, however, he immediately added, as if afraid of being accused of excessive optimism: "We cannot predict the USSR's policy for decades ahead. A return to a complication of relations cannot be ruled out."

What prompted the minister to make such statements? Let us recall: The issue revolves around increasingly sharp debates about the external aspects of the problem of the two German states' unification. What will happen to the Bundeswehr, to the GDR National People's Army, to the troops of FRG allies, and to the Soviet Armed Forces in the GDR?

As far as the last are concerned, the opinions of many West German politicians coincide on this account. A sufficiently clear statement in this context was made by, for example, A. Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic faction in the Bundestag, who declared the need to demilitarize East-West relations. He moreover let it be understood that he meant the withdrawal of Soviet troops from GDR territory. Not a word about the allies' troops. Incidentally, no sooner had Hessen Premier W. Wallmann (also from the Christian Democratic Union) suggested the dismantling of a series of U.S. military installations in that land and the withdrawal of U.S. military subunits from there, and a hailstorm of reproach descended upon him. He was supposedly undermining friendship with the Americans, and wanted to leave hundreds of West German citizens unemployed.

As a matter of fact, there are plenty of contradictory arguments used by leading FRG politicians. On the one hand, G. Stoltenberg admits that the situation in Europe has radically changed and now there is no need for large numbers of soldiers and armaments. Moreover, if the Vienna talks on reductions of conventional armed forces proceed successfully, it will be possible to significantly reduce the Bundeswehr's numerical strength, but the presence of allied forces and the existence of nuclear weapons in Europe remain as always "taboo."

The defense minister also admitted the fact that many positive changes in East-West relations are the result of the processes of transformations now under way in East European countries and primarily the USSR. But he immediately added that if promising prospects for the future have emerged in Europe today, this is solely due to the West's policy.

It is impossible to imagine a future united Germany being neutral and outside NATO. A demilitarized Germany as an alternative to membership in the North Atlantic alliance is a problem which, in the minister's opinion, need not be discussed at all.

But the problem actually happens to concern not just the FRG or NATO alone, it concerns the security of the whole of Europe. What kind of future "all-European home" can we talk about if the neighbors' interests are disregarded? Why not heed their opinions, proposals, and advice? Their anxiety is historically justified.

'No Unity of Opinion' on Unification in FRG

PM1104103990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by A. Balandin: "FRG: Euphoria Is Passing; Problems Remain"]

[Text] Bonn—What will a united Germany look like in the future? What problems await the FRG and its population? These questions now are leaving indifferent virtually no one I encountered in the first days of my stay in Bonn.

The answers were most varied. From the cheerful—we shall finally be united and will perhaps become one of the strongest countries in Europe—to total rejection: Why do we need this? Why should I pay the "Easterners" out of my own pocket? Let them get out of the crisis themselves. They are being taught new professions while suitable work cannot always be found for us local people.

Here, of course, everything is intermingled: the attitude toward unification and toward the migrants coming from the GDR to take up permanent residence. Undoubtedly such a lightning poll cannot claim to be a generalized version of public opinion among the FRG population but it does help to form some idea of ordinary people's feelings.

At government level, too, there is no unity of opinion. You only have to recall the problem of the creation of unified currency, economic, and social unions. For instance, what should the exchange rate of the GDR Mark be against the FRG Mark? The German federal bank has suggested setting it at 2:1. The reaction was immediate. In the GDR there were protest demonstrations involving thousands of people, in the FRG there were very keen disputes and debates.

The establishment of this exchange rate, FRG Foreign Minister H.-D. Genscher stated, will have a particularly adverse effect on the welfare of elderly GDR citizens. After all, it is a case of savings which people have accumulated over their lifetime. Many of them will be on the verge of the poverty line. W. Roth, a Bundestag deputy from the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany], believes that this will lead to a sharp increase in the flow of migrants from the GDR.

O. Lafontaine, deputy chairman of the SPD and that party's candidate for the post of chancellor, noted that this step will lead to the GDR's transformation into a country with a cheap workforce.

Representatives of the government tried to soften such a sharp picture. According to H. Tietmeyer, the chancellor's adviser and a member of the board of the German federal bank, the final decision has not yet been taken and various options are being examined.

But whatever the final decision it will hardly be able to satisfy all interested sides. K.-O. Poehl, president of the German federal bank, expressed himself more frankly on this subject, stating that an exchange rate of 1:1 would result in a considerable financial burden for the FRG itself, which would have to assume all the GDR's debts.

And so on the one hand no one wants to suffer, as Federal Chancellor H. Kohl stated, and on the other—where to get the money? How to supplement the budget? Obviously, again at the expense of the ordinary citizen. The circle has closed. The leaders' reassuring speeches are not having a very reassuring effect on ordinary citizens: Ultimately it was decided to defer the discussion of this problem with representatives of the GDR Government until the end of the Easter celebrations.

Many people in the FRG have started to wonder whether events are not developing too rapidly, whether it is necessary to force them on so, and whether plans have to be built on the basis of a change in the GDR Constitution and its association to the FRG.

J. Rau (SPD), prime minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, and his Hessen counterpart W. Wallman (Christian Democratic Union), for instance, intend at the forthcoming conference of heads of land governments to defend the proposal to create a German federation. They are of the opinion that the future Germany should not be a metropolitan state with its capital in Berlin.

There is even the opinion that unification is not necessary at all. In my view the viewpoint of the West German journalist S. Khaffner [name as transliterated] set forth in an interview with STERN magazine is interesting in this connection.

There is not a single European state, S. Haffner stated, which would not feel better if both German states continued to exist. The experience which Europeans have already had with a unified Germany on two occasions inclines them to melancholy reflections.

Although the Germans themselves are no longer subject to imperialist and chauvinist ambitions, although existing economic, military, and political ties will not allow them to pursue their old policy, nonetheless those same economic ties have not yet once been able to prevent war. As for various treaties and alliances, to this day debates are continuing over whether NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be retained. And when people assert that we ourselves have changed, here I feel dominated by skepticism. It is not easy to change the character of one person, and it is even harder to change the character of an entire people.

Well, that is pessimistic but after all, like any viewpoint this one also has the right to exist. It is simply that you are convinced yet again of how far we are all linked in this life and how important it is to find solutions acceptable to all.

FRG Debate on Future of Nuclear Weapons Viewed

PM1804114790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90 First Edition pp 1,5

["On The Spot" report by own correspondent Ye. Grigoryev: "Following the Pershing-2's"]

[Text] Bonn, 13 Apr—Following the Pershing-2's, the U.S. side has started removing nuclear cruise missiles from the FRG and destroying them. A U.S. transport aircraft which took off from the Hahn military base, in the West German Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, was carrying the first eight of these missiles to the United States, where they will be destroyed. They will be followed by a similar consignment. So yet another stage has begun in the implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles on FRG territory. When it is over, not one of the 62 U.S. nuclear cruise missiles will be left in the Hunsrueck mountains.

As is known, in accordance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S. warheads for the Bundeswehr's Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles are also due for elimination. There are 72 of them. The removal of the warheads is to take place next year. At the moment, I was told at the FRG Defense Ministry, the West German air force is starting the process of removing these missiles from alert status and dismantling them.

Despite this, the question of nuclear weapons on FRG territory has not been removed from the agenda, indeed it is becomong increasingly topical in the eyes of the public and political circles. Particularly in the light of the prospect of German unification. We are talking about tactical nuclear weapons, which it would be dangerous and absurd even to hypothesize about using in the conditions of a united Germany. The Free Democrats, headed by Foreign Minister Genscher, say that they cannot conceive of the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons remaining part of NATO's plans. Some Christian Democratic Union leaders favor the elimination of nuclear artillery.

In a recent interview, Defense Minister Stoltenberg agreed in principle that it was fair to raise the question of whether "it serves any purpose or any need" to replace NATO tactical nuclear missiles with new systems. However, within the framework of the standing NATO guidelines Stoltenberg still favors "keeping a certain number of nuclear weapons in Europe."

He has also put forward the "idea of air-based nuclear defense" instead of the corresponding ground weapons. Of course, this would permit the removal of the undesirable "close combat" systems from West German soil. But on the other hand, given the combination of aircraft and tactical nuclear missile, the idea proposed by the Bundeswehr leadership would effectively turn this system into a medium-range weapon, that is, it would circumvent the provision of the Treaty on the Elimination of iIntermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles.

France's Schmitt Views Military Hardware

LD1704145990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1303 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 17 April, (TASS)—"We do not have such machines; perhaps we ought to purchase them?" Army General Maurice Schmitt, chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of France, asked his entourage after an Mi-26, the helicopter with the greatest lifting capacity in the world, was demonstrated to him today at an airbase at Kubinka, near Moscow. Maurice Schmitt is in the USSR on a five-day official visit.

The Soviet combat equipment made a great impression on the French general. However, as was explained to him by Colonel General of Aviation Vladimir Pankin, first deputy commander in chief of the air force, it is not only military circles that are displaying an interest in it in various countries. The Mi-26, for example, which is capable of lifting up to 40 tonnes of cargo and carrying more than 80 people, has been purchased by civilian firms for constructing pipelines and powerlines.

Maurice Schmitt gave a high appraisal of the proficiency and skill of the Soviet military pilots who demonstrated the technical capabilities of the MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters in the sky around Moscow. Representatives from the base not only answered the numerous questions from members of the French delegation, but also allowed them to look over the cabins of combat equipment. In a conversation with the air base commanders, the chief of the general staff of the Armed Forces of France stressed that the military in Europe must maintain "the dynamics of the new relations in order to establish stability on the continent."

The members of the French delegation also visited a training center of the Dzerzhinskiy Military Engineering Academy, where they were given a demonstration of the command post and launch silo of the RS-18 ICBM, known as the SS-19 in the West.

In a brief interview for a TASS correspondent, Maurice Schmit noted that "in France there is no talk of the country returning to the NATO structure." However he said, "it is necessary to think about the evolution of the North Atlantic bloc." Touching on the potential for creating an all-European security system, the French general stated that "this could serve the long-term future, the aim of which is stability." In his words, "every country must possess the possibility of defending itself, and must not have the possibility of attacking."

After the visit to military installations, Maurice Schmitt will make a speech to the students, professors, and teaching staff of the General Staff Academy of the USSR Armed Forces.

Finnish President Calls for 'Restraint' on Baltic

PM1204135090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy report: "The Finnish President Calls for Restraint"]

[Text] Helsinki—Finnish President Mauno Koivisto held a major press conference and gave interviews to two television channels. He answered many questions of concern to the country's population.

It is well known that foreign policy in Suomi is the head of state's prerogative, and his views, in particular on the events in Lithuania, were eagerly anticipated here.

The president said that his country always shows restraint in interpreting international events taking place anywhere in the world. Why should this principle not apply to nearby countries, too? Especially since good relations with neighbors are an important premise in Suomi's entire foreign policy.

The country's position, as is well known, was set forth earlier in the statement by Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio. Recognizing the right of nations to self-determination within the all-European process, he stressed that Finland believes that the solution to the question should be found through talks.

When M. Koivisto was asked whether Finland could act as an intermediary in such talks, the president rejected the idea, adding:

"It is very difficult to hold talks when Lithuania believes that USSR laws do not apply on its territory."

M. Koivisto in effect approved the statement by Lieutenant General G. Hagglund, chief of the main staff of Finland's defense forces, in an interview for Swedish journalists. The general stated that no one can deny the USSR's legitimate rights to ensure its security in the Baltic region.

Answering another question, the president said that he sees no possibility of raising the "Baltic question"—from the viewpoint of the "occupied territories"—for discussion on the agenda for the next stage in the all-European conference.

There has recently been much debate in the country over the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and Finland, signed in 1948. It is increasingly frequently claimed that a number of articles in this document are "obsolete" and not in keeping with the times, and that it should be revoked entirely as inappropriate to the status of a neutral state.

"The treaty is fine in the form in which it exists," the president statd. In his opinion there is no reason to change it.

M. Koivisto's position on the question of the return to Finland of territories ceded to the USSR as a result of the "winter war" of 1939-1940 was clear (some Finnish politicians are raising this question). The country's borders, the president noted, are enshrined in three peace treaties, and he sees no reason to return to this question.

Once again assessing highly the results of M.S. Gorbachev's visit to Finland last October, M. Koivisto said that work on the accords reached is continuing.

This "evening with the president," as the screening of the press conference and interviews on the television channels could be called, may not have satisfied everyone in Finland—especially those who hold extreme views. But people in the country rightly believe that there is an important difference between how particular events are discussed by the broad public, and how the political leadership speaks and acts.

Finnish Center Party Delegation Holds Talks

PM1704121990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Interparty Links"]

[Text] A Finnish Center Party delegation headed by S. Kaariainen, the party's general secretary, was in the Soviet Union 9 through 12 April. The first sitting of a joint CPSU-Finnish Center Party working group on questions of political collaboration in economics and ecology took place. The delegation also had discussions in the CPSU Central Committee International Department and the Karelian and Leningrad Oblast CPSU Committees.

CPSU Greets Danish Communists' Congress

PM1704090190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Text of CPSU Central Committee message "To 30th Danish Communist Party Congress"]

[Text] We cordially greet the delegates to the 30th Danish Communist Party Congress.

We wish the Danish Communists successes in the struggle for the working people's interests, for peace, democracy, and social progress.

In developing relations between our parties we will make a joint contribution to the consolidation of mutual understanding and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Denmark.

[Signed] CPSU Central Committee

Supreme Soviet Delegation Ends Visit to Cyprus

PM1704152990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Interparliamentary Ties"]

[Text] Nicosia, 12 Apr—The official visit to the Republic of Cyprus by a USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by USSR People's Deputy A.S. Yeliseyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Parliamentary Group, has ended.

The delegation members had full and mutually beneficial meetings with Cypriot President Y. Vasiliou and the leaders of the leading political parties. There were constructive talks with the leadership of the Cypriot parliament during which questions of developing interparty ties between the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Cypriot House of Representatives were discussed.

Public 'Concerned' Over Hunger Strike in Turkey

PM1604130590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Profound Concern"]

[Text] Broad Soviet public circles are profoundly concerned about reports which have issued from Ankara that Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargin, leaders of the United Communist Party of Turkey, have announced the start of an indefinite hunger strike, a statement by the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries reads. They have been forced into this by the position of the authorities, which, despite indications of the democratization of Turkish society, are failing to take measures to repeal discriminatory articles in the Constitution banning the Communist Party's activity in the country.

Comrades H. Kutlu and N. Sargin command authority and respect in their motherland and among the democratic public throughout the world. The Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries expresses concern at the state of health of H. Kutlu and N. Sargin and urges the Turkish authorities to avert the threat to their lives, the statement emphasizes.

Latin America & Caribbean

Soviet-Cuban Commission Signs Payments Protocol

LD1804103790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2126 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Havana, 18 Apr (TASS)—The 20th session of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation ended with the signing on Tuesday in the Cuban capital of the final document and the protocol on commodity circulation and payments for 1990. The head of the Soviet delegation at the session was Leonid Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Cuban delegation was headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Cuba.

A wide range of issues linked with the development of bilateral ties between Cuba and USSR was discussed at the session. Particular attention was paid by the sides to the progress of realizationof the bilateral agreements signed for the current five-year period on construction and reconstruction of projects in various branches of the Cuban economy, on cooperation in the sphere of trade relations and of science and technology. Measures were outlined which will facilitate strict fulfillment of the contract obligations to supply goods important for the USSR and Cuban economies, an increase in efficiency of construction, and cooperation projects and will help ensure increasing volumes of goods transportations between the USSR and Cuba.

The sides thoroughly analyzed the progress made in coordinating the state plans of both countries taking into account the changes which are taking place in cooperation within the CEMA and the implementation of economic reforms in the Soviet Union. An agreement was reached on setting up a joint working group to draft proposals to improve the mechanism of economic cooperation between the USSR and Cuba in accordance with the decision of the 45th CEMA sitting.

Speaking of Soviet-Cuban cooperation, two processes should be taken into account: the process of strengthening traditions and links and the process of renewal, Leonid Abalkin pointed out in an interview to TASS correspondents and USSR Gosteleradio after the signing of the documents. Many of those who are speaking about the folding of relations with Cuba or other countries are not thinking in real terms. Suffice it to say that a third of all the sugar Soviet people consume is produced here on this island. This is a serious matter. Without Cuban sugar we simply could not make ends meet. Examples could be mentioned of other forms of cooperation, too. For instance I saw the work of the nickel combine which supplies all its output to the Soviet Union.

I also want to stress the fact that Cuba has always been the very first to give us aid in times of difficulty, be it the earthquake in Armenia or the disaster in Bashkiria when Cuban doctors sent us the world's best medicaments for burns and helped save the lives of many Soviet people.

A group of Soviet servicemen wounded in Afghanistan is now in Havana for treatment. I met them. They are sincerely grateful to Cuba for what is being done for their recovery. There is also a big group of Soviet children here who directly or indirectly suffered from the Chernobyl tragedy. Cuba generously and selflessly helps us in this respect. In talks we have had with Fidel Castro it was said that Cuba is ready to take up to 500 Afgantsy servicemen and up to 10,000 Soviet children. In the field of medicine Cuba possesses a very big potential. It has developments unique in world practice. We have already concluded an agreement on a significant increase in purchases of Cuban medicines and medical equipment.

As regards new forms of cooperation, at the time of the session of the intergovernmental commission we reached agreement on the creation of a joint working group to make a careful study of measures to be taken to fulfill the decisions of the 45th CEMA session, including the need for certain transitional measures. We are on the road of renewal, not lightheartedly, but with careful thought and consideration, and we are discovering very promising channels of cooperation, Leonid Abalkin stressed.

'Collapse of Communism' in East Bloc Condemned

PM1504140590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Unattributed report under the rubric "IZVESTIYA Teletype Room, Wednesday": "Minister Believes a Backward Step Has Been Taken"]

[Text] Cuban Culture Minister Armando Hart Davalos declared Tuesday that the collapse of communism in East Europe has upset the fragile balance in international relations and signified a backward step in historical development. In a commentary disseminated by PRENSA LATINA A. Hart also said that as a result of this the United States has abandoned its attempts to resolve existing problems by peaceful means and now feels free to impose its will by force everywhere, and in Latin America in particular.

A. Hart said that for the past 45 years the balance in international relations and also the existing interdependence of states made the United States respect international laws, if only formally. "The situation that has been created in East Europe has sharply changed this balance of forces," he declared.

Cuban Chief of General Staff To Visit USSR

PM1704193590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Visiting Soviet Union"]

[Text] Division General Ulises Rosales del Toro, chief of the General Staff and first vice minister of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces, will pay an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union in the second half of April this year at the invitation of Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister.

Cuba Tests Jamming System for Marti Stations

LD1704214190 Moscow TASS in English 2122 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Havana April 18 TASS—The tests of systems to jam Radio Marti station, which has been operating from U.S. territory in for the past five years, began in Havana City Province on the night of April 16 to 17.

An official communique circulated here on Tuesday pointed out that the organisers of Radio Marti broadcasts that are a violation of international laws and norms do not conceal the ultimate aim—to stifle the Cuban revolution.

The present U.S. Administration has gone still further by launching anti-Cuban TV Marti Television broadcasts, the communique pointed out.

Taking into account all these facts, the Cuban leadership decided to test jamming systems that during the first phase will affect only Havana City Province in the mornings.

Petrov Comments on Nicaraguan Government Changes

LD1704175990 Moscow TASS in English 1733 GMT 17 Apr 90

["Situation in Nicaragua—TASS Comment"—TASS headline; by TASS political correspondent Gennadiy Petrov]

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The closer April 5 [as received], the day of the transfer of power by the Sandinistas to the government of President-elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, draws, the more acute the problem of disarming and disbanding the Contra rebels grows.

The Toncontin Agreement, signed by representatives of Chamorro and the leader of anti-Sandinista forces on March 23, envisages the total demobilization of the Contra forces by April 20. However, while rebel groups in Honduras have begun turning in weapons to U.N. forces, armed sallies by rebels on Nicaraguan territory continue, which hampers the normalisation of the situation in Nicaragua and the Central American region as a whole.

The commanders of some groups have declared that they would lay down their arms only after the new president takes office. Others insist on waiting for the establishment of full democracy, without making clear the meaning of this vague phrase. Still others ignore the compromise solution reached by the Sandinistas and the victorious opposition and demand the resignation of the commanding officers of the Sandinista Army, overlooking the readiness expressed by Sandinista military leaders, including Defence Minister Umberto Ortega, to resign from their party posts.

The rebels' unconstructive stance, nearing on an ultimatum, certainly torpedoes the solution of many Nicaraguan problems. This stance could well have been predicted. But the present silence of the U.S. Administration on this score cannot fail to make people wonder—it is common knowledge how great is Washington's influence on the anti-Sandinista forces, which have been receiving generous American aid throughout the ten years of the undeclared war in Nicaragua.

The most pressing and vital question for the long-suffering Nicaraguan people is how to ensure a peaceful transfer of power on mutually acceptable conditions. A civil war would not only mean a national disaster but would considerably complicate the settlement of the Central American conflict and create conditions for greater outside intervention.

As for the Soviet Union, it unequivocally respects the agreements reached by Nicaraguans themselves, supports national reconciliation in Nicaragua and favours the settlement of the Central American conflict exclusively by peaceful means and the demilitarization of this volatile region.

Komplektov Meets Nicaragua's De Chamorro

LD1104090890 Moscow TASS in English 0850 GMT 11 Apr 90

[Text] Managua April 11 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Viktor Komplektov met Nicaraguan President-Elect Violeta Barrios de Chamorro here on Tuesday.

The meeting was held in a friendly atmosphere and was marked by a sincere mutual desire to understand each other better.

De Chamorro praised the international activities of the Soviet leadership and expressed the intention of her government to develop good and comprehensive relations with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side confirmed its full respect for the results of the recent general elections in Nicaragua.

The sides discussed aspects of the Nicaraguan transitional period and stressed the need to provide for its normal progress and tranquil and peaceful Nicaraguan development, as well as the fulfilment of the national reconciliation policy. They also agreed that this development is necessary for not only solving national problems, but also for ensuring a Central American settlement.

De Chamorro welcomed the positive Soviet role in progress towards a Central American settlement. The Soviet side stressed that it will continue to actively and constructively contribute to this process, and build bilateral friendly relations on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs and respect for sovereignty.

Central American Presidents' Meeting Assessed

PM1104081990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

["Viewpoint" article by Yuriy Stroyev, PRAVDA developing countries department special correspondent: "A Step Toward Peace"]

[Text] The presidents of Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and El Salvador have met for the seventh time. They spent two days in the resort of Montelimar, on the Pacific coast of Nicaragua, discussing Central America's most pressing problems. The outcome was the signing of an agreement that is modest compared with the other six. The main element in it is the process of demobilization and disarmament of the formations of Contras—both in Nicaragua and outside. It will start immediately and will end no later than 25 April. It is on that day that the handover of power to new Nicaraguan President V. Chamorro takes place.

The only new thing about this decision is the timeframe. A conference in the Honduran city of Tela demanded the disarming of the gangs before the end of 1989. But the presidents' wishes were totally ignored by the U.S.-backed Contras. They are continuing their efforts to influence the situation in Nicaragua. And they are doing it in their usual manner. Why else should they dash off from their bases in Honduras and cross into Nicaragua, where they have essentially resumed their combat actions.

The conference participants condemned the terrorist actions in the region and called for an end to "all violent actions which directly or indirectly inflict damage on the civilian population and production infrastructure." At the same time, they welcomed the new steps taken in Guatemala and El Salvador toward national reconciliation. However, it is well known how agonizing this process is.

I think there is something else at issue here. For many people in Central America and throughout the world the new political thinking in Soviet-American relations is associated with hope for a settlement of regional conflicts. But the reactionary forces in Central America had their own ideas, seeing it as a good opportunity to settle scores with the "isolated rebels." They were mistaken. The national liberation movements' popularity and the patriots' peace proposals brought the governments to the negotiating table. The experience of national reconciliation in Nicaragua was also a contributory factor.

The conference in Montelimar demonstrated for the umpteenth time the simple truth that the settlement of the Central American crisis is by no means being held up by the "malicious intent of the Sandinistas," who, incidentally, have scrupulously, sometimes to their own detriment, observed all their commitments. It is well known what influence the United States is having on the processes in Central America, in its brazen exploitation of the economic backwardness, social inequality, and instability of governments and frequent incitement of the region to violence and war.

The results of this are evident from a study carried out by the International Commission on the Restoration and Development of Central America, which has on it 47 representatives from 20 European and Latin American countries, the United States and Japan. In the past 10 years between 2 and 3 million people have lost their jobs and cannot even feed themselves and the living standard has fallen by 25 percent. In this same period more than 160,000 people have died.

Central America is in a vicious circle of underdevelopment and violence and this has been exploited by the United States. It has increased its presence and created military bases in some countries in the region. Now its advisers are strutting around in Honduras, El Salvador, and even in Costa Rica.

Incidentally, the problems of foreign military interference and the need for socioeconomic and political integration and protection for the Central American countries, which were to some extent touched on at previous summits, were again passed over on this occasion. Possibly because three presidents—D. Ortega in Nicaragua, O. Arias in Costa Rica, and V. Cerezo in Guatemala—will soon be surrendering office. Then these important questions will have to be tackled by a completely new "five."

In any case, optimists claim, the era of conflicts has passed and the era of peace has come. One has to agree with the last part. The importance of what took place in Montelimar is in fact confirmed by the newly emerged prospects for mutual understanding, cooperation, and revival in the region. As for the first part, it is an equation with many unknowns, whose solution depends on the sincerity of all the interested parties, including the

Supreme Soviet Session

Reportage From 18 Apr Gdlyan, Ivanov Discussions

Deputies Support Conclusions

LD1804082590 Moscow TASS in English 0804 GMT 18 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The USSR Supreme Soviet continued to discuss the results of a parliamentary probe into the work of the disgraced criminal investigators Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov today.

The parliament is expected to pass its verdict on the case today and respond to a Soviet Prosecutor's office request to lift the pair's parliamentary immunity in order to begin criminal proceedings against Gdlyan and Ivanov.

On Tuesday, the commission set up by the Congress of Soviet People's Deputies to investigate the allegations reported that Gdlyan and Ivanov violated the law and used illegal methods to elicit confessions.

The commission accused senior officials of the prosecutor's office of patronising the investigators and turning a blind eye on their violations.

The commission also cleared several Soviet leaders, accused by Gdlyan and Ivanov of corruption.

Most deputies supported the commission's conclusions on Gdlyan's and Ivanov's activities, but declined to lift their parliamentary immunity.

Deputies failed to agree on a draft resolution on the case.

The parliament began its morning session today with a discussion of the up-dated version of the resolution.

Gdlyan, Ivanov Statements Condemned

LD1804091590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpts] To begin with, news from the third session of the Supreme Soviet. Over to the All-Union Radio correspondents' post in the Kremlin. At the microphone is Marina Novitskaya.

[Novitskaya] Hello. As you know, this morning the Supreme Soviet was to decide on the question discussed yesterday: on the conclusions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies commission that examined materials connected with the activities of the investigative group of the USSR procuracy headed by Gdlyan. [passage omitted]

The voting was not a simple matter. First of all they voted on the draft as a whole, and then point by point. All the points were passed as a result of the voting, except for one, dealing with agreement or nonagreement on the dismissal of people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov from the procuracy bodies. There are some other clauses on this point, but so far they have not been formulated definitively, so I will refrain from quoting them. The other clauses that have been adopted are these:

to take cognizance of the commission's report and consider its functions as completed;

to condemn the unproven statements of people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov defaming the Supreme Soviet and certain people's deputies and officials—of course, I am not quoting these points in full;

The Procuracy, Ministry of Internal Affairs, KGB, and Supreme Court are to carry out measures aimed at implementing the proposals contained in the commission's report and also put by the people's deputies at the Supreme Soviet sitting dealing with the calling to account of persons occupying top posts whose activities caused particularly serious public concern.

'Final Decision' Postponed

LD1804104690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpt] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Over to the All-Union Radio post in the Kremlin. Andrey Nikiforov reports:

[Nikiforov] Deputies at this morning's joint session continued the debate of the resolution on the conclusions of the commission for checking materials connected with the activity of the investigation group led by Gdlyan. This work was not completed yesterday, as you know. The commission for drafting the resolution today tabled a practically new version of this document, taking into account many proposals from deputies.

I could not find in the draft resolution even a mention of the statement of the Prosecutor's Office regarding Gdlyan and Ivanov asking the Supreme Soviet to agree to bring these investigators to criminal liability. So there is is no question of that. But there is a point denouncing the unproved statements of people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov defaming the Supreme Soviet and individual deputies and officials. It also says that in the event of the continuation of such activity leading to the destabilization of the situation in the country, the Supreme Soviet may return to the question of depriving them of deputy's immunity.

There is a total of five points in the resolution. Four of them have been adopted as a basis, so amendments of an editorial nature only can be made. The point of the resolution about giving consent to the dismissal of people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov from the bodies of the USSR Procurator's Office has not been adopted. More work will have to be done on this point in order to reach agreement.

Overall, taking into account the multitude of amendments which deputies have contributed today, it has been decided to redraft the resolution and return to it, and to make a final decision at 1700. [passage omitted]

Moscow TV Carries 17 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Lukyanov Chairs Session

LD1704163190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 17 April begins broadcasting a recording of a joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow on 17 April.

The program begins with Anatoliy Lukyanov in the chair for the morning session and noting that 445 deputies are registered in attendance. Lukyanov declares the joint session open. He then provides bcakground to a commission's work on the activity of Gdlyan and Ivanov, and adds that deputies have copies of the commission's report and procuracy document.

At 1505 GMT Historian Roy Medvedev takes the floor. In response to a question about the relay of the session, Lukyanov says that it will be full, as decided. Medvedev begins by saying he will not read out the whole report. He regrets the absence of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Lukyanov points out that they have the right to participate or to refrain. Medvedev then notes the breaches of the law committed by Gdlyan and Ivanov. He notes the general fine work of investigative officials in the country. He goes on to detail the investigations into corruption in Uzbekistan, and notes the errors committed by Gdlyan and Ivanov.

Medvedev goes on to the actual work of the commission. He reads out evidence against Gdlyan and Ivanov provided by people formerly under prosecution and since rehabilitated and freed. Medvedev refers to the Aliyev case, and notes the need to take account of the huge amount of damage wrought by the leaders of the period of stagnation in order to understand the popularity of Gdlyan and Ivanov. He reads out the views given by Sakharov on the case, noting that there were probably breaches of the law during the investigations.

Medvedev concludes by saying that there was no pressure on the work of the commission from above.

At 1544 GMT Medvedev replies to written questions on details of various cases.

At 1545 GMT Lukyanov asks that questions to the commission be presented in written form, as there are three co-chairmen and they need to consult. He grants the floor to Golik of the Committee for Issues of Law and Order. Golik provides the background to a Gdlyan appeal published in a Leningrad newspaper containing allegations against Gorbachev and other leaders for their alleged relations with the mafia. He goes into detail on the law on slander, noting that the committee cannot make decisions on a legal matter of this sort.

At 1552 GMT Lukyanov gives the floor to Professor Denisov of the deputies' ethics commission. Interruptions from the floor occur on procedures. Denisov points out that his commission has no power to interfere with the political views of deputies. The point is not even that deputies criticize one another, but how they do it. He says Gdlyan and Ivanov on occasion abuse their opponents instead of fighting their arguments, and spread rumors and commit slander. Denison elaborates on the role of his commission, the role of conscience, and the moral code. He calls for an improvement in deputies' ethical conduct. Denisov says Gdlyan and Ivanov deserve censure, especially when they slander people who the deputies have elected themselves. The commission believes that in this case it is moral censure that is needed.

Debate Continues on Gdlyan-Ivanov Case

LD1704170990

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1604 GMT Denisov continues. He states that he believes the investigators acted incompetently from a moral point of view. The whole of the procuracy is probably incompetent in the same way. The leadership of the procuracy should be punished in the same way as the two investigators and released from their duties if Gdlyan and Ivanov are to be released. The investigators should not necesarily be prosecuted for violations of the criminal law as the issue in hand is incompetence rather than criminal acts, Denisov sates in conclusion.

At 1608 GMT the recording of the first session ends. The announcer says that there will be a 15-minute break, which will be followed by the recording of the second session.

At 1623 GMT the television recording resumes with Lukyanov opening the second session. A decision must be made on who is to be allowed to speak and in what order, Lukyanov says.

At 1625 GMT Sukharev begins his report. He states that it is unusual for the Supreme Soviet to be discussing corruption. He gives figures for bribetaking and prosecutions connected with it in Uzbekistan. He speaks about the number of people who were falsely detained as a result of Gdlyan and Ivanov's work. Others were also at fault and they are being punished. He outlines difficulties in dealing with the case due to the investigators' popularity.

At 1635 GMT Sukharev refers to the investigators' claims of corruption in the Kremlin. The Procuracy has looked into everything connected with this and is convinced that the people accused were slandered. The accusations, including those addressed toward the president, are political provocation. He defends the Procuracy's record, giving figures for the number of Procuracy workers prosecuted over the past year, and concludes by speaking about plans for improving supervision of the Procuracy.

At 1641 GMT Lukyanov says that Sukharev should examine the questions handed to him and will be given time to answer them later. More people have requested permission to speak on the issue. Deputy Tutov has asked to be allowed to read out a statement by Gdlyan and Ivanov. Lukyanov asks deputies what should be done.

At 1644 GMT Deputy Pupkevich intervenes from the floor, opposing the reading of the statement.

At 1645 GMT Lukyanov requests that the issue be put to the vote.

At 1646 GMT an unidentified deputy makes a point from the floor. Deputy Tutov comes to the rostrum. An unidentified deputy objects from the floor to Tutov speaking.

At 1648 GMT Lukyanov puts the issue to the vote: 164 for, 236 against, and nine abstentions. Tutov is refused permission to speak.

At 1650 GMT an unidentified deputy says that Tutov should be allowed to speak. Lukyanov says that the Supreme Soviet's decision is adopted, but the document with the statement should be distributed to deputies during the interval. It is decided that this will be done.

Accused of 1930's Investigation Methods

LD1704183390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1652 GMT an unidentified deputy from the floor makes a point.

At 1653 GMT Deputy Nemtsev says that the material in the posession of the governmental commission proves that Gdlyan and Ivanov are guilty. He criticizes those in judicial circles who are throwing doubt on this. Those who permitted Gdlyan and Ivanov to act in such a lawless fashion should also be brought to account, Nemtsev states.

At 1656 GMT Deputy Guliy speaks about the necessity for objectivity. The material put before the deputies is not in his opinion sufficiently objective, and no proof is given. He criticizes members of the Supreme Court for making statements against Gdlyan and Ivanov and in effect prejudging the issue. An independent court system is needed. He calls for Sukharev to be replaced as procurator general.

At 1703 GMT Deputy Azarov refers to the events of 6 April when a statement by Ivanov was read on Leningrad television. He states that the text of this statement should be distributed. He expresses the opinion that the investigators should be punished for any violations of the law which occurred in their work.

At 1709 GMT the afternoon session begins.

At 1710 GMT Lukyanov reports that there are a number of problems with registration: A number of deputies who are not present appear to have registered. A proposal that deputies' statements be published in the press is read out—it is decided not to vote on this. Lukyanov speaks about a number of other procedural issues.

At 1713 GMT Deputy Sorokin comes to the rostrum. He says that the investigatory commission and the Procuracy have worked efficiently, but are not disinterested as they are dealing with issues concerning the Procuracy's own leadership.

At 1717 GMT the floor is given to Adylov. He accuses Sorokin of whipping up inter-ethnic feelings. He says fraud was one of the main elements in the work of Gdlyan in his investigative work. Adylov goes on to defend Sukharev from some of the attacks made against him. He cites details and figures of abuses carried out in connection with the Gdlyan and Ivanov group. He says the electorate were duped into electing Gdlyan and Ivanov people's deputies. Much has to be done to restore inter-ethnic relations in the USSR, Adylov stresses.

At 1728 GMT Lukyanov calls for restraint from using epithets and reiterates the need for a calm approach. Zhdakayev takes the floor. He casts doubt on the procurator's statements regarding the Gdlyan case, and supports Denisov's assertion that the two of them are scapegoats. Zhdakayev says the Procuracy has been trying to lead deputies astray in order to lay the blame on Gdlyan and Ivanov. He calls for a vote on Sukharev's position.

At 1734 GMT Lukyanov again calls for calm. Deputy Chekoyev takes the floor. There is much speculation on the people's feelings as regards Gdlyan and Ivanov, he says. The two investigators may be a weapon in the hands of those who want to bury perestroyka. We ought to establish who stands to gain or lose in this controversy, says Chekoyev. The Procuracy must be supported, he concludes, in order to ensure order in the country.

At 1741 GMT Akbarov, a Central Asian deputy, comes to the microphone to say that Gdlyan and Ivanov should be tried in Uzbekistan where they committed their crimes.

At 1743 GMT Deputy Burbulis speaks. This controversy goes deeper than the work of two investigators, he says. The whole procuracy system was based on a different system of power, a system that still persists. If we make do with a condemnation of Gdlyan and Ivanov, we would be failing to go to the root of the problem; the commissions should continue their work, and Gdlyan and Ivanov should come clean on the information they claim to possess, Burbolis says.

At 1748 GMT Deputy Isayev shares Denisov's opinion on charitable feelings, but what about those who committed suicide under pressure from Gdlyan and Ivanov?

The two investigators established a "regime of lawlessness and arbitrary rule" that smacked of Beria-ism, Isayev states. The facts that are clearly sufficient to put them on trial in the USSR Supreme Court.

At 1751 GMT Deputy Angapov takes the floor. What kind of an example are we setting to the viewers, he asks? Why did the Procuracy fail to act on the initial reports concerning Gdlyan and Ivanov's work? Despite Gdlyan's claims about a Kremlin mafia, he has not come up wih facts to prove it, just as his opposition to Sukharev's appointment was weak on facts. Gdlyan and Ivanov's slander against Gorbachev is an insult to the entire country, and was rightly condemned by the Komsomol congress, says Angapov.

At 1757 GMT Deputy Chelyshev comes to the rostrum to comment on the overwhelming number of citizens' complaints in the country. Poor work by the Procuracy is to blame. If Gdlyan and Ivanov had not taken a swing at the upper echelons of power, they would have been left in peace, says Chelyshev. They should not be treated as scapegoats, the whole system must be reformed.

At 1802 GMT Deputy Mamedov from Uzbekistan denounces Gdlyan and Ivanov for using 1930s methods in their investigations, and complains about the central authorities refusal to react on the thousands of complaints from mistreated Uzbek citizens. Mamedov cites exampls of unlawful arrest and extraction of confession by Gdlyan and Ivanov. The victim has now been rehabilitated and compensated at state expense: Mamedov mentions a long list of similar victims. This kind of thing would hardly be possible even in Chile or South Africa, says Mamedov. The campaign in support of the two investigators has led to frequent disorders.

Evidence of Criminal Activity Cited

LD1704191890

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1810 GMT Deputy Yudin takes the floor to oppose attempts to present the issue as an anti-Uzbek campaign. Gdlyan and Ivanov must, however, be tried, he says. He says the Procuracy must continue its investigation of the Smirnov case.

At 1817 GMT Deputy Gubenchenko, a member of the commission takes the floor. He sees Gdlyan and Ivanov as real heroes of our times. He says there is no truth on either side; on both sides means are being used to achieve certain aims. Gubenchenko draws attention to shortcomings in the Soviet practice of investigating crimes. He calls for a separation of the procuracy from the investigative bodies, and notes the need for such bodies to be subordinate to the law. Gubenchenko also notes cases of the misuse of power in Russian history for the sake of combating officialdom. He says it would be wrong to bring Gdlyan and Ivanov to criminal account in view of other failures to bring wrongdoers to book.

At 1829 GMT Yeltsin takes the floor. He draws attention to shortcomings in the conclusions of the commission. Yeltsin recalls 1986, when there were attempts to take measures against the leadership of Uzbekistan. He recalls how he raised the matter in the Politburo, and how there was opposition to taking measures. Yeltsin says Gdlyan and Ivanov had always denied an Uzbek case, and that it was a matter of a mafia throughout the country. He calls for the procuracy's appeal to be rejected and states that the commission should continue its work.

At 1836 GMT Lukyanov announces a break until 1600 Moscow time.

At 1837 GMT the recording continues. Lukyanov is still in the chair, and asks deputies to register again; 424 register. Lukyanov is flanked by Mokanu and Nishanov. Lukyanov says discussion of the Chernobyl situation will be postponed at the request of the Council of Ministers. He says deputies must omit all hints of inter-ethnic tension, otherwise they will be deprived of the floor. Lukyanov tells deputies of the amount of corruption in the country in recent years, and gives data from the Supreme Court on the courts' activity during this period. He says there is as yet no draft resolution, and calls on chairman of chambers and heads of committees to prepare such a draft resolution. A deputy from the floor calls for an end to the debate and requests more information from the commission on the case. Lukyanov says there won't be a vote on this matter as there are more deputies wishing to speak.

At 1847 GMT Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, takes the floor. He says he called the Yerevan KGB during the break to ascertain whether Gdlyan and Ivanov were there. He was told that they had been there since Sunday, as both are standing there as deputies to the republican Supreme Soviet. This causes a commotion. He also asked about their health and was told that there is no cause for concern on this. Kryuchkov goes on to the body of his address. He gives background to the KGB's fight against corruption, the Cotton Affair in particular. Kryuchkov cites details of Gdlyan and Ivanov's work in the Smirnov affair. He goes on to defend Sukharev and his work in rooting out shortcomings in the Procuracy. Kryuchkov draws attention to flagrant irregularities in the work of Gdlyan and Ivanov, and compares methods used by them to those used in the 1930's. He notes the efforts made by the two investigators to escape responsibility. Kryuchkov says there is firm evidence of the criminal activity by the two men. He notes the recent efforts by them to influence people ignorant of the actual facts of the case. He rejects the charge that there is official pressure on the KGB.

Certain Deputies Defend Gdlyan, Ivanov

LD1704202790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 1907 GMT Giro takes the floor. He says the main thing is to give a political assessment of the two men. He condemns their arrogance in refusing to even attend the session.

At 1911 GMT Gryazin takes the floor. He refers to a case in Estonia, where he is a deputy. Gryazin asks why these two in particular are being picked on. He notes the difficult situation of the Procuracy and proposes further work by the commission with the help of legal specialists. It would be a dangerous precedent to strip a people's deputy of his mandate on the basis of an incomplete criminal investigation, he concludes.

At 1917 GMT Deputy Shapovalenko says that Gdlyan and Ivanov are not to blame for everything. Thousands of others committed infringements along with them. An assessment must be made of the entire system rather than treating them as scapegoats. He regrets the Gdlyan and Ivanov are not present, but asks the deputies present to act according to their conscience rather than publicly tearing the two deputies to pieces.

At 1923 GMT Deputy Strukov speaks. From an early stage, he says, Gdlyan and Ivanov took an accusatory approach in their investigations, and the complaints against them began to build up. Strukov categorically rejects attempts to denounce the entire Procuracy system. Whether Gdlyan and Ivanov are guilty or not is something for the courts to decide, not the Supreme Soviet. If it weren't for unlawful statements in the press by Procuracy representatives, there would be no campaign in defense of Gdlyan and Ivanov. The laws must be strictly observed. Strukov censures Gdlyan and Ivanov for their unfounded claims of corruption in high places.

At 1934 GMT a Central Asian deputy says that he personally experienced the methods of Gdlyan and Ivanov. True, corruption was undermining the economy and faith in the authorities, but Gdlyan and Ivanov committed too many law violations. The Supreme Soviet commission has been objective in its work and the two investigators must answer for their deeds.

At 1941 GMT Deputy Sukhov comes to the rostrum to ask why no measures have been taken to step up investigations into corruption in Uzbekistan. He has appealed to Gorbachev on the subject, but received no reply. This matter concerns the entire country, not just Gdlyan and Ivanov. Malpractice by representatives of the state occur all over the country and this debate will not solve the problem.

At 1949 GMT Deputy Krayko comes to the rostrum. Nobody doubts, he says, that the Gdlyan-Ivanov investigation group broke the law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Soviet should not consent to the two men being tried: This will make them into national heroes, as people attribute the state of the country to corruption above all. Krayko says that Gdlyan and Ivanov should, of course, be cautioned, but anything more would undermine the authority of the Supreme Soviet.

At 1953 GMT Deputy Sobchak speaks. He is no supporter of Gdlyan and Ivanov's methods. The current debate is on the conclusions of the commission's report, but that report contains no conclusions, says Sobchak. It merely describes the activities of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Why is it that some commission members have spoke at this session, while others have merely sent in written reports? This does not allow us to assess differences of views within the commission. The procuracy presentation gives no specifics on the violations allegedly committed by the Gdlyan-Ivanov group. Sobchak says that, since more than 600 people worked in that group, these violations could have been committed by anyone. People can only be tried for what they have done. If there really is irrefutable evidence against Gdlyan and Ivanov, as Sukharev has claimed, this should be presented here. Only then can we vote on this issue, says Sobchak. We are being asked to place our faith in the Procuracy, but past experience has shown this to be impossible. Lukyanov asks Sobchak to keep to the point. Sobchak goes on to say they should trust nobody—only their own conscience. His proposal: Reject the motion.

Lukyanov points out that the commission does in fact give its conclusions in the report. Sobchak objects: He meant that there are no conclusions on the acculations made in the procuracy presentation.

Deputies Vote To End Discussion

LD1704222490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 2006 GMT Deputy (?Alekseyev) comes to the rostrum and warns against stirring up passions and fears in the country. This is fraught with danger at this crucial stage in the country's development. The commission has done its job, he says, and by dragging out the issue we are merely agitating public opinion further. The major part of the responsibility in this matter should be borne by those procuracy officials who allowed the violations to occur in exchange for bribes.

At 2015 GMT Deputy Semenov speaks about the Hint affair, which he says has no connection with the Gdlyan and Ivanov case. He considers that the commission's report is unobjective—many of those who refuted evidence given to the investigators later went back to them. Semenov quotes an article in a Kharkov newspaper which praised Dukhanin who had uncovered some of Gdlyan's malpractices. He speculates that accusations of testimonies being obtained under pressure were made because members of the Central Committee were being placed under suspicion.

At 2024 GMT Deputy Ignatovich states that the Chernobyl issue is to be considered tomorrow. He moves on to the issue in hand. The commission has not properly carried out its work. Many issues were not cleared up. Therefore, the conclusions cannot be completely valid. Both the investigatory group headed by Gdlyan and Ivanov and the USSR Procuracy are, in his opinion, guilty of having done poor work. He supports the proposal already made that an independent group of experts be set up to investigate the matter in an objective fashion.

At 2030 GMT Deputy Baranov starts to speak. Baranov states that the refusal of the Supreme Soviet to listen to Gdlyan and Ivanov's statement would be seen as bias by the people. He criticizes those in the Central Committee who are not defending the slander against them, and asks why they are not defending themselves. He speaks about the lack of confidence in the work done by the investigatory group.

At 2037 GMT Deputy Golik takes the floor. He speaks about opinions on whether Ligachev took bribes or not; opinions depend on whether people like him. He claims that it is easy to accuse any deputy of bribetaking. It is important that the law is supreme. The opinion of the people over someone's guilt should not be the main consideration. Golik speaks about the legal aspects of prosecuting Gdlyan and Ivanov; there are not yet structures for trial by jury, and this is what is needed if proceedings are to be instigated against the two investigators.

At 2045 GMT Lukyanov calls for a vote on whether discussions should end: 364 for, 30 aganst, 20 abstentions. Discussions are ended. Lukyanov announces a 15-minute interval. Medvedev and Sukharev are to speak after the interval, after which a decision will be made.

Medvedev, Sukharev Answer Questions

LD1704223590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 2048 GMT Lukyanov gives the floor to Roy Medvedev. Medvedev speaks about the questions which he has received. He will group some together as many coincide. Some people have criticized him for not reading the full account of the commission's work. He states that the report would have been two hours long. Sobchak claimed that there are no conclusions; Medvedev claims that each section of the account contains conclusions. The account speaks of the grossest violations of the law by the investigators and the necessity that they be immediately removed from the leadership of the investigatory group—there can be no other interpretations of the conclusions of the commission, Medvedev states. The commission has also clearly stated that the accusations against Ligachev are totally unfounded. He explains why some members of the commission did not sign the account—they have spoken and given their opinions here. He denies that the investigators were only accused of malpractices after they accused those at the top. The investigation into their work began before this. Gdlyan and Ivanov accused important figures, without any proof, simply because they had themselves been exposed. Medvedev says the case is a political one. He believes that the country is in danger if people such as Gdlyan and Ivanov are heroes. In connection with questions about the commission's relation to the Politburo, he states that the commission was working under the instructions of the Second Congress of People's Deputies. It did not have a mandate from the Politburo or the KGB. The commission never met with the Politburo. The commission's task was to disclose the truth.

AT 2013 GMT Medvedev answers a question about whether Gdlyan and Ivanov could have investigated crimes in Uzbekistan without breaking the law. He believes this to be a strange question and states that of course they could. Medvedev again stresses that the commission was not working under a mandate from the Politburo, but it did receive documents from the Politburo. One question is about how often Ligachev had been called before the commission in relation to the fact that the commission found it possible to declare him clean. Medvedev recounts how they investigated the issue.

At 2109 GMT Sukharev answers questions. He speaks about the Smirnov affair. After the Second Congress of People's Deputies the case was considered for more than two months by a new investigatory group, as a result of which it was concluded that he was innocent. Sukharev reads a statement made in May 1989 by Ligachev in which he calls the accusation provactive in response to accusations that pressure was put on the Procuracy and the investigatory group by Ligachev. This statement clearly shows that this was not the case. The investigation was thorough, and the Procuracy was convinced that Ligachev was not guilty. A third question asks how many people were invovled in investigations in Uzbekistan. A further question asks whether it was correct that Smirnov was cleared by the commission. Sukharev says that the investigation was thorough and the case against him was not proven.

At 2120 GMT further questions are read out by Sukharev: What kind of punishment would he consider fit for Gdlyan and Ivanov? For a long time he supported the two men, but then began to doubt their honesty. Gdlyan and Ivanov refused to cooperate, which has led the Procuracy to appeal to the Supreme Soviet to strip them of their people's deputy mandates.

Question: Why did the Procuracy fail to react sooner? Because of the command-administrative system, says Sukharev.

What about the Uzbek cotton scam. The investigation is not yet complete, replies Sukharev. Are there any allegations against Gorbachev? None, says Sukharev. All such suggestions are pure speculation

Summing up, Sukharev answers Sobchak's point that the Supreme Soviet should not be making decisions on legal proceedings against Gdlyan and Ivanov: It is a fundamental issue, but he is unable to arrest the two investigators. Should we continue living by double standards or investigate things to their conclusion?

At 2132 GMT Sukharev objects to the all-encompassing conclusions made by the commmission on the work of the procuracy as a whole—these criticisms are unfounded.

At 2134 GMT in response to a remark from the floor, Lukyanov reminds everyone that they are not discussing whether or not to strip Gdlyan and Ivanov of their deputies' mandates. They are merely deciding whether to permit legal proceedings against them, he says.

At 2138 GMT Sukharev reiterates the point: For several months the Procuracy has been unable even to interview Gdlyan and Ivanov because of their immunity.

At 2139 GMT Lukyanov gives the floor to Laptev, who will present the final draft decision. A very serious amendment has been made to the initial draft following observations during the debates. Laptev reads out the draft: To agree with the commission's conclusions; to agree to criminal proceedings against Gdlyan and Ivanov, and to ask the USSR president to appoint an independent procurator to ensure legality in the handling of the case; to recommend that the USSR president take measures to step up procuracy supervision; to ask the appropriate authorities to take measures to implement the recommendations in the commission report, and to submit them at the current session of the Supreme Soviet; to instruct the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Law and Order Committee to analyze the state of the anti-crime drive in the country and to report on this matter.

At 2149 GMT Lukyanov proposes passing the draft decision point by point rather than beginning another debate. The deputies vote on this proposal: 238 for, 93 against, and 55 abstentions; accepted.

At 2152 GMT Lukyanov calls deputies who are objecting to the procedure to order. An unidentified deputy makes a point on the way in which voting should be carried out. Lukyanov puts to the vote the issue of whether the draft in hand should be voted on: 155 for, 148 against. There are no objections; people do not understand what is being voted on. Lukyanov attempts to explain again. Other deputies make remarks from the floor.

At 2158 GMT Laptev continues his reading of the alternative draft proposals.

At 2207 GMT the deputies register; 435 are present. Voting on the draft proposals takes place: 244 for, 145 against, and 33 abstentions. The draft is therefore to be discussed.

Voting on Commission's Report Begins

LD1704225390

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian continues its recording of the 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin in Moscow.

At 2212 GMT Lukyanov speaks about whether voting should be by name. An unidentified deputy says voting should be by name.

At 2214 GMT Deputy Golik does not consider that names need to be revealed. Deputies should reveal themselves before voting if they so wish.

At 2215 GMT Lukyanov says voting can be either anonymous or by name. Deputies vote on whether to vote by name: 190 for, 200 against, and 26 abstentions. Lukyanov decides that voting is to be by name as more than a fifth of deputies are in favour of this. Deputies agree to vote by clause: 351 for, 37 against, and 23 abstentions.

At 2221 GMT Laptev asks for remarks on the first point. Sobchak remonstrates inaudibly from the floor. An unidentified deputy says that the first point cannot be agreed with. A second deputy makes a point on the voting procedure. Several deputies make points. Two opinions are to be voted on. The first: Sobchak's proposal that the commission's report be taken into consideration and the commission's work be considered finished; the second: to agree with the main conclusions of the commission and to consider the work of the commission finished. The first option is voted on: 271 for, 99 against, and 37 abstentions. The second option is voted on: 125 for, 245 against, 30 abstentions. The first option is therefore adopted.

At 2231 GMT the announcer says agreement was not reached on point two and they are to discuss it on Wednesay 18 April.

Gdlyan, Ivanov Cited for Serious Violations

LD1704191990 Moscow TASS in English 1901 GMT 17 Apr 90

["Soviet Parliament Discusses 'Gdlyan Case'. (includes end of parliament discussion)"—TASS headline]

[Text] [no dateline as received]—Nikolay Strukov, a cochairman of the commission to study the activity of the Gdlyan and Ivanov group, stressed at the evening session that "the facts of violation of law by several investigators of the Gdlyan group are numerous and serious." He said the commission could not find evidence proving that the higher echelons of power counteracted the Gdlyan and Ivanov group. There is no evidence either to prove numerous statements by the former investigators about the involvement of several top leaders of the country.

Replying to allegations often repeated by Gdlyan and Ivanov that their removal led "to the curtailment of the struggle against corruption in the country", Anatoliy Lukyanov, who presided over proceedings, cited relevant data of the USSR Supreme Court that refuted these assertions.

Although the majority of speakers supported the conclusions of the commission assessing the activity of Gdlyan and Ivanov, the request of the USSR Procurator's Office to sanction their arrest did not meet approval. A Leningrad lawyer, Anatoliy Sobchak, stressed that before demanding the arrest sanction, the procurator's office must hold an inquiry into the case of Gdlyan and Ivanov and give the parliament convincing evidence of their guilt.

Replying to them, Procurator General Aleksandr Sukharev stressed that without the Supreme Soviet sanction the procurator's office cannot conduct an investigation.

Speaking about the political motives of Gdlyan and Ivanov in the past few months, many deputies discerned in them obvious signs of adventurism.

"It looks like Gdlyan and Ivanov are interested in not letting the scandal around their names to subside," said Nikolay Ignatovich, a member of the Deputy Commission.

No matter what guided Gdlyan and Ivanov, many speakers stressed, the whipping up of passions around them objectively works against perestroyka.

"Some radical groups today simply use Gdylan and Ivanov as a battering-ram for destroying the bastions of power," a Moscow lawyer, Konstantin Lubenchenko, stressed in this connection.

A draft resolution was proposed for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet. However no decision was passed. The discussion will continue on Wednesday.

Gdylan, Ivanov Discussion Viewed

LD1704120890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Correspondent Olga Vasilenko report from USSR Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin]

[Text] May I remind listeners that there is a joint sitting of the chambers of the USSR Supreme Soivet today, hearing the report of the commission set up at the First Congress of People's Deputies to check material connected with the activities of the procuracy investigation group headed by Gdlyan. Here is a chronicle of the morning session up to date:

Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, one of the commission co-chairman, delivered a report from the commission. Then Golik, chairman of the Committee on Issues of Law and Order and the Eight against Crime, read the conclusion on the appeal by people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov published in the VECHERNIY LENINGRAD newspaper.

Next was Denisov, chairman of the Ethics Commission; then Sukharev, procurator general of the USSR, on the representation to the USSR Supreme Soviet on obtaining agreement to dismiss people's deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov from the procuracy organs and to bring criminal charges against them. There followed a brief discussion on whether to give the floor to Deputy Tutov, chairman of the Gdlyan and Ivanov Defense Committee, so that he could read their appeal to the Supreme Soviet. It was decided, by a vote, not to give him the floor but to circulate this statement during the main intermission.

The debate began. Nemtsov, Guliy, Azarov, Sorokin, and other deputies spoke. We shall tell you later about the content of these debates.

I shall turn now to the report by Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev. An hour ago we gave a fairly detailed exposition of it, but I shall nevertheless say that Roy Aleksandrovich considers one of the main reasons why public attention throughout the country has been focussed upon Gdylan and Ivanov to be the following: None of the fathers of stagnation have been punished. No investigation is being carried out into the Medunov case, or the Aliyev case: Incidentally, Aliyev himself, Medvedev said, is even insisting on such an investigation. No check is being carried out on Brezhnev's family, and so on. Yet what they did, their acts, inflicted a great deal of harm—moral, economic, and political—and this is no less significant than the harm inflicted by Stalinism.

The co-chairman of the commission also reported that the commission had been subjected to no pressure from the top leadership; it worked independently, and came to its conclusions independently.

Now for Golik's conclusions. His committee—for issues on the fight against crime—examined the appeal, and came to the conclusion that points one and two of Gdlyan's and Ivanov's appeal reflect the political views and aims of the authors, and touch upon law and order issues only indirectly. As for the assertion that Gorbachev and Lukyanov, together with Ligachev, act in the role of protectors of the mafia—in inverted commas—such an utterance in the press bears signs of the objective corpus delicti described as libel.

And further: The appeal contains a call to start on 1 May this year general political demonstrations and strikes and to cast off the hateful unlawful political clique which is leading the country into social catastrophe. Here, Golik said, there are signs of the objective corpus delicti described as insult. Such calls could provoke violent actions against the legitimate authorities. However, Golik stressed, the final legal evaluation can be given only by a judge.

The address by Anatoliy Alekseyevich Denisov was unusual but humanly convincing. He spoke of the huge number of letters sent to the ethics commission: Deputies complaining about one another, and people complaining about deputies. In many cases, when there are insufficient grounds, smears are sought and disseminated. We may be dissatisfied with someone's actions, whether the person involved be a party leader or a co-chairman of a commission. But we ourselves elected them, and so why do we ourselves defame them, and thereby defame ourselves as well? Our commission's verdict is God's verdict, Denisov said—that is his assessment, he was speaking figuratively—and we are guided by our conscience. We do not want the concept of good and evil to be turned into malice: Forgive others, and much shall be forgiven thee, was the quotation Denisov cited. The commission expresses moral censure, not legal condemnation. As regards Deputy Denisov's personal opinion, we could make it possible for Gdlyan and Ivanov to be dismissed from their work for professional incompetence. But then the entire procuracy leadership should then be dismissed, too. As regards crimes, the allegations about these are none too convincing, and this is no justification for bringing the two deputies to court. That sets a bad precedent.

I shall not repeat Sukharev's address: Practically everything he said has been published previously, and is well known. He also said that that it is not a matter of Gdlyan and Ivanov themselves—both Denisov and Medvedev said this, too—but of the fact that their activities are an encroachment upon the values of perestroyka, and he called for the law to be obeyed. True, he added that it was only recently that we had started to deal with supervision, and this had indeed enabled the case connected with the Gdlyan-Ivanov investigatory group to be brought.

The question of why Gdlyan and Ivanov were not in the hall could not fail to arise: Perhaps, Sukharev said, because to start with the sitting should have been on Thursday rather than Tuesday. How did we get the idea that it should be on Thursday Luykyanov asked? Lukyanov also said that Gdlyan is being nominated as a candidate deputy for Armenia: Perhaps that is why he is not here today. It was also suggested that he might be indisposed.

Well, as I say, debates are under way now. In addition to Nemtsev, Guliy, Azarov, Sorokin, Adylov, Zhdakayev, Akbarov, Burbulis, and Isayev also spoke. The debate continues, and we shall report in our later news bulletins on what the deputies are saying.

Resignation of Prosecutor General Demanded

LD1704130790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1213 GMT 17 Apr 90

[TASS parliamentary correspondent report]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 17 April (TASS)—The majority of members of the commission have acknowledged that the decision of the USSR Prosecutor's Office to initiate criminal proceedings concerning abuses of official position by investigators Tel'man Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov was well founded. This was stated today at a session of the USSR Supreme Soivet by Deputy Roy Medvedev, one of the cochairmen of the commission set up by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies to study the activity of Gdlyan's and Ivanov's investigation group. [passage omitted]

According to Roy Medvedev, members of the commission have called for the resignation of Aleksandr Sukharev, the current USSR prosecutor general. [passage omitted]

There was a sanctioned public meeting held on the initiative of the "Gdlyan Defense Committee" on Manezhnaya Square in the center of the capital at around 1400. Taking part in it were, among others, a group of USSR and Russian people's deputies and over 200 deputies from the Moscow City Soviet of the new convocation, which is now into its second day in Moscow.

17 Apr Speakers Address Gdlyan, Ivanov Case

Medvedev Addresses Parliament

LD1704163490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 17 Apr 90

["Excerpt" of speech by Roy Aleksandrovich Medvedev, co-chairman of the commission investigating the USSR Procurator's Office, delivered at the USSR Supreme Soviet session at the Kremlin in Moscow on 17 April—recorded]

[Text] [Medvedev] It is an unusual thing when the fate of two investigators, two people, is discussed literally by the whole country, splitting the country into two different groups. I must say this occcurs frequently in the history of various states. This happened at one time in France with a question of principle when issues relating to anti-Semitism split France into supporters of Dreyfus and anti-Dreyfusites. This happened in Russia with the Beylis case. It happened during the time of Rasputin when some people were fervent supporters of Rasputin and others were fervent opponents of Rasputin. Some elements of all these cases, Rasputin and the other cases, can also be traced in these people. Therefore, to some extent, our session here today is not only an important precedent but also a kind of historic session because people will talk for a long time about the decision which we adopt and about our discussion, and I can honestly say the issue will not end with this session. Whatever decision we adopt, the issue of Gdlyan and Ivanov will remain for a long time in our people's consciousness. Countless groups supporting Gdlyan and Ivanov exist and will continue to exist, and I discern in this movement not just a shortcoming but also a certain virtue of our public opinion because for an enormous majority of the people, even those living far from Moscow and who have never seen or heard of Gdlyan and Ivanov, this is not just a question of the fate of two investigators but also a matter of principle—hate for corruption, hate for injustice. In these people, justly or unjustly—you can judge on this from the accounts you will evaluate—they see two avengers, two protectors of the people, and two bold fighters against corruption. I say I discern in this the positive factor in this movement which has unfolded in our country in defense of Gdlyan. The negative factor is that an enormous degree of legal ill-breeding among our people is also revealed by this. We have received a huge number of letters from the most diverse corners of the country, thousands and tens of thousands of letters, defending Gdlyan, against Gdlyan and Ivanov. We have received very many letters which are simply strange to read. People write directly, sometimes elegantly and sometimes less elegantly, that Gdlyan and Ivanov are, of course, criminals, but they were fighting against even more dreadful and powerful criminals. Some people express themselves in a more refined manner, as it were, saying that in rising to fight the hydra of corruption we cannot avoid staining ourselves with its blood, that we cannot wage a struggle against illegality in our country using legal methods, and even that when people find out about arrests of families, about the arrest of wives and children, mothers—some people write, and I have even received one letter from the chair of a juridical institute—they write that these women, although they are innocent, should go to prison because they also enjoyed the luxurious houses and dachas which were built for them by their husbands and that they received valuables from them, unembarrassed by their violence, and that it would be a good thing for them to go to prison too. This legal nihilism, this lack of respect for the law, this aspiration to protect the law even using the most illegal methods, is of course a grave consequence, a grave legacy of those eras of illegality which we have lived through at various times and which we shall probably not overcome very soon. Now that we are faced with the issue of decisively strengthening the law enforcement bodies we must all concern ourselves also with strengthening the procuracy. Over the past two years, and especially during the year which has passed since the first congress of USSR people's deputies, the prestige of the procuracy has unfortunately dropped to a considerable extent both in the eyes of the Supreme Soviet and in the eyes of the broad masses of the population. The report by our commission contains a phrase about the need to decisively strengthen both the cadres and the leadership of the procuracy. I can decipher this phrase. The general report of the commission was not signed by all of the commission's members; the majority signed it. In this case we approved the report with a majority of the members of the commission. We had a minority and this monority wishes and, I hope, will be able to speak immediately after my speech or in the course of the debates and it will express its own viewpoint on the report and on the commission's work. On one issue all of the commission's members were agreed; I hope I speak on behalf of all of the commission's members: We must elect a new procurator general for our country at the next congress of people's deputies.

Yeltsin Criticizes Politburo

LD1704210490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1829 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Remarks by Boris Yeltsin at 17 April joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow, during debate on Gdlyan-Ivanov affair—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! I am personally not satisfied with the conclusions, or rather materials, of the commission set up by the Congress of People's Deputies. Yes, there is a great deal of factual material there, a great many facts which have been taken from individual criminal and other cases. Nevertheless, the matter has not been brought to a conclusion there, conclusions have not been drawn, and conclusions have also not been drawn on the work of the many organs and organizations which are directly involved in this. Conclusions have not been fully drawn regarding the actions of the Procuracy at this time and on this major issue. Second, conclusions have not been drawn on the work of the court, on the work of the KGB, and on the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, which on several occasions granted permission for an extension of custody. As a member—on two occasions, during two periods—of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, I did not once take part in the examination of those matters relating to an extension of these cases; that is, they took place somewhere, someone signed them, and we don't know anything about this. Nor are the actions of the Party Central Committee and of the Politburo known with regard to this matter.

As a member of the Politburo [as heard], I would like to mention at least one fact that characterizes the atmosphere in which the Gdlyan and Ivanov group worked. Early in 1986 they appealed to the leadership of the Central Committee and to many members of the Politburo with a serious memo which outlined cases they had come across. They also asked that they be given permission to initiate an investigation of the leaders of the republic, including Usmankhodzhayev [former first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Central Committee]. For six months there was no reply, nor any decision, and I think that 1986 was precisely the period when the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Party Central Comittee, and the Politburo failed to draw timely conclusions from this very substantial and serious work, because at that time it was possible to make corrections in time, including Gdlyan and Ivanov, who were certainly committing certain official errors in their work.

Only by the end of 1986 did they write a letter to me, too. I went to the general secretary and then tabled the matter at the Politburo. I have to say that at that moment the Politburo did not support bringing to account, or at least bringing charges, against Usmankhodzhayev. That is, the commission failed to draw conclusions on the whole of our system and not just the law enforcement system that is in operation in our country. After nearly 18 months it was given a shove by the 19th CPSU Conference, and this matter was set in motion; and as has been said today Usmankhodzhayev was also brought to account and convicted.

I don't know, and I have not once heard, that Gdlyan and Ivanov had spoken of the Uzbek affair. On the contrary, wherever they spoke they constantly repeated that there was no Uzbek affair, that there was a mafia system in our country, and that there was corruption in our country which needed to be seriously dealt with and sorted out.

Unfortunately, carried away now with personal examination of the questions of Gdlyan and Ivanov, we have started devoting less attention than previously to the fight against corruption and the fight against the mafia. I think that the proposals of the Procuracy are completely illegitimate, impermissible, and we, the Supreme Soviet, have to decline this proposal of the USSR Procuracy, since if we deprive two deputies of their deputies' immunity today, then tomorrow there will be others, because many of us can already feel pressure from many sides, so to speak, as people's deputies of the USSR. I think that the commission should continue its work so as to draw very serious conclusions, including political ones, to present them to the Congress of People's Deputies, and also to set up a large commission of specialists so that they might bring this matter to a conclusion professionally and close it. Thank you.

KGB's Kryuchkov Urges Charges

LD1704155190 Moscow TASS in English 1447 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondents:

USSR People's Deputies Telman Gdlyan and Nikolay Ivanov, who are absent from the hearings which are now under way in parliament, are now in Armenia where they have been nominated candidates for the posts of People's Deputies of the republic, USSR State Security Committee (KGB) Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov told parliament today.

He said that he phoned the republican KGB in Yerevan today and received information on the whereabouts of Gdlyan and Ivanov. Gdlyan and Ivanov are safe and sound, he added.

Speaking at the hearings, Kryuchkov emphasised that the drive to combat organised crime and corruption was conducted not by Gdlyan and Ivanov alone. Back at the end of the 1970s, KGB agencies in Uzbekistan and the USSR uncovered embezzlers of state property in particularly large amounts. A total of 21 million roubles worth of money and valuables were withdrawn under those cases in 1981-1985 in Uzbekistan alone.

The KGB chairman described the violation of legality by Gdlyan and Ivanov during the handling of a number of cases as "a typical example of political and penal adventurism".

"One gets the impression," he said, "that they are now doing everything to evade responsibility for what they did."

Kryuchkov supported the USSR Procurator's Office address calling on the USSR People's Deputies to sanction the stripping of Gdlyan and Ivanov of parliamentary immunity and instituting criminal proceedings against them.

Gdlyan Calls for Parliamentary Hearing

PM1704161390 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 6

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy T. Gdlyan by unnamed correspondent: "After the Leningrad Television Broadcast"—no place or date of interview given; first paragraph is an introduction]

[Text] Everyone is talking about the three-hour program on Leningrad Television which showed video material recorded during the investigation by the Gdlyan-Ivanov group. A MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent met USSR People's Deputy Telman Gdlyan.

[Gdlyan] In my view, this program was a breakthrough in the news blockade which surrounded us for almost 18 months. What Ivanov showed contained nothing that was not known to the CPSU Central Committee, the Prosecutor's Office, the KGB, and the USSR Supreme Court. But for tens of millions of our compatriots (Leningrad Television reaches an audience of 45 million, if I am not mistaken) this was the first opportunity to decide for themselves, on the basis of documentary evidence, the extent to which the accusations against us are justified. It seems to me that now they would find it hard to accept the veracity of the thesis, which is also being promoted by the press, that mountains of gold had been confiscated from poor Uzbek peasants. Moreover, television viewers could decide for themselves whether the interrogations, face-to-face confrontations, and other investigative actions taken with regard to the partocracy which was accused of bribery had been conducted with sufficient propriety. Let people ultimately decide for themselves whom and what to believe.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] But the investigation material was not shown in its entirety....

[Gdlyan] To show it in full would take every evening over a three-month period—we are, after all, talking about a case whose files run into 1,000 volumes. We are prepared to do this if an opportunity is provided. I am afraid that it would have the effect of a political-legal Chernobyl on the country.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] Do you think that people believe you?

[Gdlyan] Judging by our information, the overwhelming majority of those who saw the program are now on our side. It would be hard to make them change their minds, because the program dealt a blow against one of our opponents' main theses: These guys are bluffing, they said; they have nothing in their hands. As regards another thesis, I can admit this: Both I and my subordinate investigators threatened those under investigation and used unlawful methods in just one respect—we demanded only the truth from those who made revelations. I threatened them and told them that anything could be forgiven except slander. As a matter of fact, the Prosecutor's Office has in its possession video recordings and protocols of investigation sessions with these "threats."

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] In your view, how will events develop in the immediate future?

[Gdlyan] If we were to be given time on Central Television, I think that there would be relatively few doubters left in the country. Proceeding from the experience of two congresses and sittings of the Supreme Soviet, I can predict that a full company of prepared official spokesmen will fire their shots.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] But you also were provided with a platform, and you appeared unconvincing.

[Gdlyan] This is so. I really do not know how to compress a case of 1,000 volumes into even a one-hour speech. In fact, nobody can do this. And the apparatus is perfectly well aware of this. This is why we are driven into a corner, and the methods used are not always clean. We cannot refute our opponents with emotions, we can do so only point by point, using facts. This requires time and quiet preparation. Any more predictions? I was notified that if the Supreme Soviet grants its consent for proceedings, we shall be arrested immediately we leave the Kremlin.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] Does it not seem to you that too many different opinions have been expressed, and people are not in a position to work out who is right, who is guilty, what is truth, and what is a lie?

[Gdlyan] Despite all the persecution and defamation, I sense that the majority of people believe us. A simple commonsense analysis would enable them to perceive who protects the state's interests and who protects clan interests. I repeat, we are prepared to show all the material in our possession.

[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI] In the same way, in other words by "taking over" the television as it happened in Leningrad in the night of 6-7 April?

[Gdlyan] Had the glasnost and pluralism proclaimed in our country not been applied selectively, there would have been no need to use such an exceptional form for the transmission of information. This is the only way out of the prevailing situation that I can see: An open parliamentary hearing at which all sides will be represented and all documents will be investigated. There is no other way of establishing the truth. The people must have an opportunity to see, to hear, and to understand, otherwise a crisis of confidence will be inevitable, but not in us.... [end Gdlyan]

From the Editorial Office. Following the Leningrad Television broadcast of the speech by Investigator Ivanov, Roy Medvedev, cochairman of the relevant parliamentary commission, presented his point of view on the activity of the Gdlyan-Ivanov investigations group on Central Television. MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI's correspondent tried on Monday, 9 April, to find out what some USSR people's deputies thought about the "war of the telewaves," and they all expressed their disgust. But who is the target of this disgust? We voters have been trying to obtain an answer to this question for a long time. Without success, as always.

Pavlov Speaks on Taxation Law 16 April

LD1704113390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1835 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Speech by USSR Finance Minister Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov at 16 April session of the Soviet of the Union in the Kremlin in Moscow—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies! Consideration of this draft continues the work begun by the Supreme Soviet on the practical implementation of the radical economic reform in the national economy. The draft bill that has been placed before you for examination is the result of great work which has been done by committees and commissions jointly with the government, with academics and the public. It takes into consideration the main provisions of laws already adopted by the Supreme Soviet which lay down the foundations of the new economic relations—the laws on land, on ownership, and on leasing. And in this connection it seems to us that it has been possible to give the draft a relatively finished and integrated appearance. Of course, individual issues remain which require examination and straightforward decisions to be taken upon them: I will dwell upon them in a little while. But now let me set out for you the general concept of the draft bill.

First and foremost, I must report that the new taxation system proposes to implement the principle of equality for all enterprises, regardless of the type of ownership on which they are based. This is in keeping with the law on ownership. Basically this will be achieved by a uniform package encompassing the taxable object, tax rates, the system of tax abatements, deduction procedures, and consideration of production costs when assessing taxable profit.

Second, as you can clearly see, the purpose of the bill is not to rectify today's difficult financial situation, even partially, at the expense of enterprises. On the contrary, it is directed at creating efficient machinery for stimulating the earning of financial resources for economic and social development, by making financial relations stable and long-term. The average level of taxation is being significantly reduced through the system of abatements which is being proposed.

Third, the taxation system must reliably reinforce the principle of social justice and protect collectives against arbitrary behavior and extortion. Enterprises are being relieved for the obligation to pay contributions to the centralized funds of ministries, which are used as a channel for long-scale redistribution of resources to those lagging behind. Today it is being proposed that collectives should be in charge of their own operations. Henceforth, they will be able to channel all their earnings, minus a deduction for tax, toward their own social and economic needs. In this way, we hope to eliminate the economic basis, which, for decades, allowed certain enterprises to survive at others' expense.

Fourth, the expansion of the economic and financial autonomy of enterprises is being harnessed in the taxation system to efforts to accumulate public resources through the implementation of the principle that the wealth of members of society is the wealth of society as a whole. This will be achieved, by the long-term character of tax relations based on proportional distribution of revenue for the purposes of self-financing and general state requirements and, secondly, by the regulation of economically well-founded correlations and the use of self-financing resources for consumption and accumulation.

Fifth, the new taxation system liberates the financial ties between the center and local areas, clearly separates tax payments to the all-union budget from payments to the budgets of union republics, and determines the size of such payments. This guarantees the economic autonomy of regions and territories and creates a stable financial basis for local Soviets. They will have a real opportunity to gather resources in accordance with the volume and efficiency of economic activity on their respective territories.

As you see, the taxation system proposed in the draft law is based on new principles, ones which are fundamentally different from existing prainciples, which are based on a totally centralized system of mobilization of resources and their distribution.

I would like to stress that the proposed tax reform will only work properly if it is geared to the program for economic recovery and the development of the economic reform outlined by the Second Congress of People's Deputies. It lays the foundations for a large scale advance in this direction.

In our view, the general conclusion which can be drawn is that the draft law basically continues the implementation of the concept of restructuring the system of economic management by rejecting financial arbitrariness and dictates from above and going over to economic relations of a new type.

Of course, as a result of distortions that have occurred in the economic mechanism, primarily the unfinished nature of the reform of price setting and differences in conditions at the starting point, it will not be possible to implement the changeover to a single system of taxation of enterprises without taking into account in a flexible manner the specific features of individual industries and regions. For some particular period of time it will be necessary to resort to definite forms of financial support of enterprises in industries and regions which have a vital importance for the country. This will have to be considered specifically when the draft budget for 1991 is being formulated. In general, as a principle this should be served by tax concessions operating as incentives for investment in the development of the most effective areas of social production, and at the same time it is obvious that the implementation fo the tax reform is intended to strengthen the principles of self-provision and self-financing.

Permit me to dwell briefly upon a description of individual provisions in the draft bill, the most important ones in our view.

The object of taxation: As a result of great analytical work which has been done by academics, by those engaged in practical work, by the government and the commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet, all have arrived at the conviction that profit should be the object of taxation. It is precisely this that creates the conditions for equal taxation demands upon enterprises and organizations.

The problem of establishing a single procedure for calculating taxable profit is another key question upon the solution of which the provision of equal conditions of economic activity for enterpises of all types demands. For this purpose the draft provides for the structure of outlay upon production and realization of output to be unified: This is achieved by means of including in prime-costs a number of types of expenditure which in various industries today are met from profit and not infrequently from its redistribution and also the differention of the payment and budget norms. With the changeover to taxation, for example, it is proposed that all forms of current bonus giving and payments for labor and natural resources and some others should be included in prime-costs of output.

The taxation rates: The draft law sets down an important provision of fundamental importance for the whole system of financial relationships. It amounts to this—that with due regard for the process of the renewal of our federation, all enterprises, to whomsoever they are answerable, must participate in an identical way in the formation of the union budget and the budget of the union republics. And union-republican and local enterprises will make payments both to the union budget at the single rates determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet and payments to the budgets of the union republics at the rates that are fixed by the Supreme Soviets of the union republics, within the upper limit for the rate under the draft bill. Thanks to this, conditions will be created for the economic independence of regions and at the same time a stable base for the financing of expenditures born by the whole state. An exception is made in the draft for enterprises the activity of which is concentrated upon the solution of local and regional problems. It is proposed that such enterprises should include cooperatives, agricultural enterprises, enterprises providing everyday services for the population, municipal services and some others.

One of the questions involved in tax rates is the problem of determining their maximum level. This is one of the most acute problems, around which a particularly large number of arguments has been and is being conducted. The government considers it possible to agree with the proposal of the committees and the commissions that the maximum level of the tax rate should be reduced from 60 percent as was originally proposed to 55 percent, including a reduction from 35 percent to 30 percent for payments into the union budget. This means that the whole of the reduction is being born by the union budget. Of course, this step will intensify pressure in the union budget and the finances of the whole state, insofar as the union budget would have received an income R6 billion lower than today's even with a 60 percent tax rate. The idea was that centralized financing of relevant measures would be reduced by that sum and that responsibility for carrying them out would be allocated to the places where the income was received. Reducing the rate by an additional five percentage points costs the centralized finances approximately R8,000 million. But given that the commissions and committees of the Supreme Soviet deemed it possible to take that kind of measure in the interests of strengthening the finances of the enterprises and regions the government supports it.

Practice in implementing and extending the rights of enterprises and establishing economic links, particularly where prices, tariffs, and wages are concerned, has revealed a trend for the incomes of certain collectives and individuals to be increased not just and frequently not so much through increased production but primarily through raising prices. During the transitional period of the development of market relations, therefore, during conditions where the monopoly element on the part of the producers has not yet been overcome, the application of increased taxation rates in cases where excessively high profits are being received will be of great importance. The draft that has been tabled provides that tax at rates of 80 percent and 90 percent will be levied upon profits arising from profit rates in the bands of from 40 to 50 percent and of more than 50 percent respectively. This differs from the draft presented by the government. It has to be borne in mind that profit rates average just 14 percent at the present time throughout industry.

The taxation rates set in the draft bill reflect the realities of the present day and the prospects for our development. Major monetary resources will be required to finance the widescale social programs mapped out for the 13th Five-Year-Plan period and to provide cash resources for the large set of measures which is being proposed today by the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet. As I have already reported to the Supreme Soviet, approxiamtely 60 million annually are required today for immediate projects alone. It is clear that the financial pressure will increase in the coming years. Unfortunately, therefore, it is not economically possible for us today to go for the use of lower rates of taxation of profits, of the order of 30 to 50 percent.

But this is not the main consideration by which we were guided in selecting the optimum rates of tax. In view of the fact that there are different views about this now, I would like to express quite definitely the following thoughts. For us it is absolutely clear that taxation rates cannot be chosen arbitrarily or be urged as a result of some or other of the desires that we have today, no matter how noble the objectives they pursue.

Take, for example, the problem of eliminating the budget deficit. It is tempting to solve it immediately by means of an increased tax rate. It is clear, however, that if one were to proceed along that course it would mean bringing about a new outburst of inflation. Prices would rise immediately afterward. On the other hand one cannot either adopt the other proposals—that the taxation rate should be reduced as far as possible, to 30 or 35 percent, for example. Here, too, economic laws of a kind are also operating. The volume of so-called empty money in the hands of the enterprises would once again rise sharply. Under conditions of virtually universal deficit it would be impossible to turn these into goods or to transform them into real savings. Thus, once again a step of that kind will be a factor for adding inflationary pressures to the economy.

Virtually no possibilities remain for regulating all of this in some way by means of further lowering the budgetary financing of investment in the national economy. About 28,000 million are directed there today. Of this R13,000 million are required for strengthening the material and technical base of the agro-industrial complex and about 9,000 million for the fuel and energy complex. Thus the figures that have been proposed indicate that it is virtually impossible to reduce any further budgetary financing of the development of the national economy. That might lead to vitally important proportions in the national economy that are already weakened being knocked sharply out of balance. This is why the whole analysis led us to the view that a taxation rate of 55 percent is defined as the optimum.

To those same comrades who criticize us with reference to overseas practice, I would like to say that they did not get to their present level of taxation straight away, either. Clearly, we have to cover a certain path in time: Economically it is unavoidable, while socially, from our point of view, it is justified. As the empty money runs out and as the supply demand ratio improves the economic base for futher lowering taxation rates will be created.

I would also like to observe that it is not right to compare the rate for the maximum permissible level of taxation with today's proportions for the division of profit. Some people assert that the burden of payments into the budget is being intensified. In actual fact life is such that according to the data to hand, under comparable conditions in 1991 the proportion of profit paid into the budget, given a tax rate of 55 percent and taking into account the concessions, will actually amount to just 45 percent, which compares with the figure of 50 percent that has come into being today. Under the conditions of 1991 paments into the budget by comparison with existing levels will fall by approximately R14,000 million.

Changes in the proportions by which financial resources are distributed presuppose that it will also be necessary to transfer a part of the expenditure to those links in the economy which will receive additional resources from this redistribution.

Of course, when the average level of taxation is lowered, the linear taxation rate means that for many enterprises they deviate from what are for them normal proportions for the distribution of profits.

The majority of enterprises, under the proposed taxation rates, will receive additional income as a result of the fact that deductions into the centralized funds have been revoked and that norms governing payments into the budget have been lowered by comparison with existing ones. At the same time, under conditions where prices are set on a centralized basis, some enterprises will face questions with regard to the financing of existing development expenditure, which today is paid out for out of centralized funds belonging to the ministries and the budget. Evidently it will be necessary to sort things out separately with each other of them. At the same time the switch to the market will make it possible to even out their situation in many respects and if necessary to grant credits for building up production of high efficient output and strengthening their own financial base.

Now about tax concessions. The draft law envisages that taxable profit will be lowered and that tax rates will be reduced on the basis of broad system of allowances. This forms an integral part of the overall concept of the reform, and we see the necessity for it in the fact that concessionary taxation is directly linked to the strengthening of the principle whereby collectives earn themselves the resources for their social development. We want to move away from the idea of asking for resources and living at the expense of others, and to place the enterprises, with their individual specific features as they have come about, upon equal conditions.

Concessions in taxation also pursue another important objective, that of stimulating more productive use of resources belonging to the enterprise and their investment in production that is economically and financially advantageous, and thereby to speed up the turnover of capital.

As concerns the specific features of the tax concessions, the most significant ones in terms of size are the social ones. Thus, all are given the right to reduce taxable profit by the sum of expenditure taken out of profits for maintenance of health care projects, pre-school establishments, pioneer camps, cultural and sporting projects, housing stock, and other socio-cultural spending. Taxable profit will also be reduced for part of expenditure connected with nature conservation measures, profit contributed to charitable funds, and that used to help agricultural enterprises in the construction of rural projects. A number of other concessions are also set out in the law. Here it is important to emphasize that the bulk of the concessions will be given to enterprises regardless of what industry they belong to or what the form of ownership is. The tax concessions will increase substantially the amount of profit left at the disposal of enterprises. According to our estimates, the total taxable profit, thanks to the concessions, will be reduced by approximately R20,000 million in a year. Moreover, the list of concessions indicated in the draft law is an open one. It is expected that the union council of ministers or the council of ministers of a union republic should have the right to bring in additional tax concessions within the bounds of the sums paid into the union or republican budget. This is particularly important, in our view, in the first, transitional, stage, in order to permit enterprises to adapt to the specific new economic conditions.

Comrade deputies! Life has convinced us that it is not possible to go on to balanced development without creating effective long-term regulators for distribution of the national income between consumption and accumulation, in order that private and public interests can be organically combined in every productive cell. Needed for this are stable regulators which would ensure enhancement of living standards and increases in the population's income in step with the growth of material production and its efficiency. And such levers must, in total, represent a self-regulating mechanism which excludes the possibility of demand outstripping supply. For that reason, a regulatory law is being introduced in the system proposed, oriented toward stimulating investment in expansion of production and increases, on this basis, of the overall resources for consumption and accumulation in manufacturing. The new method gives advantages to those enterprises which increase the volume of production and reduce costs. It is aimed at growth of production and against stagnation. On the whole, we propose allowing enterprises to increase their consumption funds in accordance with the growth of production, that is, on a materially balanced basis, and not through swallowing up the accumulation funds.

It is understandable that taxation of the consumption fund, while ensuring a link between the remuneration of labour and its final result, is also a substantial anti-inflationary factor. The draft envisages preserving the existing procedure for taxation of the wage fund of collective farmers. This is connected with the fact that the economic transformations planned for the near future envisage only a gradual bringing into line for agricultural enterprises. Therefore, in the future it will obviously be necessary to return to the question of the system of taxation of the incomes of collective farmers, as the market principles of pricing of rural produce develop.

The bill envisages keeping the existing procedure of application of taxation on turnover, taking into account the amendments made to it of late regarding the incentive role in production of consumer goods. Here it is borne in mind that a radical restructuring of the practice of levying tax should have been carried out simultaneously with the change in the system of pricing and in keeping with the measures for accelerating the transition to market relations. We propose in the bill a gradual transformation of tax on turnover into a system of the excise duties and value added tax, or at the first stage, a simplified model of taxation on economic turnover, that is, a tax on sales.

A few words on taxation of joint enterprises. The bill is orientated toward the development of market relations and naturally envisages bringing closer together the taxation mechanisms of joint enterprises and Soviet ones. To ensure a favorable mode of taxation of the profits of such enterprises, it is planned to keep the tax rates at the level of 30 percent. At the same time it is proposed to make a number of changes to the practice of levying taxes from joint enterprises hitherto applied by the government.

First, a joint enterprise with legal foreign participation should in our opinion become a payer of tax on turnover. By this means it is made equal with the Soviet enterprise as regards price conditions. The practice of such an enterprise in marketing its output on the internal market of the USSR at retail or contract prices without payment of tax on turnover leads, from our viewpoint, to underservedly high profit. today contradictions occur in a case when a Soviet participant, before entering the joint enterprise, was a payer of turnover tax. In the current year alone for this reason the budget will fail to receive some R500 million.

Second, as an incentive to attract foreign capital on a broader scale, in taxation of joint enterprises with a foreign capital holding not exceeding 30 percent it is proposed to apply the tax rate on the profit of Soviet enterprises while keeping certain concessions for joint enterprises.

In our view there should be discussion on the possibility of introducing a generally more flexible dependence of rate of taxation on the share of the foreign partner. This is connected with the fact that at the present time concessions of this kind are granted indiscriminately without any regard for the real holding of the foreign partner. Of 1,500 joint enterprises registered today, in every fifth one the share of the foreign participant comprises less than 30 percent. In many cases practically no payments are made by foreign participants. But concessions on taxation are meticulously granted on the basis of (?exports) alone. At present, for instance, the Finance Ministry has documents of the joint enterprise (Almazit) according to which, of the enterprise's statutory fund of R110 million, the payment of the foreign participant amounts to some 4 milliion, that is, 3.5 percent. But the tax will be immediately lowered from 55 to 30 percent. I think the deputies will agree that business cannot be conducted like that any more.

Third, taking into account international tax practice, it is proposed to introduce for joint enterprises a provision on spreading losses to the results of activity of the succeeding five-year period. In this way conditions are created for advance investment in progressive technology.

A few words on taxation on exports and imports. This proposal is connected with the fact that we precisely need to make a move in regulation of foreign economic relations from the administrative command system to relying on economic methods, that is, as in the whole economic mechanism.

A few words about the tax on owners of means of transport. Taking into account the persistent wish of republics, citizens, and local soviets, it is proposed that this be passed to the income of local budgets for the fulfilment of the long-term task of construction and repair of roads in the place where the taxpayer is located.

The law also proposes introduction of a whole series of measures on responsibility for observance of tax legislation. These norms will ensure for us that the legislative act is complete and rounded, and in their essence they will represent yet another step along the way to creating a law-governed state.

Comrade deputies! The majority of the disagreements which arose were settled in the process of preparing the draft law in committees and commissions. At the same time, several problems remain which, we are convinced, must be further examined. The first is connected with the need to step up the anti-inflation measures in the draft law, by making harsher the effects of taxation on income which does not depend on the results of economic activity. The second problem is connected with defining the source of repayment of interests on short-term credit. While switching to market regulators, the division of expenditure to pay interest on credit between the economic body and the budget will in our view, hinder the banks in waging an energetic anti-inflation policy. The third problem is connected with the fact that the draft law envisages a reduction of the taxable balance of profit by the sum of dividends received through shares, bonds, and other securities. In our opinion, all incomes of a specific legal entity should be subject to tax. As far as encouraging acquisition of securities in enterprises is concerned, we reckon that it would be expedient to provide tax concessions at the state's expense only for state securities.

A few words on the alternative draft. We reckon that this obviously follows from what is to a certain extent a mechanical attempt to mechanically transfer elements of the U.S. tax system to our conditions of economic management. But suffice it to say that the state in the United States, with certain exceptions, is not the owner of means of production, and does not carry out economic organizational functions. The system of social security and guarantee of the population's rights is also constructed differently there. At the same time, this draft would lead to a reduction in the budget, over a year, of more than R90,000 million. Thus, in our view, an objective discussion of this proposal can only be carried on in connection with and after changes to all the fundamental laws of the country, which have already been adopted.

The government has certain further amendments to the text as well, comrade deputies. I do not think there is any point in reading them out, since the plan, budget, and finance commission has them. They follow from the approaches that I have just been reporting to you, and so may I refrain from reading them out. There are amendments there, such as unification of tax rates for public and public political organizations, and a number of others. In addition to this, we have this week endorsed the law on general principles of local self-government and local economy. This also provides for extra rights for local organs of authority in use of income on the territory involved. This will also require that certain refinements be made to the text of the draft law under discussion today. On the whole, the government asks you to support our proposals included in the draft law. Thank you for your attention.

Deputy Assails 55 Percent Profit Tax

LD1704124290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2021 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Speech by Deputy Yaroshenko at Soviet of the Union session of 16 April in the Kremlin, Moscow—recorded]

[Excerpts] Esteemed chairman, esteemed deputies! First of all I would like to make an announcement that a deputies' group called "Reforma" has been formed. It is a group of USSR people's deputies who are supporters of radical economic changes and opponents of half-heartedness and indecision in what is happening in our country in the economic field. I request that the presidium duplicate our declaration and acquaint all USSR people's deputies with it.

Now to the theme of today's session. Esteemed colleagues, regrettably, we live in a mighty but poorly developed country, and one of the reasons why a mighty state has become poorly developed is the chronic violation of objective economic laws. We are all today united by the desire to bring our country out of the profound economic crisis into which it has fallen, but we are disunited by our understanding of the causes and consequences of this crisis. That is the reason why two draft laws on taxation have emerged, that is why the alternative concept for taxation has emerged, one supported by a whole range of economists, economic managers, and people's deputies.

Now, about the draft law. What is the essence of our disagreements? Our draft law proposes a tax rate on profits of 35 percent. This is a scientifically grounded, calculated rate. Beyond 35 percent a prohibitive zone begins, whereby all kinds of business activity no longer makes sense. It has been said here that this is derived from the American experience, but that is not quite right. This was developed in America but it is used in dozens of countries, but even in the countries where other systems are used, value-added tax in France, for example, the sum of taxes does not exceed 35-40 percent, and so it is international experience. [passage omitted]

The only argument in favour of a 55 percent rate for tax on profits is that it is necessary to balance the budget, that there is a big deficit in the budget. But I consider this a very weak argument, because the deficit is rising, the budget is increasing, and our taxes must not be tuned to the expenditure side of the budget. We are constantly captive to an illusion, we have some kind of blinkers, we reckon that the budget can only be topped up through taxes. There are other means, and I will speak of them later. [passage omitted]

The situation forming today in taxation policy reminds us of the situation with war communism in 1918, when the food detachments, violating all economic laws, on the pretext of fighting hunger, threw out all of the producers' resources. As a result, hunger only became worse, because neither the resources nor the incentives to work were there. The 55 percent rate has about the same confiscatory nature. So if we want to avoid the mistakes already made in the past, we must reject the 55 percent tax rate.

We say a lot about the transition to a market, but if tomorrow we were to announce the transition to a market, what would we trade? We have virtually no mass of goods. A market is possible when the sum of worth of goods is much greater than the disposable money of the population and enterprises. So, to go over to a market, there are two options, in principle. First, one can sharply raise prices and taxation; this is what we are currently oriented toward, and it would literally cause a catastrophe in our society. There are already 40 million on the poverty line, and they will not survive such shock therapy. There are another 40 million who somehow manage to make ends meet and who would be shifted into the poverty zone. That is, simply a collapse of the system would ensue. But there is another means of extracting money from the population. It is necessary to put onto the market new, costly goods. It would seem that these do not exist, but that is not true. In the course of 70 years, several generations of Soviet people have worked and have created this circulating capital for the market. State property, basic assets for example, are valued at more than R3,500,000 million. If other forms of property are added, there are R4,500,000 million to 5,000,000 million. That is what our people have accumulated, and that is what can be put onto the market. It is not necessary to increase taxes and prices, but to give the population the opportunity to buy part of these basic assets, to carry out a partial denationalization, a privatization, and thus both eliminate the budget deficit and balance and budget, and also accumulate the mass of goods for a transition to a market in 1991.

There are two arguments against this. Firstly, will we not return to capitalism, and secondly, who will buy? The budget deficit is R60,000 million, that is, one sixtieth of the value of the basic assets. If we sell off one sixtieth, there is no threat to us. Even if the population spends all its savings, everthing in their savings books, and the enterprises spend R100,000 million, they will be able to buy up only 10 percent of state property, and again that presents us with no threat. That is, we must boldly go for denationalization, and not for tax increases.

Now, will they buy? I think they will. At the moment, when we offer leases to workers and peasants, they don't much go for it. Why? Because they know what is provided gratis can also be taken away without payment some time. They prefer to buy, and public opinion polls show that there are many more peasants wishing to buy land than those who take up leases. So denationalization must be carried out now, immediately, so as to approach a market and normal tax rates by 1991. [passage omitted]

Tarazevich on Devolving Powers to Republics

PM1804093190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
16 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with G.S. Tarazevich, chairman of the Soviet Nationalities Commission on Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, by PRAVDA parliamentary observer Miroslav Buzhkevich under the rubric "Parliamentary Week": "From Law to Law"—date, place of interview not stated]

[Text] The package of laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet is getting fatter. Last week, after lengthy discussion by the public and in parliamentary committees and commissions and the introduction of amendments proposed by voters and deputies, yet another was ratified: "On General Principles of Local Self-Management and the Local Economy in the USSR."

It is extremely topical, for it gives the local soviets of people's deputies, renewed in the recent elections, a reliable compass in determining their course. The resolution on urgent measures to improve the position of women, protect mothers and children, and strengthen the family adopted by the country's Supreme Soviet, which was examined as a matter of priority at the proposal of President M.S. Gorbachev, has also been greeted with satisfaction by Soviet people.

Judging by readers' telephone calls to the editorial office, many people are interested in the fate of the law connected with problems of renewing the union treaty. Its second reading began last Wednesday [11 April] and will be continued. I asked Georgiy Stanislavovich Tarazevich, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, to comment on the importance of this law.

[Buzhkevich] Why did the need arise to amend the union treaty?

[Tarazevich] I would remind you that the union treaty was concluded in December 1922 by four Soviet republics: the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasus Federation. Its signing marked the creation of the USSR. Other republics acceded to it later. There are now 15 of them in the USSR. The content of the treaty itself has also changed, mainly in the direction of centralization and a monopoly of union power. The 1977 USSR Constitution brought this centralization to its high point. Its Article 73, after a long list of questions in the charge of central organs of state power and management, says: "the resolution of other questions of unionwide significance." Which meant that the union republics had practically no rights, since it is quite simple to categorize any problem as a unionwide matter.

Once perestroyka began it immediately revealed the total unacceptability of this system. How can normal relations be built within the federation when diktat by the center is immutable? The problem of the demarcation of powers naturally arose. And also the union republics began to promulgate laws running counter to union legislation. It is possible to understand them: After all, the constitution proclaimed them to be sovereign states.

Autonomous republics and other autonomous formations found themselves in an even more complex situation. While union republics possessed some autonomy, albeit a miserly amount, having a number of issues within their competence, these rights practically did not exist even nominally for autonomous formations.

I repeat, all this did not accord with perestroyka's course of developing genuine democracy and creating a rule-of-law state. Therefore, around four years ago the question of redistributing powers—that is, effectively of renewing the union treaty—sharply arose.

[Buzhkevich] When did this work begin and what did it reveal?

[Tarazevich] Even the previous USSR Supreme Soviet was seeking a solution of these problems. A special commission including representatives of all union republics was created. I was entrusted with leading it. So I can see how far we have come since our idea of the concept of this law changed.

After the first congress we circulated the proposals we had formulated to the USSR people's deputies. Just under a year has passed, and they are being fundamentally reworked. This is not surprising—the first commission remained largely captive to former ideas. For instance, its draft spoke chiefly of the demarcation of powers between the USSR and union republics. There was no mention of autonomous formations.

At this point I want to reproach our science. It has been practically unable to help us in work on the draft law. The point is that scientists have effectively not studied the problems of the Soviet state's national structure. For many years it was believed that all aspects of the nationalities question had been resolved in our country once and for all. And today we are reaping the fruits of this dogmatism that is alien to the very spirit of Leninist dialectics.

[Buzhkevich] What direction did work on the draft law take? How did the draft change?

[Tarazevich] It was formulated by our commission and the Committee on Legislation, in close cooperation with other parliamentary committees and commissions, of course. This was done not secretly, but in an atmosphere of total glasnost. USSR people's deputies, voters, and scientific institutions submitted proposals to us.

Work on a law is always a complex business, and work on such a law concerning the foundation of the state and delicate issues of national sovereignty is doubly difficult. In our commission, for instance, there are 42 deputies of 27 nationalities. Not only all the union republics, but also many autonomous and other national formations are represented. What a range of views, approaches, and contradictory interests! However, difficult though it may have been, we invariably reached consensus—general agreement—via the arguments and sharp debates.

Now for the new elements that have appeared in the draft law. Above all, in my view, it has been possible to demarcate powers between the USSR and the union republics quite clearly and sensibly. Mostly in the direction of expanding the rights of the latter and ensuring genuine sovereignty for them. The mechanism for this demarcation does not have a rigid structure but is quite flexible—I would describe it as "floating"—so it makes it possible when concluding treaties to make the necessary amendments according to the particular features of the specific republic.

But probably the greatest steps have been taken to increase the powers of autonomous republics, oblasts, and other such formations. There is literally no article in which this is not felt. In vesting autonomous formations with great powers, we were concerned to protect their rights and to create the conditions for exercising these powers. Fundamental importance attaches to the articles which have appeared in the draft law and which say that in the event of a disagreement arising between a union and an autonomous republic, including on questions of the demarcation of powers between them, the dispute is resolved by a union organ. This may be the USSR Supreme Soviet or its chamber—the Soviet of Nationalities. Another important point is that autonomous republics and other autonomous formations will receive the right to enter upon treaty relations with any union or autonomous republic or oblast in the country.

[Buzhkevich] The discussion of the draft in both chambers began with arguments about its title. In the first version it was this: law "On the Renewal of the Union Treaty and the Demarcation of Powers Between the USSR and Union Republics." As a result of the debates the two chambers approved the title "On the Demarcation of Powers Between the USSR and Subjects of the Federation." What is the point of this?

[Tarazevich] Let us think back. The union treaty was concluded by four republics, then others joined them. Note: union republics. So what is to become of autonomous republics and other autonomous formations? Should all subjects of the federation, that is, all elements of the state, be parties to this treaty, and on what basis? This remains to be seen. Therefore the present law should be regarded as a precursor, or rather as part of, as the foundation of the future union treaty.

I want to note that in the Soviet of Nationalities a sharp debate flared up about the very first article (the Soviet of the Union approved it). It calls the union republics sovereign Soviet socialist states and the autonomous republics Soviet socialist states. A proposal was immediately submitted that the latter also be deemed sovereign. Tempting? But we must profoundly consider and assess the possible consequences of this step. How will it influence the whole system of relations in the Soviet federation, will it not weaken it? After all, most of us sincerely want it to be strengthened on the basis of further democratization.

Supreme Soviet Body Views Ingush Problems

PM1704150190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Commission Session"]

[Text] A session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities Commission on questions of the examination of appeals from the Ingush population (the commission chairman A.M. Belyakov is chairman of the Russian

Soviet Federated Socialist Republic State Committee for Nationalities Questions) held an organizational session in the Kremlin 12 April.

The session was chaired by R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities.

G.S. Tarazevich, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission on Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations, took part in the session.

Political & Social

50,000 Attend Moscow Rally Over Gdlyan, Ivanov

LD1704214390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2037 GMT 17 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program; video report by correspondent Ya. Radzevich]

[Text] A sanctioned public rally took place on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow today. It was announced that 50,000 people were present. The rally was a reflection of the passions raging around two names: Gdlyan and Ivanov. As always at such rallies, the speakers had no shortage of emotions. What distinguished this rally was perhaps one thing: direct insults aimed at the country's leaders—for which one could boldly take court action in democratic countries—were heard next to Red Square for the first time. The artificial aggravation of passions surrounding any matter, even the most important, probably does not encourage true objectivity. [Video shows demonstrators at open air rally, many holding banners. Banners visible include: "Prosecutor-General Sukharev must resign!"; "Sukharev must resign!"; "A President not elected by the people is a dictator."]

Shishlin on Gorbachev Aim 'To Kill' Old System

PM1704105990 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 12 April 90

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee member Nikolay Shishlin by correspondent David Smith on 12 April in Moscow on channel 4 "News" program—recorded]

[Text] [Smith] Is Gorbachev worried by the possibility of, say, Yeltsin forming a new party and presenting a formal challenge to him?

[Shishlin] I don't think so, I don't think so. I am afraid that Yeltsin will be a loser, not Gorbachev.

[Smith] So the president obviously believes that he can afford to take this leap to multiparty democracy?

[Shishlin] Yes, I am quite sure of that.

[Smith] Why? Because he thinks he'll win?

[Shishlin] Because Gorbachev and his supporters have a real strategy. Now with presidential rule, they have instruments to implement this strategy into deeds, into actions.

[Smith] What's the strategy?

[Shishlin] The strategy of radicalizing the whole policy of perestroyka. It includes multiparty system, a real market economy, freedom of conscience, and great changes in our federation. We'll have a new Soviet Union based on a new union treaty.

[Smith] By the summer?

[Shishlin] Maybe a little bit later—maybe in autumn.

[Smith] It sounds as if in political terms the president's going for broke: Is that the case?

[Shishlin] I am sure that Gorbachev will be quite persistent, and he will try to do his best to achieve his goals. The main goal is to kill that old system which is still alive and to contruct a new system which will be our pride and our hope and which will change the whole life of the Soviet people.

Press Secretary Maslennikov Describes Duties

PM1804090090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Interview with A. Maslennikov, presidential press secretary, by parliamentary correspondent A. Stepovoy under the rubric "Appointments": "Press Secretary to the President"—date, place of interview not stated; first two paragraphs are Stepovoy introduction]

[Text] A new feature of glasnost, which is widening its bounds with every day, is the briefings for Soviet and foreign journalists carried out by the recently created press office to the USSR president. A. Maslennikov has been appointed its leader (press secretary).

Arkadiy Afrikanovich Maslennikov, born 1931, graduate of the Moscow State University Faculty of Economics. Worked in the Institute of World Economics. Since 1965, PRAVDA's own correspondent in India, Pakistan, and Great Britain, editor of the capitalist countries desk, member of the editorial collective of this newspaper. August 1989, appointed leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet press center. Appointed 2 April 1990 to the post of leader of the press office (press secretary) to the USSR president. A candidate of economic science.

[Stepovoy] Press secretary to the president... Until recently such a post did not exist in our country. What do his duties involve?

[Maslennikov] The main task of the press secretary, or to be more precise, of the press office which I have been entrusted to head, is to maintain a link with the media, to communicate through the media what the president and his working organs, the Presidential Council and the Federation Council, want to say. We will endeavor to ensure that the policy of the president and the working organs to the president is reflected appropriately, that is to say correctly, accurately, and precisely, in print, on radio, and on television. The way to do this is to keep journalists as fully informed as possible. People must know what the president of the USSR is doing, how he came to this or that idea or decision, why priority is given to a particular question, direction, sphere...

One of the most dangerous and chronic of our complaints is the urge to "suppress" information, to "sit" on it. A type of worker has been formed: The larger number of secrets at your own disposal and the less information you give to others, the cleverer and more important you seem to be... A real politician, however, is interested in the dissemination of information. Our president is a real politician. He has no urge to cut off information. He often and eagerly meets the press. Employees of the press office, to the best of their abilities, will offer him assistance in this.

[Stepovoy] What forms and methods will your work with the media take?

[Maslennikov] The president intends to address the people on television and on radio (or in whatever other format he deems necessary) on cardinal questions of the life of our country. The president has declared that he will meet quite regularly with journalists and hold press conferences.

[Stepovoy] And what other forms of contact will the president have with representatives of the press?

[Maslennikov] There will be briefings, the practice of which has been well developed in other countries. At these meetings we will say what the USSR president is doing at each specific moment, what his priorities are, let us say, for the current week or month.

Members of the Presidential Council must also be accessible to journalists. I know that many of them intend themselves to speak in the press and to give interviews. I should say that the president encourages such contacts. He thinks that members of the Presidential Council are independent, that they have their own identities, that they can and should express their points of view publicly.

[Stepovoy] Do your duties include drawing the president's attention to this or that publication in the press?

[Maslennikov] Yes, that is one of our tasks.

[Stepovoy] You quit the post of leader of the USSR Supreme Soviet press center. How will your relations with your former colleagues shape up now?

[Maslennikov] I hope that we will be partners and comrades, that we will work together.

[Stepovoy] Will there be a special accreditation of journalists to the USSR president?

[Maslennikov] Yes. We expect each of the central newspapers, the leading political journals, TASS, APN, and the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting to assign one or two of their leading journalists to cover the head of state's activity.

[Stepovoy] What foreign languages do you speak?

[Maslennikov] English, Hindi, and Urdu.

[Stepovoy] Arkadiy Afrikanovich, what do you feel more like now: a civil servant or a journalist?

[Maslennikov] A difficult question. I can say one thing: I feel a huge responsibility, because I understand what great expectations the people now have from the introduction of presidential power. I know too what a huge sense of responsibility the president himself feels to the people. The principal concern of the press office is to see that these expectations are justified, and to see that what presidential power does for people is known to the public as widely and as fully as possible.

Resolution on Regional Economic Ties Law

PM1704081190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[USSR Supreme Soviet resolution: "On the Procedure for Implementing the USSR Law 'On the Fundamentals of Economic Relations Between the USSR and Union and Autonomous Republics'"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To introduce the USSR law "On the Fundamentals of Economic Relations between the USSR and Union and Autonomous Republics" as of 1 January 1991.

2. The USSR Council of Ministers shall: adopt within two months the necessary decisions to ensure implementation of the said law;

submit for examination by the next USSR Supreme Soviet session proposals stemming from the said law to alter existing USSR legislation and the system of USSR administrative organs;

bring USSR Government acts into line with the said law by 1 January 1991 and ensure the revision or annulment by USSR ministries, state committees, and departments of their normative acts, including instructions, which contravene the said law;

elaborate within two months together with union and autonomous republic councils of ministers a procedure for determining the prospects for the USSR's economic and social development, for compiling and implementing all-union programs, and for shaping the union budget in line with the provisions of the said law.

3. During the period in which the program of measures to improve the economy ratified by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies is being implemented, it shall be deemed expedient to issue to union republics,

enterprises, and organizations state orders and quotas for centrally allocated resources without distributing them by sector and area, bearing in mind the need to consistently reduce the proportion of state orders.

4. Union and autonomous republic supreme soviets shall be instructed to make the necessary changes to republic legislation. The relevant soviets of people's deputies shall carry out organizational and preparatory work to ensure the transition of union and autonomous republics, and autonomous oblasts and okrugs to economic mutual relations in line with the provisions of the said law.

5. The USSR Supreme Court and the USSR State Board of Arbitration shall submit proposals to the USSR Supreme Soviet within six months on altering USSR legislation in connection with the said law's expansion of the powers of the USSR Supreme Court and the USSR State Board of Arbitration.

6. As of 1 January 1991 USSR Council of Ministers resolutions and normative acts issued by USSR state committees, ministries, and departments which fail to correspond to the provisions of the said law shall be deemed invalid.
A. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Moscow, Kremlin, 10 April 1990.

Christian Democratic Movement Platform Outlined

LD1404104890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0433 GMT 14 Apr 90

[TASS correspondent Boris Aksenov writes]

[Text] Moscow, 14 Apr (TASS)—The creed of a new USSR public organization is "to transform the world on the basis of Christian morality." Recently, the Russian Christian Democratic Movement [RCDM] held a founding conference in Moscow.

The movement unites adherents of radical transformations of all spheres of the country's life on the basis of the norms of Christian morality and advocates the rejection of communist ideology as the official state ideology; as well as parliamentary democracy and independent cultural, social and professional organizations; the independence of judicial authority; the observance of human rights and freedoms; and the freedom of conscience. In the economic field, the RCDM is in favor of the deideologization of state economic policy and equality of rights for all forms of ownership, including private.

Gleb Anishchenko, cochairman of the RCDM, has said that three of the 15 members of the Duma (ruling body of the movement) are people's deputies of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. They intend to form a Christian Democrat faction in the republican parliament within the framework of the "Democratic Russia" bloc.

Vyacheslav Polosin, another cochairman of the RCDM and a priest, recalls that Christians have always participated in political life in one form or another. Therefore now, when a multiparty system is being established in the country, Christians should have a voice in parliament. They should become a political bastion to guard and defend the basic freedoms of the human individual. Then no form of totalitarianism will be possible in society.

So far, no one can say how many people the RCDM embraces, since there has not yet been a registration of movement members, but in principle it envisages both personal and collective membership and the participation of compatriots living abroad. The RCDM sees itself as a movement representing believers of the RSFSR, but does not exclude inhabitants from other USSR republics from participation in its activity. For instance, representatives of Odessa and Riga belong to the Duma.

Activists of the movement are in favor of contacts with Western Christian Democrats and are setting up links with related movements in other USSR republics. At the present time, they intend to apply for official registration of the RCDM by the authorities.

In a talk with journalists, the movement leaders pointed to their fundamental divergences from the "Democratic Union" and "Pamyat" organizations. "We reject any extremism, be it on the left or right," emphasized Vsyacheslav Polosin.

AUCCTU Congress Preparations Previewed

LD1704115890 Moscow TASS in English 1032 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—A plenary meeting of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) opens here today. It will discuss preparations for the 19th congress of the Soviet Trade Union Organisation, comprising over 140 million people, due next autumn.

According to the trade union charter, the congress was to be held early in 1992. The date was moved up because of the rapid social changes in the country. During the three years since the previous congress, a new attitude to the trade unions' role and place in the Soviet state has become apparent. The trade unions are playing an ever larger role in the protection of the rights of the working people.

Work collectives supported radical measures, proposed by the AUCCTU to protect the interests of the working people in a number of socio-economic conflicts.

The need for a sharp change in trade union activity is also prompted by new economic and socio-political conditions in the country. The laws on ownership, land, lease and the basic principle of local self-government have changed the sphere of labour relations.

New bills to develop market relations, to restructure the financial-credit policy, to reform prices and introduce anti-monopoly measures are being drafted.

In addition, state legal relations have changed and president rule has been introduced. The trade unions hope to reflect the country's new priorities in the congress' policy documents.

The plenum will consider the draft documents that will shape the structure and activities of the USSR's trade union centre in the future.

Creation of Trade Union Confederation Suggested

LD1804081190 Moscow TASS in English 0716 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The Central Council of Soviet Trade Unions has decided to submit a draft declaration on the creation of a confederation of Soviet trade unions before the 19th trade union congress in October.

The Central Council met in Moscow on Tuesday to debate its future in the wake of Soviet reforms.

Given the need to demolish old centralized trade union structures and the emerging federation-type trade unions in Soviet republics and industries, a confederation is the most attractive road ahead, participants said.

Draft organizational guidelines and rules for the confederation of Soviet trade unions will also go before the October congress, the meeting decided.

On May 14, the Central Council will meet again to iron out the documents and approve them as the Central Trade Union Council's platform for the upcoming congress.

Delegates discussed ways of stepping up the role of trade unions' protection of workers during the current social and economic difficulties.

The transition to market economics will inevitably aggravate the country's social problems, participants said, calling for legal and economic measures to cushion the impact of reforms on the population and especially its low-income bracket.

Trade unions should campaign for the early passage of laws on inflation, labour protection, pensions and leaves, they said.

The presidium of the central trade union council requested, on behalf of the plenum, the government to introduce annual socio-economic agreements with the national trade union center—a kind of a national collective bargain.

New AUCCTU Chief Yanayev Interviewed

LD1804050690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Today the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions] adopted a decision to convene a routine trade union congress on 23 October this year. [passage omitted]

Gennadiy Ivanovich Yanayev, who was until today deputy chairman of the AUCCTU, has been elected chairman of the AUCCTU. He is 52 years old. He is a Candidate of Historical Sciences and a people's deputy of the USSR.

[V. Stepanyuk, correspondent, identified by screen caption] Gennadiy Ivanovich, the transition to market relations will indomitably come. What effect will that have on the position of the present trade unions?

[Yanayev] One does not have to be a prophet to foresee that unemployment, let's say, will drastically increase, prices will leap up, inflation will rise, inflation will acquire the nature of hyperinflation, and in these conditions we should do everything to install a social shock-absorber in our system which would even out the possible consequences for the working people when a market economy is introduced. That is why I see my task as chairman of the AUCCTU to seek, together with the government, together with the Presidential Council, solutions to these social problems which the people, the working people, will face in the future. First and foremost I am thereby thinking of those families that are poorly provided for, of people with a fixed income, of pensioners. I think that the most proper form of mutual relations with the government before the transition to a market economy would be the conclusion of a social agreement, a unique national collective agreement, in which all these issues must be provided for.

[Stepanyuk] On 14 May the participants in the plenum will gather again to work out a platform for the coming trade union congress. Taking part in the work of today's plenum were Comrades Razumovskiy and Baklanov. [video shows Razumovskiy and Baklanov at session]

Komsomol Issues Statement on Direction

LD1704222590 Moscow TASS in English 2220 GMT 17 Apr 90

[By TASS special correspondents]

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—The 21st Congress of the Soviet Young Communist League [YCL], held in Moscow, has adopted a statement on its programme aims. Until recently, this most numerous youth public and political organisation operated on the basis of the CPSU programme.

The Young Communist League views as its aims the creation of conditions for the free development of young people, the protection and exercise of their interests and rights, the assistance in the creation of a democratic and humane socialist society.

The statement stresses that "the basis of the league's unity is provided by Marxist theory in its creative development". Along with this, the league recognises "the priority of universal human values".

The organisation's tasks include the participation of its members in the activity of all bodies of popular power, the working out and implementation of the state youth policy in the fields of education, culture and the socioeconomic area.

"Youth employment is regarded by the Young Communist League as the most important direction of its activity under present economic conditions", the statement says. For this purpose, the league will insist on adopting measures to guarantee employment of young men and women in accordance with their choice.

The declaration of the 21st YCL Congress, adopted today, noted that the Youth League is striving for independence and close interaction with the Soviet Communist Party and equitable cooperation with other parties and organisations.

The declaration noted the need to renew the league's organisational basis, to do away with rigid inter-league structures and to oust bureaucracy. The Young Communist League, while retaining its ideological unity, is transformed into a federation of youth unions.

The youth forum is expected to conclude its work on Wednesday after adopting the new rules and electing leading bodies.

New Weekly Newspaper To Be Distributed Abroad

LD1804053390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0130 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Summary] Soon the new weekly newspaper RUSSKIY KURYER [RUSSIAN COURIER] will appear in our country. It will be a joint publication of progressive Soviet journalists and Russian emigrant representatives.

Aleksandr Gleyser, editor-in-chief, says the editorial council will include Viktor Korotich. Despite Ernst Neizvestnyy's participation, the newspaper will not be extremely left-wing, but in Russia's democratic tradition. The newspaper will be distributed in Paris, Ottawa, California, Tbilisi, Leningrad, Moscow, Ufa, Tallinn, and Petrozavodsk. Negotiations are proceeding for distribution in Lvov, Kharkov, and Krasnoyarsk. The newspaper will have 24 pages and an arts supplement of 16 pages. It will cost 60 kopecks, and the supplement an additional 50 kopecks. He lists literature he hopes to include in the publication.

Legislation on Employment Under Way

LD1404185290 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Text] Legislation is being worked out in the Soviet Union covering the employment of the population. The need for such a document has become extremely acute in connection with the market economy which is coming into being and which could release many millions of people. The trade unions have put forward an alternative draft which places the accent upon real guarantees of the right to work. The state undertakes to implement an effective policy for the creation of new jobs. The trade unions will monitor measures for ensuring full employment. If a person nevertheless finds himself left without work, then it is proposed that he should be paid benefit over a 26-week period at half pay.

Draft Legislation on Unemployment Discussed

PM1204105090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[A. Nikitin article: "How To Help the Unemployed"]

[Text] The latest session of the State and Social Council for Labor and Social Problems under the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems was devoted to problems of employment of the population. People's deputies, ministers of union repbulics, and scientists took part in the debate. The draft Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on Employment of the Population were examined. What did these discussions show?

Things must be called by their names. Unemployment, even if mainly only temporary as yet and often hidden, is becoming a social reality in our country. Although it is still given a rather misleading name—"the problem of employment of the population"—this does not change the crux of the matter.

But the situation itself is changing, and very drastically. It is necessary to prepare for living conditions in the context of a planned market economy. Hidden unemployment could become open and evident. Surplus manpower will hit the market.

First of all, the state is decisively renouncing all claims to a monopoly of the use of manpower. Employment is not only labor at state enterprises, kolkhozes, and social organizations, but also in leaseholding, joint-stock, and cooperative associations and on personal farms. Child care and the care of the sick, disabled, and elderly is also labor, nor is it easy. And there is no reason to humiliate those who do this kind of work by calling them "dependents." The draft that is proposed for discussion also grants the right to "voluntary unemployment" for people of working age who have legitimate sources of income. A tricky issue, because it is a question of the right not to work. It can already be foreseen that this will provoke a major debate in the highest organs of power. The position of those drafting the labor legislation is clear: If we seriously want to move to a market system, this right must be granted. It is for society to decide.

So who, and by what criteria, is to be regarded as unemployed?

We are talking about able-bodied citizens who have not reached pensionable age and are deprived of a wage by factors beyond their control. And only those of them to whom the employment service has not offered a job within a period stipulated by law. The law also defines the procedure for the registration of such citizens and the conditions and amounts of unemployment benefit payments.

The state has no intention of leaving someone who finds himself in a difficult situation to cope alone with his problems, buying him off with an allowance. It should, for instance, provide free general educational and specialized training or retraining and help in the search for a suitable job.

Probably the trickiest problem is the amounts of unemployment benefit payments. Ways to resolve the contradictions that exist in real life must be found. The desire to increase the amounts of benefit payments is natural and justified. But there is not and is not likely to be a surplus of money in the state budget. It is desirable to guarantee reasonable conditions of existence for all Soviet people. But ideas on what constitutes reasonable conditions and the financial potential are by no means identical in different republics.

At the moment the proposed version is one that takes account of the federal structure of our state. The union guarantees a minimum level of benefit. It is a question of the minimum wage for those who were formerly working at socialist enterprises but have lost their jobs, have been demobilized from the Armed Forces, or have just completed vocational training. And also 50 percent of the minimum pension for all other unemployed people, including those seeking work for the first time. Union and autonomous repbulics, in the light of an analysis of the prevailing financial and economic situation, will be able to pay supplements to unionwide benefits out of their own resources.

In order to resolve the whole range of employment problems it is proposed to set up a central component of the state employment service, and also a number of republican components. This service would operate under the auspices of parliament and be accountable to it alone. Provisions on the employment fund have been formulated. The resources will come from the state and from enterprises. The main source of contributions is taxes and other types of revenue, including voluntary social insurance.

The participants in the debate were virtually unanimous—which does not often happen nowadays—in rejecting the idea that a certain level of unemployment should be maintained in order to put psychological pressure on workers. Unemployment is a serious social problem, not a stick to beat the lazy. On the contrary, people who have been temporarily freed because of structural changes should form a real reserve "perestroyka army"—by retraining and mastering a new trade.

Every year some 25 million workers already change their jobs in the country. The reason lies in more rapid structural changes and the uneven development of social conditions for the population. The problem is perhaps one of correctly assessing and understanding the specific problems of the first wave of people released from their jobs. Merely the revision of wage rates created a reserve of 1.5 million people. It is necessary only for the time being to help this rear army of labor by preparing it for the next battle for perestroyka.

Serious attention should be paid to employment on a republican and regional scale. Here too, of course, it would be intolerable thoughtlessly to shift the entire burden of responsibility to the union republics. They are by no means always capable of coping themselves, without the Union's help, with problems that developed over the decades.

The draft fundamentals of labor legislation stipulate that unionwide programs to ensure employment will be drawn up in the context of five-year plans. That is good. But the concern expressed during the discussion that such programs should have been drawn up already and should have begun to be actively implemented by now is also justified. We have already seen how the combination of poverty, unemployment, and national demagoguery can be socially explosive.

"For the first time in history we are addressing an audience in the USSR that has thought seriously about employment problems and which has its own names for every aspect of it," Rikka Sergio [as transliterated], an expert from the International Labor Organization [ILO], said. "It must be remembered that this problem cannot be resolved by decree. In general enormous work is needed, which will take much effort and time. But it is worth it. And it is good that you are trying to resolve this problem at the very beginning of the path to the market system. We promise you every help, because the ILO is an observatory of world experience."

Asked what transitional models he would advise us to use in the USSR, Rikka Sergio replied:

"Your situation is as new for us as it is for you..."

It is therefore no use turning to routine solutions. An in-depth discussion of the draft fundamentals of legislation lies ahead in the government, in the USSR Supreme Soviet deputies' commissions, and in society as a whole.

Andreyeva Discusses Perestroyka, Communism

LD1504135290 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 0630 GMT 15 Apr 90

[Text] Nina Andreyeva. Is there anybody who does not know the name since the lecturer from the Leningrad

Polytechnic, doctor of science, openly unfolded her flag against Mikhail Gorbachev and perestroyka? As far as I know, now for the first time, she talks in an exclusive interview with us. The interviewer is Istvan Kulcsar.

[Begin recording] [Kulcsar] Nina Alexandrovna, how do you see today the leading role of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union?

[Andreyeva in Russian, with superimposed Hungarian translation] I don't know if in the situation which has now developed the Communist Party will be able to retain its leading role. Even if it manages to do so, we must not forget this party is getting deformed, in full view of us, and this is the consequence of the actions of its main leaders. In my view, this is the right-wing opportunist group of Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and Shevardnadze. Under the cover of democratic slogans, promises of humanization of our society, in reality the exact opposite is happening. They are speculating with the historic authority, which in spite of all their, perhaps, mistakes, and the degeneration of some personalities, the Communist Party had gained in the past. The party did fulfill its main role during the past 70-80 years. It has led the people. Today, this mentioned leading group, misusing the credits gained earlier, have the opportunity to do unpunished what they can, that is, to promote the disintegration and distortion of our society, the restoration of capitalism. More and more people are leaving the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and not those who are dogmatic, unable to change as the press maintains, but mainly the first communists who cannot resign themselves, do not wish to accept the petit bourgeois, social democratic, revisionist distortions of the Communist Party. After the 28th congress, even if the CPSU survives, in essence it will not be the same party that we had until the eighties. Very likely there will be a split. One group plans a social democratic party, but they are not leaving the party now because they are counting on laying their hands on some of the Party's assets, printing presses, publishing companies. Those who feel unable to remain in this social democratic party, or in such a centrist, spineless party whose typical representative is Mikhail Gorbachev, will create their own party, the Bolshevik party. In the Soviet Union the need for the Marxist, Bolshevik party is ripe, a party which will be based on the dictatorship of the proletariat.

[Kulcsar] Only two years ago, you were an ordinary party member, university lecturer. Since then the whole world knows about you. Could you please talk about your political activities since your article in the SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

[Andreyeva in Russian with superimposed Hungarian translation] Indeed, the article which appeared in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA fundamentally changed my life. I have received lots of letters since then. Together with myself many people took a stand against the counterrevolutionary nature of perestroyka. This also raised the question of uniting. Last May in Moscow we had formed Yedinstvo or Unity, a society fighting for Leninism and communist ideas. I have become its president. This month we are going to hold our second national conference, which will be attended by delegates from all parts of the Soviet Union. The conference will decide how to progress further. We might become a party. We will be the party for Bolshevization, but this is not simple. We have no sponsoring organizations. It is also possible that, in addition to the new party, the new Bolshevik Party, we will also retain our society which will be the reserve of the party, its members candidate members for the party.

Not for one minute do I regret publishing that article, because with it I have succeeded in uncovering the political games of Gorbachev and the pirates of reconstruction. The events since [passage indistinct]. We must realize that our future, the future of our children and grandchildren, is in our hands. We will not give away our socialism, even if it is somewhat disfigured. So, today the question is socialism or death. [end recording]

Russian Amnesty International Report Issued

LD1304213290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1832 GMT 12 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 Apr (TASS)—A report by the organization Amnesty International contains complete information about the use of the death penalty in various countries of the world. It was brought out today in Moscow in a collection called 'When the State Kills: The Death Sentence Against Human Rights'.

"This publication in Russian is evidence of the positive changes in the public life of our country", the well-known Soviet lawyer Professor Sofya Kelina, told a TASS correspondent in an interview. "The factual material contained in the book will undoubtedly be useful in further discussions in the USSR within the whole complex of problems linked to the restructuring of the legal system".

In the opinion of the Soviet politicist, USSR People's Deputy Fedor Burlatskiy, who wrote the preface to the Russian edition of the report, one of the stereotypes which has survived from the past is a belief in the effectiveness of harsh punishments. Now it has been refuted by the experience of all mankind. Soviet criminal laws need to be toned down, Burlatskiy considers. "As regards the abolition of the death sentence, people are making the same opinions. Personally I am in favor of such an abolition", he writes.

The report by Amnesty International was published by the Moscow publisher Progress in an edition of 10,000 copies.

Burlatskiy Urges Solzhenitsyn Citizenship

WA1604185190 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 15, 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Letter "to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] Deeply respected Mikhail Gorbachev!

The issue about which we have considered it necessary to address you personally, the president of the country, is not new. But it is precisely because its resolution has dragged on so long that the need has arisen to ask for your intervention in order to put an end to a continuing injustice.

We are speaking about the civic fate of the great Russia writer Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn, against whom a shameful campaign has been conducted for many years, and which must now be regretted by those who took part in it. Forcibly and illegally evicted from the country without the opportunity to defend himself, A.I. Solzhenitsyn was deprived of his birthright and the Soviet citizenship which inalienably belongs to him, and it was done in a manner which destroyed his personal and professional dignity. Millions of the country's readers over long years were severed from the truthful, passionate literary word directed at the most painful and fundamental problems of our reality.

The ban on the books of Solzhenitsyn has been removed, but civil legal rehabilitation of the writer has not been forthcoming. How much longer can such an abnormal situation last?

The secretariat of the board of the USSR Union of Writers has asked those writers who are USSR people's deputies to raise the question of annulling the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium edict by which A.I. Solzhenitsyn was deprived of his Soviet citizenship. Other creative unions as well have requested the revocation of this edict.

In accordance with the Helsinki and Vienna documents, which were signed by the Soviet Union, all previous decisions concerning the compulsory revocation of citizenship must, in our opinion, be annulled without special petition.

It seems to us today that the situation must be ended as quickly as possible in which one of the greatest artists of modern times, A.I. Solzhenitsyn, is forced to live and work far from his homeland.

Apparently the issue will not be resolved without your personal intervention. For this very reason we address ourselves to you with this open letter.

[Signed] On behalf of the LITERATURNAYA GAZETA collective, F. Burlatskiy, chief editor and USSR people's deputy.

Pensioning Off of Aging Politburo Members Urged

PM1704083590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Letter from Perm reader A. Chepkasov, CPSU member since 1953, as part of full-page "Pre-28th Congress Debate" feature: "Now Is Not the Time for Grudges"]

[Text] Much has been said over a long period of time about the need for perestroyka within the party, about the decline of its prestige. It is all true. But what really gets me is the slogan "The Party—initiator and guarantor of perestroyka!," which was produced by the party itself, or rather by its apparatus. What is the purpose of self-glorification? After all, nobody knows yet whether perestroyka will actually materialize but the party apparatus has already spread this slogan everywhere.

People no longer respond to sundry slogans, appeals, and promises, they are tired of them. This must be realized. We don't need slogans or words, we need actions.

How is the party to be rendered militant and efficient? First and foremost, it is necessary to get rid of people of pensionable age, primarily in the Politburo and the Central Committee. Look no further than the Politburo, more than 10 of its full and candidate members now are over the age of 60.

I support the draft CPSU Central Committee platform proposal about giving communists the right to freely resign from the party. I do not perceive this as sedition—especially as regards communists on pension. This would be a natural self-cleansing process within the party. I think that no pensioner would bear a grudge as a result of this. Now is not the time for grudges! The only result would be a cutback in party structures in housing operations administrations and block administrations, which have virtually nothing to do.

Conference in Ulyanovsk Discusses Leninism

LD1604164190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Excerpt] A scientific practical conference, the Leninist Theoretical Legacy and Socialism, took place in Ulyanovsk today. Our Ulyanovsk correspondent Yuriy Kolyukov reports:

[Begin recording] [Kolyukov] The conference took place in the Lenin memorial near the house where Vladimir Ilich was born. It is of course symbolic that it is precisely here, today, that new scientific ideas and a new approach to Lenin's legacy were engendered. Senior ideological staff of the Party Central Committee, CPSU oblast and town committees, and social scientists took part in the conference. Aleksandr Semenovich Kapto, doctor of philosophical sciences and head of the Ideological Department of the Central Committee, delivered a report entitled On Lenin and Leninism. The conference participants discussed topical issues relating to defending Leninism from attacks from extremist groups and purifying the Leninist legacy of extraneous layers of dogmatism, distortions, and falsifications.

I am taking to Emmanuil Markovich Serlin, doctor of economic sciences, and Konstantin Sergeyevich Ovsyannikov, head of the Social Sciences Laboratory of the Academy of Sciences. Tell me, what is your opinion: Lenin talked about the need to respect and esteem independent people of different views. Today there is the Democratic Platform and a Marxist Platform in the party has been published today. What is your attitude to different views in the party and to the possibility of a schism and demarcation?

[Serlin] As regards the possibility of a schism and demarcation, that is of course a bad thing; it could weaken the party. But in general, one should take a specific view of it, too. [passage omitted] [end recording]

'Secret' Documents on CPSU Faction Cited

PM1104142790 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 10 Apr 90 p A9

[Harald Hamrin dispatch: "'The Party's Social Democratic Faction Must Be Combatted'"]

[Text] Moscow—The social democratic faction within the CPSU is rapidly growing in strength. In some places the situation has already become "intolerable." The party leadership must mount a counterattack and in the struggle against the "antiparty" groups these should be accused of "reviving man's exploitation of man."

These are some of the views put forward in three secret internal Soviet party documents which have come into DAGENS NYHETER's possession. The documents—two of which bear the "Confidential" stamp—discuss the growth within the CPSU of a social democratic-oriented group which calls itself Democratic Platform and which was described in Sunday's [8 April] DAGENS NYHETER.

The documents paint a picture of a rapidly growing social democratic faction within the CPSU. The faction is said to still be relatively poorly represented among party members from the working class. But several of its local leaders are skillful and active organizers who occupy key posts around the country, it is said.

It is therefore high time to settle the score with these "antiparty" activists and if necessary expel them from the party.

"In the work of tactical propaganda, use can be made of the argument that the aim of Democratic Platform is to re-establish capitalism and revive man's exploitation of man," the author of one of the three documents suggests.

Two of the documents come from Belorussia. One has been written by the party organization and cadre department of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee. The second is signed by Belorussian party boss Yefrem Sokolov and exists in a limited number of numbered copies. The third document has been written by a researcher, A.E. Yakimov of the Communist Party's Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow.

Together the three documents give a unique insight into the working methods and the thinking of the otherwise so introvert party apparatus.

For example, from the document from the cadre department of the Belorussian party it emerges that one of the leaders of Democratic Platform in the Belorussian capital of Minsk is an infiltrator.

M.V. Podgaynyy, one of the joint chairmen of the social democratic club "Communists for Perestroyka" in Minsk, has worked his way into the club with the aim of "making observations and providing information about its activities."

Unfortunately his work has not been "satisfactory." Could he have been infected himself with the social democratic virus?

In his two-page report, dated 21 March this year, Belorussian party boss Sokolov writes that the "political activity" among party members in Belorussia has increased recently. "Party clubs" and "discussion centers" have been formed and some of them—principally the party club "Communists for Perestroyka"—"have begun to develop separatism."

"The club has begun to follow the path of open and oppositional political struggle," Sokolov writes. In objective terms this will lead to the creation of a new political structure and to the splitting of the Belorussian Communist Party.

Sokolov therefore states that it is necessary to "take swift action to strengthen the party's ranks and its ideological and organizational unity." The leaders of local party organizations are therefore urged to "hold talks with all communists who have deviated from the CPSU's ideological positions" and "explain what is incorrect in their views and actions." If these talks "do not produce the desired result" it is necessary to "take steps (against them) to isolate them and ultimately expel them from the party."

The other Belorussian document also accuses the representatives of Democratic Platform of adopting "antiparty positions" and working for a "split in the Belorussian Communist Party."

"They openly slander the party, the whole of its historical course, and dissociate themselves from Soviet society's vision of a socialist future and from the CPSU's role as an influential political force," the organization department's anonymous officials write.

In the capital in particular, but also in several other party organizations, "the situation is becoming intolerable." Violations of party statutes are occurring "on a mass scale." Party members are refusing to pay their membership subscriptions. Others are encouraging "every form of disobedience."

"Things have gone so far that in some party organizations it is even impossible to take a member to task for an open antiparty attitude," the document states. In meetings with representatives of the Central Committee there are sometimes threats of a "Romanian scenario" (a bloody showdown with the party apparatus—DAGENS NYHETER note), and other insults also occur.

What particularly upsets the comrades in the party organization department is the fact that many representatives of the local party sections—if they have not themselves gone over to the "other side"—adopt an "impermissibly wait-and-see attitude" to various anti-party activities and show "uncertainty and toothlessness" vis-a-vis the "splittists."

In many of Belorussia's largest cities—such as Minsk, Gomel, Mogilev, and Vitebsk—internal party meetings are being organized at which people are discussing "increasingly actively and with great interest" Democratic Platform's alternative proposals for a new party program in preparation for the summer's major party congress in Moscow.

Reading between the lines, it is clear that the official proposals for a new party program are attracting much less interest.

The party organization department also points to several named leaders of the social democratic movement in Belorussia. "Especially active" is A.T. Zhivotnyuk, a local party worker who is described as "enterprising" and in possession of "not inconsiderable organizational talents."

The third and final document from the party's own Academy for Social Sciences in Moscow—traditionally a bastion of the conservative forces in the CPSU—states clearly that today Democratic Platform already amounts to a faction within the party.

Factionalism was expressly forbidden as long ago as Lenin's day in the early years of the 20th century when the Bolshevik Party was organized almost as a militarily organized force with the task of toppling bourgeois capitalist society.

"Its strategy is to create a social democratic party on the foundation of the CPSU and its colossal material and technical base (this refers to buildings, printing plants, newspapers, publishing houses—DAGENS NYHETER note)," Yakimov writes in his analysis.

Yakimov draws the conclusion that a split in the CPSU at this summer's congress in "inevitable."

"The only question is who the majority will follow and into whose hands the party's property will fall," he writes. And the majority is made up of workers. The only way today of winning over the majority is to begin radical democratic changes within the party even before the congress... and (by doing so) bring the party out of its current state of ideological-organizational confusion and hesitation.

According to Yakimov, in other words the alternative is this: Either the "social democrats" take over the party, or the party apparatus adopts the minimum of reforms necessary to maintain control over the CPSU. In this latter case the social democratic minority will be forced to leave the party and—hopefully—move out into the political wilderness.

But Yakimov admits that in the final analysis the Soviet Union is nevertheless "objectively and inevitably on its way toward a multiparty system" with all the elements of uncertainty that such a system brings.

Pros, Cons of Multiparty System Examined

90UN1348A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by V. Khalipov, doctor of philosophy and head of department at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences: "With Alarm and With Hope"]

[Text] **No person, no worker who feels concern for the fate of socialism and the country, or for his own fate, can remain indifferent to the wide spectrum of issues related to the multiparty system.**

Like mushrooms after a rain, new social and political associations of citizens have been springing up around us. The further advancement of society along the road of democracy does not exclude the possibility of creating parties as well. In just this fashion, although indirectly, the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Congress reflected the inevitable signs of today's social and political life. And only the March Central Committee plenum, which came out to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies with a legislative initiative on changes in the articles of the Basic Law concerning the party, dotted all the i's in my opinion.

Once we proclaimed a course toward democratization, glasnost, and pluralism we, the communists, did not have the right to ignore the fact that it will lead to a qualitatively new condition in the political sphere—to a multiparty system. However, little consideration was given to this. The result is our recent attempts to remain only within the framework of the socialist pluralism of opinions, to forbid pluralism of actions the right to exist, and to prohibit political pluralism. Unfortunately we did not succeed in forestalling the far-reaching changes which are overdue in society by renouncing the total monopoly on power of the CPSU in a timely fashion. And now, having lost the opportunity, we are compelled to catch up.

So that we do not find ourselves in the position of the "behind-the-times party" in the future, it is time for communists to examine the essence of the multiparty system more deeply and to acknowledge and evaluate its merits and shortcomings. And finally, it is time to consider the direct and indirect consequences of the multiparty system, which has become a fact, especially after the special Third USSR Congress of People's Deputies adopted new wording for Articles 6, 7, and 51 of the Constitution. And the issues which arise in connection with this must be decided, of course, not by experts at meetings, not in a crucible of emotions, not with rapturous applause or the hooting of crowds, but peacefully, sensibly, and responsibly.

The multiparty system is one of the most important of the characteristic traits of modern democratic societies. Political parties are differentiated from other mass social organizations and movements in that they are created to register, express, and form the political interests of certain classes, social groups, and sectors of society. The main goal of a party is accession to political power and the undivided or partial possession and use of that power for the sake of satisfying the fundamental needs of the specific categories of the population they represent in their countries.

The quantity of parties functioning in the country can vary greatly. For instance, in Russia in the summer of 1917 there were about 50 of them, and in October there were even more. Historically it came about that after the revolution the various parties, unable to withstand the strain of the subsequent bitter political struggle, left the stage. As the sole functioning political quantity, our party existed in quite comfortable conditions over the course of the decades, beyond control and criticism. As a result it forgot how to maintain active, constant ties to the masses, to register the needs and moods of the people, to defend its interests, to convince the masses of the logic of its arguments, and to lead it. Under Stalin and later under Brezhnev various echelons of the leadership, especially the higher echelons, aware only of their own narrowly selfish interests, lived and functioned out of touch with the masses and the expectations and aspirations of the workers. And this undermined the workers' trust in the party and its authority. Unfortunately the present generation of communists must answer for the many crude mistakes tolerated in the past.

A one-party system or the presence of an insignificant number of parties under the domination of communists is one of the past "customary" variants of political development in the countries that are called socialist. As it now turns out, this is not the definitive type of general political system and balance of real forces. Because it did not at some time pass through the stages of successive development of bourgeois democracy, our country, like several others, now must pay for its "sins" of a youth that was insufficiently democratic and lacking in pluralism. And the desired breakthrough to democratic maturity will not take place only with a grand assault on one-party structures. Looking ahead, however, we will assert that the multiparty system is still far from the ideal for a normal social system.

I dare surmise that the highly developed society, in which perhaps not even our grandchildren but our distant descendants will live, will be neither one-party nor multiparty. In the conditions of eventual social self-administration it is certain that the need for political power, for the corresponding structures, and for parties will disappear. Because the whole variety of the social and spiritual interests and aspirations of the citizens will be reflected by social organizations that have reached maturity. But that is in the distant future.

In the meantime there is one significant instance, an omen of that far-off future, even in today's processes of our renewal. I have in mind the gradual transformation of the CPSU from an all-embracing command state and political force into a force that is mainly political and has the goal of designing a theory and strategy of social development. In the wider historical context, today's changes in the functions of the CPSU indicate not only that it is overcoming its past mistakes and miscalculations but that it is undergoing a transformation into a vanguard organization.

What are the pluses of a multiparty system and political pluralism? First of all, they are a type of "social instrument" for the expression of the political aspirations of various sectors and groups of the population. These aspirations must not be ignored if we wish to guard society from outbursts of political tension and instability with ruinous consequences. The interests in the sphere of power that appear among various categories of the population and various strata of the workers can be taken into account and coordinated in mutual fashion and balanced most successfully and optimally today only in a political system that is pluralistic in content and spirit. But this must be studied, and we have all but forgotten how to study it. In fact I believe it was here that we committed an error when, in the course of perestroyka in various regions, the process of creating new parties was begun and the CPSU "closed its eyes" to it as though it did not exist.

By the way, the conclusion at one time that the CPSU had been transformed from the party of the working class into the party of the whole people was severely exaggerated. It had not become and could not become such a party because there never has been and could not be complete correspondence of the basic interests of all the strata if you take the people as a whole.

Acknowledgement of political pluralism and the multiparty system demonstrates the transition of the CPSU from an ostentatious declarative realism to actual realism. No invocations against the multiparty system and in support of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution today could succeed in restraining the growing wave of dissatisfaction with the situation in the country, and particularly with the sphere of political power. The transition to a multiparty system is able to introduce those processes that politicize society into the organized, normal course of life, and to bring the necessary elements of common sense into the excited atmosphere of the many informal organizations which have made their political claims. Of course I am not speaking about the advent of the "calm" that many desire. On the contrary, our exposure to true pluralism is only just beginning. Political competition, the contest, and even the regular behind-the-scenes play of the forces that quickly replace the vacuum of political life of many years demand a sudden restructuring of the activities of state organs and party organizations.

And finally, the multiparty system also has merit in that it provides the opportunity for parties to maintain a close, mutual control over one another. It preserves and activates a mechanism for mutual stimulation to action and to a search for those measures and steps that would answer the demands of the masses. It keeps the parties on their toes, as they say. It is a thankless occupation to guess "what would have happened in history if what did happen had never happened." But one thing can be surmised with accuracy: We would have a sensible political opposition and civilized methods for the parties and their leaders to interact, and we would have avoided the horrors of the Stalinist persecutions as well as the swamp of the decay of social and political life in the time of Brezhnev and stagnation. And, obviously, many recent mistakes would not have been tolerated. And that is only one of the facets of the political guilt that has fallen to the lot of the sole and ruling party, which has declined, however bitter it may be to admit it, to the position of party that thinks too much of itself and has backed away from the primary democratic principles and norms of its vital functions.

I will note in passing: Because we are speaking of living people and of the play of human passions, ambitions, and pretensions, society has a better chance in the sphere of personal enterprise under conditions of the multiparty system. With a multitude of parties, the whole system will be made up of a great number of all possible positions—secretaries, chairmen, members of soviets and boards, etc.—and society in a sense has at its disposal a far greater arsenal of proposals for supplying and satisfying ambitions and making careers. Although in the final analysis this armada of representatives, to be honest, "rides on the backs" of the people who produce the various goods, this will nonetheless be "cheaper" than that most bitter struggle with unforeseeable results which frequently springs up within the framework of the narrow circle of key posts of the one-party system. It is enough to recall what Stalin's cult of personality or the forcible removal of Khrushchev cost us.

Let us not, however, idealize the multiparty system. Again, it is a contest, a conflict of aspirations, it is a thirst to achieve leadership by any—and not only loyal—means, etc. In short, the multiparty system has just as many minuses under socialism as it has pluses. The biggest minus is in the quantity of organizations, that is to say the splintering of the corresponding political forces, their opposition and their antagonism, their hidden or open competition.

William Shakespeare said, "All the world's a stage." But plays on the political stage are quite costly for the common man, diverting not only his attention but also his mental and physical forces. We can now expect this too. And it is difficult to say what kind of whimsical television programs, what kind of intellectual as well as unintellectual skirmishes and battles are in store for us at rostrums, in journals and newspapers. I say sincerely: Hope for the best but prepare for the worst. We still have not had to live with a multiparty system in earnest, and therefore "it is all still to come."

What has already taken place in our country, in any case, is far from an idyllic picture of the formation of a multiparty system. There are a number, although not a large number, of organizations which speak candidly of their hostility to the socialist choice of the people and the ideas of the October Revolution, and declare their desire to eliminate the CPSU from political life. It is difficult to count on compromise and agreement with such a "point of departure." And this means that social tensions will continue to exist here, and extremist and even nationalist seeds of discord and hostility will hereafter be sown in abundance. I expressed my position unambiguously at the third USSR Congress of People's Deputies: The creation and activities of parties, organizations, and movements which intend to forcibly change the Soviet constitutional system and the integrity of the socialist state, to undermine its security, or to inflame social, national, or religious enmity—will not be tolerated! But the people, the CPSU, and the law enforcement agencies must show much patience, self-control, and a willingness not to indulge in provocative actions.

For the time being neither the political analysts nor the sociologist, nor even the practical organizers of our current "lively" social and political life, have dealt seriously with the issue of the consequences of society's transition to a multiparty system. Common laborers (and they make up an absolute majority)—workers, collective farmers, "rank and file" soviet office workers—are already at the point of making fundamental decisions about the kind of multicolored world of politics they will soon enter. We are still very far from that moment when "each cook" will take an interest in politics. But politics will intrude upon the realm of each human fate in the foreseeable future.

Of course we can look forward to very heated debates concerning the law on parties. We can also expect to be dumbfounded by the programs and platforms of the representatives of various views—whether they belong to the Democrats and the Social Democrats or to the Republicans and the "Greens," etc. We will be persistently pressed to join all the new parties under the banners of new boards and chairmen. There will also be enticements to move from party to party. New rituals and symbols will appear. Those people who are a little quicker and sharper will certainly reanimate much of what was read in the long-forgotten prerevolutionary presses, or make a revelation of what they have seen or borrowed from life abroad.

Once more we will learn that politics is the struggle for possession of the levers of real power. In the foreseeable future we can expect the problem of choosing deputies from several aspirants of several parties. With an abundance of forces and organizations participating in the political life, they will begin to aspire not only to seats on the soviets at various levels but also to administration of the state.

And how can one pass over in silence this question which for the time being can only be heard faintly, but which can be heard nonetheless? Our Army, KGB, and Ministry of Internal Affairs are set up so that party organizations and political organs operate in them and conduct work from the positions and in the spirit of the CPSU. Concern for the genuinely reliable and effective defense of the country and its state security in a way logically presupposes a unifying party influence on these units in the future as well. Lenin taught us this. However a renunciation of its monopoly on power by a CPSU that is renewing itself induces us to seek new approaches and resolutions here too. In whose interests, in the name of what? In the interests of the workers, of the people, of socialism.

We choose our fate ourselves, and we deserve that destiny and that fate that we have chosen and will choose.

Economic

Pricing Committee Chairman Explains New Measures

LD1304151190 Moscow TASS in English 1104 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 13 TASS—"We wish to revamp our entire system of prices—purchasing, wholesale and retail—and to adjust it to a market economy," Chairman of the State Pricing Committee Vyacheslav Senchyagov said, describing new measures prepared by the Soviet Government.

In an interview published in PRAVDA today, he said three types of prices were envisaged—state, regulated and free. The state retains the right to fix prices on basic goods that affect the economic situation and the level of retail prices. They include petroleum, gas, coal, ferrous metals and electric power. Today their prices are 30-50 per cent lower than on the world market and below produciton expenses.

"It is impossible to provide full compensation for higher retail prices today," Vyacheslav Senchyagov believes. The situation has deteriorated in the national economy in recent years. "Not only finances and monetary circulation have been disrupted, but the circulation of all material values too. Production, the foundation of any economy, is declining. Earnings are growing notably."

"At the same time," Senchyagov noted, "it is necessary to provide full compensation to those whose living standards are below or near the poverty line. They include pensioners, students and people with large families. People in the middle income bracket and below will get partial compensation."

"The government is now concentrating on a complex of measures to accelerate the country's transition to planned market economy," Sinchyagov said. "They include a whole package of bills and decisions without which it is impossible to ensure the market's efficiency. It is envisaged to start moving towards it already this year."

More on Abalkin 9 Apr Remarks on Market Reform

LD1404094990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1735 GMT 13 Apr 90

[News conference by Academician Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in Moscow on 9 April, with unidentified moderator and foreign and domestic correspondents, from the "Meet the Press" program—recorded]

[Text] [Moderator] Hello there, esteemed colleagues. Today Academician Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, has agreed to meet you and tell you about the matters with which he deals, economic reform and its acceleration. I shall hand over to him.

[Abalkin] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, comrades, our meeting is going to deal with matters connected with the work of the government and, within the government, of the state commission for economic reform; matters connected with the further intensification of reform, with the proposals which are being drawn up for speeding up the reform processes, and speeding up the transition of the Soviet economy to a regulated-market type [regulir-uyemogo rynochnogo tipa] economy. What is behind this? I wan to begin by saying that this is not motivated by short-term considerations or simply day-to-day events. It is connected with a strategic choice.

We are setting ouselves the target of creating a highly developed, highly efficient economy. An economy that is receptive to scientific and technical innovations; an economy that is oriented toward the consumer; an economy in which healthy competition and rivalry between various types of economic management and forms of ownership develop, in which the way is open to initiative, creativity, and the spirit of the initiative of enterprise. It has been proven quite obviously, both by our own experience and to an even greater extent by world practice, that the creation of a highly efficient economy of this kind is impossible without going over to the widespread use of market mechanisms.

We are now carefully working to create what could be called a critical mass of conditions necessary and sufficient for entering this new state of economic development, for entering a market structure. The government is now preparing proposals; it is preparing a whole series of documents. The country's best scientific forces have been brought in to work on them, specialists in practical application and staff of the economic reform commission and central economic departments. We have already held a series of discussions with general directors of enterprises and associations, staff from the financial and banking system, staff from the service responsible for the movement of material resources in the national economy, and scientists. A careful calculation is being made now of the possible consequences of the steps that are being undertaken. These have to be seen in advance, possible difficulties have to be foreseen and forestalled. After all these calculations and preparatory material are ready, the government, as the body of executive power, will place them for consideration before the legislators, those who have the right to make decisions. But in order to propose something, everything has to be scrupulously weighed, thought through, and readied.

Public opinion has now been aroused over these matters. Much discussion of the proposals is taking place. It is too early to speak of results. I repeat that what is going on is normal work, this is a preparatory stage. The aim is to be able to go out and say something fairly definite and to set out how we understand the issues and the methods. We are now at an intermediate stage of research, calculations, comparisons of alternative options, and putting the action program into a more precise form. That is the way our work is going. Within the limits of what has been done to date, I am prepared to reply to your questions.

[TIME magazine correspondent] Two questions, please. Recently you were quoted as an advocate of the so-called Polish approach or Polish solution for economic problems, i.e. a race for a market mechanism. But now you are advocating a calmer, slower approach. How do you react to the Polish variant? And a second question about price formation: What will happen with prices? Will they simply be raised? Or will they be freed? Does this mean that you yourselves will raise the prices? Or will you simply set them free?

[Abalkin] I cannot complain that people do not quote me enough, or about the various attempts to interpret my views in publications. I do not know where I was cited as being an unequivocal advocate of the Polish variant of shock therapy.

We are indeed watching carefully the processes taking place in that country, just as we are those in other Eastern European countries. We are studying the experience of those countries which in their own day have changed over to market structures during the postwar period. We are not confining ourselves exclusively to material from just one country. I have said on many occasions, have always said, and am prepared to repeat now that there is no such thing in existence as the experience of any one particular country which is capable of being disseminated in the form of a carbon-copy. We must take everything that is interesting, we must pass it through the filter of our own historical conditions and reflect it in our program.

As for price formation, this is one of the most complicated questions on which we are seeking the most sensible solution. Various options in this movement are under discussion, and it also must be borne in mind—and I mentioned this—that implementation of a transition of this kind, even if we speed it up sharply, if we bring if forward insofar as the timescale for its implementation is concerned, will nevertheless not be effected in one single day. One cannot go to bed under one economic system and wake up under another in the morning. This will require certain consistent steps, transitional measures, and stages, maybe stages that are compact and condense in terms of time, but stages nonetheless. This also will be determined by the possibilities that exist for setting prices free: All at once, gradually, by different groups, accompanied with the application of certain regulators for the maximum levels of prices.

[Unidentified correspondent] Leonid Ivanovich, I would like to continue on the question concerning Poland, and to extend it to the other CEMA member-countries. What effect will the transition to a market economy have on the relations and economic contacts between the Soviet Union and the other CEMA member-countries? Some economic managers in the CEMA member-countries express concern about the prospects for reliable Soviet deliveries in the coming five-year period. To what extent is such concern justified?

[Abalkin] At the last session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance the Soviet Government's concept was put forward. We propose a broad-based transition to trade at international prices and to transactions in freely convertible currency starting from next year. It is possible that here too there will be a need for a certain transitional period. We understand that we cannot sever all connections in the future. But, it is not direct intergovernmental agreements, in which the volume of coal, oil, gas, or other commodity supplies is set five years in advance, that will develop more and more actively in foreign economic relations, but, and to an ever greater degree, direct links between enterprises and firms based on business cooperation, contractual obligations, and the most rigorous accountability of each side. In theory—and this is demonstrated by international experience—it is precisely these links which are most stable, reliable, and forward-looking. However, there will be no guarantee that we will conclude these contracts no matter what and deliver products irrespective of other conditions. Our partners abroad, and indeed within the country, must be aware of this, that no one is going to deliver products as a matter of course. This is a matter for contracts and agreements, taking into account all the financial and other aspects of the problem. However, transactions should be carried out in accordance with the quality of the product and the international price level for it and must satisfy all the laws and rules of conduct. That is, all economic organizations, our own included, and our partners must prepare for a new type of economic agreement and relationship. It is a new type of relationship.

[(Sayyed)] I am (Sayyed), KUNA. At what stage are currency reforms in government circles today? Can you tell us approximately when this reform will be carried out and in what relationship to today's market and that of the future?

[Abalkin] We have put the government's attitude to this matter forward on more than one occasion. It was also formulated in the report which the government presented to the second Congress of People's Deputies in December of last year, relating to currency reform in the country. Of course, any problem that comes up is raised in the press. It is very often raised at meetings, in the process of the election contest which took place not long ago during the elections to the republican and local soviets. The following measure was mentioned as a means to improve the economy: confiscating money from wealthy groups and the mafia and redistributing it, and so on. All the calculations we have made thus far, and the consultations, have shown that it is not possible to solve this problem with the aid of currency reform and we have not provided for implementation of currency reform in the country in those measures, in the program of measures, that are being worked out at the moment.

If it is a question of something else, of changing exchange-rate correlations, that is another issue. It must—account being taken of the transition to market methods—also take the path of that correlation. We must move toward officially establishing the exchange rate that corresponds to the real correlation of the purchasing power of the Soviet ruble with other currencies, but that is not a matter of monetary reform.

[Correspondent (Ayt) from (?Cambodia)] Tell me, how do you assess the categorical statement by All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions against raising prices at the beginning of this year? That is my first question. My second question is: How do you assess the activities of Gosbank against the decentralization of the banking system, also at the beginning of this year? Thank you.

[Abalkin] We seem to be gradually developing a relation—fairly well known in the West—between government and trade unions, which does not exclude the possibility of opposite approaches of certain conflict situations. I think any program of radical reform—and we are committed to such very radical reforms—naturally demands a certain amount of agreement: Agreement between various social forces in the country, and to carry out radical reforms without such agreement is scarcely possible. Therefore, here too we must seek mutual understanding, but at the same time we must display firmness in carrying through our policy line, and having embarked on the road of reform we must not retreat when we encounter rather powerful displeasure and resistance. Of course, it is possible that one has less difficulty in seeing and becoming aware of one's own mistakes than those of others, but a number of the actions, both those of the trade unions and the concessions made by the government in that direction, have not brought reform closer, but made it more difficult and have created a still worse situation in the country. Here we must approach these matters very calmly and not act on group interests or give in to pressure, but firmly implement our chosen course.

As for the Gosbank, the document that must create the critical mass of conditions I mentioned as necessary for the transition to new principles of the development of the economy now include some draft laws on the State Bank of the USSR and on the banking system. No doubt these laws will, in the very near future, be submitted to the legislative bodies for consideration. We envisage profound reform of the banking system, and special functions for the State Bank as a central bank carrying out its characteristic functions, including the function of a central reserve system and regulator of the country's entire banking policy. That is normal and correct.

[U.S. correspondent (name indistinct)] Mr. Deputy Prime Minister, if the Soviet economy is now in a very critical situation, what is your attitude now toward aid to the Third World, the countries of the Third World? Will that aid be reduced?

[Abalkin] Our economy really is going through a very difficult period of development. Without too much exaggeration, one might even talk of serious crisis phenomena, of an economic crisis. But at the same time, I would like to caution against certain simplified assessments.

I'd like to give you a small illustration. In the first quarter of this year, January through March, the volume of industrial production in the USSR was 1.2 percent less than in the first quarter of last year. A fall of 1.2 percent, which is usually something that signifies a crisis, at least according to the customary conceptions that we have always used in the Soviet Union. What else, after all, could a fall in production mean? It is, however, the beginning of a real structural perestroyka of the Soviet economy. Behind this minus 1.2 percent of industrial production lies a 7 percent growth in consumer goods for those same months. A real process of conversion has begun, the reduction of military hardware production and the putting into production of civilian goods in its place, and in a number of industries that growth is approaching 20 percent. This is a very important phenomenon which is not noticed amongst everything else.

So in talking about the present state of the economy, I would like to stress that the processes developing here are not straightforward ones. Nevertheless, the economic situation is fairly difficult and the issue of aid, foreign aid including that for the Third World, is being discussed fairly actively. I would limit myself here to two aspects of the issue.

First, this is a normal and healthy process connected with the fact that we must increasingly free our foreign economic links, including those with Third World countries, from various kinds of ideologized approaches. We have to transfer cooperation as a whole onto normal economic rails. I've already mentioned emotions. What concerns me here is another aspect of the problem, which is partly domestic and only in part touches on this external aspect. There is in society nowadays a predominant striving to divide things, to take away from some and give to others. This is a very dangerous trend and we have to take a very considered approach to these issues.

[Unidentified journalist] Leonid Ivanovich, the author of this program, the package of reforms, is the government and it's the government that is evidently going to implement them if the program is adopted. It's hard, of course, to evaluate things from the sidelines, but still, what kind of government do we need in your view in order to really achieve a market. First and foremost, I'm referring to functions and structure rather than numbers and qualitative make-up. Second, given that the previous program adopted in December was adopted for six years and has existed for approximately four months, what kind of reception are you expecting this time around in the Presidential Council and the parliament? What are you expecting?

[Abalkin] Yes, indeed, it is the government that is the author of this program, this package of proposals which we are preparing. And indeed it is the executive, whatever its composition, that will have to implement this program. That is clear. So what should it look like? Well, above all—and this has to be seen to in the near future—the government must have full powers to implement this program. It must be spared the need to have to discuss and agree on every practical step it takes with the bodies of the legislature that are formed. Because, as world practice has shown, without this no government on earth can act consistently and vigorously and take responsibility. For, by making it agree to every step, we would erode its responsibility. The government should—well, this is a general outline condition for its work—it must be a well-trained, professionally trained, governmental apparatus. It is difficult for me to be any more specific, although we must be prepared for certain changes. As regards expectations: Yes, indeed, the program was presented as a strategic program covering six years. I would not like to say today that it has been dropped completely. The plan to switch to a market economy and the market economy itself, as an integral part of this program, was incorporated in the six-year plan, too. It was designed for 1990-95. The whole question focused on the sequence, the timetable, and the stages for this switch. But, there is a choice here: either to display stubborness and insist on our own recently approved program, irrespective of the direction taken by life and of the way in which the situation has changed in the country, or else to take a more resolute step and show that, yes we must take account of the demands and laws of life, and, if necessary, make adjustments to the course originally selected. How is this going to be received? Well, most likely we should prepare ourselves for a negative reaction on the part of the Supreme Soviet. That will be the case. It will be a very unpleasant, or at any rate impartial [as heard] conversation, and we're going to have to have it out. But, when you start to weigh all the unpleasantness that there could be over this, one point remains clear: Honesty must be valued above all else in politics. A dishonest policy has no chance of success in either the short- or the long-term future.

[Unidentified journalist] Pronouncements have been made more frequently of late on the incompatibility of such combinations of words as the socialist market, and a planned market economy. What terminology—the point is not in terminology—do the government and you, personally, use?

[Abalkin] In the documents the government is currently drafting, we use the terminology I used in my introductory remarks today, that is the transition to a regulated market economy. Although this is a very concise concept and does not absorb all the complexities, the regulated market is more precise in that it includes the presence of market mechanisms, examples of regulatory influence, and indirectly, through these concepts, examples of social protection.

[Unidentified AP correspondent] A number of Western business people believe, on the basis of what the Soviet leader has said, that there will be a convertible ruble by the summer.

[Abalkin] I find it hard to say what might have made them decide this, since no serious person and much less from among specialists in the West, has said anything of the kind. I can say that I have been answering that question every week for about three years in succession. It is constantly being asked by my colleagues, and I am able to drew very a very clear distinction. The more professional the specialist you bring into the conversation—for example, the representatives of the major Western banks and the major firms, and leading scientists and specialists with whom I have had occasion to speak—all have said that it will take a long time. It is hard; it cannot be done by decrees of any words, the more profound the knowledge someone had of the problem, the more distance the date to which he regulated the introduction of convertibility. That is indeed the case since we cannot just convene the Supreme Soviet and ask who is in favor of introducing a convertible ruble: Not any more, they press buttons now—Everyone, a majority, adopted. It does not happen like that. You must have...[changes thought] How can you want a convertible ruble without a market economy in the country? When there is nothing in common between domestic and world prices? With a monopoly system of production? It is a complex and lengthy process.

[THE TORONTO STAR correspondent] Developing Mr. Abalkin's answer to the last question, could you not explain a little more just how this package of economic laws will be implemented? You said it would be submitted to the Supreme Soviet, but is it possible that presidential powers, emergency powers, might be used to implement a number of proposals in the package?

[Abalkin] I would say that this question bothers me less than the question of quality, of the content of the documents being drafted. I need to achieve that maximum whereby our commission, with the involvement of all the central economic bodies of the country, come up with the most true-to-life, most realistic option for this movement. This must be a well-drafted model and mechanism, for if one starts to amend it later, as we often do, to rectify one thing and change another, then it may lose its integrity. This is very dangerous: The less professional and competent the intervention is, the more danger there is of disrupting, so to speak, the unity of the author's idea.

[Moderator] Three last questions: From you, you, and you.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Abalkin, in one of your recent speeches you indicated that the USSR Government should resign if the political and economic situations in the country do not change. Does this mean that the Ryzkhov government already has exhausted its possibilities or that those possibilities are running out? Thank you.

[Abalkin] I was criticized on various sides for such statements, which I made, but only six months have passed out of the 15 I mentioned, less than half. Nine months still lie ahead. It is early for us to resign, but the question is decided in the country by the parliament, without asking the government about it.

[NEWSWEEK correspondent] How do you react to the political opposition to market reform? You have said that the emotional situation is changing and maybe people have a poor attitude to reform, and there are stagnant apparatus people. Do you think that today you can convince them or win them over to your side?

[Abalkin] Proposals for an accelerated transition to a regulated market economy will meet quite powerful resistance. One must regard this realistically. One can expect resistance, such methods from the various sides. This indeed applies also to certain strata working in the population. Of course, it will meet resistance in many structures in the administrative apparatus. This is true, but what is the essence of the matter? It is unavoidable. One must undertake that openly. Today it is necessary to ensure other things. One must firstly ensure a clear understanding by all of society, by all strata, that there is no future as a highly developed great power for the country without such a transition, that if one does not embark on that road and if one does not go over to those new methods, we will deprive the country, ourselves and our children, of an opportunity to live in a highly developed, efficient economy, in a powerful state in which life is pleasant, of which one can be proud, and in which one is not ashamed before others of the country's position. But this is just one aspect of the issue.

The second is that powerful supporting forces must also be found. That is, we have to find mass public support, for this is the most intensive kind of support, because the strongest most creative and audacious people, people in whom the spirit of initiative, of a creative entrepreneurial approach, is coming alive, will be on that side and one can rely on them.

[Unidentified journalist] A question from the Hungarian economic newspaper. No market economy will support the number of apparatchiks and administrators that exist in the Soviet Union now. How do you intend to destroy the power of industry ministries and free enterprises from personal administrators?

[Abalkin] This is one of the myths that exist and have become deep-rooted in the Soviet Union. For example, the state government apparatus in the United States—a country which unquestionably has a market economy—is many times larger in absolute numbers and as a proportion of the population than the administrative apparatus in the Soviet Union. This is not the problem. I am convinced that in the near future there will be a sharp overall increase in the number of administrative staff in the Soviet Union, and naturally so, precisely because of the transfer to a market economy. This will ensue from the strengthening of the structure of banking institutions and the tax inspectorate, the creation of various kinds of information and commercial centers, consultancy trading firms, and so on. It is perfectly normal logic. The functions of these bodies are changing and bodies of a fundamentally new type are emerging.

I have tried to tell you what I think so that you have an idea of the work being done and realize the complexities awaiting us in this area. Thank you for the patience with which you have listened, but unfortunately my time has run out.

[Moderator] Leonid Ivanovich spoke for half an hour more than initially planned. His time has become your money. Thank you for your attention. All the best.

Defense Industry Conversion Fair To Be Held

PM1504165590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 12 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[V. Ivanitskiy report under general heading "News Briefs": "Trade Fair of Ideas"]

[Text] Today, when conversion has been translated from a political idea into reality—a grim reality for many people—the former defense industry workers have greater need than ever before of regular business contacts among themselves.

It is in their interests and the interests of the future consumers of their output that the regional commercial center "Sibirskaya Yarmarka" [Siberian Fair] of the Siberian Cities' Association and the USSR Defense Ministry Trade Administration are holding the All-Union "Conversion-90" Fair with international participation in Novosibirsk 16-22 April. The organizers are hoping that the get-together on Siberian soil will help all the participants to choose from a multitude of new ideas precisely those which will assure them success in the market and fill the shelves of our stores with goods for which people have been waiting.

Scientific

'Cosmos-2073' Satellite Launched 17 Apr

LD1804074890 Moscow TASS in English 0730 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The Earth satellite "Cosmos-2073" was launched in the Soviet Union on Tuesday, using the "Soyuz" rocket-booster.

The satellite carries scientific equipment for continuing space research.

The satellite was put into orbit with the following parameters:

—The initial period of rotation: 88.7 minutes.
—The maximum distance from the earth surface (in the apogee): 267 kilometers.
—The minimum distance from the earth surface (in the perigee): 189 kilometers.
—The inclination of the orbit: 82.3 degrees.

In addition to the scientific equipment, the satellite carries a radio system to precisely measure orbital elements and a radiotelemetric system to transmit operational information about devices and scientific equipment to the earth.

The on-board equipment is functioning normally.

The coordination and computer centre is processing incoming data.

Cosmonauts Continue Mission, Operations

LD1704180390 Moscow TASS in English 1712 GMT 17 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin continue their space mission.

The cosmonauts have fulfilled many difficult operations to install additional equipment aboard the Mir complex. They put into operation a new computer and several electronic interface systems.

They switched in power gyroscopic stabilisers of the Kvant-2 module into the general circuit of the Mir complex on Sunday [15 April].

In compliance with the plan of preparing scientific equipment for forthcoming experiments, the crew assembled an additional TV unit the re-equipment module.

The unity will monitor geophysical investigations with the videospectral instrumentation of the Kvant-2 module.

Work in the complex proceeds according to schedule.

The cosmonauts are healthy and feel well.

Military

Yazov To Attend Red Square Military Parade 9 May

LD1704164190 Moscow TASS in English 1627 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 17 TASS—In accordance with a decree of the Soviet president, made public here on Tuesday, a military parade will be held on Red Square in Moscow on May 9, 1990, to mark the 45th anniversary of the victory of Soviet people in the Second World War.

Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov will review the troops.

Moiseyev Chairs Armed Forces Development Meeting

PM1704142190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 First Edition p 1

[Colonel V. Davydikov report: "Following Course of Military Reform"]

[Text] A regular session of the commission to elaborate a concept of Armed Forces development in 1991-1995 and through the year 2000 was held 11 April. This concept will form the basis of the military reform being implemented in the Armed Forces in accordance with the requirements of the new defensive doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

The session was chaired by Commission Deputy Chairman Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. The participants included the chiefs of the main staffs of the branches of the USSR Armed Forces, representatives of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate and categories of troops, chiefs of USSR Defense Ministry main and central directorates, chiefs of a number of military academies and scientific research establishments, and military scientists.

It was noted at the session that a great deal of work has already been done. Radical transformations in the Army and Navy have begun. The question of finalizing and implementing an integrated concept of military reform has now switched to the practical level.

Alongside the commission members' coinciding or close views on fundamental aspects of the concept, it became clear that some questions need additional work taking account of the views expressed. For example, attention was drawn to need for comprehensive consideration to be given to the changing situation in both Europe and other regions and also to the possible results of the talks on reducing strategic offensive arms and conventional armed forces and arms.

Attention was also drawn to the need to give fuller consideration in the concept to the provisions of the USSR Law on Defense currently being elaborated and also to other legal enactments governing the life and activity of the Armed Forces.

The conference participants expressed concrete proposals on the package of documents submitted for discussion and specified the deadline for their finalization prior to submission to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security Questions.

Obituary of Marshal of Aviation Savitskiy

90UM0467A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA obituary: "Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy"]

[Text] After a grave and prolonged illness, Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy, a prominent Soviet military commander, an active participant of the Great Patriotic War, a Lenin Prize laureate, and twice hero of the Soviet Union, passed away on 6 April 1990. He departed this life a loyal son of the Soviet people, who dedicated his entire conscious life to the devoted service of the socialist motherland and to the cause of the Communist Party, which he was a member of since 1931.

Ye.Ya. Savitskiy was born on 24 December 1910 in the city of Novorossiysk into a worker's family. From his early youth, he began to work as an apprentice in the port. He completed schooling in the factory training school, and he worked as a chauffeur. In 1929 he voluntarily joined the Red Army, moving up in its ranks from cadet in a military school for pilots to marshal of aviation.

Ye.Ya. Savitskiy's active participation in the Great Patriotic War is a shining page in his biography. From May of 1942, he was in a field army on the Western, Voronezh, Southwestern, Stalingrad, North Caucasus, the fourth Ukrainian, and the first and third Belorussian fronts. He commanded a fighter air division and an air group, and from December 1942 to the end of the war he commanded a fighter air corps that took part in battles for the liberation of the Kuban, Donbass, the Ukraine, Crimea, Belorussia, the Baltics, and Poland, and in the assault on Berlin. Under difficult combat conditions he skillfully mastered tactical air combat and aviation equipment, and he distinguished himself by bravery and courage. He completed 216 combat sorties, and he personally shot down 22 enemy aircraft.

In the postwar period, Ye.Ya. Savitskiy graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, he served in responsible positions in the Air Force, he commanded air units of the air defense troops of the country, and he was the deputy commander in chief of PVO [air defense] troops. From 1980, he was a military inspector-adviser of the general inspectors' group of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Ye.Ya. Savitskiy devoted all of his energy, knowledge, experience, and organizational abilities to increasing air combat readiness, and he paid a lot of attention to questions of the education and training of flying personnel. He was marked by a high sense of responsibility for an assigned task, exceptional industry, great competence and adherence to principles in resolving assigned tasks, sensitivity to people, and personal modesty. He took an active part in public and political life, and he was elected a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party and the Soviet state valued the services of Ye.Ya. Savitskiy to the motherland highly. He was twice awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, he was decorated with three Orders of Lenin and many other state awards, and also with orders and medals of foreign states. He is an Honored Military Pilot of the USSR.

The fond memory of Yevgeniy Yakovlevich Savitskiy, a loyal son of the Soviet people and an ardent patriot of the socialist homeland, will be preserved in our hearts forever.

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, V.A. Ivashko, V.A. Kryuchkov, Ye.K. Ligachev, Yu.D. Maslyukov, V.A. Medvedev, N.I. Ryzhkov, N.N. Slyunkov, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, Ye.M. Primakov, B.K. Pugo, G.P. Razumovskiy, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, A.S. Pavlov, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, B.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, S.F. Akhromeyev, V.G. Kulikov, S.K. Kuropatkin, N.V. Ogarkov, V.I. Petrov, S.L. Sokolov, I.N. Shkadov, A.F. Shcheglov, A.N. Soshnikov, N.M. Boyko, V.V. Litvinov, I.M. Maltsev.

From the commission for the organization of the burial of Marshal of Aviation Ye.Ya. Savitskiy.

The coffin with the body of Marshal of Aviation Ye.Ya. Savitskiy will be placed in the Red Banner Hall of the M.V. Frunze Central House of the Soviet Army (Commune Square, 2).

The deceased will be on farewell viewing from 1100 to 1230 hours on 10 April 1990. Burial will be on 10 April in Novodevichiy Cemetery.

Baltic Republics

Soviet Reinforcements Reportedly Arrive in Vilnius

AU1804142490 Belgrade Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Soviet military reinforcements arrived in the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius this morning. TANJUG correspondents report that several airplanes landed at the city's airport.

Lithuania has not yet replied to the demand by President Gorbachev and Premier Ryzhkov to annul the decision on secession. TANJUG has learned that the text of the reply that has been prepared includes four points. It is actually said that the Lithuanian parliament will stop the adoption of new political laws by 1 May if prior parliament consultations begin between the Soviet Union and Lithuania.

Vilnius Radio Carries 18 Apr Council Session

Draft Response Debated

LD1804085790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 18 April begins to carry a live relay of the Supreme Council session in Vilnius, chaired by Deputy Stankevicius.

At 0705 GMT a draft response to Moscow's ultimatum is read.

At 0707 GMT debates on the draft begin. Deputy Stakvilevicius says that the tone of the document should be changed—a tone of pleading, not demanding should be applied. He says many other points should also be included.

At 0710 GMT Deputy Karvelis from Klaipeda says that his electors urged him and other deputies to stand firm on the adopted positions and not to give in to any blackmail or brutal pressures. He agrees with this, saying if they renounced the decisions adopted on 11 March, they would be labelled as a bunch of members of a coup. He quotes Gorbachev, saying that the USSR president said that Russia had had Klaipeda as their boarder for centuries and that this boarder will remain such. The deputy asks the Council: is this the USSR president speaking—or the emperor of the Russian Empire?

At 0117 GMT debates continue. Deputies say that Lithuania has now entered the path of political disobedience—military service is specifically mentioned. Moscow is regarded as an enemy, however, some kind of solution must be found and diplomacy must be employed. Some laws could be repealed and this would help Moscow to agree to negotiations. Deputies are asked to reduce their ambitions.

At 0743 GMT V. Landsbergis takes the floor.

At 0802 GMT debates on the decision continue.

At 0804 GMT Deputy Sepetys says that acts adopted on 11 March should not be subjected to any discussions. These should be the cornerstone now and in future.

At 0816 GMT Deputy writer Kazys Saja takes the floor.

At 0826 GMT debates on the issue of blockade from Moscow continue.

At 0830 GMT the session is adjourned until 0900 GMT.

Draft Editing Group Established

LD1804103890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0900 GMT on 18 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Session in Vilnius, after a 30-minute interval. A. Abisalas takes the floor. He says that to go back on what had been adopted would be a grave mistake and that any concessions to Moscow would not satisfy Moscow unless Lithuania turns back to its former situation.

At 0910 GMT debates continue. Deputies say that Moscow will give promises, but only Lithuanians can push the occupational army out of Lithuania.

At 0920 GMT Deputy Puplauskas takes the floor. He says that his electors give full support to the Supreme Council.

At 0925 GMT a vote is taken on entrusting a group of deputies with the task of editing the draft decision on the blockade, taking into consideration all the proposals which had been voiced until now. There is unanimous agreement on this. It is decided that a letter attached to the decision should also be adopted.

At 0936 GMT some procedural issues are debated. At issue is finding a way to allow two deputies from the Lithuanian-Polish region of Salcininkai and Trakai to be deputies in the local government as well as at the Supreme Council, which runs counter to the Constitution.

At 0956 GMT Deputy Simenas presents information on the draft Law on People's Employment. He says that this is only information and not the first reading of the bill.

At 1005 GMT questions are posed to Deputy Simenas.

At 1018 GMT the session is adjourned until 1200 GMT.

Economic Conditions Discussed

LD1804130190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 18 April resumes its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius.

Questions are posed to the members of the government. Prime Minister Prunskiene is unable to take part in the debate, as she is in the Norwegian Embassy arranging her trip to Norway. She will return on Saturday. A brief debate arises on whether the so-called hour of questions and answers is really necessary. There are questions about the Inturist agency's activity, the reorganization of education, and other issues. Some questions are not answered and the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers promises to supply answers next Wednesday.

At 1216 GMT an unidentified deputy proposes that the Supreme Council Presidium should have more time allocated to broadcast various important events in the republic.

At 1218 GMT Deputy Jarmolenka asks about the real state of the economy in the republic, and says the general public should be informed about it.

At 1222 GMT Deputy Vagnorius asks the government's attitude to the setting up of various associations in the republic.

At 1230 GMT questions are posed about the work of local government, about the republic's economic program, whether state aid can be expected in the restoration of the Resurrection Church in Kaunas, and when rubles will be changed into Lithuanian currency. These questions are answered briefly, and some of them will be answered next Wednesday, 25 April.

At 1239 GMT questions continue: which institution will combat the possible blockade? The chairman asks that the more important questions be posed—others can be solved by a simple telephone call or by other means.

Food Shortage Discussed

LD1804135590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1245 GMT on 18 April continues its live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session in Vilnius. The questions and answer period continues. An unidentified deputy objects that the government is selling houses at very low prices. There are questions about the financing of the republic's procuracy.

At 1253 GMT some questions are submitted in writing and corresponding ministers or their representatives supply brief replies: the application of chemical fertilizers from planes has been prohibited in some parts of the republic; cooperative laws will also be applied in agriculture; the Ministry of Agriculture will take measures to supply the population with sufficient quantities of food products during the possible blockade, while accumulating sufficient quantities of these products for export.

At 1317 GMT a question is posed about the employment of people of various nationalities at the Department of Nationalities. The corresponding official states that in this case nationality is not important—what is important is that the work is done properly.

At 1325 GMT questions on hunting are answered by the minister of forestry.

At 1326 GMT questions are answered on the supply of food products. There is a shortage of soft drinks and of bottles.

Landsbergis Addresses 18 Apr Supreme Council

LD1804091890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0743 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Address by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at its session in Vilnius on 18 April—live]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Now about the concept which was used here: civic disobedience. This concept is known in the world, it is interesting and important. But it does describe our situation. It would have been appropriate a year ago. [passage ommited]

Since we are the citizens of the republic of Lithuania, obey its laws—there is no need to be disobedient in Lithuania. It is not a war on our side. On the other [side], if they do not recognize our rights, our laws, and use force, this can be called a war.

And now to our debates. It would be more constructive to return to the document, to the draft resolution which is being submitted. [passage omitted] The question has arisen about the second article, urging that the USSR renounce the use of any coercion, because economic coercion is also coercion. If anyone thinks that this is not polite, we could discuss it and vote. [passage omitted] Otherwise I have not noticed any basic objections.

I wish to draw your attention to another document, a direct reply, because this resolution is a resolution for us—or for the people of Lithuania—to be published in the press. This is not a document which would be dispatched to Moscow, although, of course, they will have it and read it. We could reply as we intended. After the Council of Ministers has dispatched its reply, the Supreme Council could also prepare its reply.

Such a reply was being prepared, but we were confused yesterday by the news about the application of brutal economic sanctions, about economic destruction in Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Therefore it was intended to prepare a brief letter expressing regret about the USSR attitude and methods, and stating our readiness to examine any questions taking into consideration all legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, its citizens, and its strategic interests. [passage omitted]

Thus, I think, disucssion of only the resolution is not enough. We should explain why we do not send a reply from the Supreme Council. [passage omitted] I think that the Supreme Council must adopt a text addressed to Moscow. [passage omitted]

TASS Reports No Halt in Oil, Gas Supply

LD1804125190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1229 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 April (TASS)—TASS correspondent Andrey Surzhanskiy writes: Rumors being spread in the Lithuanian mass media to the effect that the all-Union power system has sharply reduced or completely stopped supplies of oil and gas to the republic are completely groundless. This was stated today during a telephone conversation by Aklim Mukhamedzyanov, USSR Deputy minister for the Oil and Gas Industry, in answer to a TASS correspondent's question.

So far, he said, supplies of oil and gas to Lithuania have not been stopped. There have been no instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers on this matter.

The correspondent's question was prompted by reports which have appeared in the Western masss media about "a sharp reduction" and even "the stopping" of supplies of natural gas and oil to the republic. Similar assertions have also been made by the current leaders of Lithuania in an interview to Western journalists and have been broadcast by Lithuanian radio.

A TASS correspondent in Vilnius today talked by telephone to the Mazeikiai oil refinery. The management there confirmed that the plant is working normally and that oil supplies have not been stopped.

Lithuanian Fuel Supply Situation Detailed

PM1704201590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by special correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Gromak: "Lithuania: Plenty of Questions, No Answers"]

[Text] Vilnius, 17 Apr—A session of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers was held Monday to examine the action program in the event of the Soviet Government starting to implement the policy of an economic blockade of Lithuania. Ministers briefed those present on fuel, energy, and material resources, as well as on the possibility of working with limited resources, ELTA reports.

At a news conference held the same evening at the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, the reply signed by Prime Minister K. Prunskiene and sent to the USSR's leaders was read out. There was not a single concrete proposal behind the smooth phrases about the need for dialogue and respect for mutual interests, however. Nonetheless, there is no doubt about the fact that the Lithuanian leadership is unwilling to abandon its positions.

At the same time, the inhabitants of the republic have reacted to the Soviet leadership's warning. Lines have appeared at gas stations—a phenomenon that, to be blunt, is unusual for Lithuania. But it accurately reflects the sentiments of ordinary workers, among whom the "political games" of Mr. V. Landsbergis are creating a lack of confidence in the future.

"We're tired of living in uncertainty," said V. Sobolevskaya, a pensioner and former teacher. "Resolute measures are needed... Unfortunately, the Lithuanian government takes no account of its own citizens' interests."

At the news conference Landsbergis avoided giving a direct answer about the possible consequences of the policy of ultimatums. Although it was by no means an idle question. It is not hard to imagine what will result from the halting of shipments to the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] from other Union republics of types of output which can be sold on the foreign market for convertible currency. Appearing on Lithuanian television, R. Ozolas, vice prime minister of the republic's government, attested: "The products obtained by Lithuania from the USSR and which could be sold on the foreign market for convertible currency are oil, petroleum products, gas, various metals and metal products, chemicals, cotton, and timber. If shipments were abruptly and resolutely halted, most of our enterprises could last for around two weeks using existing stocks. Our economy could operate for about a month using existing stocks of gasoline, provided they were used carefully. There is enough fuel for farmers to carry out their sowing work. After gas processing is ended there will be enough supplies for approximately 20 days. The situation with regard to electricity will be similar."

So just what is the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet counting on? Perhaps on support from the West, where Prunskiene is planning to travel in the next few days? There are plenty of concrete and acute questions. But there are no clear answers.

More on Energy Supply

LD1704222290 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] The prime minister of Lithuania, Kazimiera Prunskiene, has said today at a new conference that oil supplies to the Mazeikiai oil refinery might be cut short tomorrow morning. Automobile petrol is being produced in Mazeikiai.

According to the Lithuanian minister of energetics, the Soviet regional controllers office based in Riga issued a command to stop the first power unit of the Ignalina nuclear power plant while the second unit is not functioning at present because of repairs due to end on 23 May. Meanwhile, the first power unit will be stopped for extraordinary repair from 23rd April. Up til now no disturbing news about the technical reliability of the first power unit were made public.

Gas supplies are also going to be stopped to Lithuania. Most of gas supplies were used up by the [name indistinct] thermo electric power plant and the [name indistinct] fertilizer plant in Jonava. Apartment heating will most probably be cut down so that 10 percent of gas could be saved.

Prunskiene on Moscow's 'Blockade,' Oil Supplies

LD1704223890 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] A news conference for home and foreign journalists was held in the Lithuanian Council of Ministers today. Answering questions at the news conference was Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, her deputy premiers Algirdas Brazauskas and Romualdas Ozolas, as well as two ministers of the new cabinet. The main topic of the news conference was the possible economic blockade of the republic of Lithuania.

Kazimiera Prunskiene pointed out that if the Soviet Union decided to employ economic sanctions against Lithuania, the Lithuanian partners in the USSR would be informed about possible breakdowns in supplies from Lithuania by stating clearly the causes and the culprits of the disorder, namely the Government of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand she said Lithuania's economic partners in the Soviet Union could put pressure on the Soviet Government, thus mitigating the effects of the blockade if not avoiding them altogether. Kazimiera Prunskiene defined Moscow's policies toward Lithuania as genuine renunciation, and added that that was the real beginning of freedom.

Anyhow, rational use of fuel and alternative parters in the West are indispensible for Lithuania at present, and that is why the premier and the foreign minister, Algirdas Saudargas, are leaving for Norway this week. Mention was also made of a few big companies in Finland, Canada, and France which had offered their assistance to Lithuania in case of a blockade.

Going by unofficial data available to the Lithuanian government, the supply of oil to the oil refinery in Mazeikiai, north Lithuania, might be cut off Tuesday morning between seven and eight AM. Commenting on this the Lithuanian minister of power engineering, Leonas Asmonatas, pointed out that the Soviet Union itself would suffer an estimated yearly loss of $850 million besides the fines that it would have to pay for breaking international contracts. Knowing the present state of things in the Soviet economy, such a step would be unwise and hardly justifiable, Minister Leonas Asmonatas noted. The Soviet Government most probably intends to indulge in a (?special) but dubious luxury. By punishing the republic of Lithuania it will also punish citizens of the Soviet Union who are at present in or near Lithuania.

For example, the same pipeline supplies gas not only to Lithuania but also to the Kaliningrad region of the Russian Federation. As Algirdas Brazauskas put it, the possibilities of channelling all the gas to Kaliningrad, cutting off only the [words indistinct] (?pipes) to the biggest Lithuanian cities are more theoretical than practical.

Toward the end of the news conference Kazimiera Prunskiene drew the journalists' attention to one (?serious) fact. The Soviet Union was threatening to stop the supplies of gas and oil to Lithuania without specifying the reason; that is, whether the Soviet Union was just punishing Lithuania or whether it would like Lithuania to pay in hard currency. An answer to (?this) question is likely to come in the near future.

Lithuanian Fuel Minister on Petrol Situation

LD1804093290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0835 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Interview with Leonas Asmantas, Lithuanian minister of fuel and power engineering, by Liudas Minkevicius; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpts] Liudas Minkevicius now interviews the Lithuanian minister of fuel and power engineering, Leonas Asmantas:

[Minkevicius] Yesterday, at a news conference about the reduction in the oil supply, you stated that this is only a rumor until there is some official document. Have you got it?

[Asmantas] No, I did not get it and the supply of oil is normal. [passage omitted] In Elektrenai the supply of gas has been increased. The nuclear power station is at present being overhauled.

[Minkevicius] But don't you think that you will receive such an official document about fuel?

[Asmantas] In present conditions I do not think I will get it. If the Soviet Union really takes care of people, I think it will not take such actions which create much inconvenience for people. Maybe economic pressure will be carried out in some other forms, but not in the supply of fuel.

[Minkevicius] People store petrol wherever they can. There are very long queues at petrol stations. [passage omitted]

[Asmantas] I can only say that in the last few days the sale of petrol tripled, compared with other days. This creates unnecessary troubles and difficulties in delivering petrol to the stations because transport facilities for delivering petrol are limited. The production of fuel is progressing normally in Mazeikiai. The fuel stocks at the enterprises manufacturing oil products make it possible to state that at present no limitations exist. But, maybe, it will be expedient to restrict the sale of petrol at some petrol stations to filling the tanks of vehicles. We have stocks of petrol for a rather long time. [passage omitted] I would like to warn those who accumulate stocks of petrol that they increase the danger of fire. [passage omitted].

Belorussia Reduces Gas Shipments to Lithuania

LD1704172590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1747 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 17 (TANJUG)—Belorussia today "considerably reduced" its shipments of natural gas to Lithuania, but this is not believed to be part of the economic sanctions.

The general manager of Zapadotransgaz of Minsk last night informed his colleague in Litgaz [Lithuanian Gas] of Vilnius about the decision which came into effect today.

Belorussia criticized Lithuania's decision to secede and has already officially warned the leadership in Vilnius that it will ask for its territories if Lithuania secedes from the Soviet Union.

Lithuanian Parliament Discusses Reply to Gorbachev

LD1704154590 Moscow TASS in English 1447 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 17 ELTA-TASS—After a five-day interval the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet session resumed its work here today. In the morning the Supreme Soviet began to discuss the political situation in the republic and a draft reply to the message from Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The message warned in particular that if within two days the Lithuanian leadership did not abrogate the legislative acts and decisions which it had taken recently and which counterpose Lithuania to the other republics and to the Soviet Union as a whole, instructions would be issued to stop the delivery of goods, which are sold on the external market for hard currency, to Lithuania from other union republics.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet told the session that "there is headway towards dialogue despite difficulties."

At the same time, Landsbergis described as "impracticable" the demands to cancel the act on the restoration of Lithuania's statehood. He believes the demands are aimed at postponing talks indefinitely.

It was suggested that a reply should also touch upon the problems of the rights of members of non-indigenous nationalities who live in Lithuania, on matters concerning defence construction and property on Lithuanian territory.

A telegram sent on Monday to Gorbachev and Ryzhkov by Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene says that the Lithuanian government, "for its part, sees no reason to justify a worsening of economic relations. We do not understand the content of the economic sanctions alluded to and would not like to give false explanations to our people and the world."

The Lithuanian government made it incumbent upon the republic's enterprises to continue to fulfill obligations to their partners in the USSR.

Text of Draft Reply

LD1804082290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0705 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Draft reply to President Gorbachev from the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at its session in Vilnius on 18 April]

[Text] Resolution of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council on the development of relations between the republic of Lithuania and the USSR:.

The Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council, affirming that it will also in the future consistently strive for the consolidation of the Lithuanian republic's independence, stressing that all disputes arising between Lithuania and the USSR can be solved only by dialogue, and being convinced that only by way of dialogue is it possible to find solutions acceptable to the Soviet Union and Lithuania, resolves:

1. During the period of preliminary parliamentary consultations between Lithuania and the USSR—if they begin—not to pass new political legal acts up to 1 May 1990.

2. Urge the USSR to renounce coercion against the republic of Lithuania and its citizens.

3. Propose to the USSR president and the USSR Supreme Soviet to instruct authorized persons to begin consultations on the conditions of negotiations with the authorized delegation of the Lithuanian Supreme Council.

4. Send to Moscow an authorized delegation of the Lithuanian Supreme Council for consultations on the conditions of negotiations.

Reply to Letter, Landsbergis Remarks Cited

PM1704145090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[IZVESTIYA correspondent Leonid Kapelyushnyy report from Vilnius under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Lithuanian Situation"]

[Text] It appears that the Lithuanian situation could now be called the Lithuanian crisis.

The letter from the USSR president and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers to the Lithuanian leadership calling for a realistic assessment of the situation and the adoption of mutually acceptable ways of resolving it is apparently going to remain unfulfilled.

For the republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Easter vacation days were ordinary working days. The Council of Ministers was working on a reply to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The reply notes that the problems touched on in the letter from the USSR president and Council of Ministers chairman are in fact far wider. First, there is the Army question—Lithuania has exempted its young men from universal military service, but the time for the draft has arrived; then there are questions of borders and joint actions to protect them, and the problems of inhabitants of Lithuania who wish to retain the right to remain citizens of the USSR. It is claimed that, according to preliminary figures, these amount to about 10 percent of the population... It is also proposed to discuss the question of former Union property "taking into account the interests of the USSR as a supplier of some raw material and the main consumer of its output."

The Lithuanian government, the reply says, sees no factors that could exacerbate economic relations between the USSR and Lithuania, especially since "that would not only affect the Lithuanian Republic's situation." As for economic sanctions, the Lithuanian side would like to know what form these will take, so as to "explain them to our people and the world."

It is stressed that the Lithuanian Council of Ministers has instructed its enterprises strictly to fulfill their delivery commitments.

At a press conference Vitautis Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet, reaffirmed Lithuania's position: There can be no question of revoking the Supreme Soviet's decisions on Lithuania's secession from the USSR. As for sanctions by Moscow, this measure cannot be effective.

It was noted at the press conference that Lithuania's economy is strong enough to cooperate not only with the East, but with the West. Of course, it will take time to reorient the economy and obtain the necessary goods from other countries. Especially since the USSR Government's letter does not contain the words "economic blockade," but only talks about reductions in deliveries. The republic Council of Ministers has calculated what material and energy resources it has, how to ensure the viability of the Lithuanian state, how to support it with deliveries from other countries or other republics of the Soviet Union... Joint enterprises and good links with a number of republics already exist.

Lithuania could suffer only in the event of its borders being closed on the Union's side. But in that event, the chairman said, "we will regard this as a manifestation of ill will."

Landsbergis Says Lithuanian Decisions Irrevocable

PM1704222590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Session of Lithuanian Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] Following a five-day recess the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet deputies reassembled here and devoted practically the entire day to discussion of the main issue—the situation in Lithuania.

A report on this question was delivered by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, who—like the other deputies who spoke—devoted much attention to the letter from USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N.I. Ryzhkov to the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. In particular, speaking of the chief condition contained in the message—the abrogation of the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the restoration thereby of the republic's 10 March 1990 position—he called these decisions "irrevocable" ["neotmenimyy"], drew attention to the fact that possible curbs on supplies of output to Lithuania "will inevitably mean economic losses not only for Lithuania but for the republics of the Soviet Union also," and stressed that "Lithuania will seek a dialogue by every means, along various channels."

A heated debate ensued. The most diverse opinions were heard from the rostrum. Whereas some deputies categorically criticized and condemned what they called the "ultimatums" and "threats" contained in the letter from the USSR leaders, others endeavored to evaluate more soberly, even self-critically, the steps taken by the republic's parliament; and individual participants in the debate even proposed "declaring a moratorium" and "suspending the implementation" of certain of the adopted laws and resolutions.

Lithuanian Leaders on Response to Gorbachev

LD1704131990 Moscow World Service in English
1110 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] According to reports from the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, the Supreme Soviet of the republic will discuss today the situation emerging in Lithuania after the warning by President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov on stopping shipments to the republic of goods sold on the world market for hard currency. This will go in force if the Lithuanian leadership does not renounce its illegal decisions. On Monday the Lithuanian government sent a preliminary answer to the Soviet leadership. Commenting on it, the Lithuanian head of government, Kazimiera Prunskiene, said in a television interview:

The address to the government and the president of the Soviet Union that is now in the making names the issues on which we see the possibility of agreement and asks for explanations concerning the economic blockade. If one of the sides suddenly applies such sanctions they can only be termed as a cold and very brutal war against the people of Lithuania. By the way, there are people among the residents of Lithuania who consider themselves citizens of the Soviet Union. Our counter measures are of an opposite kind. We decided to urge our industries not to respond to the termination of Soviet shipments and continue our own shipments to the Soviet Union. We don't want to break our relations with our partners. There can be no other solution of the question as the immediate reception of a delegation of the Lithuanian government in Moscow. We don't lose hope for mutual friendliness and common sense in our relations, said Kazimiera Prunskiene, head of the Lithuanian government.

The readiness of the Lithuanian government to conduct talks and its desire not to break economic ties with Soviet republics can be only welcomed, thinks our news analyst Boris Markovnikov. But, as we see, neither the prime minister in her interview nor the message to the Soviet leadership make any mention of the causes for the steps named in the message of President Gorbachev and Prime Minister Ryzhkov. At a news conference on Monday the chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Vytautas Landsbergis, was categorical. He described as unacceptable the main condition put forward by the Soviet leadership, the abolition of the parliamentary decision on the restoration of Lithuanian independence. However, it is clear that the success of talks and their normal course is possible only when both sides approach them in a responsible constructive spirit. The Lithuanian leadership actually demonstrates reluctance to conduct a productive dialogue by refusing to abolish its separatist decisions, restore the operation of the Soviet Constitution on its territory and observe Soviet legislation.

There is one more point that should be made: Kazimiera Prunskiene said the steps the Soviet leadership intends to take were sudden. But on many occasions earlier, for example the message of President Gorbachev to the people and parliament of Lithuania, warned about the grave consequences thoughtless hasty actions of the Lithuanian leadership can result in.

Landsbergis Addresses 17 Apr Council Session

LD1704101190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0711 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Statement by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Supreme Council session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Good morning, esteemed deputies. Allow me to congratulate those who have been elected only recently.

Not just the latest events can be examined today. Maybe it is time to examine the important period of the last month. This was a month of consolidating our independence. We declared legal and state acts of great importance on 11 March, thus paving the way for the implementation of these acts. This is the course we have chosen; it has its difficulties as well as its advantages. What did reinstating our independence mean? This was a declaration of will, our voters' will, Lithuania's will, the people's self-determination, as well as our unanimous self-determination. The Rubicon has been crossed, and on the other side we have found ourselves in a new legal situation. Is it indeed a new situation?

Numerous reactions from the outside manifestly reminded us of 1940; some of us remember it from our own experiences, others know it from history books. It is even conceivable that in a political sense we have found ourselves in a similar situation: back to the year 1940; spring and summer, maybe the end of June or the beginning of July, the situation when Lithuania is still like a state and yet the powers of its government are able to decide only very little in the face of constant threat by military and secret forces in Lithuania. Of course, if we compare this with today then we can see that much is to the advantage of the present situation. The fact that organs of state power are more independent and stronger and have not been disconcerted by military actions on Lithuania's territory—we have probably become accustomed and have learned to work in such circumstances—is also to the advantage in the present situation.

On the other hand, if in 1940 the blow on Lithuania was aimed on the day when Paris fell, when the world paid absolutely no attention to the Baltic states, now the situation is completely different. Great, if not full, attention to the Baltic states is our great weapon.

So, what is the significance of this period of a month, what is the experience, and what are the conclusions?

We have withstood the threats that all state power would be used, as it had been declared, and this power would be used if it were used to defend the past, that is, to defend what had already become events of the past in Lithuania. We were not deterred either by these threats or by demonstrations of force, by various acts of sabotage and the onslaughts of the psychological war, of which there is no need to remind you. We withstood attempts at political blockade, attempts to isolate Lithuania in the international arena. We also had to resist certain advice and other more elaborate means of pressure to make us renounce our main achievement which led us to the new legal position. We heard demands to annul what cannot be annulled. Then we had proposals to annul the decisions of 11 March, though no one explained how the Constitution could be annulled without our appearing as dictators and members of a coup d'etat who as a rule revoke the validity of constitutions, or without surrendering our own will now to the validity of the USSR Constitution on our territory which had formerly been imposed on us by force. Probably many of those who proposed this formulation to us were well-meaning friends, but they had not taken everything into consideration.

We also had to withstand the sabotage of jurisdiction, an attempt to destroy law and order in Lithuania and to introduce dual legislation and dual supervision of laws.

We also had to withstand the instigation of ethnic unrest which had already been fueled on a large scale here in Lithuania and which had recently been exacerbated by threats to take territories away from the republic of Lithuania. And finally there was the bluff of certain propaganda and allegedly constitutional adherence to the USSR laws in Lithuania.

Our weapons in the peaceful struggle were mutual understanding and solidarity, rallying together, and conscious discipline. The public of Lithuania, citizens, young people, various social strata, and organizations showed great maturity indeed. They demonstrated to the world that Lithuania is worthy of independence already today.

The solidarity of nationalities was also our weapon. Here in Lithuania we have all probably paid attention to the results of the USSR opinion poll conducted here among residents of Vilnius. These results destroyed the myth of the central Soviet propaganda [as heard] and its attempts to divide the people of Lithuania into Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians and to draw an artificial and nonexistent line between them.

The solidarity of nations is being very strongly expressed in the Baltic states. There have been many statements of support from our neighbor, Latvia. The strengthening of the constitutional position in Estonia in the last few days leaves no doubt that Estonia is also resolutely following our path, because it has made a decision on the most urgent and painful problem of the illegality of military service on Estonia's territory.

Maybe we have all already read or heard a statement by the Estonian National Front on Lithuania. Only the two texts that we have received are different: for some reason in the Lithuanian text one sentence is missing about the Soviet Union's aggression against Lithuania at present.

There are many statements of solidarity from the Soviet Union's peoples at meetings, demonstrations, and from delegations.

Finally, the solidarity of the peoples of the world is more pronounced, stronger, and more consistent than the attitudes of many governments. This is more important. At present the time has come when in East Europe, too, a great part has been played by mass movements, and there has been an increased social upsurge of the nations. In other countries, too, there are phenomena which could be described as the transition to people's diplomacy. These have occurred not necessarily through the activity of professional diplomats, but rather due to a direct talk between the nations, their representatives, their newly emerging forces and countries, too. Maybe it is quite possible that on the scale of the USSR this will be a factor of great importance which would help to neutralize the hostile designs toward us and which would demonstrate what in reality genuine friendship and cooperation among nations can be without services by nomenklatura bureaucracy.

The world's public opinion is yet another weapon that is also very important but which only partially depends on us. However, it depends on our consistency and on our very clear position. Here we encountered an extraordinary competition in the people's minds, the press, and all the media that form public opinion. This competition was made by the myth of Mikhail Gorbachev in the world and the pragmatism and indifference which had taken root a long time ago in many Western countries. Here many things have changed and are continuing to change. Here the main political struggle took place which so far we have been winning. This was helped by crude mistakes made by the leaders of the Soviet Union which have already been labeled in this way quite often by rather prominent politicians.

Now about the results which could be summarized to some extent. One of them is the general demand to hold negotiations or a dialogue which has been heard since the outset, since the middle of March. We know that some countries offered their territories as a location for negotiations, such as Czechoslovakia, Iceland and France. Rather influential people offered to mediate, including the initiative of Pope John Paul II, which we received by telephone yesterday and today—I would like to have a more accurate text of it.

All the definite, I can say, commanding proposals—or hopes which are voiced in a commanding tone—are to the effect that only through negotiations should issues concerning Lithuania and the Soviet Union be resolved without delay. The Soviet Union set a precondition for such negotiations, a condition which is known in advance as impossible to meet and, therefore, by setting this condition it has a clear objective, which is to postpone the very issue, maybe even in the hope of misleading public opinion, to believe that allegedly Lithuania is being stubborn and does not want negotiations.

However, nothing came of this, and so we can only believe that probably this was necessary for the Soviet leadership in some way to avoid directly answering the question of why the Soviet Union does not agree to begin talks.

It looks as if few preparations were made, although we raised in Moscow as early as last summer, if not earlier, the issue of talks that would lead to the restoration of independence. However, at that time this was ignored and forgotten, and so no preparations for this were made for this March. Maybe the new situation is now being seen as something that has taken place and which cannot be changed and that negotiations will become inevitable indeed.

It is important that most politicians or statesmen in the West note quite clearly also the objective of negotiations, namely, that negotiations should produce such a result which would be the implementation of independence, or advice on how the USSR should get out of this situation and Lithuania. The Danish Foreign Minister and former

Secretary of State Shultz spoke about that. Influential politicians speak about the Hague international courts of law where the case of Lithuania could be presented by some country, or where the claims of the USSR on Lithuania and vice versa could be discussed. If the Soviet Union refused to go to the Hague courts of law then certain consequences should follow as regards the Western countries in relation to the Soviet Union These are not our ideas; these are the ideas and proposals of Western politicians.

Another result which has been consolidated universally, and even repeated by the USSR leaders and the propaganda workers, is that force or coercion should not be used. This issue has been discussed in various ways and sometimes very dangerously for us, to the effect that perhaps under certain circumstances it is possible and permissible to use force. It is strange to read even now in some Soviet central papers about possible bloodshed, though it is not indicated who and whose blood would be shed here, though it might be clear that armed servicemen would shed the blood of those unarmed. But why should things be said thus without the main source of danger being named?

In brief, the USSR has given certain promises to the Western states on more than one occasion, although later the Soviet Union has demonstrated that the promises given could not be trusted. In some cases these were called lies and deceit.

Some Western politicians have noted that it was useful to get to know what the Soviet Union is really like, and with whom the West is dealing. If even M. Thatcher, the British Prime Minister, admitted that she was shocked by this unexpected turnabout of M. Gorbachev's policy, then probably the USSR leaders are indeed making mistakes.

We have experienced a rather big propaganda campaign waged rather subtly by high-ranking Soviet officials who are constantly repeating formulations in an attempt to convince Western politicians that Lithuania is a matter of the Soviet Union's internal affairs. PRAVDA even uttered such nonsense, saying that according to international law Lithuania was a matter of internal affairs. Of course, this issue is not regarded entirely in this way, although some Western politicians have made similar utterances.

However, according to what we know from a detailed description of the meeting between representatives of Baltic organizations and President Bush, Secretary of State Mr. Baker, and other officials in the White House, Baker has made it clear that the United States does not accept the viewpoint that the law on secession from the Soviet Union or any kind of referendum should apply to Lithuania. They tell us that here is the USSR Constitution and, they say, everything has to be resolved within the framework of this Constitution. Until this day, and even today, these formulations are being repeated in the Soviet press. Within the framework of the USSR Constitution, although this Constitution is not valid in Lithuania; this Constitution was enforced earlier; no one voted freely for this Constitution here in Lithuania, and since 11 March this Constitution has been officially invalidated.

Therefore this kind of talk is maybe prolonging the issue and, we could say, is even self-contradictory, because this Constitution clearly states the right of the republics to freely secede.

Recently a hastily adopted law, which is extremely poor, was set up in order that there could be no talk at all about any free secession. It speaks about secession, which is made so complicated that in practical terms no one could ever secede because self- determination has been turned into a decision made by everyone else and not by the republic's self-determination.

So, such confusion in their own statements and laws indicates a deep political and legal crisis in the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless the position of major Western states has been consistent in identifying the unlawful annexation of the Baltic states and in refusing to recognize this annexation. This is mentioned now in particular because Lithuania has especially stressed this problem as a problem between two states, or simply as a regional problem of the entire Baltic area and this part of Europe.

It looks that a certain blackmail—(?and I may refer to it like that)—on an international scale concerning the future of M. Gorbachev and the hopes of Western states which are linked with it, has also failed. They say: What should be sacrificed? Lithuania or Gorbachev? Or perestroyka? As if Lithuania would mean a return to some sort of stagnation and not to a consistent continuation of the same perestroyka. Even here one understands how things are in real terms. Therefore, certain threats that the issue of Lithuania may even threaten world peace look too paradoxical because the whole world could see what these forces of peace were, and how these forces behaved in Lithuania.

There is a certain matter which Western politicians were made to believe: That one should not hurry with recognition of the Lithuanian government or direct diplomatic contacts because this could provoke the most conservative forces of the USSR. In other words, recognition would provoke madness, and therefore one should not hurry with this. Well, concerning this we can be patient. A month is a very short period of time in comparison with the several years which Lithuania had to wait after the declaration of independence in 1918.

When sometimes attempts are made to attribute propaganda to us which says that nobody has recognized us, we remember very well that very many world states simply said: We have recognized you since 1920 and we have never changed our position regarding this.

It seemed that the Soviet Union would consistently work for our political isolation, and through psychological warfare to convince us that we were absolutely alone and supported by nobody. Such isolated people can be easily broken down. The aim was to prevent us from surviving the long political seige.

However, this also failed, because this was not allowed to happen by the international situation, and by the internal situation in the Soviet Union itself, and by public opinion which, as I have already mentioned, is on Lithuania's side throughout the world and in many places in the Soviet Union as well. We are winning over public opinion; we are right, and the world is not yet entirely wrong.

What is our current situation? The relationship between Moscow and Lithuania is twofold: On the one hand an absolute need of a dialogue is understood and voiced; sometimes certain conditions are indicated; sometimes a reminder of the maximum condition, which cannot be met, is given once again. However, in fact, unofficial contacts are taking place. There are documents in which other issues are raised, and not the maximum unfulfillable conditions. Specific problems are raised. This can be said about the latest appeal by M. Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, which is identified in the world as an economic ultimatum, a promise of a blockade, yet at the moment it is already being corrected on the Moscow side, because they realize they have made a political step which is not beneficial to them.

Therefore, on the one hand, steps are taken toward a dialogue, having realized that a dialogue is inevitable, with certain difficulties, which were created by making certain maximum statements, first of all in Moscow. Yet on the other hand new methods of pressure are being employed and used. This we identify as a threat of economic war, however. We realized at the very beginning that this was more a means of political pressure designed to produce a psychological effect, and to frighten the people, or even perhaps to demonstrate unemployment as a perceptible reality should these economic sanctions be applied. An artifically created unemployment would again be directed at social sabotage and splitting society, hoping to catch some political fish in muddy waters.

This could be seen at once, and now the flip side of the coin is showing, or a certain correction to the position—namely that the entire problem of our economic relations can be presented as a means to earn hard currency for the USSR. Explanations of this kind have multiplied from Moscow officials. This of course will set us up for active work and thrift in the field of economic activity. On the other hand this will give us more confidence, because this is already a de facto recognition, with Lithuania beginning to be regarded as another state, and accounts being settled with it by international means.

Old pressures and threats are also used, such as alleged debates concerning party property—although paratroopers or Internal Affairs Ministry troops being the only experts invited to these debates. We must admit that we have shown too little attention and given too little notice to all these events.

There is impending danger for us, and not only for us, but also for Latvia and Estonia. This is a provocation for the entire Baltic area if young men are picked up [as heard] en masse. Here we also have certain proposals which we sent through unofficial channels, and which perhaps would be worthwhile discussing if the top leadership of the Soviet military forces—this would not be the government but would be at least the military leadership—would enter some sort of agreement, an agreement which would perhaps be similar to the one in the program adopted at the Sajudis [Lithuanian Movement for Reconstruction] congress. This has been rejected all the time. Yet now we see that many things which had been categorically rejected are being discussed in Moscow as something normal and as mature points of issue. We have been progressive all the time, and we outstripped the reform which was matured in Moscow, and for that reason we are wicked.

There is most likely a threat with the use of force, the removal of leadership after the proclamation of presidential rule, or not proclaiming it if the most reactionary profascist forces take the upper hand in Moscow. As far as the continuing propaganda against us in the central mass media in the Soviet Union is concerned we must pay attention to some things, to the so-called problem of human rights which has at last started to become clearer. Maybe, they speak of those people who do not wish to take Lithuanian citizenship but who want to live in Lithuania as Soviet citizens. Their problem must be understood and resolved. And as for each silly propaganda intimidation to the effect that those who do not have certificates of Lithuanian citizenship will not be sold goods, that they will die of hunger, or that they will be expelled from Lithuania, I do not know whether it is necessary to respond or deny. Maybe it is necessary to tell people who are being misled and to explain things to them.

There is some really provocative terminology about refugees from the Baltic region. Allegedly, there are now refugees from the Caucasus and from the Baltic region. They very much want to identify us with the Caucasus problem. They are unsuccessful, but their efforts persist. Maybe some people will be misled.

As we understand it, the struggle which we are waging is not only for our benefit but also for the benefit of the Soviet Union in order to overcome not only errors but also crimes of its former leaders and some errors of its present leaders. Our methods in this struggle and political confrontation is to seek a dialogue by various means and through various channels, including yesterday's statement by the Council of Ministers which echoed very loudly in the world, saying that a Lithuanian delegation led by the prime minister is going to Moscow.

A very important method in this political activity is direct contacts with the Soviet Union's republics and even cities, and, of course, the striving for trade contacts with the West. Trade is the best aid politically. It is better than asking only for aid. When the need arises, it will be rendered. There is talk about it there. Our dignity and our real interests are the development of trade.

As far as the Soviet Union's republics, political movements, and new democratic forces are concerned, there is an extensive sphere of activity which delegations of our various scientific, art and other public organizations, on the basis of social initiative, should act upon. This work is being started, maybe, with some delay—we could have started it earlier—but we are going to achieve something now, too. For this purpose we must enlist former USSR deputies. This has already been discussed, and a corresponding document is being prepared. A proposal will be made to set up such a corps of advisers attached to the Supreme Soviet which would act in the Soviet Union, in its republics or cities.

It seems we should have paid more attention and must pay it now to what we call the property of the party. This is not only the property of the party; we see other things linked with the freedom of the press and speech. These are not merely economic problems, so to say, the preservation or loss of national property, but much more important matters. Therefore we must admit that our parliament did not pay sufficient attention to this, did not defend sufficiently both national property and the freedom of the press. This has been compensated by the public.

Explanations coming from Moscow that Lithuania is allegedly plundering property which does not belong to it, are provoking a smile. Apart from that, the world has seen who has strength and who is plundering or taking property for himself. But we should raise these problems in arbitration, if necessary, in international arbitration. This should be done with the republic's authority, not leaving this problem for the Lithuanian Communist Party alone, which has, perhaps, displayed too little activity.

If we discuss here a more detailed reply, or an appeal to the Soviet Union's leaders—you have a brief text—we can also consider those problems which were mentioned in the letter from our Council of Ministers. We could consider something more precise; something must be done about the attitude toward military service call-up, the definition of citizen's rights and human rights—linking it with the citizen's certificate which has so annoyed the Soviet Union's leadership. It is a further consistent step in accordance with the citizenship law which has been passed in Lithuania.

Thus, our reply could be based on these concrete, newly posed questions which could begin to be answered. And the most important is—as proposed by the authors of the project, and what we have already proposed and mentioned previously by the Soviet Union's people's deputies in Moscow—how to cope with the anxiety of the Soviet General Staff, expressed by General Denisov, about strategic interests which would be harmed by Lithuania's secession from the Soviet Union. We must assess this very seriously until the West thinks otherwise; because the West could regard the Soviet Army stationed in Lithuania from the same angle as it regards the whole Soviet Army outside the borders of the Soviet Union, and not within its [the USSR] borders.

But in our direct contacts with Moscow we can propose, as is stated in the project, a certain return to the relations of 1939- 1940, to a certain model of the interstate agreement of that time. This would be a transition stage toward or aim to restore Lithuania's neutrality, its traditional neutrality. This transitional stage, without a doubt, would be unavoidable. Its most important quality and argument would be the return of Soviet- Lithuanian relations to a legal plane.

We must strive for some legal description. In the present situation when the Soviet Union's leaders stubbornly repeat the thesis about their condition's alleged validity in Lithuania, and we can only shrug our shoulders about it, any stance on another's view is necessary and useful. It is not the confrontation of attitudes but the search for common interests that is important.

We must also continue to plan our future steps in passing laws concerning the state structure which, together with a gradual transfer of functions from the Armed Forces as far as the control of the borders is concerned, would be transformed into a real independence, into the fulfilment of all state functions in Lithuania. This would be a period of time for us to advance toward complete real independence. I would like to call this not a transitional, but a coming period of time. Maybe, this is also necessary for negotiations with the Soviet Union in looking for new formulae.

I think that we will return to some questions and possibilities mentioned here when we discuss a draft reply to Mikhail Gorbachev, which has been submitted to you. It can be brief like this one, or can be expanded in some concrete aspects, although they have already been mentioned in the Council of Minister's reply. They are mentioned there briefly and clearly. Maybe we should supplement them with a new aspect which was expounded here, or, if colleague deputies find it necessary, comment more in detail and propose new possibilities for discussions about these three matters which have been not clear to the Soviet Union's leaders. Perhaps they received a distorted interpretation like, let us say, the citizen's certificates. We can see from some constantly repeated phrases about hasty midnight voting on our independence that the Soviet leadership has been misled by one-sided information from some interested circles. In such a documentary perhaps we could repeat the well-known matters. Or, maybe, this would not be necessary. This is for you to decide.

I think that in our reply, which is, I think, expected both in the East and in the West, you will be able to decide that we adopt this draft, having reedited it after the exchange of opinions. Maybe we can adopt it after the interval, or decide to exchange opinions more in detail, expand the document, and then some kind of an editorial commission should be set up to improve the document. If this afternoon we do not have a plenary sitting, then we will adopt this document tomorrow. I think no one will see anything bad in this. You understand that this period of two days was met with a certain amount of anxiety in the West. We are accustomed to this; we were celebrating Easter and did not have opportunity to meet here, and nothing terrible happened. The concrete and good reply by the Council of Ministers has already been dispatched. Thus, if we reply tomorrow, it will not be regarded as bad. Thank you for your attention.

Landsbergis on Economic Threat to Lithuania

AU1704121690 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Apr 90 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Vytautas Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian parliament, by Maja Narbutt; place and date not given: "The Policy Of a Boa Constrictor"]

[Text] We cannot exclude the possibility of using our powers and introducing direct presidential rule in Lithuania, but only when the situation turns into conflict, stated Mikhail Gorbachev during the recent Komsomol congress in Moscow. He stressed that he was trying to find a political solution to the problem. He called the decision of the Lithuanian parliament proclaiming independence as "trouble making," and stressed at the same time "that the Soviet leadership was trying to convince the Lithuanian leaders of the need to change their decisions".

In turn, two American experts on the Soviet Union expressed the view that the new Lithuanian authorities could reach their goal if they showed greater restraint. Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote in the WASHINGTON POST that the five-year period that would lead to independence as proposed by the Soviet parliament and which foresaw a referendum and a requirement for a two thirds majority was not "unreasonable." George Keenan in an interview he gave for ABC television thought that the Lithuanians had made an error, because they had presented Moscow with a fait accompli.

We print an interview that Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian parliament, gave for RZECZPOSPOLITA's special correspondent, Maja Narbutt.

[Narbutt] One would have thought that the last conciliatory letter of the Lithuanian parliament would break the impasse between Lithuania and the USSR. However, on Monday the Presidential Council described Lithuania's position as "unconstructive" and announced the implementation of economic, political, and "other measures." Has the Soviet response come as a surprise to you and other Lithuanian politicians?

[Landsbergis] It has come as a total surprise. We did not anticipate that our offer to begin preliminary talks would be totally rejected. Moreover, we did not anticipate such a hard response, or rather, threat. Although we know that we ought to expect just about everything from our "big brother."

All this is proof that perestroyka is nothing more than a superficial and cosmetic change.

[Narbutt] Do you think that the Kremlin's position is one more element in the delaying tactics used against Lithuania, or is it already the foretaste that "other means" are about to be introduced?

[Landsbergis] If this is one more delaying tactic then it is not to Lithuania's advantage. It may well be that brutal measures will not be implemented today, or in the next few days, but one can already see preparations for this eventuality. We see the workings of Soviet propaganda in Lithuania and abroad. It falsifies the current position of and situation in Lithuania. This reminds one of 1940 when the Soviets began, in a similar manner, to escalate their accusations and demands against Lithuania. This led to the annexation of our country.

[Narbutt] Eduard Sheverdnadze said in Washington that the Soviet Union is ready to begin a just dialogue. Do you believe this dialogue will come about?

[Landsbergis] Only the firm attitude of the West will bring about this dialogue. The West has not taken such an attitude. Shevardnadze's visit was simply one more attempt to explore the feelings in the United States on this subject. Gorbachev clearly thinks that the suggestions made by Western leaders for a peaceful solution to the Lithuanian problem can be brushed aside by vague references to Soviet desires for dialogue. In fact he rejects all possibilities of dialogue.

It surprises us that the West is still under the influence of the Soviet Union, an empire that is falling apart.

[Narbutt] How true is the theory that Gorbachev is under pressure from his conservative forces?

[Landsbergis] It is very convenient to believe in this theory, namely, to see Gorbachev as a progressive politician of the new type, regardless of what he is actually doing, and to explain his actions by saying he is surrounded by right-wing conservative forces, which have openly begun to preach a fascist doctrine.

Please note, however, that as regards Estonia, which has declared a transition period and has not made an open demand for independence, Gorbachev has taken an identical hard line. He has stated that he will implement the same measures as in Lithuania. Gorbachev's myth will not survive for long now.

[Narbutt] What is your view of what will happen next in Lithuania?

[Landsbergis] The Soviet Union will probably continue to apply a "boa constrictor" policy, but in a more determined way. To try and throttle Lithuania gradually, so that it does not appear too brutal. Nevertheless, he may opt to use brutal measures if he takes into account what could happen in other republics. He may wish to confront everyone with a fait accompli, hoping that the West might acquiesce in order to stay on good relations with "Gorbi." This has more importance for the West, rather than freedom and justice, or those values which count more in practice than in theory.

Correspondent Reports on Lithuanian Situation

LD1704195690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] [Presenter Aleksandr Ruvinskiy] Attention is directed to Lithuania, both in our country and abroad. The two-day period in which the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] and the republic's Council of Ministers were to reply to the message from USSR President Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, is over. What decisions have been made on the issues set out in the message to the republic's government, the parliament of Lithuania? Over to Vilnius. Our correspondent Elyana Kurkletite reports:

[Kurkletite] Today, the session of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania debated the reply to the message from Mikhail Gorbachev and Nikolay Ryzhkov. In spite of the Easter holidays—yesterday was a day off work in Lithuania—there was a session of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian Republic which discussed a program of actions should the USSR Government begin implementing a policy of economic blockade with regard to Lithuania.

[Ruvinskiy] All in all, though, there are not words about an economic blockade in the actual message from Gorbachev and Ryzhkov.

[Kurkletite] Indeed, there are no such words, but it was precisely the words about halting deliveries of those product types which are sold on the foreign market or freely-convertible currency that were intepreted in such a way by many inhabitants of Lithuania. It is true that in discussing this issue, many ministers avoided the words economic blockade. I will come back to this a bit later when I have played a recording of a conversation held at the Council of Ministers.

[Ruvinskiy] Well, in general there can surely only be economic sanctions if the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of Lithuania do not annul the legislative acts and decisions which set the Lithuanian SSR in opposition to other republics and the Union as a whole.

[Kurkletite] Judging by yesterday's telegram sent to the USSR president and the chairman of the Council of Ministers, which was signed by Kazimieras Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, the principal decisions will clearly not be annulled. This telegram specifically states and expresses hope with regard to possible negotiations. As far as economic ties are concerned, the telegram states, and I quote: For its part, the government of the Lithuanian Republic cannot see any reasons which would justify a deterioration of mutual economic relations, all the more so since this may not affect the Lithuanian Republic alone. Meanwhile, we do not understand the specific substance of the planned economic sanctions, the telegram goes on to state, and we would not wish to explain them wrongly to our people and the world. The telegram ends with the hope of bilateral good will and common sense in future relations.

[Ruvinskiy] Well, Elyana, the specialists have probably done some calculations. What could the cessation of certain deliveries mean for Lithuania?

[Kurkletite] Precisely. As was noted at a session of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania, with the available fuel, agriculture can go on working for 60 to 70 days, while there is enough gasoline for vehicles to last a month. If gas deliveries are halted, the chemical industry will stop operating in a few days. If the deliveries of fuel oil are halted, the work of several power facilities will be made more complicated. In that case, however, the operation of the northwest power system of the USSR as a whole would be disrupted.

I am switching now to a converation I held with Rimantas Furtulis, director general of the Department for Foreign Economic Relations of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania.

[Begin recording] [Kurkletite] Many inhabitants of Lithuania perceived the text of the message as an economic ultimatum, as the threat of economic blockade. What is your opinion?

[Furtulis] I would not use words as harsh as economic blockade, and when we read the letter from Mikhail Sergeyevich and Nikolay Ivanovich we did not find these words. We do not understand everything in this letter: For example, the provision that goods which can be sold for hard currency will not be delivered to Lithuania. Virtually everything can be sold for foreign currency, from matches to aircraft, all depending to whom, at what price, and how they are sold. For this reason we have discussed many variants, and we fully understand that we are integrated with one another in a common economy. We made a decision that we must definitely meet and obtain a more detailed explanation of what foreign currency goods these would be, what goods will not be delivered to Lithuania, by what means we can obtain them elsewhere in order that the interests of both Lithuania and the Soviet Union should not suffer.

In our session we decided to confirm the instructions to all Lithuanian enterprises in order that there should be no hotheads there, since these measures are more political than economic for the moment; in order that that some enterprises or individual collectives should not begin disrupting their deliveries to the Soviet Union; an so that all contractual obligations should be punctiliously fulfilled, as long, of course, as other components or raw material is received from the Soviet Union.

[Kurktetite] How is the situation at the moment? Are the enterprises fulfilling all contractual obligations?

[Furtulis] As before, there are difficulties at the moment, but these difficulties are the result of the actual situation in individual enterprises, probably, and of the delivery of raw materials. Everybody probably knows very well that there is a fair amount of disorder in the supply system, both within Lithuania and in the Soviet Union. If everything was ideal an economic reform would not be needed either in Lithuania or the Soviet Union. For this reason if there are any disagreements, then we consider that they are disagreemnts of a general nature, not signs of some kind of blockade or some sort of misunderstanding. We take the fairly sober view that the interests both of the Soviet Union, and not forgetting Lithuania, must be taken into account. [end recording]

[Kurkletite] Hello, Elyana. Vilnius! Hello, can you hear me?

[Ruvinskiy] Yes I hear you. What, then, is the decision of the republic's Supreme Soviet? What reply did the deputies vote for? After all, we have not reported the most important bit yet.

[Kurkletite] Yes, the deputies are discussing various versions for the reply, but they have not arrived at a final version yet as of today. Some of the deputies are proposing to halt the operation of certain legislative acts adopted since 11 March. Some are in favor of restoring the legal relations between the Soviet Union and the Lithuanian Republic which existed until June 1940. I will not dwell in detail on the versions being discussed, because I think the document will be adopted tomorrow. That is the news from Lithuania.

Commission Chairman on Possible Concessions

LD1704204190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Interview with V. Chepaythis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council Commission for Citizen's Rights and Nationality Affairs, by special correspondent A. Barkhatov in Vilnius 17 April; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded]

[Text] [Barkhatov] At the Lithuanian Supreme Council session today, debates continued about the draft reply to the president and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Many deputies took the view that the message should reflect the idea of the possibility of restoring USSR-Lithuanian relations on the basis of the 1939 treaty, taking into account, too, the temporary stay of army units on republican territory. There were calls not to confine themselves to a brief telegram, as the Lithuanian Council of Ministers did yesterday, but to send an official delegation, together with a detailed package of proposals. As yet the deputies have not come to a unanimous decision.

Tell me, how can one assess the appearance in the draft of those passages that say the Supreme Council takes upon itself the commitment to refrain from adopting new political and legislative acts before 1 May 1990, and at the same time recommending that the constitutional commission discuss the question of talks with Moscow? Is this a natural concession, so to speak, in the form of a move by one side?

[Chepaythis] Of course, because we cannot, so to speak, put a stop to the acts we have already made, but we can, as a sort of compromise, refrain from adopting any new acts, and devote ourselves, for example, to the economic laws that have been awaited as a package since last year. I think this is perfectly sensible, and although I protested in my speech to a return to the 1939 treaty which...

[Barkhatov, interrupting] Which would be a kind of acceptance of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pacts?

[Chepaythis] Yes, exactly. But I think that this is a perfectly sensible concession and we are able to make it.

[Barkhatov] Yet, it said in the message of the president and Prime Minister Ryzhkov that it is precisely the new acts that have been adopted recently which are subject to abrogation, or so to speak, closer examination.

[Chepaythis] Well, you know, we have been a separate state since 11 March of this year...

[Barkhatov, interrupting] In other words, this has become inevitable?

[Chepaythis] And it is we who decide which acts to adopt. It may be now we will not adopt new ones, but we can't recall any because we have been elected to adopt these acts.

Defense Ministry on Lithuanian Call-Up Decision

LD1804123690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 18 April (TASS)—The press center of the USSR Ministry of Defense today described the Lithuanian Supreme Council decision "On Call-up of Citizens of the Lithuanian Republic into the USSR Armed Forces" as "a dangerous trap for people confused by separatist propaganda." The decision states that "every citizen of the republic for the first time has an independent option regarding serving in an army not of the Lithuanian Republic."

After the publication of the decision, the press center material points out, a delegation of parents of young men who had, without authorization, left their place of service went to the republican Supreme Council. They declared that the entire responsibility for the fate of their sons, who became deserters under the influence of the provocative actions of separatists, rests with parliament, which adopted a series of unlawful decisions on issues relating to service in the Soviet Armed Forces by citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. "The fathers and mothers demanded that the Supreme Council should immediately take steps to correct the situation, and demanded the resignation of those deputies who are particularly zealous in respect of drawing up such decisions," the press center information points out.

Military commissariats which are responsible for calling up young people for the Army and Navy have become the object of open and forceful pressure from official bodies of authority and also from informal organizations of various kinds. A written instruction has reached the Panevezys town soviet from Kazimiera Prunskiene to stop the activity of the military commissariat by 30 April this year. The chairman of the town soviet executive committee has demanded decisive measures from the chief of the Internal Affairs Department to evict the military commissariat from the building which it occupies.

The anti-Army propaganda campaign unleashed by the republic's mass media is not stopping. Facts of this kind can only give rise to anxiety and concern. In these conditions the position of parents who have raised the matter of making those who play with people's fate face up to the responsibility, is natural, notes the material from the USSR Defense Ministry press center.

Moves Against Military Society Criticized

PM1704125790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 First Edition p4

[Report by Captain Third Rank V. Gromak, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA special correspondent under the rubric "Direct Line": "Up Against a Brick Wall"]

[Text] Vilnius—Complying with the USSR Presidential decree of 21 March 1990 "On Additional Measures to Guarantee the Rights of Soviet Citizens and Protect the Sovereignty of the USSR in the Territory of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," the republic's DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Air Force, and Navy] Central Committee has embarked on the temporary confiscation of sporting weapons in order to prevent their possible use by extremist forces.

However, the measures taken have prompted active resistance from the present Lithuanian leadership. Literally the next day, 22 March, a Supreme Soviet session took the unilateral decision to remove the republic's DOSAAF organization from all-Union jurisdiction and place it under the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian SSR Council of Ministers.

The story gets worse. Very unparliamentary expressions rained down on Major General G. Taurinskas, chairman of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee, from the parliament's lofty tribune. And on 2 April he received instructions signed by K. Prunskiene, chairman of the republic Council of Ministers.

I have read these instructions. They consist of four points, forbid the chairman of the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee to remove equipment, weapons, and property from the republic, and instruct him to take decisions on fundamental issues only with the consent of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers. This document also categorically demands that an extraordinary plenum of the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee be held and documents connected with convening a constituent congress be drafted.

Colonel General N. Kotlovtsev, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, has issued a strong protest in connection with the Lithuanian Council of Ministers' unfounded demands and categorically insisted that this unlawful decision be rescinded. Major General G. Taurinskas has been instructed to ignore these unfounded demands regarding questions of mass defense work and to continue with the planned work. However....

Let us hear what Major General G. Taurinskas has to say:

"We discussed the Council of Ministers instruction to convene an extraordinary plenum of the DOSAAF Central Committee at a session of the Central Committee Presidium. Ten of the 15 members attended. The decision was this: The demand was illegal and undemocratic and the plenum would therefore not be held. Nine people voted in favor and one against. But a so-called plenum was held nevertheless, chaired by R. Eynoris. Eynoris is my former deputy for military-patriotic work. From the point of view of human relations, he has acted dishonorably.

"The majority of presidium members, myself included, were not informed that the plenum had been convened and had no idea where it was being held. In fact, 40 percent of all Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF Central Committee members were in the dark in this respect. Only those who support Eynoris were informed.

"It was at this unrepresentative plenum that Reserve Colonel A. Kayris was elected chairman of the organization set up as an alternative to the DOSAAF. He was transferred to the reserve several years ago for bribetaking and unscrupulousness."

I listened to the general and found myself thinking that these actions put me very strongly in mind of a virtual conspiracy to get rid of the unwelcome general.

It is no accidental choice. It is well known that the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF is one of the best organizations in the country. A considerable number of young people nearing conscription age are trained in its seven motor technical schools and two radio engineering schools. These schools have an excellent technical and training base. But the DOSAAF is an institution of the state. A state which the present Lithuanian leadership wants to split. All methods, and primarily the local press, are being used to attain this objective.

The latest issue of the youth newspaper LETUVOS RITAS opens with the article "Independence Is Not a Gift of Fate," which vilifies the defense society and, in particular, Air Force Lieutenant General S. Maslov, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

"All the questions that have been raised or are still being raised in the local press regarding our society are simply amazing," Sergey Nikolayevich Maslov said to me. "The stand taken by the republic Council of Ministers regarding the USSR DOSAAF has aroused protest. Because the Council of Ministers is trying to extend its authority to material resources which have nothing to do with it at all. It is simply unforgivable of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers to take the kind of decisions it is doing."

So that is the situation that has developed in the Lithuanian SSR DOSAAF. Until recently, its chairman, Major General Taurinskas, was respected by the republic's leadership. But when the general refused point-blank to meet the demand to sever ties with the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee and clearly complied with the presidential decree, he was virtually called an enemy of his own people.

Two months ago, the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee moved into new, excellently furnished premises. General Taurinskas put a lot of strength and energy into their construction, which cost R3 million. But now it is being suggested that he leave these premises....

Article Urges Compromise on Lithuania

LD1804093890 Moscow World Service in English 0710 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The situation in Lithuania continues to be on everybody's mind, and not only in this country, following Moscow's statement issued on Friday threatening to cut off crucial supplies of raw materials to the republic unless it rescinds a string of legislative acts since its unilateral proclamation of independence on 11 March. Dmitriy Linnik comments:

[Begin recording] [Linnik] Ultimatums are bad, there's no doubt about it, especially in this age of new political thinking. In this regard perhaps the worst [as heard] thing about the Moscow ultimatum is that it seems to have worked. After the initial reaction of scoff and disdain, Lithuania's paternly radical leaders seem to be inclined to revoke some of their more contemptuous statements and provisions and asked for talks instead. [passage omitted]

On the other hand, Moscow's position in the Friday statement has softened in comparison to previous statements that it didn't recognise Lithuania's declaration of independence. So there seems to be a silver lining that goes with the cloud of the ultimatums. To be fair, the Moscow warning was probably warranted by the initially intractable stand of the new Lithuania parliament. Ever since the Lithuanian declaration of independence over a month ago, the basic difference between Vilnius and Moscow has been that the Lithuanian parliament viewed the Soviet Union as a foreign country while Moscow viewed Lithuania as part of the USSR. Having found that in this case the situation was totally deadlocked, both sides have begun looking for a formula that would get them out.

A possible solution has been described in a telephone conversation with me by (Robert Verbinskas), deputy head of the Lithuanian mission in Moscow.

[Verbinskas—in Russian with superimposed English translation] The interregional group of deputies in the Supreme Soviet has suggested: Let's freeze the decisions of both sides. I wouldn't take it upon myself to decide for either the Lithuanian leadership or the national authorities, but I view the proposal as reasonable, we've got to find a compromise.

[Linnik] That was the view of (Robert Verbinskas) of the Lithuanian mission in Moscow. The two sides could adopt this formula, or any other they prefer. But at least this is an indication that a search for a compromise is on. I'm quite sure it will be found, only I'm not sure why we had to go through this unpleasant and harsh exchange of ultimatums to realise this. [end recording]

Reportage on Pro-Moscow Lithuanian CP Congress

Shved on Preparations

LD1704172190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1656 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, 17 Apr (TASS)—A press conference given by the provisional Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee (on the CPSU platform) took place here today. Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the provisional Central Committee, addressed journalists and spoke about preparations for the congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform), which is planned for 21 April. He said that the 47,000-strong detachment of "platformists" will be represented by 900 delegates.

It has been decided to conduct the congress in three stages, V. Shved said. It is initially planned to discuss the political situation in the republic and to elect a permanent Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform). At the second stage, which it is planned to hold at the beginning of June, matters concerning preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress are to be discussed. It has been decided to hold the third stage after the 28th CPSU congress.

Shved Interviewed

LD1804045290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] The session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council will continue. The deputies will devote particular attention to the letter by Gorbachev, president of the USSR, and Ryzhkov, the country's chairman of the Council of Ministers.

In Vilnius, the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform held a press conference on 17 April devoted to the 21st congress which opens on 21 April. Our special correspondent Aleksey Kolachev was at the press conference. We present his material.

[Kolachev] The press conference declared that the congress will proceed in three stages: the first on 21 April, the second on 2 June, and the third after the 28th CPSU Congress on 21 July. Why has it been decided to act in this manner? Vladislav Shved, second secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform, responds to this question:

[Begin Shved recording] At the first stage, there will be a political report and the new composition of the Central Committee will be selected. Issues of the current moment will be resolved. There will be an evaluation of the situation and the task of Lithuanian Communist Party organizations for the subsequent period.

On 2 June, on the eve of the 28th congress, proposals on the draft platform of the CPSU for the 28th party congress and the CPSU draft rules will be studied. Here issues of the seconding and selection of delegates to the 28th congress will be studied.

At the third stage, after the 28th congress, the Lithuanian Communist Party's action program will be studied and ratified. We feel that it is possible to study the action program,—it will be published beforehand—before the 28th congress and to elaborate it, taking into account the decisions adopted at the congress, and adopt final proposals and planned actions of the communists of the Lithuanian Communist Party, plus the planned strategy and tactics of the CPSU. [end recording]

[Kolachev] At the press conference, it was said that at present there are 47,000 members in the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform. At the congress, evidently, there will be about 700 delegates. Guests and representatives of other parties will be invited, among whom, incidentally, will not be a delegation from the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. The confrontation of the two Communist Parties in one repubic, unfortunately, continues.

On 9 April, they signed the latest agreement on the division of property, but then it was annulled. At the press conference it was announced that correspondents of several Sajudis newspapers and other Lithuanian publications which, according to the press conference, tendentiously report on the activity of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform, will not receive accreditation at the congress.

Committee Member Interviewed

LD1704205190 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Correspondent Barkhatov Vilnius report; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Barkhatov] A press conference by the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party [CPL] on the CPSU platorm, devoted to the April Party congress, which opens on the 21st of this month, was held in Vilnius today. Journalists' questions were put to Comrade Shved, secretary of the provisional Central Committee, and to secretaries of rayon and city committees. The main question facing the coming congress is the shaping and renewal of the party's organizational structure in the tough conditions of rivalry with other sociopolitical forces which, what is more, have a majority in the republic's structures. [video shows press conference]

[Begin video recording] [Barkhatov] What are relations like between Sajudis [Lithuanin Movement for Restructuring] and the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU?

[I.M. Butrimovich, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee on the CPSU platform—identified by caption]. Up till now these relations have been very worrying. You can understand this as the Sajudis leaders see us as a foreign party. Today, this struggle has changed from being a struggle of ideas into a struggle of people. That is why we are trying to turn our differences into a struggle of ideas.

[Barkhatov] What proposals do you have for the congress on the main question of the day, probably, that of the republic's self- determination, the republic's independence.

[Butrimovich] The Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform has stated clearly and unambiguously, not just today, but a year ago, two years ago, that we are in favor of the constitutional rights of any republic, but within the framework of a civilized society, within the framework of the existing mechanism, and within the framework of everyone's interests being taken into consideration. [end recording]

Landsbergis Adviser on West's 'Indifference'

AU1704132690 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Apr 90 p 5

[Interview with Algis Cekuolis, foreign affairs adviser to Lithuania's President Landsbergis, by Maria Skolarczyk in London; date not given: "I Am Sure We Will Win"]

[Text] In view of the information embargo concerning Lithuania, Algis Cekuolis, foreign affairs adviser to President Landsbergis, has gone to London to inform the Western media about the actual situation in that country and about the stance of the Lithuanian authorities and people. Our colleague Maria Skolarczyk spoke to him.

[Skolarczyk] How do you view the reaction of Western governments to the Lithuania's declaration of independence?

[Cekuolis] Western governments do not understand what is actually happening now in Lithuania and the other Baltic states. Their reaction can be compared to European reactions to Munich in 1938 and to August 1968 in Prague. It is the same indifference. The Western democracies are calling for disarmament in Europe, but they want to pay for it with the freedom of the Baltic states. The West does not have to sell our freedom. The Soviet economy is already straining under the arms burden and so the Russians have no alternative to disarming.

[Skolarczyk] So, the Lithuanians were counting on more support, although historical experience does not justify being that optimistic?

[Cekuolis] We were only counting on ourselves, on our brothers in the Baltic states, and, I will not hide the fact, we were very much counting on the Poles. Poland no longer has anything to lose in its relations with Moscow, but has much to gain in the Baltic states. An independent Lithuania would like to have a border with Poland that is only protected by three signs: the white eagle, the Lithuanian coat of arms, and a sign indicating that vehicles should reduce speed to 90 kilometers an hour. Then our children will be unable to understand all the disagreements that there were. However, now, in these very difficult times for us, we very much need Poland to be on our side. The Polish Government's position is very favorable to the Lithuanians, but my personal view is that it could be even firmer.

[Skolarczyk] It would appear that Moscow is trying to exploit differences between Lithuanians and the Polish minority in Lithuania....

[Cekuolis] Yes, but in reality there are few differences between the Poles and Lithuanians. There are only certain differences of opinion between us and the Poles who are in the party leadership. They are more Russian than Polish. We do not have any problems with the Polish peasants and workers, and we easily understand each other.

[Skolarczyk] How do you expect the political situation to develop over the next few days?

[Cekuolis] We will fight as David fought against Goliath and that is nothing new in our history. I cannot predict how the situation will develop over the next few days, although the information embargo, the expulsion of journalists, diplomats, and tourists indicate that Moscow wants to give Lithuania a thrashing. The Russians are wiser now, and they will not go about it as openly as they did in Prague. What the tanks did in Prague is being done in Vilnius by commandos. However, I am sure that we will win.

Congress Urged To Respect Union's Internal Laws

LD1704233090 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Some congressmen in the United States continue lecturing the Soviet Union concerning its policy towards Lithuania. Comment now is by Vladislav Kozyakov. Here is what he writes:

One gets the impression that some critics in Congress of Soviet policy towards Lithuania are forcing through an open door so to speak. They insist that Lithuania must have the right to independence allegedly denied by Moscow. However, the thing is that any republic in this country has the right to secede and this fully applies to Lithuania as well. What is required of Lithuania is observance of the Soviet Constitution and Soviet laws. They envisage a certain procedure for secession, particularly the need to hold a referendum in a republic that is planning to secede. No legal expert, even the most prestigious, can object to this order of things.

Incidentally, officials in the White House and in the State Department seem to be aware of the need to show some respect for the Soviet Union's internal laws. However, certain members of the congress try to ignore this self-evident truth. They ignore the fact that developments in Lithuania are the Soviet Union's internal affair, that the Soviet Union has the right to employ administrative, economic and other measures to ensure the solution of the Lithuanian question within the framework of the law, and that there can be no foreign interference in that.

Senator Bob Dole, for one, upon learning about economic measures employed by Moscow in view of the unconstitutional actions by the Lithuanian leadership, decided that he could treat Lithuania as say Texas or some other American state. He declared in his television speech that the United States could provide help to Lithuania and not only to Lithuania. We can help, he said, Latvia, Estonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and others who might supply vital things to Lithuania.

The question arises: what is the senator's attitude to Soviet-American relations if he permits himself to interfere in the difficult domestic situation in the Soviet Union and put oil on the flames? The senator's statement looks all the more odd since he realizes the importance of Soviet-American cooperation for the United States. He pointed out in that same television address that an arms control agreement would benefit the United States. If we can get a good agreement he said that would be in our interest, we ought to do that.

Well, I think the time has come for certain politicians in America to make their choice: either to act in accordance with the old stereotypes, that is no matter what the Soviet Union does it is always doing the wrong thing as the West used to claim, or else they must develop an objective, unbiased view on the processes taking place in the Soviet Union. They should respect this country's sovereignty in the solution of its domestic problems and honor the principle of noninterference in domestic affairs.

Incidentally, when diplomatic relations were established between the Soviet Union and the United States almost 60 years ago, the two countries took upon themselves a mutual commitment not to interfere in the domestic affairs of each other.

Plane Hijacked to Vilnius, Hijacker Arrested

LD1804101590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0835 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Excerpts] This morning the Lithuanian minister of internal affairs, Marijonas Misiukonis, returned from the airport. What has happened?

[Misiukonis] Early in the morning we received information from Moscow that a plane which took off from the Sheremetyevo Airport and flew to Leningrad had a passenger who, threatening the crew, demanded that the plane fly to Vilnius. [passage omitted] His name is Igor Alekseyevich Kalugin, born in 1943, Russian, employed at the Moscow Sovremennik Theater as a fireman. [passage omitted] He is on the list of mentally ill people. [passage omitted] He explained that he had acquaintances in Lithuania and also wanted to help Lithuania by delivering this plane to Vilnius. [passage omitted] You must understand what the feeling of people on the plane was. They were tourists from the United States, Japan, and Cuba. [passage omitted] No weapon was found but Kalugin had a package with him and threatened to use it to blow up the plane. [passage omitted] He did not resist [arrest] on arrival in Vilnius. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian Enterprise Signs Textile Protocol

LD1804121390 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Representatives of 11 large clothing enterprises in the Soviet Union have signed in Kaunas a protocol on behalf of the Soviet Union's State Planning Committee and the Ministry of Light Industry. The document urges that the Vilna production association in Kaunas be supplied with sufficient quantities of wool, dyes, and other raw materials.

This protocol, as well as the protocols on direct cooperation, was signed after the Kaunas Vilna production association issued an invitation to its main partners. Representatives of the enterprises in Moscow, Leningrad, Donetsk, Kiev, Tashkent, and other towns took part.

The Kaunas Vilna production association has submitted 150 kinds of fabrics for the new agreements. The Kaunas Vilna production association, like the majority of Lithuania's enterprises, is known for its conscientious fulfillment of contracts.

Shevardnadze on Introducing Confederate Relations

LD1704213490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1918 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 17 (TANJUG)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced the possibility of introducing confederate relations among Soviet republics at a news conference today.

This is the first time such a possibility has been officially mentioned. Shevardnadze said that the new federal treaty, currently under preparation, would provide for different kinds of ties—confederation, federal, or other.

We can discuss anything, but these are processes that take time, Shevardadze said.

The Soviet foreign minister repeated that each nation, including the Lithuanian one, had the right to self-determination. He stated that the majority of Lithuanian people supported secession, but that not all of them were aware of the possible consequences.

Secession from the Soviet Union is a long and complex process and must be preceded by a referendum, Shevardnadze said.

Answering a question on the manner in which developments around Lithuania would influence U.S.-Soviet relations, Shevardnadze said that he got the impression during a recent visit to Washington that the U.S. side was against an intensification of tension in Lithuania, and credited the United States for leading a sensible policy so far.

UN Statement Says Lithuania 'Domestic Affair'

LD1704191490 Moscow TASS in English 1841 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] New York (UN) April 17 TASS—UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar regards actions by the Soviet Government with respect to Lithuania a domestic affair of the Soviet Union, the UN secretary-general's spokeswoman told journalists today.

The secretary-general does not comment on what is going on in a UN member country, she noted later.

Belorussian Lithuanians Request Protection

LD1704120190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] We consider it essential to acquaint you with a report from a TASS correspondent in Minsk. Several dozen Lithuanian residents of Belorussian and other nationalities have gathered at the government building and requested protection from the leadership of Belorussia. They said that in the Lithuanian republic an atmosphere of intolerance is being whipped up toward people who are not of indigenous nationalities. This is being expressed in a sharply intensified everyday nationalism, in the speeches of leaders of political groupings, the mass information media, and in discrimination on the basis of language.

The delegation from Lithuania was received by Mikulich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium. He was given the text of an appeal to the Belorussian people as well as letters and statements requesting assistance in resolving problems related to resettlement from Lithuania. We have no future in a bourgeois, nationalist Lithuania, the appeal stresses.

Lithuanian Officials Said To Have Criminal Records

PM2603132590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS correspondent S. Novrutskiy report: "Lithuania: Now They Are Members of..."]

[Text] Vilnius—At one of its first sessions the Lithuanian Supreme Council [Verkhovniy Sovet] adopted a decision on the creation of a territorial protection commission. The majority of the republic's newspapers reported this fact, some even printed photographs of the commission's members. They were of interest to many of the republic's inhabitants. Among the commission members they saw Lyudas Simutas and Balis Gayauskas.

Much of the republic's history is now being reassessed. The view of the postwar anti-Soviet armed underground movement is changing. Admittedly, the name most often used now is "resistance movement."

Lyudas Simutas and Balis Gayauskas also took part in the "resistance." Furthermore, it is claimed that it was this fact in their biographies which proved decisive to their election victory. The only question is: Did the voters know the whole truth? Did they know that it is not attacks on militiamen on point duty or the distribution of leaflets but common robbery which eventually became the main form of "resistance" activity on the part of Simutas and the entire underground group which he headed. Here is a potted account of his "combat" career: January 1953—store robbery; November 1953—armed raid on a store; the same month—murder of militiaman; October 1954—armed raid on a refreshment bar and attempted murder of a militiaman.

Gayauskas' list of exploits is considerably shorter: armed robbery at the "Viktoriya" bar and murder of a militiaman during arrest.

Stanislovas Ilgunas, another "member of the resistance"—self-styled—now sits on the Supreme Council. His biography includes: robbing an office and a rural soviet, armed attack on a store...

The court convicted S. Ilgunas as a common criminal—for theft of state and social property—and that is perhaps why he belongs not to the territorial protection commission but the cultural commission?

Lithuanian Social Democrat Views Independence

PM1704154790 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 12 Apr 90 p 5

[Report on interview with Lithuanian Social Democratic Party leader Professor Kazimieras Antanavicius by Bobo Scheutz; date, place not given: "Lithuania Needs the Soviet Union"]

[Text] The Lithuanian economy is so closely integrated with the Soviet economy that a sudden break would mean chaos. That is why there has never been any suggestion that an independent Lithuania should break off economic ties with the Soviet Union. On the contrary. These relations should not only continue, but also be further developed as much as possible.

This is in brief the view Professor Kazimieras Antanavicius takes of future relations between an independent Lithuania and its large neighbor, the Soviet Union. He views them principally from the economic viewpoint, because he is an economist by profession. As far as political relations are concerned, he takes as his point of departure that his country's independence is a fact, but he is less categorical when it comes to the timetable for the achievement of that independence than the official stance in line with the decisions adopted by the Lithuanian parliament.

In this assembly he has come increasingly to play the role of a kind of opposition politician, and he claims himself that his group is growing the whole time.

"Initially there were only a couple who followed our line, but today I think that I can state that we have the support of one-third of parliament," he said.

The "we" Antanavicius was referring to is the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, founded in 1895 and resurrected in its homeland in 1989, the year of freedom. Prof. Antanavicius is the party's leader, a member of parliament, one of the most prominent members of its Economic Committee, and a name to remember for those who wish to follow domestic politics in Lithuania in the future.

There is much to indicate that it is the Social Democrats who will grow both as a party and as a parliamentary grouping. The sources of this growth will be on the one hand the half of parliament which comprises independents and non-party deputies, who are bound to gradually find some political home, and on the other the Lithuanian Communist Party, where desertion from the ranks is becoming a growing problem.

There are communists who talk about merger with the Social Democrats in order to escape the burden of the party's less than glorious history. But Prof. Antanavicius rejects a merger, despite the fact that a merger would at a stroke make the party the largest and strongest in Lithuania.

"There can never be any suggestion of anything other than a merger through membership. We are an open party. Every one who wants to join the party as a result of a personal decision is welcome. That process has already begun. In a few months' time I expect our parliamentary group, which today consists of nine people, to have increased to 20-25 as a result of defections from the communists and from the non-party grouping," he said.

Have there been any personal contacts over the issue between Kazimieras Antanavicius and Communist Party leader Algirdas Brazauskas?

"No, Brazauskas is not talking to me in person, but there have been informal contacts on a number of occasions through go-betweens. They generally point out that there is a body of public opinion in favor of a merger," the professor replied.

On this point Brazauskas' go-betweens are probably right. For obvious reasons communists are not particularly well liked in Lithuania, whereas the independent Lithuanian Communist Party's leader, Algirdas Brazauskas, is very popular. It was he who first dared to show his teeth to the Russian bear when he put himself in the vanguard of the Lithuanian liberation movement last year by breaking off links with the Soviet mother party and declaring an independent Lithuanian Communist Party.

Some of his popularity has nevertheless rubbed off on the party, which won 40 parliamentary seats in the February elections. A merger with the socialists, who are not weighed down by the burden of history, would be an ideal solution from Brazauskas' viewpoint. But impossible, according to the Social Democrats' Antanavicius.

Antanavicius has ideas of cooperation in other directions. First, he wants to establish proper links with the Socialist International and create working contacts with the West European Social Democrats. During the Soviet era the Lithuanian social democrats have been represented by exile groups, but it has now proved necessary to change this.

Prof. Antanavicius sees his party's role in domestic Lithuanian politics almost as that of an opposition party, and he predicts that by the summer a centrist opposition will have already been established in parliament.

"We will be part of it, but we will not be saying that it is a Social Democratic opposition, because that would repel other groups. But for the time being at least it is too early to announce any official political opposition. What is needed now is unity. The Lithuanian people would never accept any political group's destroying this unity in the present situation," he said.

The issues that he is currently pressing in parliament are therefore not political but economic. He speaks in very positive terms of the possibility of carving out a Lithuanian economy from the Soviet economy and says that "this could take a year, if we are not the targets of an economic blockade or faced with other obstacles. If that happens it will take at least five years."

At the end of the year Lithuania will reintroduce its old currency, the litas, and according to Antanavicius there have already been preliminary contacts with the United States on printing the new banknotes.

But changing the Soviet ruble for the litas and getting the litas to function on a relatively stable base cannot be easy. How will this process happen, and what will one litas be worth?

"Before we introduce the new currency we will privatize some factories, farms, and so on. Today we have about R11.5 billion in Lithuania; if we were to change the ruble for the litas at a rate of one to one, a gap would be created, because we only have real values corresponding to one-tenth of the ruble's official value.

"At the same time as selling off some of the state's property we will also distribute some free of charge to people without capital or with low wages, who would otherwise never be anything other than poor. I have proposed that around 30 percent of the value of industrial capacity should be distributed in this way. This will mean that we take around R7 billion out of circulation, while three or four billion would be collected in ruble accounts in the banks for changing later.

"There would perhaps be R1 billion left, which must be exchanged immediately for the litas at an exchange rate of one to one," Prof. Antanavicius said.

His calculations seem somewhat optimistic from the political viewpoint. One of the demands made in Moscow is that no union property may be commandeered or sold by Lithuania, and to stress the seriousness of this soldiers have been posted at a number of symbolic buildings in Vilnius.

The very definition of Union-owned and republic-owned assets will be one of the most difficult points in the secession negotiations which will probably be started at some point between Lithuania and the central authorities in Moscow.

Estonian Premier Savisaar Interviewed

PM1704152390 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 15, 15 Apr 90 p 11

[Interview with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar by Grant Gukasov under the rubric "Office Holder," as part of full-page "Personalities" feature; no place or date of interview given: "Comrade Prime Minister. Edgar Savisaar, New Head of Estonia's Government, Answers a MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI Correspondent's Questions"]

[Text] [Gukasov] Comrade prime minister, will the policy of economically accountable Estonia be pursued?

[Savisaar] Yes, of course. The Estonian self-management program means economic autonomy based on a market economy.

[Gukasov] Everyone knows that you have left the CPSU's ranks. What will be the future of nomenklatura officials subordinate to the government?

[Savisaar] This will depend only on specific personalities. It is of no importance at all to me whether someone belonged to the Estonian Communist Party nomenklatura or not. The important factor is competence.

[Gukasov] Journalists occasionally refer to you as Edgar Vissarionovich [reference to Stalin's patronymic], hinting at your supposedly authoritarian attitudes in running affairs. Could it be that you are truly committed to authoritarian order?

[Savisaar] Authoritarian order makes it easier to solve everything, but the results are always lamentable. From the very beginning, the Estonian People's Front was created for no other purpose but to democratize society. Our main goal is to recreate the Estonian Republic and, if it does not turn out to be a democratic state, I will consider that all our efforts have been in vain.

As for "Edgar Vissarionovich," to be honest, this is the first time I have heard about it. A useful caution for a politician.

[Gukasov] How does the coalition government intend to act in the present complex Estonian situation?

[Savisaar] We are now conducting talks with various political forces, including some with which the People's Front has hitherto had no contacts. After all, we all have to live together. This was also the topic of a detailed conversation at the recent council of Estonian People's Front plenipotentiaries. The former government, for example, attempted to organize cooperation with the adminsitrations of plants under Union jurisdiction, but nothing came out of it. We hope that something will come out of it this time.

[Gukasov] For its part, the Committee for Defense of Soviet Power claims that the government disregards it and does not respond to its proposals.

[Savisaar] This is a joke. I think that this is nothing but a remnant of election campaign tactics. But the elections are already in the past, the time has come to change positions.

[Gukasov] Had you been chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, would you have brought yourself to retreating from the position declared by V. Landsbergis 11 March?

[Savisaar] I visited Lithuania a week ago, and there was no talk about any concessions at that time. The situation may have changed meanwhile. Politics must be flexible.

More on Latvian Independent CP Congress

PM1704092790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[By PRAVDA correspondent O. Meshkov: "Another Party"]

[Text] Riga—Another organization, the independent Latvian Communist Party, whose constituent congress was held Saturday in the assembly hall of the Latvian State University, has appeared in the republic's political spectrum.

The decision to hold the congress was adopted 24 February at a conference of independent Latvian Communist Party supporters. Many of them had attended the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress as delegates a week previously. Having put forward demands unacceptable to the majority of the delegates in the form of an ultimatum, they demonstratively walked out of the congress hall. There and then they decided to continue the discussion of the draft action program, which had been rejected by the majority, at their own constituent congress.

The following claim was repeatedly emphasized at the "independents'" congress: We continue to steer a course in search of consolidation, which has been rejected by the "conservatives." However, I believe that this is merely a tactical move. You only have to acquaint yourself with the key principles of their activities, which were described in the report by Yu. Rozenvalds, dean of the Latvian State University history and philosophy faculty. What are these principles? The independent Communist Party rejects organizational subordination to any political organization inside or outside Latvia. Furthermore, freedom in the economic sphere means diverse forms of ownership, the right of free initiative, and legal guarantees for the development of private property. Political tasks for the near future include proposing to the new composition of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet that it adopt a decision at its first session to restore Latvia's independent statehood.

The new party's programs and statutes were adopted at the congress. And the Communist Party's leading organs and the chairman were elected.

Latvian CP Factions Prepare for Congress

90UN1384A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 1 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by B. Proskura: "The Last Features—The Latvian Communist Party: Compromise or Schism"]

[Text] **Riga—"The final deadline is not subject to appeal either," joked my old acquaintance from the Latvian**

Communist Party Central Committee department of organizational and party work. Judging by his tone, he was in a good mood. He already knew that more than half of the delegates elected to the republic's Communist Party congress in the party districts were "loyal to the CPSU Platform."

It is an extraordinary congress, but its dates have already been adjusted several times by Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenums—it was approaching. This happened in the course of heated discussions which were only summed up in the assembly hall of the Central Committee. Communists and nonparty people debated with each other and together.

Thus, the congress will begin work on 6 April, and the term that is used unofficially—extraordinary—fits it as never before.

The approach of the date of the forum for Latvia's communists really was dictated by extraordinary circumstances. The aggressive intrigues of the factionaries are "pressing." A conference of the adherents of an "independent Latvian Communist Party" has designated the date of their constituent congress—14 April.

I. Godmanis, head of the political committee of the People's Front of Latvia [NFL], spoke at this amateur assembly of party separatists before his "companions-in-arms" and substantiated the need for an "acceleration" in the following manner: He said that the "independent Latvian Communist Party" must become the "lawful successors" of the present Communist Party. But not by virtue of ideological heritage, revolutionary past, or social reforms of society, but rather for its share... of party property.

The meeting which took place later in front of the Central Committee building was organized by the "environmental protection club," whose members enjoy "rights of individual membership" in the NFL, and it formulated similar aspirations in a more concrete manner. The "national radicals" demanded that the communists hand over everything—from their membership dues for party funds to the service archives. But that is not all... It was suggested in the form of an ultimatum that the party also "disband itself," that it repent before that nation, and that it acknowledge itself a "criminal association."

I will make one immediate reservation. I have no intention of putting an equals sign between the frenzied orators at meetings on the squares and, let us say, the respectable organizational committee for the creation of an "independent Latvian Communist Party" or its virtual ally—the board of the NFL Duma.

For example Ya. Shkapar, the head of that board, himself held a quite important position not so long ago in the apparat of the republic's Communist Party Central Committee. And D. Ivans, chairman of the front's Duma, was a delegate to the 19th All-Union Party Conference and left the Latvian Communist Party quite recently. And the lecturer at the conference of adherents of an "independent Latvian Communist Party" was also a long-time acquaintance of mine—M. Rukmane, first secretary of the Kirovskiy raykom [rayon committee] of Riga (that is the central rayon of the Latvian capital where the ministries and departments are concentrated). In the years of stagnation she had an outstanding career even for those times of precocious growth among the nomenklatura—from a school-level Young Pioneer leader to first secretary of the republic's Komsomol Central Committee. And without having taken any party leadership posts as a commander of the national economy.

The organizational committee of the party's separatists was headed a few days ago by the no less well-known A. Chepanis, deputy chairman for trade and consumer services of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers. The popularity of the latter is explained not only by the fact that his name is connected with the local "releases" of crucial goods. There is something else: In the years of stagnation Chepanis headed party committees in the rayons where a great sporting fan stopped in to hunt and fish—the former "first leader" of the republic, whom the adherents of an "independent party" speak and write about today in the context of last names from the "center" that I do not wish to mention. By the way, even Alfred Kazimirovich himself noted recently in the republic newspaper LAUKU AVIZE that the "chief accomplishment of the Bolsheviks is the GULAG." But talk is cheap, and he too has a career record.

Or one more—L. Zile, the faction's theorist and director of the Institute of Party History under the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. Her road as the wife of a permanent business manager of the republic's Central Committee in the years of stagnation—from small-town Komsomol organizer to doctor of science with a dissertation on the unprecedented political and economic growth of socialism—was in general strewn with roses in the literal and figurative sense of the word.

So there are various people among "the independents." I will not repeat the gossip that some of them supposedly just want to receive soft positions in the new times as well. However I will say frankly that the communists from the workers rayons have little trust in those who have "deserted."

Of course that does not mean that only national careerists are gathering under the standard of the "independent party." Among the potential schismatics there are also quite young functionaries and secretaries of committees, predominantly from the rural rayons, who have gotten lost in the complicated social and political situation and are frightened by the fall of the authority of their party organizations. They look for support in the "national idea," supposing that staking a position on the priority of the indigenous population will increase their popularity with the local population.

There are also teachers from departments of VUZ's [higher educational institutions], predominantly from the Academy of Arts, the conservatory, and the university. Many of them combine membership in the party with membership in the NFL. For some of these "creative people," such a situation favors the organization of their personal matters. The theaters, film studios, and mass media are, on the whole, in the hands of the "national coalition," but your fate (your position on the stage of life, your honoraria, and the other "cultural and communal facilities") is in your own hands. Because it depends upon where you file your candidacy as delegate.

Everything, however, is just temporary. The recent elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet graphically demonstrated the growth of authority of the principal party leaders, who are selflessly defending the platform of the CPSU, in the workers' rayons. Defeating their opponents with an appreciable majority were E. Aboltinsh, secretary of ideology of the Riga Latvian Communist Party gorkom [city committee]; A. Rubiks, member of the bureau of the gorkom; A. Belukha, Yu. Lyalin, and I. Prokofyev, first secretaries of factory raykoms of the republic's capital; E. Eglit, secretary of the party committee of a steamship line... A sociological poll confirmed the high popularity rating of A. Klautsen, first secretary of the Riga party gorkom and USSR people's deputy. A united council of labor collectives of the Latvian SSR declared its full support for those who are "for Soviet Latvia in a renewed federation and against opportunists of every stripe." And that principal question—"for or against"—has become, properly, the main watershed of the two alternative pre-congress programs.

Yes, there is still intense work ahead—heated debates and difficult searches for reasonable compromises and for ways to consolidate those who are vacillating and fight the schismatics. In a word, a bitter political struggle is ahead.

Latvians Report on Meeting With Gorbachev

90UN1384C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 23 Mar 90 p 1

[Report by LATINFORM correspondent E. Zarinsh on comments by A. Gorbunov, V. Bresis, and J. Vagris, representatives of Latvia, on their Moscow meeting with M.S. Gorbachev: "The Beginning of the Beginning..."]

[Text] As we have already reported, President M.S. Gorbachev received representatives of our country—A. Gorbunov, I. Bisher, V. Bresis, J. Vagris, and M. Vulfson. They talked about the issue of restoring Latvia's political and economic independence. On the afternoon of 21 March A. Gorbunov, V. Bresis, and J. Vagris returned from Moscow and as they were leaving the plane they answered questions from journalists.

[Question] What were your impressions of the meeting with the president?

[Gorbunov] I would say that it was the beginning of the beginning. We talked about the main principles for further work.

[Question] Why have you come up with the initiative for conducting such meetings at this time in particular?

[Gorbunov] Gorbachev and I have already talked repeatedly about restoration of state sovereignty for the republic. But our opinions and approaches were different. In my opinion it is necessary to lay the foundations for independence in political, economic, and other spheres. Gorbachev understands our situation very well and, like us, he believes that we have a long way to go before the issue is resolved. He stressed that a treaty with each republic is needed that takes into account its political and economic characteristics. We agreed with that, but we emphasized that our goal is the restoration of political and economic sovereignty so that Latvia will become a subject of international law. If that goal is not achieved, then any treaty will have practically no meaning.

[Question] How far is Gorbachev prepared to go right now?

[Gorbunov] We asked him that too. And he answered "We are beginning."

[Vagris] Gorbachev emphasized that the treaty that he mentioned will not be a standard treaty. As a result he asked, "What are your specific proposals?" In our opinion, we need to create working groups which should work out a packet of specific proposals.

[Question] The president has been informed of the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Latvia. Will he be prepared to speak with representatives of the People's Front, which already has a majority in our parliament?

[Gorbunov] We speak in the name of the whole republic. The president stressed that it is all the same to him who speaks so long as they speak in the name of the supreme organ of power.

[Question] That means that there is work to be done. Where do we begin?

[Bresis] We have already partially begun the work. We already have some versions of the specific paragraphs of a treaty. The necessary economic accounts have also been started. Now this work must be systematized and working groups must be organized which could study this question and present their proposals to the Supreme Soviet. Then we must address the president in the name of the republic. As for whether we should follow Lithuania's example, I believe that we have the same goal, of course, but each Baltic republic can have its own tactics. Lithuania has begun the path of pressure, so to speak, and we are beginning the path of negotiations.

[Gorbunov] But in our conversation with M. Gorbachev, we stressed that these discussions can only take place under conditions of equality. If that is not possible, then pressure from one or another side is unavoidable.

[Vagris] As a result, similar working groups will also be created in Moscow to study and work on this issue.

[Question] You have already had repeated conversations with Gorbachev. Now he has become president. Did you sense something new in his approaches?

[Gorbunov] In the first place, I treated him as the president of a state, and he received us as such. I sensed that his freedom of action had increased greatly. His treatment of many issues had become broader.

[Question] Was any issue raised to which the president would simply answer, "No"?

[Gorbunov] Gorbachev is an experienced politician and he would never give a categoric "No." And we too did not leave for Moscow so that we could pound our fists on the table. But as soon as we began to talk about forthcoming steps, he answered, "First we will begin."

[Question] Did you agree on further meetings?

[Vagris] No. But everything depends on how we ourselves do our work. We need specific proposals.

Latvian Independence Negotiators Listed

90UN1384F Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 21 Mar 90 p 4

[Decree of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium: "On the Staff of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Delegation for Negotiations With the Leadership of the USSR on the Restoration of Latvia's Economic and Political Independence"]

[Text] In accordance with the 2 March 1990 Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet decree "On the Confirmation of a Commission to Develop Measures for the Restoration of Latvia's Economic and Political Independence," the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

To approve the staff of the Latvian SSR delegation for negotiations with the leadership of the USSR on the restoration of Latvia's economic and political independence as follows:

Bisher, Ilmar Olgertovich—deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities, USSR people's deputy;

Bresis, Vilnis-Edvins Gedertovich—chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, USSR people's deputy;

Vagris, Yan Yanovich—first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, USSR people's deputy;

Vulfson, Mavrik Germanovich—senior teacher in the department of social sciences at the Latvian Academy of Arts, USSR people's deputy;

Gorbunov, Anatoliy Valeryanovich—chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet, USSR Central Committee;

Ivans, Daynis Evaldovich—chairman of the Latvian People's Front, USSR people's deputy;

Lutsans Yanis Petrovich—chairman of the "Ladezers" collective farm and agricultural plant in Limbazhskiy Rayon, USSR people's deputy;

Martinson, Vladimir Karlovich—general director of the "Radiotekhnika" production association, chairman of the board of the Latvian SSR Association of Industrial Enterprises;

Nefedov, Petr Fedorovich—general director of the "Latvia" production sewing association, chairman of the Latvian SSR Associated Council of Labor Collectives;

Peters, Yanis Yanovich—USSR people's deputy;

Poch, Eyzhen Antonovich—Latvian SSR minister of foreign affairs;

Eyzan, Andrey Vilisovich—deputy head doctor at the Ventspils Tsentralnyy Rayon Hospital, USSR people's deputy.

[Signed] A. GORBUNOV, chairman of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
I. DAUDISH, secretary of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Riga, 19 March 1990.

Anti-Draft 'Incitement' in Latvia Deplored

PM1704135390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel M. Ziyeminsh: "Latvia: Lessons for Simpletons"]

[Text] The Soviet Army and "occupation" is one of the favorite topics in the press organ distributed in Latvia by the "Neatkariba" ("Independence") movement for national independence. Its latest issue gives it the amount of space it traditionally merits. It carries a feature comprising five items united under the rubric "Army Matters."

What "army matters?" The first person to be given a say is former "dissident" Nugzar Mgaiolishvili, a member of the Georgian Helsinki group since 1974. "We all have to realize," he begins his interview, "that the army is the only remaining bastion of the empire. Everything else—its ideology and its party alike—have suffered total bankruptcy."

This pretentious generalization is followed by advice and injunctions to young Letts and their ideological inspirers in the domain of, for example, how to boycott the Armed Forces conscription campaign—that is, how to destroy this "only bastion of the empire," the army. In Georgia, the informal activist boasts, strikes and hunger strikes are being held to this end and male students are transferring from extramural to full-time courses with an equal number of female students transferring to extramural departments by mutual agreement with the men. And he goes on in the same vein, the thrust of all his utterances being "we will not let the spring draft happen."

Another "tutor of young people in army matters"—apparently a foreigner—gives advice to those who, despite everything, have found themselves drafted into the ranks of the Armed Forces. And especially to those who have been victimized, humiliated, or abused in some way. "Documentary evidence—who, when, where, and what—is obligatory. Obtaining photographs of the commanding officers is considered important here." A foreign address where all this material should be sent is indicated. Why? The information thus obtained will apparently be widely used in Western propaganda. Among other things, the volunteer mentor hopes, as he puts it, "both to help the Soviet Army get rid of the old generals" and at the same time to lessen the dangers of a national youth movement in favor of refusing to serve in the army.

The council of the Latvian "Geneva-49" committee and Latvian Rebirth Party spokesman Janis Ozols are even more unceremonious in their calls for a boycott of the army draft. Their unparalleled lessons for simpletons are simply astounding: Are all these and other well-wishers not concerned at all that their advice could result in young people possibly ending up behind bars instead of fulfilling their military duty?

At the same time I would like to have faith in the sense of the draftees themselves and the solid sense of their parents and kith and kin. It is particularly important today not to succumb to incitement to commit crimes.

New Latvian KGB Chief Biographic Data

90UN1257C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 p 3

[LATINFORM report: "In the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium"]

[Text] The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium has appointed E.V. Yekhanson as chairman of the Latvian SSR Committee for State security.

The Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has relieved S.V. Zukul of his duties as chairman of the Latvian SSR Committee for State Security.

Edmund Voldemarovich Yekhanson was born in 1936 in Riga. He is a Latvian with a higher education. He graduated from the Vilnius Higher Party School in 1968. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1960.

E. Yekhanson started work in 1959, working in various capacities in the apparatus of the Latvian Komsomol Central Committee and as first secretary of the Komsomol Bauskiy rayon party committee, and also of the Komsomol Kirovskiy rayon party committee in Riga city. From 1972 he worked in the organs of state security, and from 1986 to 1989 he was deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Committee for State security, and then chief of a USSR Committee for State Security department.

Latvian Deputies Elected 18 March Listed

90UN1374 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 23 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[List of people's deputies of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic elected on 18 March 1990]

[Text] Abikis, Dzintars Emilyevich, senior abstracter on the People's Front of Latvia Committee for Science and Enlightenment, Riga city, electoral district No. 20.

Aboltinysh, Eduard Eduardovich, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Riga city committee [gorkom], member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 36.

Agafonov, Grigoriy Dementyevich, general director of the "Latvstanloservis" Production Association, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Duagavpils electoral district No. 77.

Ayzezers, Yuris Petrovich, chairman of the Liyepaya rayon executive committee [rayispolkom], member of the CPSU, Liyepayskiy rayon, Grobinya city, Grobinya electoral district No. 143.

Albertinya, Skaydrite Yanovna, dean of the Riga Polytechnical Institute, member of the Greens Party, Ogre city, Pagorskiy electoral district No. 157.

Alekseyev, Anatoliy Georgiyevich, chairman of the Inter-Front Presidium, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 48.

Alksins, Viktor Imantovich, serviceman, serial number 13793, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 62.

Alksins, Leonid Voldemarovich, chief architect at the "Tirdzinetsibas proyekts" Institute, member of the CPSU, Yurmala city, Yurmala electoral district No. 84.

Andreyev, Georgs Nikolayevich, professor, Riga Medical Institute, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Bauska electoral district No. 110.

Anton, Yuriy Grigoryevich, LTOT [expansion unknown] party committee secretary, member of the CPSU, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya city electoral district No. 94.

Apinitis, Andris Raymontovich, chairman of the "Ilzene" kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, the Izlene rural soviet, Aluksenskiy rayon, Ape electoral district No. 105.

Apsitis, Roman Vladimirovich, docent at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 27.

Bartashevich, Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, chairman of the Rezekne interkolkhoz construction organization, member of the CPSU, Rezekne city, Rezekne electoral district No. 97.

Batarevskiy, Oleg Vladimirovich, associate of the newspaper ELPA, member of the Greens Party, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 7.

Belskis, Normund Zigmunovich, editor of Latvian Radio, member of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers Party [LSDRP], Riga city, Livany electoral district No. 161.

Belukha, Andrey Nikolayevich, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Proletarskiy rayon committee [raykom], Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 64.

Bekasov, Martinyan Dmitriyevich, deputy chief of Rezekne city rayon executive committee, member of the CPSU, Rezekne, Rezekne electoral district No. 98.

Berzinysh, Andris Voldemarovich, chairman of the executive committee [ispolkom] and the soviet of people's deputies in Valmiera city, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Valmiera electoral district No. 194.

Bezinysh, Indulis Augustovich, senior teacher at the Latvian Agricultural Academy, Yelgava city, Yelgava electoral district No. 83.

Bezinysh, Martinysh Yuryevich, chairman of the "Driva" kolkhoz, Saldusskiy rayon, Saldus electoral district No. 178.

Berzs, Arnolds Karlopich, senior teacher at the Liyepaya Pedagogical Institute, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya city electoral district No. 89.

Berklavs, Eduards Karlovich, pensioner, Riga city, Madona electoral district No. 151.

Biyezays, Yanis Karlovich, economist with the "Kekava" agricultural firm, Kekava village, Kekava electoral district No. 168.

Bikins, Valdis Ansovich, deputy chairman of the booard at the "Kurzeme" plant in Ayzpute city, Ayzpute electoral district No. 141.

Birkavs, Valdis Voldemarovich, docent at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Vetsumniyevskiy electoral district No. 112.

Blazhevich, Yanis Vladislavovich, chairman of the Ventspils rayon soviet of people's deputies, member of the CPSU, Ventspils city, Zirskiy electoral district No. 199.

Boyars, Yuriy Rudolfovich, docent at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Sigulda electoral district No. 175.

Briyedis, Ivars Karlovich, director of the Viyesite Secondary School, Valmiera city, member of the CPSU, Valmiera city, Ruyiyenskiy electoral district No. 196.

Bresis, Vilnis-Edvins Gedertovich, chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Viyesite electoral district No. 131.

Budovskiy, Maris Pavlovich, faculty head at the LGIFK [expansion unknown], Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 67.

Bukele, Emerita Stanislavna, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Bauskiy raykom, member of the CPSU, Bauskiy rayon, the Islitse rural soviet of people's deputies, Islitse electoral district No. 113.

Belorussia, Alberts Arturovich, writer with the Latvian SSR Union of Writers, Riga city, Ropazhskiy electoral district No. 176.

Vayvads, Yanis Kazimirovich, deputy director of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Inorganic Chemistry, member of the CPSU, Salaspils settlement, Salaspils electoral district No. 173.

Vanags, Daynis Elmarovich, director of the Grikskaya Nine-Grade School, Bauksiy rayon, Tseraukste settlement, Iyetsavskiy electoral district No. 111.

Vidavskiy, Aleksey Antonovich, chairman of the Daugavpils gorispolkom, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Daugavpils electoral district No. 71.

Gabranov, Peteris Eduardovich, board chairman at the "Raynis" kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Gulbene city, Daukstskiy electoral district No. 125.

Gavars, Yanis Aloisovich, chief editor for Latvian television information programs, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Tsesvaynskiy electoral district No. 152.

Gavrilov, Mikhail Mikhaylovich, senior teacher at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 58.

Gaponenko, Valentin Konstantinovich, troop commander, the Baltic Border District, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Ventspils city electoral district No. 103.

Geyge, Ilmars Eduarovich, group leader with the Ventspils special design group at the "Latkommunproyekt" Design Institute, member of the CPSU, Ventspils city, Targalskiy electoral district No. 200.

Geydans, Imants Ulyanovich, laboratory chief at the "Lauktseltniyeks" Product Association technical center, Yelgava city, Yelgava city electoral district No. 82.

Gerasimov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich, chief of the planning-and- economic department in the Riga branch of the Baltic Railroad, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 35.

Godmanis, Ivars Teodorovich, physicist, Latvia University, Riga city, Kuldiga electoral district No. 139.

Gorbunov, Anatoliy Valeryanovich, chairman of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Marupskiy electoral district No. 170.

Grube, Guntis Petrovich, chief engineer at the "Ogre" kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Ogrskiy rayon, Yumprava, Maliyenskiy electoral district No. 159.

Grutups, Andris Yulyevich, lawyer in the Sigulda legal consulting offices, member of the CPSU, Rizhskiy rayon, Inchukalns, Malpilsskiy electoral district No. 169.

Gulbis, Yanis Yanovich, teacher at the Riga No. 2 Medical School, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 16.

Daudish, Imant Antonovich, secretary of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Saldus electoral district No. 177.

Dimans, Sergey Leonidovich, docetn at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 59.

Dinevichs, Yanis Vladislavovich, senior teacher at the Riga Polytechnical Institute, deputy chairman of the People's Front of Latvia Duma Board, member of the LSDRP, Riga city, Valmiera electoral district No. 195.

Dobelis, Yuris Yanovich, engineer at the "Lauktseltniyeks" Technical Center, Riga city, Saulkrasti electoral district No. 174.

Dozortsev, Vladilen Leonidovich, chief editor of the journal DAUGAVA, Riga city, Yurmala electoral district No. 86.

Drobot, Yevgeniy Pavlovich, deputy chief engineer at the "Khimvolokno" Production Association, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Daugavpils electoral district No. 76.

Zharkov, Vladimir Vitalyevich, first secretary of Lithuanian Communist Party Daugavpils city committee, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils, Daugavpils electoral district No. 74.

Zhdanok, Tatyana Arkadevna, docent at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 40.

Zaletayev, Sergey Pavlovich, leading designer at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Physics Magnetohydronamics Special Design Bureau, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 21.

Zashcherinskiy, Yevgeniy Yazepovichm director of the "Berze" kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Dobelskiy rayon, Krimunskiy electoral district No. 123.

Zeyle, Valentina Boleslavovna, docent at Latvia University, Riga city, Preylskiy electoral district No. 160.

Zeltkalne, Brigita Eduardovna, senior editor with Latvian television, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Skrunda electoral district No. 140.

Ziyedinysh, Ziyedonis Petrovich, board chairman at the "Skanyayskalns" kolkhoz, Valmierskiy rayon, Skankalne settlement, Mazsalatskiy electoral district No. 197.

Ziyendonis, Imant Yanovich, chairman of the Latvian Cultural Foundation, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Stuchkinskiy electoral district No. 180.

Zotov, Aleksey Vladimirovich, priest of the Riga diocese, the Holy Trinity Church, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 30.

Ivanov, Ivan Pimanovich, section chief at the No. 85 Civil Aviation Plant, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 38.

Ivanov, Mikhail Semenovich, first deputy chairman of the Daigavpils gorispolkom, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Daugavpils electoral district No. 70.

Kalnberz, Viktor Konstantinovich, director of the Latvian Scientific Research Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Aluksnenskiy electoral district No. 104.

Kalninysh, Imants Augustovich, composer, borad chairman of the Music Society, Riga city, Nitsskiy electoral district No. 144.

Karkla, Mariya Meykulovna, teacher at the Ludzenskaya No. 1 Secondary School, Ludza city, Karsavskiy electoral district No. 149.

Karlsons, Yuris Georgiyevich, chief designer at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Special Design Bureau for Scientific Intrument Building, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 52.

Kekhris, Oyars Erikovich, department chief at Latvia University, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 25.

Kide, Edvins Voldemarovich, director of the agricultural school in Yanmuyzha, member of the CPSU, Tsesisskiy electoral district No. 114.

Kinna, Yanis Robertovich, deputy board chairman of the People's Front of Latvia Duma, Tsesis city, Ligatnenskiy electoral district No. 117.

Kirshteyn, Aleksandr Karlovich, the "Indeks" Production-Technical Cooperative, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 4.

Klindzhans, Gunars Yazepovich, chairman of the executive committee of the Rezekne rayon soviet of people's deputies, member of the CPSU, Rezekne city, Kaunatskiy electoral district No. 165.

Kodolinsysh, Arturs Khansovich, senior scientific associate at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Babitskiy electoral district No. 167.

Koroshevskiy, Petr Stepanovich, board chairman of the "Skaysta" kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Kraslava city, Graverskiy electoral district No. 136.

Kostanda, Odisey Savelyevich, teacher at the Riga No. 69 Secondary School, Riga city, Koknesskiy electoral district No. 181.

Kraminysh, Atis Khugovich, numerically controlled machine tool operator at the Riga State Electrotechnical imeni V.I. Lenin, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 69.

Krastinysh, Andrey Viktorovich, lawyer at the No. 3 Riga Legal Consulting Office, Riga city, Strenchskiy electoral district No. 193.

Krastinysh, Ivar Valdisovich, assistant at the RMI [expansion unknown], Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 10.

Krastinysh, Edmunds Arvidovich, postgraduate student at the Latvian Agricultural Scientific Research of Farming, the Latvian agroindustrial complex, Valmiera city, Kotsenskiy electoral district No. 198.

Kristovskis, Girts Imantovich, chairman of the Ventspils branch of the People's Front of Latvia, Ventspils city, Ventspils electoral district No. 102.

Krols, Viktor Yanovich, chairman of the Daugavpils rayon soviet of people's deputies, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Vetspillskiy electoral district No. 118.

Krugalyauzhs, Peteris Yanovich, director of the "Liyezere" sovkhoz, member of the CPSU, Liyezere village, Madonskiy rayon, Varaklyany electoral district No. 154.

Kruminysh, Girts Adolfovich, laboratory chief at the Riga Automotive Plant minibus plant, Zveyniyektsiyems settlement, Rizhskiy rayon, Riga electoral district No. 5.

Kruminysh, Raymonds Gunarovich, chief dispatcher at the "Komyyaniyetis" kolkhoz, Stuchkinskiy rayon, Yaunelgava electoral district No. 182.

Kruminysh, Yanis Imantovich, deputy editor of the newspaper ATMODA, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 28.

Kurdyumov, Leonid Leonidovich, director of the "Agrosnab" Rayn Production Association RIVTs, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 37.

Kutsan, Larion Kirillovich, general director of the "Mirnyy" agricultural combine sovkhoz, Daugavpilskiy rayon, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Kalkunskiy electoral district No. 119.

Lagzdinysh, Yanis Voldemarovich, lawyer with the Liyepaya Legal Office, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya electoral district No. 90.

Lakis, Peteris Petrovich, department chief at Latvia University, Riga city, Gulbenskiy electoral district No. 124.

Lazda, Peteris Yanovich, deputy chairman of the Tukumskiy rayon soviet of people's deputies, Tukums city, Slampskiy electoral district No. 189.

Lange, Aleksandr Kharyevich, chairman of the Kuldiga rayon soviet of people's deputies ispolkom, Kuldigskiy rayon, Alsungskiy electoral district No. 138.

Ligotnis, Andris Imantovich, lawyer with the Resekne legal office, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Balvskiy electoral district No. 107.

Liyepinysh, Karlis Sergeyevich, electrician at the Ogre Spinning and Knitting Production Association, Ogre city, Ogre electoral district No. 156.

Lembergs, Ayvars Robertovich, chairman of the Ventspils city soviet of people's deputies ispolkom, member of the CPSU, Ventspils city, ventspils electoral district No. 100.

Lutsans, Yanis Petrovich, board chairman of the "Ladezers" agricultural combine, member of the CPSU, Rizhskiy rayon, Ledurgskiy electoral district No. 145.

Lyalin, Yuriy Andrianovich, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Leningradskiy raykom, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 13.

Mantulnikov, Oleg Nikolayevich, Latvian Communist Party Liyepaya gorkom organizational department chief, member of the CPSU, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya city electoral district No. 92.

Maryash, Ruta Maksovna, pensioner, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 2.

Makharev, Eduard Ivanovich, chief of the Central Scientific Research Institute of Automated Control Systems Civil Aviation, member of the CPSU Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 33.

Machtams, Alfreds Andreyevich, chairman of the "Sarkana baka" fishery kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Ventspils city, Ventspils electoral district No. 101.

Medins, Sarmis Pavlovich, chief agronomist at the "Komunars" kolkhoz, Gulbenskiy rayon, Lizumskiy electoral district No. 126.

Mikhaylov, Nikolay Vasilyevich, director of the Riga Experimental Marine Mechanics Plant, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 23.

Movel, Igor Anatolyevich, editor of the newspaper ELGAVAS ZINTETAYS, Yelgava city, Yelgava electoral district No. 81.

Mutseniyeks, Visvaldis Krishevich, leader of a brigade of electricians in the Yurmala Volunteer Fire Service, Riga city, Yaunorgskiy electoral district No. 155.

Muntsinysh, Linards Arnoldovich, lawyer with the Liyepaya city legal office, member of the CPSU, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya electoral district No. 91.

Ozols, Indulis Zhanovich, director of the Latvian SSR Ministry of Health Work Study and Management center, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 6.

Panteleyev, Andrey Borisovich, postgraduate student at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 1.

Plotniyeks, Andris Adamovich, professor at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Kalntsiyemskiy electoral district No. 133.

Preynberg, Gunar Adolfovich, docent at the Latvian Agricultural Academy, Yelgava city electoral district No. 79.

Prishchepov, Valeriy Fronichm senior reacher at the Riga Higher Military-Political School imeni Buryuzov, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 68.

Prokofyev, Ivan Kalinovich, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Oktyabrskiy raykom, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 45.

Puzo, Andris Pavlovich, director of the Aglonskiy residential college, member of the CPSU, Preylskiy rayon, Pelechskiy electoral district No. 162.

Punovskiy, Artur Khariyevich, chairman of the soviet of people's deputies in Proletarskiy rayon Riga city, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 55.

Razna, Stefan Petrovich, peasant from the "Teykas" peasant farm, Daugavpilskiy rayon, Ilukstskiy electoral district No. 120.

Repsha, Roland Donatovich, engineer at the "Tselyuproyekts" Institute, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 26.

Repshe, Eynars Ayvarovich, engineer at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, Yelgava city, Sabilskiy electoral district No. 185.

Rikard, Roland Brunovich, professor at the Riga Polytechnical Institute, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 18.

Rogal, Mikhail Fedorovich, chief of the Riga Main Power Station, member of the CPSU, Salaspils settlement, Salaspils electoral district No. 172.

Rodin, Vladimir Grigoryevich, general director of the Daugavpils Production Association for Construction Materials and Structures, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Daugavpils electoral district No. 72.

Romashov, Gennadiy Fedorovich, senior teacher at Riga Higher Military-Political School imeni Biryuzov, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 34.

Rubiks, Alfredsd Petrovich, USSR people's deputy, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 24.

Ryabinin, Igor Ivanovich, serviceman, member of the CPSU, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya electoral district No. 96.

Salitis, Broniiislav Lyuvigovich, deputy chairman of the "9 Maya" fishery kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 51.

Setle, Anna Vilisovna, deputy director for scientific work at the Sliterskiy State Park, Talsinskiy rayon, Royskiy electoral district No. 188.

Seletskiy, Vilis Vladislavovich, editor of the newspaper IZGLITIBA, Tukums city, Tukums electoral district No. 188.

Silars, Ivars Arnoldovich, physician at the Central Hospital in Yurmala city, Riga city, Yurmala electoral district No. 87.

Simson, Peteris Ermanovich, chairman of the soviet of people's deputies in Talsinskiy rayon, Valdemarpils city, Talsinskiy electoral district No. 186.

Skosta, Ludis Petrovich, chairman of the "Yekabpils" Agricultural Production Association council, member of the CPSU, Yekabpilsskiy rayon, Salasskiy rayon electoral district No. 130.

Skulte, Druvis Karlovich, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Tsesisskiy raykom, member of the CPSU, Tsesisskiy rayon, Piyebalgskiy electoral district No. 116.

Smirnov, Vladimir Nikolayevich, chief of the political directorate at the Riga Naval Garrison, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 12.

Stefanovich, Viktor Andronikovich, deputy editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 11.

Strikis, Voldemar Ernestovich, pro-vice-chancellor for training work at the Latvia Agricultural Academy, member of the CPSU, Yelgava city, Ugalskiy electoral district No. 201.

Teykmanis, Andris Gunarovich, chairman of the Riga city soviet of people's deputies, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 53.

Teteris, Ludvig Yanovich, director of the "Vetsautse" experimental training and reasearch farm, member of the CPSU, Dobelskiy rayon, Autsskiy electoral district No. 121.

Tomashun, Andris Imantovich, director of the No. 4 Yelgava Secondary School, member of the CPSU, Yelgava city, Yelgava electoral district No. 80.

Ulme, Arvid Yuryevich, president of the Environmental Protection Club, member of the Greens Party, Riga city, Saldusskiy electoral district No. 179.

Udris, Ariys Kheyrikhovich, deputy chairman of the "Adazhi" agricultural firm board, member of the CPSU, Rizhskiy rayon, Adazhskiy electoral district No. 166.

Felss, Andris Yanovich, chairman of the "Krustpils" kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Yekabppilsskiy rayon, Kukskiy electoral district No. 128.

Fershalov, Boris Aleksandrovich, commander of a military unit, member of the CPSU, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya electoral district No. 95.

Freymanis, Yanis Fritsevich, laboratory chief at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Organic Synthesis, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 61.

Khodakovskiy, Vladimir Anatolyevich, vice-chancellor of the Riga Red banner Institute of Engineers Civil Aviation, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 31.

Tsalitis, Interests Maksovich, board member of the People's Front of Latvia Duma, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 8.

Tsaune, Ivar Adolfovich, chairman of the "Igrive" kolkhoz, Aluksenskiy rayon, member of the CPSU, Aluksne city, Maliyenskiy electoral district No. 106.

Tselminysh, Yuris Uldovich, editor of the newspaper TUKUMA ZINYETAYS, Tukums city, Tukums electoral district No. 187.

Tsibulis, Yuris Bronislavovich, chairman of the Balvskiy branch of the People's Front, member of the LSDRP, Tilzha settlement, Balvskiy rayon, Rugayskiy electoral district No. 109.

Tsilinskis, Eynar Egonovich, junior scientific associate at the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Organic Synthesis, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 57.

Tsirulis, Martsis Edgarovich, deputy chief medical officer for pediatrics at the No. 1 birthing facility, Riga city, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 54.

Tsupruns, Ivan Ivanovich, chief engineer in the "Latesa" Latvian Design Industrial Construction Association Talsinskiy Mobile mechanized Column, member of the CPSU, Talsi city, Valdemarpils electoral district No. 184.

Chebotarenoka, Velta Arnoldovna, deputy chairman of the Yurmala city soviet of people's deputies, Yurmala city, Yurmala electoral district No. 85.

Chepanis, Alfred Kazimirovich, deputy chairman of the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Valkskiy electoral district No. 191.

Shkapar, Yanis Yanovich, board chairman of the People's Front of Latvia Duma, Riga city, Limbazhi electoral district No. 146.

Shpogis, Kazimir Albinovich, professor at the Latvian SSR Agricultural Academy, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Vilyany electoral district No. 163.

Shteyns, Valdis Voldemarovich, docent at Latvia University, member of the LSDRP, Riga city, Ergli electoral district No. 153.

Eglays, Vilnis Ottovich, docent at the Riga Polytechnical Institute, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 3.

Eglit, Edgar Petrovich, party secretary of the Latvian Maritime Steamship Line, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 49.

Eynin, Vladimir Martynovich, chairman of the Liyepaya "Kursa" fishery kolkhoz, member of the CPSU, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya electoral district No. 88.

Elerts, Ivars Ansovich, leading designer at the Riga State Electrotechnical Production Association Scientific Research Institute, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 56.

Emsis, Indulis Vilevich, deputy chairman of the Latvian State Committee for Environmental Protection, member of the Greens Party, Salaspils, Salatsgriva electoral district No. 147.

Endele, Yanis Yanovich, teacher at the No. 1 Tsesis Secondary School, Tsesis city, Pargauyasskiy electoral district No. 115.

Endzin, Ayvar Arvidovich, docent at Latvia University, member of the CPSU, Riga city, Riga electoral district No. 66.

Eninysh, Teodor Kirilovich, chief of the traumatology department at the Liyepaya central city hospital, Liyepaya city, Liyepaya electoral district No. 93.

Yundzis, Talvs Edgarovich, lawyer, Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences, Riga city, Liyelvarde electoral district No. 158.

Yurshevits, Egils-Eynars Imantovich, physician at the Liyepaya rayon central hospital, Priyekule city, member of the LSDRP, Priyekule city, Durbskiy electoral district No. 142.

Yagupets, Yevgeniy Nikolayevich, department chief in the Daugavpils Air Defense Forces Military School of Aeronautical Engineering imeni Yan Fabritsius, member of the CPSU, Daugavpils city, Daugavpils electoral district No. 78.

Yaunklyavinysh, Agris Karlovich, chief agronomist at the "Dzimtene" kolkhoz, Tukums city, Kandava electoral district No. 190.

RSFSR

Disputes Mark First Day of Moscow Soviet Session

PM1704160390 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[S. Skorokhodov report: "Difficult Beginning"]

[Text] The first session of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, 21st Convocation, with an agenda of more than 20 items, will be a difficult marathon for the deputies despite the fact that, according to E.A. Bakirov, who was chairing the session, a tremendous amount of preparatory work was done by the organizing committee.

The session is finding it difficult to pick up steam. The appeal for a minute's silence to honor "all those who have died for the ideals of freedom and democracy," with which the entire auditorium complied, did not save the people's representatives who had displayed unity of will from differences of opinion. These emerged first and foremost because they were a reflection of "bloc thinking"—the Moscow City Soviet deputies currently include representatives of four different political groupings. "Democratic Russia," which has two-thirds of the seats, and the "Moscow" bloc, which together with other independents holds the other third, are the biggest formations. And despite the fact that all these blocs' levels of representation were punctiliously and properly observed when the session's working organs were being formed, the disputes often went as far as outright abusive accusations of lies, mutual impropriety, and so forth.

After a recess S.B. Stankevich, who was chairing the session, gave the floor to Deputy R.R. Chervontsev, who read out an appeal in defense of USSR People's Deputies Gdlyan and Ivanov on behalf of 121 Moscow City Soviet deputies. Surely, at a time when Moscow has many simply glaring problems, this cannot be what deputies regard as most important, Deputy V.I. Ampilov legitimately asked from the rostrum. Aren't our deputies thereby seeking to usurp the powers of the Supreme Soviet, which is engaged in an examination of the question?

It was precisely this appeal that led to conflict when deputies had to decide at the end of the day whether to adopt it as a session document. Refusing to participate in the vote, a section of deputies from the "Fatherland" group and the "Moscow" bloc walked out.

At a press conference held immediately after the first day's work had ended, members of the presidium expressed satisfaction at its results, considering that the day's program had been fully completed.

First Round of RSFSR Elections Summarized

PM1303142790 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Mar 90 Single Edition p 3

[TASS report: "In the Central Electoral Commission for the Election of RSFSR People's Deputies"]

[Text] The Central Electoral Commission for the Election of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies held a regular sitting 12 March. It heard a report by Commission Chairman V.I. Kazakov on the results of the elections of RSFSR people's deputies. On the basis of documents received from district electoral commissions, it was established that 121 RSFSR people's deputies were elected from national-territorial and territorial districts 4 March. The Central Electoral Commission registered 120 RSFSR people's deputies.

The commission examined the question of holding repeat elections of RSFSR people's deputies in 33 electoral districts where two candidate deputies stood without either being elected; in Krasnoyarsk Kray's No. 210 Norilskiy Territorial Electoral District, where the elections were adjudged invalid; and in Leningrad's No. 12 Northern National-Territorial Electoral District, where the Central Electoral Commission declared the elections invalid due to gross violations of the law in the voting process.

On the basis of Article 53 of the RSFSR Law "On Elections of RSFSR People's Deputies," the repeat elections will be held 22 April 1990. The holding of the repeat elections has been assigned to district electoral commissions as previously composed.

The Central Electoral Commission asked Leningrad City Soviet to form a newly composed district electoral commission in Leningrad's No. 12 Northern National-Territorial Electoral District.

Whenever necessary, executive committees of okrug (autonomous okrugs without rayon subdivisions), rayon, city (except cities under rayon jurisdiction), and urban rayon soviets of people's deputies can form newly composed precinct electoral commissions.

Candidate RSFSR people's deputies for the repeat elections by electoral districts will be nominated between 13 and 19 March, and nominated candidates will be registered between 19 and 21 March. Announcements by district electoral commissions of the names of registered candidate RSFSR people's deputies will be published in the press between 20 and 25 March, and candidates' meetings with voters will be organized from the day of candidates' registration until 21 April 1990. Voting at repeat elections will take place at the same polling stations and using the same voter lists as in the general election, which will be available for general information as of 8 April 1990.

In response to applications it has received, the Central Electoral Commission explained that when repeat elections are held in electoral districts with two candidate people's deputies running for election and one of them withdraws before polling day, the district electoral commission will hold the election with only the remaining candidate deputy running. A candidate will be deemed elected provided he gains more than one-half of the votes cast by voters taking part in the repeat election.

The commission also examined several other questions associated with summing up the results of the elections of RSFSR people's deputies.

Khodyrev Elected Chairman of Gorkiy Oblast

LD0404100790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] New power structures are gradually taking shape in the country. The local soviets are gaining strength. We have received news from Gorkiy where the first session of the oblast soviet is continuing. Khodyrev, first secretary of the CPSU oblast committee, was elected chairman by a secret ballot yesterday.

Chechen-Ingush People's Deputies Meet 30 Mar

LD3003210890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1930 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] Here is a report from Groznyy. The first session of people's deputies of Checheno-Ingushetiya is continuing to work until late in the evening. TASS correspondent (Sharip Osuyev) reports from Groznyy:

(Gersalt Ilmurzayev), who has just been elected first deputy chairman of the autonomous republic's Council of Ministers, asked the TASS correspondent to convey ardent gratitude to the organizers of the all-union radio marathon for that philanthropic action. Unfortunately, he stressed, the problems of the proection of motherhood and childhood are very acute in Checheno-Ingushetiya. The child mortality rate is high, and one reason for that is the shortage of pediatricians.

Buryat Oblast Party Committee Chairman Elected

LD0604184790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1000 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Today in Ulan-Uda a plenum of the Buryat Oblast CPSU Committee was held. An organizational issue was examined. Comrade Potapov, who was working as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenia and secretary of the Buryat Oblast CPSU Committee, has been elected first secretary of the Buryat Oblast party committee on a multi-candidate basis.

Stavropol People's Deputies Hold First Session

LD2503092390 Moscow TASS in English 0823 GMT 25 Mar 90

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Styazhkin]

[Text] Stavropol March 25 TASS—The maiden session of the newly-elected territorial Soviet (Council) of People's Deputies has been held in the city of Stavropol in the northern Caucasus. Deputies, winners of fierce competitions in Russia's first contested elections to local councils, made some unusual decisions.

The creation of the post of chairman of the territorial council, which did not exist previously, is one example. Other innovations included the establishment of the territorial council Presidium, standing committees and commissions for various concerns—the economy, farming, science, culture, education, health services, law and order. Deputies are confident that all these bodies will help the council respond better and more fully to the population's needs and requirements.

The session was unanimous—a rare case nowadays—in electing First Secretary of the territorial Communist Party Committee Ivan Boldyrev as chairman of the territorial Council of People's Deputies and approving his dual role as the council head and the territorial party chief.

"I regard this stance as confirmation of the fact that the authority of the party, which initiatied perestroika and is leading it, remains high among the population," Boldyrev said after the results of the vote were announced.

The discussion at the first session of the newly-elected Stavropol Council of People's Deputies showed that deputies were determined to firmly pursue the policy of separation of administrative and executive powers.

Previously, many vital decisions were made by the territorial council's Executive Committee. Henceforth this right is fully vested in the council itself and its Presidium, as also in its committees, commissions and individual deputies.

As for the Executive Committee, it will only execute the council's decisions. It can no longer make decisions and adopt resolutions. It will be fully responsible for the practical implementation of decisons made by the Council of People's Deputies.

Stavropol Kray Soviet Elects Leadership

LD1703232190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] A session of the Kray soviet in its new composition was held in Stavropol today. Boldyrev, first secretary of Stavropol Kray CPSU Committee, was elected chairman. The establishment of this post is an important step toward demarcating management and executive powers on a local basis.

A presidium of the kray soviet and permanent committees and commissions were also elected at the session. An Executive Committee of the kray soviet was elected. It is expected to implement the decisions developed by the soviet. Comrade (Tralov), who formerly worked as a secretary of the kray party committee, was elected chairman of the kray executive committee.

Volgograd Obkom Elects First Secretary

LD1603231690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 16 Mar 90

[Excerpts] Today in Volgograd an oblast party conference continued its work. The election of the first secretary of the party oblast committee became the main question of the day. [passage omitted]

We have just received a message: (Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Anipkin) has been elected—I stress, elected—first secretary of the party oblast committee. He used to work before as the Volgograd party oblast committee's first secretary [as heard].

Kemerovo Party Obkom Retains First Secretary

LD1703233390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 17 Mar 90

[Text] The forthcoming report-back and election campaign of the Kemerovo Oblast party organization, which was set up in the war years and which is one of the largest such organizations in the Trans-Ural area, will be the most democratic in its history. The decisions adopted at a plenum of the party obkom today will serve as the basis for this.

The communists of the Kuzbass did not submit to the mass-meeting fervor which favors the retirmenet of obkom secretaries and bureaus and which has spread across the country. Even though they had lived through the miners' strike, they resolved cadre issues in a businesslike manner. They approached in a balanced way the proposal that obkom First Secretary Melnikov should retire, and did not adopt it.

The experience of difficult situations led the obkom members to work out democratic foundations for the report-back and election conference which is planned for the end of April a mechanism for elections of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress. The aktiv, which includes rank-and-file communists and the secretaries of primary party organizations in addition to obkom members, has taken on itself the work to prepare for the conference, formerly carried out by the apparatus.

The elections of delegates will not take place at town and rayon conference, as used to be the case, but rather directly in the primary party organizations. Communists' proposals for candidatures to the elected bodies of the party obkom and to positions of leadership, up to and including the first secretary, will be discussed with glasnost. Elections of delegates to the CPSU congress will take place in the party constituencies as well as on an alternative basis. All 230,000 communists in the Kuzbass will thus take part in very important political actions for the first time.

Ufa Water Supply Contaminated With Phenol

LD1204194690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 12 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video report by correspondent M. Gafurov in Ufa including recorded interview with V.K. Gusev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; date and place of interview not given; participants identified by screen caption]

[Text] For two weeks now the situation in Ufa has been tense. Over half the residents in this town of 1 million people are unable the use the water supply. A considerable content of phenol has been detected in the drinking water. A government commission, set up by presidential decision, started work in the town today.

[Gafurov] Mass meetings and lines for water that has been brought in are the usual picture at present. Harmful effluent from the Khimrom production association has ended up in the small Sugurovka River and from there in the Ufa River and the town's southern water supply. By the way, reservoirs are also being polluted by the oil refinery, the railway steaming station, and the Sintezspirt works. They are also situated at a higher level than the water intake. The measures taken by the local authorities have not produced the right results.

[Begin recording] [Gusev] I want to say that there is a program to basically technically reequip the majority of enterprises in the chemical and timber complex situated on the territory of Bashkiriya. The details are now being discussed at a large conference taking place at the oblast party committee and the Bashkiriyan Council of Ministers. We are examining each step with scientists and managers of associations and enterprises. I think that this will answer all the questions by Bashiriya's population.

[Gafurov] Vadim Kuzmich, today the main question which is alarming and worrying the residents of Ufa is whether Khimprom will be closed?

[Gusev] I cannot say that we have sought advice once more: First, I don't see the possibility of doing this. The state will not tolerate this. That is the first thing. Second, we have every opportunity to put this enterprise in order.

[Gafurov] That is to say, for the time being, we will be drinking the very same water, water that has been brought in?

[Gusev] No, I don't believe that such water will continue to be drunk. Comrade Kondrushev believes that the analyses of the water now conform to the public health inspection requirements. We believe that in the next few days water wil be supplied normally. I am simply expressing my confidence. I think when this is confirmed by analyses and the opinion of medical scientists from the public health inspectorate we will announce and do this. I think this will be in the very near future. [video shows cityscapes of Ufa, people lining up for water; Gusev in office with Gafurov] [end recording]

Nalchik Ammonia Leak Kills 6; Investigation Begins

LD1603143490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 15 Mar 90

[Text] In the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office: As was reported to us here today on the accident at the cold storage plant at the Nalchik Kurorttorg, as a result of which an ammonia leak occurred and six people died and three are in serious condition, the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Kabarda-Balka ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] has instituted an investigation into a criminal case. A team has been formed headed by (Yim Kuzhov), investigator of particularly serious cases from the autonomous republic's Public Prosecutor's Office.

At present the investigators have seized certain documentation, the site of the incident has been inspected, forensic-medical examinations are being conducted, and other investigative actions are under way which will establish the causes of the accident and determine who is responsible. The course of the investigation is being monitored by the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office.

Western Republics

Ivashko Meets With Ukraine KGB Officials

LD1704124890 Kiev Domestic Service in Ukrainian 1645 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Text] Comrade Ivashko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee, met on 14 April with officials of the Ukraine SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] KGB.

He talked on urgent problems of social, political, and economic development of the republic, on the course of discussion of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, on the program principles of the work of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and on preparations for the party congresses.

Special attention was paid to the task of forming a law-governed state. It was noted that ethnic conflicts which have not ended, the escalation of separatist tendencies, and the growth of crime raise serious concern among Soviet people. It is necessary to resort to urgent measures for strengthening law and order. (?A great role) here is to be played by the state security organs which, together with other law-maintaining organs, are called on to provide reliable guarantees for the protection of the Soviet constitutional order and to assist in the stabilization of the social-political situation in the republic.

Vote-Rigging Alleged in Donetsk

LD1704123990 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 16 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Here is a report from Donetsk. A conflict has flared up there between the oblast and city soviets over the present status of Igor Orlov, mayor of Donetsk. Our correspondent, Sergey Khubin, got in touch with the city over the phone and established a thing or two:

[begin recording] [Khubin] The receiver was picked up by Aleksandr Makhmutov, chairman of the Donetsk city soviet. Tell me, please, what has caused the conflict?

[Makhmutov] It was found out that during the election the number of votes cast for Orlov was several hundreds more than the number of electors. Proceeding from this, the deputies at the soviet's first session refused to recognize Orlov's mandate since in this case the election law was violated.

[Khubin] What is the oblast soviet's attitude to this development?

[Makhmutov] The oblast soviet disregarded the findings of our auditing commission and attempted to nullify the decision of the city soviet with regard to Orlov, but our soviet stood firm. The matter is now in the hands of the central electoral commission.

[Khubin] Later the matter was explained to me by Vladimir Shevchenko, deputy of of the oblast soviet.

[Shevchenko] After we had checked all the documents, it became evident that a sort of card sharpening had occurred. [passage omitted] Still, we recommended to confirm Orlov as deputy until a clearer picture is presented to us on what sort of breaches did happen at the polling station on election day.

[Khubin] What has the oblast soviet to do with all this if Orlov was seeking to become deputy of the city soviet?

[Shevchenko] [passage omitted] Well, Orlov turned to us for help as to a higher authority.

[Khubin] It seems that each side regards the election law in its own way.

Mironov Confirmed Donetsk Oblast Party Chief

LD0708210990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 7 Apr 90

[Text] An oblast party report-back and election conference ended in Donetsk today. Its participants pointed to ways of eliminating accumulated shortcomings, of which there are still a fairly large number in the work of the oblast committee. It was stated with alarm that the USSR Council of Ministers decision adopted following the miners' strikes is still being fulfilled unsatisfactorily.

The participants in the conference appealed to Gorbachev, the country's president, requesting him to demand that the USSR Council of Ministers unconditionally fulfill Decision No. 608. Following a secret ballot with a choice of candidates, Comrade Mironov was elected first secretary of Donetsk Oblast CPSU Committee. He previously worked as second secretary at the oblast committee.

New Leader of Lvov Oblast Elected

LD1404192190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Apr 90

[Text] A plenum of Lvov Oblast Committee of the Commuist Party of the Ukraine has freed Comrade Podgrebnik from his duties as first secretary of the committee in connection with his retirement. By a secret vote on a multi-candidate basis, Comrade Sekretaryuk, former director of a domestic radio electronics equipment research institute, was elected to the post.

Lvov Party Plenum 'Far from Easy'

LD1404211590 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 14 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A plenum of the Lvov Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party was held today and examined a matter of organization. Over to our corresondents for the details:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent Lyashkov] The pretext for convening an extraordinary plenum was, to a large extent, furnished by the results of the elections to the local and supreme soviets of Ukraine. As you know, the overwhelming majority of deputies' mandates to the rayon, town, and oblast soviets went to representatives of the democratic bloc of Ukraine. Moreover, of late, there has been a trend in the oblast party organization itself toward dividing communists along certain basic principles of party activity. It was in these complex conditions of internal party debate that the issue of a new leader of the oblast party organisation was resolved. Our film crew was not allowed to work during the sitting, but we do know what the work of the participants in the plenum was like, and it was far from easy since a sanctioned meeting of many thousands of people was taking place outside the oblast committee building. The speeches at the meeting varied but many of them contained calls for the communists to deal publicly with those matters which impinge upon the interests of the people.

[M.G. Vasyliv, identified by caption] I think that the communists are coming together today after too great a delay. This matter should have been resolved when the people showed their lack of confidence in Comrade Yakov Petrovich Podgrebnik in the elections for the USSR people's deputies. The party organization has lost its position and (?to a large extent) its authority. That is not only my opinion but that of the people and the oblast. It is talked about openly. We have glasnost today and people express their opinions. That is undoubtedly a good thing. [end recording]

As a result of a secret ballot on a contested basis the plenum elected Sekretayuk, who had been working as the director of a scientific and research institute for domestic radio and electronic equipment, first secretary of the Lvov Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. [video shows (?deputies) talking; the oblast committee at work; the meeting outside: visible slogans include "The people will not forgive traitors"; Vasyliv interviewed outside]

Kiev Party Committee, Democratic Platform Meet

LD1504170490 Kiev International Service in English 1800 GMT 14 Apr 90

[Text] Two significant political events took place in Kiev today: In the morning there was a sitting of the plenum of the city committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and in the evening a mass meeting was staged by the supporters of the democratic platform.

The participants of the plenum adopted a decision to convene a regular conference of the Kiev City organization of the Communist Party of the Republic on 8-9 June, 1990. Examined at the conference will be the drafts of the party documents for the upcoming congress, with all the amendments introduced by the Kiev communists. No less significant was also the endorsement of the procedure of electing deputies to the congresses of the Soviet Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Ukraine. From now on, it is not the regional party committees but rank-and-file communists who will decide whom they will elect as their delegates to the forums. The plenum's participants also discussed, in a critical and businesslike way, the platform of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee and the democratic platform to the 28th Party Congress. In a resolution adopted at the meeting, the supporters of the democratic platform within the Communist Party called on the communists of Kiev to consolidate their efforts on a democratic basis; denounce dogmatism and conservatism in the approaches to democratization within the party.

Ukrainian Communist Party Issues Resolutions

On Interethnic Relations

90UN1299C Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum resolution: "Against the Spurring of Tension on the Grounds of Interethnic Relations"]

[Text] Expressing the opinion of the republic's communists, the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum emphatically condemns the provocative actions of destructive forces spreading rumors concerning possible civil confrontations and pogroms for the purpose of destabilizing the political situation. The plenum unequivocally supports the strengthening of the unity of people of different nationalities and the friendship of the USSR peoples, and calls on the party organizations and all communists to rebuff all manifestations of chauvinism, nationalism, and separatism.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum instructs the communists working in the republic and local law enforcement authorities, guided by constitutional provisions and Soviet laws, to reliably protect each individual against encroachments on his national dignity, extremist actions, and slanderous fabrications.

The party organizations of editorial outfits to enhance journalists' responsibility for precise political evaluations of the situation in the sphere of interethnic relations.

On Military Ties

90UN1299D Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 1

[Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum resolution: "Strengthening the Ties between the Ukrainian People and the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text] The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee plenum supports the strengthening, upgrading, and conversion of the USSR Armed Forces and is opposed to their disconnection on a territorial and national basis.

To consider as a most important task of the republic party organizations a broadening and intensification of the ties of the workforce and educational institutions to the military units and subunits on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

The party committees and soviet authorities to initiate the necessary organizational work pertaining to the location of the military units that will arrive on redeployment from the East European countries, and the creation of the necessary social and everyday and housing conditions for the servicemen.

The Central Committee plenum condemns manifestations of a scornful attitude on the part of individuals and groups toward war veterans, servicemen, and members of their families. The party organizations should do everything necessary to ensure that the participants in the Great Patriotic War, soldier internationalists, and all servicemen be surrounded by nationwide attention and concern.

Belorussian Bureau Discusses 'Democratic Platform'

PM1004095790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by Mikhail Shimanskiy under the rubric "Direct Line; IZVESTIYA Own Correspondents at the Teleprinter": "Position of Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau"]

[Text] Minsk—The Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has examined the question "of the activity in the Belorussian Communist Party of the supporters of the 'Democratic Platform in the CPSU'" and has adopted a resolution.

The resolution notes that separatism has recently begun to appear in the work of individual political clubs created with a view to democratizing party life and that attempts are being made to exert direct influence on the primary party organizations and remove them from the party committees' control.

In this connection the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau has obliged the party obkoms [oblast committees], gorkoms [city committees], and raykoms [rayon committees] to investigate the situation which has taken shape in all primary party organizations and to talk with each communist who has deviated or is deviating from the CPSU's ideological positions. In those cases where persuasion and explanation fail to produce the desired results it is proposed to examine the views and actions of such communists at meetings in primary party organizations and at party gorkom, raykom, and obkom bureau sessions and to take steps to break off relations with them, right up to their expulsion from the party.

Commentaries on the resolution speak of the recent Belorussian republican conference of supporters of the "Democratic platform in the CPSU." The delegates' speeches and the documents adopted make it possible to conclude, the commentaries assert, that the club members have in fact embarked on the path of an open oppositional political struggle. This is borne out by the creation of a coordinating council and primary structures of the "Democratic platform" in some labor collectives.

To preserve the party and its development, the commentaries state, it has become vitally necessary to break off relations with those who have steered a course toward undermining the Belorussian Communist Party's unity. Right up to the dissolution of some primary party organizations.

That is the position of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. It has generated a varied reaction in the republic's party organizations.

Moldavian Interethnic Roundtable Ends in Accord

PM1704152190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Eduard Kondratov report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Accord Reached"]

[Text] Kishinev—The heated discussions, which have lasted for more than a week, between representatives of Moldavian social movements participating in a "roundtable" debate have ended in a political consensus.

At first it did not seem very likely that they would be able to reach agreement on anything. The platforms declared by the Moldavian People's Front, the "Yedinstvo" International Movement, the Union of Moldavian Working People, the Humanist Club, the Union of War Veterans, the "Gagauz Khalky," the Union of Peasants, the League of Women, the Bulgarian and Jewish cultural societies, and other republic social organizations were too different. How was a common language to be found?

This sharp demarcation—with clear interethnic features—became apparent in the very first days, when questions concerning Moldavia's sovereignty and its immediate future were being discussed. Should the republic remain within the renewed federation or did it have no choice other than to leave the USSR? Accord was reached, however: Rejecting the "Lithuanian option" as unacceptable in terms of the methods used, the "roundtable" participants reached the common opinion that Moldavia must attain full independence as soon as possible in terms of the solution of vital problems concerning its economy, culture, and social development. A declaration to this effect was signed by Moldavians, Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, Gagauz, and Bulgarians.

The participants took some time to reach mutual understanding when discussing the problems of migration, growing unemployment, laws on languages, guarantees for ethnic minorities' rights, and the historical boundaries of Moldavia and the Ukraine.

So what practical results have the "roundtable" debates given to the participants themselves and to the republic's inhabitants, who have been intently following their progress? It goes without saying that only the Moldavian parliament is empowered to issue decisions. The benefit from the debates is considerable, however. They have proved that confrontation at rallies and the airing of mutual grievances and claims are not the best way to get to the truth. On Monday, when, on the final day of the "roundtable" session, its participants made an appearance on republic television, their million-strong audience was able to see for itself that the most important thing today is to be able to listen carefully and try to understand each other.

It has been decided that these "roundtable" sessions will be held regularly and become a permanent public forum.

Caucasus

Armenian CP Economic Aktiv Meets 17 Apr

NC1804090890 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0500 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the review of KHORHRDAYIN HAYASTAN]

[Text] On 17 April the republic's party economic aktiv held a meeting to discuss the situation in the republic, ways to improve this situation, and issues pertaining to party and soviet bodies. The meeting was chaired by Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee.

Reports were submitted on the situation in the republic by Asatryan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Yerevan city committee; Badamyants, chairman of the republic's state security committee; Yerin, first deputy minister of the republic's internal affairs; and (Koletkov), first deputy procurator of the republic.

Yeghamyan, acting chairman of the Yerevan city soviet executive committee; (Tatamyan), director of the HAYGAZARD production unit; Ananyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Idzhevanskiy Rayon committee; Minasyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Baghramyanskiy Rayon committee; (Ivontsyan), first secretary of the Armenian CP Ghukasyanskiy Rayon committee; Saakyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Martuniskiy Rayon committee; Agopyan, deputy department director of the Armenian CP; and (Aloyan), first secretary of the Armenian CP Leninakan's Movskovskiy Rayon committee were also present during the exchanges of views.

Movsisyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, spoke at the meeting of the republic's party economic aktiv. (Sereba), official of the CPSU agroindustrial committee, was also present at the meeting.

The newspapers carries an ARMENPRES report on its first page on the ideas exchanged at the republican party economic aktiv.

Baku City Party Committee Holds Plenum

NC1804075990 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0440 GMT 17 Apr 90

[From the republican press review]

[Text] The plenum held by the Baku city party committee [gorkom] examined the tasks of the city's party organizations in connection with the effort made to normalize the social and political situation agreed upon at the plenum held by the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 31 March 1990. Comrade Agayev, first secretary of the Baku Gorkom, read the report of the Gorkom Bureau.

The plenum decided that the (?38th) Baku city party conference be held on 26 May 1990.

Fugitive Azerbaijani Soldiers Return to Units

PM1704132090 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Captain M. Kislov report: "They Did Not 'Visit' Home for Long"]

[Text] They left the plane and climbed down to the ground like guilty schoolboys. It was obvious that the guys were ashamed to face the officers meeting them on the airfield, as well as their fellow countrymen who had accompanied them to the Trans-Baykal.

Nearly 20 soldiers and sergeants of Azerbaijani nationality, yielding to the provocative, inflammatory appeals of extremists from the republican People's Front, left their subunits without permission and fled to their native region in order, as they put it, "to protect their nearest and dearest against the Armenian militants' terror." However, as it turned out they did not "visit" home for long. The majority of the fugitives' parents sounded the alarm, realizing that their sons had embarked on a slippery, unjustified path, and notified the local soviet and party organs and military commissariats. It was decided to return the fugitives to their place of service without delay.

The republic did not confine itself to putting the runaway soldiers on a plane. The soldiers were accompanied to the Trans-Baykal by a delegation of representatives of the public headed by A. Makhmudov, second secretary of Akdashkiy Rayon Party Committee, and R. Mamedov, deputy chairman of Apsheronskiy Rayon Soviet Executive committee. On arriving in the military district the guests expressed the hope, so to speak, that the soldiers' action would be assessed in the light of the circumstances that had prompted them to take unlawful actions.

The delegation members spent a week among the district's troops, studied the life, combat training, and living conditions of the Trans-Baykal servicemen, visited gunnery training facilities, classrooms, and barracks, and presented souvenir discs and books by Azerbaijani writers.

However, the main purpose of the meetings held at units and subunits was real contact with servicemen. And not only with their fellow countrymen. The guests spoke in detail about the situation in the republic, the reasons for the events of January this year, and the measures being adopted to normalize the situation.

Tbilisi Commemoration Events Termed 'Ambiguous'

PM1704153390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kaushanskiy: "Tbilisi: A Year After"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 9 Apr—...The two colors of Tbilisi—red and black—were in evidence. The latest copies of Georgian newspapers were full of year-old pictures. Memorial photographic exhibitions have been opened, and local TV has broadcast a documentary on "Black April" two days in a row.

A mourning rally began at midnight Sunday and lasted through till Monday morning. On the evening of 9 April virtually all parties and social organizations in Georgia held yet another rally of thousands at the National Stadium (the new name for the "Dinamo" Stadium).

The events of the past few days in Tbilisi have been ambiguous. Each has had its own emotional and sometimes even political overtones. The Democratic Party of Georgia staged an event outside Government House. Anyone who wanted one was offered a form: filling it in would allow you to... cease being a Soviet citizen and become a citizen of independent Georgia.

Both at the stadium and in the square in front of Government House there was no shortage of the radical appeals to which we are beginning to get accustomed, despite the sometimes excessively sharp "decibels of glasnost." Demands were heard for Georgia's national independence to be restored, for the "forces of occupation" to be removed from its territory, and for the forthcoming Armed Forces draft to be boycotted...

There was no shortage of conjecture and rumor to jangle the nerves of that section of the population now referred to as Russian-speaking They were talking about acts of revenge, about covert KGB subunits which had allegedly come to Georgia to cope with anything, so to speak, about preparations for the departure of servicemen's families, and about threatening letters delivered to officers...

But those who were interested in a war of nerves lost out back in early spring. A sharp rebuke to the burgeoning rumors was given in the press by N. Natadze, leader of the People's Front. A committee was set up in Tbilisi in advance of the national mourning day to deal with the memorial events. It included representatives of the city authorities, opposition parties, public associations, the creative intelligentsia, and public order organs. Speaking on republic TV, I. Tsereteli, leader of the Georgian National Independence Party, called on the city's inhabitants to display calm and good sense, announcing that any excesses during these days of national sorrow would be viewed as a provocation against the Georgian people. Essentially the same platform was adopted by the national forum (an organ uniting all opposition forces in a single structure), whose headquarters we visited on the eve of the sad anniversary.

Thin candles quietly sputtered in the night, and nobody felt the chill of approaching morning. We thought again about many things while preparing this article on the streets of Tbilisi, which is particularly pretty when the spring blossoms are out. We thought especially about the lessons of 9 April. The country has grown up a lot in the year which has flown by since the Tbilisi tragedy. That is how democracy grows up when objective conditions are created for it. A multiparty mechanism has already been launched, a law regulating the procedure for union republics to secede from the USSR already exists, the internal troops' duties and rights in safeguarding public order have already been clearly defined, and ways of ensuring republics' economic independence have already been discussed at parliamentary level. And we, wiser now, use less and less the language of ultimatums, which turns us more into the builders of a Tower of Babel than into people preparing to greet a new millennium.

Gumbaridze Gives Plenum Speech on Renewing Party

90US0629A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 6 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[Report on speech by G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee: "On the Path of Qualitative Renewal and Moral Recovery"]

[Text] As already reported, the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee 17th Plenum, which discussed the question of the social and political situation and the tasks of the Communist Party of the republic, was held on 31 January. A report at the plenum was delivered by G.G. Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee.

The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee has to at its plenum, he said, to formulate its position on a number of important and acutely urgent political questions. An extremely complex task. Particularly with regard for the overall very complex and tense situation both in the republic and in the country as a whole. There is every reason to conclude that the present stage of perestroyka has proven one of the most complex, crucial and, perhaps, critical on the entire path of renewal.

To what, in our view, does its main distinctiveness amount?

Primarily, the constant transformation of the political mood. Democratization and glasnost have strongly boosted the awakening of national and social self-awareness. The sharp politicization of views and the rapid, extraordinary movement of public thought have come to really encroach on the conservative foundations of the managerial structures, which retain administrative power, evoking their counteraction to perestroyka and engendering serious contradictions. Extensive pluralism and the shaping of alternative opinions have led to the spread and polarization even of the interests and positions of various groups of the population, an increase in social heterogeneousness and elements of exclusiveness, which is seriously hampering the continued advancement of perestroyka.

The Georgian Communist Party can only preserve the political initiative and maintain its political authority by operating on a qualitatively new basis, having organically imbibed and stored national and social ideals and interests, having initiated a mutually respectful constructive dialogue with various social and political forces, having become the genuine nucleus of the consolidation of all of society and having confirmed by actual deed that it is capable of solving the most acute political, national and social problems.

This must today determine the strategy and tactics, meaning and purpose of our activity and our preparations for the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress.

Despite serious obstacles, the CPSU Central Committee, the party leadership and M.S. Gorbachev are constantly confirming devotion to the arterial policy of perestroyka, democratization and the emancipation of social awareness.

The April Crisis in the Republic: Lessons and Conclusions

Each of us, each member of society, is now asking increasingly: how should we work and how act and live henceforward?

In order to answer the question it is essential as a primary duty to soberly clarify the essence of the situation which has taken shape in the republic for the signs of serious political crisis may be clearly divined therein. And the events of 9 April, when the confrontation of the institutions of authority and public forces assumed open forms and an irreparable tragedy occurred and entirely innocent people perished, should be seen not as the cause, what is more, but the culmination of crisis phenomena.

Parliamentary commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet made an evaluation of the actions of specific persons and bodies. The Congress of USSR People's Deputies categorically condemned the entirely unjustified violence against our own people, against the peaceful population.

It also needs to be seen against the social and political background which had been created in the country how absurd was the contrast of the attempts to prevent in the republic at any price mass meetings or other forms of people's free expression and how anachronistic were the claims to a monopoly right to criticism and self-criticism and choice of forms of democratization. Processes of perestroyka and glasnost began throughout the country following the CPSU Central Committee April (1985) Plenum. Meanwhile the analogous processes in the republic were perceived extremely one-sidedly and were evaluated on each occasion as manifestations of extremism and nationalism. Colossal energy was squandered on formal maneuvering. In a word, attempts were made to establish perestroyka by the same compromised administrative-command methods. Unfortunately, there were no other weapons in the republic Communist Party's arsenal at that time.

The first disturbing symptoms of the noncorrespondence of the style and methods of political leadership to the requirements of social life began persistently, and quite strongly, what is more, to make themselves known back in May and, subsequently, in November 1988. Serious protest actions and mass meetings and demonstrations in the course of discussion of the draft alterations and additions to the USSR Constitution largely reflected common dissatisfaction at the hampering of the restructuring processes in the republic.

Unfortunately, all this was at that time left without due analysis. The dialogue between the leadership and the republic, which had barely been struck up and which suffered from unjustified peremptoriness and irreconcilability as it was, was in fact suspended. Naturally, given this approach, there could have been no question of the formation of a mechanism of the political solution of conflicts and disagreements. On the contrary, arbitrary pressure on all unsanctioned displays of thought and feeling was intensified.

Deprived of reliable information and active political influence, the working class occupied a wait-and-see position. The healthy part of the intelligentsia, youth and students with a vital interest in the renewal of social life was increasingly disappointed in its expectations. Under such conditions the initiative in the solution of many questions urgent and important for the nation and the public was lost.

The growth of national awareness engendered in Georgia, as in other republics, heightened interest in questions of the history and cultural values and traditions of the people which had undergone changes as a result of certain distortions of nationality policy. The public was worried by the demographic situation which had taken shape, the environmental situation and the sharp deterioration in the moral atmosphere. General discontent was caused by the arbitrary diktat of many central departments failing to take account of the mentality and distinctiveness and way of life of the indigenous population. The problem of the further development of the Georgian language and its status arose in full.

However, even the individual hesitant steps in this direction were taken, unfortunately, manifestly late, when the situation was threatening to become explosive. The debate on the Caucasus pass railroad project was conducted in precisely such an atmosphere. A manifest irreconcilability of positions was sensed also on questions of the return to our history of certain names of public figures and writers who were unjustifiably banned. This was the case also at the time of the restoration and evaluation of certain dates and events inseparable from our history.

This was one of the main reasons why public expectations of perestroyka failed to coincide with the official opinion and policy, which became increasingly detached from the nation and from people.

Public associations and various alternative movements not burdened by past mistakes and not having exhausted the credit of trust were meanwhile gaining momentum. It transpired that the positions of these movements, even the most radical, proved closer and more comprehensible to the large numbers of the public expecting real change. The sentiments which had arisen on the wave of emotion, which could in themselves have been a new danger against the background of party inactivity, were not analyzed in depth.

Alternating with inconsistency and indecisiveness, the categorical approach prevented their precise differentiation with regard for the attitude toward perestroyka and constructive and destructive aspirations. The confrontation continued to grow, and the situation became latently inflamed, approaching a critical, fateful point.

Thus an analysis of the style and methods of political leadership of the republic shows that they essentially already contained the elements which ultimately prompted arbitrary and power methods of the solution of urgent problems and contradictions. The leadership proved both politically and morally unprepared for other, more civilized forms of actions for resolving the situation.

The 9 April tragedy laid completely bare the political crisis which had matured in the republic and drew a line in our thinking and consciousness, inverting customary concepts and ideas. And all this at a price of immense moral ordeals and losses. And no one has the right to absolve himself of a share of the responsibility for this! We must all learn a lesson for ourselves and draw therefrom exhaustive conclusions.

First, the lesson is that a solution of most significant, urgent problems must be and is gradually becoming a most important priority direction of the activity of the republic Communist Party. It is essential for this to have a well-oiled system, a precise strategy, purposefulness and political wisdom.

Second, it is not possible to talk with the people while taking cover behind tanks and armored personnel carriers. Constant contact with the public and consideration of its interests are essential. It has to be recognized that the various public formations born of perestroyka reflect a particular public position and thought which actually exist and are presenting this problem or the other and ways of solving them, including those which are for us unacceptable, in a new way. All this brings to the fore the need for political dialogue.

Third, it is no less important that this dialogue be constructive. Only thus is it possible to discuss cardinal problems of the nation's development and formulate the correct decisions. A desire to understand one another and find points of contact, of which there are far more than might appear at first glance, is needed; this by no means, what is more, prevents the scrupulous expression and defense of one's own positions.

Fourth, a most important condition of the successful solution of the problems confronting us is high self-discipline, civic and political responsibility and consolidation on a constructive platform taking account of the entire spectrum of economic, social and national problems. The republic Communist Party must boldly set about the solution of this set of problems. It needs for this primarily organizational, structural and ideological renewal, moral recovery and intellectual growth. Otherwise it undoubtedly cannot be the nucleus uniting society.

Interests of National Development—Basis of Consolidation of Social and Political Forces

Perestroyka and dogmatic teachings are incompatible. We are faced with formulating new approaches and determining original, particular strategy and tactics of action most fully in keeping with the actual political, economic and social independence of Georgia and the public aspirations and national traditions and particular features of our people. The blind copying of existing outlines and approaches and others' prescriptions is impermissible here, as is, even more, waiting for some standardized recommendations. There are no patterns, nor could there be, suitable for all republics and peoples.

There is no longer any doubt today that in the sphere of national self-determination the self-determination of the republic Communist Party is essential. It was the disregard for national problems and their relegation to the background which entailed most severe consequences. This could discredit primarily the republic Communist Party, counterpose it to the public and national movements, the intelligentsia and the youth and create a situation of dangerous confrontation. We are graphically persuaded of this by the bitter lessons both of the past and of the recent period of the republic party organization.

The task now is unambivalent: the Georgian Communist Party undoubtedly must become and is becoming a qualitatively renewed social and political organization restructured in accordance with the new times and geared to national problems.

It was just such an approach which characterized the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee 15th Plenum, which considered entirely correctly that the republic Communist Party had necessarily to have a most important action program—a comprehensively balanced concept of national development oriented toward the near and distant future.

The draft of this concept, which was formulated by common efforts, is comprehensively based on the principle of continuity and the wealth of historical experience of our people in the sphere of national-state building and their age-old ideals. It sets as a most important task of national development the republic's achievement by the parliamentary path of real national-state sovereignty and independence, which should ensure Georgia's further progress, its political, economic and social and cultural growth, the enhanced labor, social and political and creative assertiveness of the population and the moral-ethical cleansing of all of society.

In accordance with the draft concept, Georgia is in the future to conduct its affairs independently and prevent a violation of its sovereign rights on the part of anyone at all and the interference of outside forces in the internal affairs of the republic and the autonomous formations which are a part thereof. Such important questions as the status of republic citizenship, the procedure of the operation of union laws in Georgia, control of immigration processes, the creation of national army formations, draftees' performance of their compulsory military service on republic territory, a cardinal improvement of landuse legislation and others have to be regulated.

The draft concept declares all national wealth on the territory of the republic—land, minerals, inland and territorial waters, the shelf and forests and also enterprises of various sectors of the national economy—the property of Georgia. The republic will be the sole and sovereign proprietor and administrator of the entire economy located on its territory.

It independently elaborates and implements the policy of its economic, ecological and demographic development, directs the national economic complex with regard for complete equality and economic efficiency and decides all questions connected with relations with the Soviet Union, the union republics and foreign countries.

A most important set task is that of the development of such appreciable spheres of spiritual life as public education, science and culture. It is here that the consciousness of our people and their intellectual strength and creative potential are manifested most strikingly. It is these sectors which should exert an appreciable influence on the formation of the spiritual and social values of the generations and their morals, professionalism and standard of labor, and then, proceeding from this, on the cultural and economic development of the people and, what is most important, their moral improvement.

A subject of particular concern will be the Georgian language, an official program whose development has already been approved and by a joint decision confirmed by the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet Presidium. At the same time the republic will display all-around concern for the free use and development of the Abkhaz and Ossetian languages, Russian and also other languages. The necessary conditions for their mastery of the republic's official language will be created for all permanent residents of Georgia.

The draft concept provides, together with the development of the natural and technical branches of science, for the creation of propitious conditions for an improvement in all spheres of Georgian studies for the purpose of an intensification of the study of both the theoretical and applied aspects of Georgia's historical, ethnic, economic, geographical, social and political development.

The draft concept extensively reflects also questions of the further development of our literature, the theater, fine art, the cinema, folk creativity, library-museum and publishing activity and the protection of historical and cultural monuments and support, as necessary, in each individual case for the useful activity of the Georgian Orthodox Church and other religious organizations.

Such are the principal aims and directions of the concept. Inasmuch as the draft has already been published in the press for nationwide discussion, there is no need, I believe, to focus attention on all its aims and propositions. It was decided from the very outset, incidentally, entirely correctly, certainly, that the elaboration of the draft concept should be undertaken with the maximum openness, in a democratic atmosphere. It was for this reason that a large part of the members of the Central Committee and representatives of our scientific and artistic intelligentsia were acquainted from the very outset with the first version of the draft. The basic propositions were approved in the work force, research establishments and other organizations. The draft published last September for public discussion took account of up to 300 comments, considerations and wishes.

It may without exaggeration be said that the draft concept evoked a great public response. Interest was shown by all strata of society, even the most radical people. It was generally acknowledged that this is an unprecedented document in the history of the Georgian Communist Party.

The results of a study of public opinion which encompassed the multinational population of the republic are eloquent testimony to this. The fact that in the course of the study it was ascertained that 93 percent of those polled were already familiar with it may also serve as an expression of the great interest in the draft concept. An absolute majority of working people—85 percent—approved the document. A negative opinion was expressed by only 2.3 percent of those polled.

All these comments, proposals and opinions were analyzed in depth by the editorial group. The changes affected 28 of the draft's 75 articles, that is, one out of every three.

More than 5 months have elapsed since the draft was submitted for nationwide discussion. It may be said that it began operation as of the day it was published. Eloquent testimony to this are the most important decisions adopted by the 11th Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet 12th Session. They are imbued with the spirit of this document.

Despite the complex social and political situation, many important questions have been solved in Georgia recently. The prospects for the realization of a number of national problems and paths of the republic's further development have been mapped out. We have succeeded in solving many questions which had for years been considered insoluble, restoring the objective picture of individual episodes in Georgia's very harsh history and returning to the Georgian people some unjustly forgotten names and dates, revitalizing hope and faith in the future. And, what is most important, the complete right to sovereign state development has been declared for all to hear.

We inherited a heavy enough burden from the past. It is known what serious deformations were allowed to occur in the post- revolution years, in the era of the cult of personality and in the time of stagnation precisely in the sphere of nationality policy. Thus certain processes and phenomena in the sphere of national relations characteristic both of Georgia as a whole and individual regions and autonomous formations thereof could not have come as a complete surprise to us.

We declared at the Congress of People's Deputies that the republic has every opportunity for fairly solving all interethnic problems under conditions of mutual concord and respect independently and without outside interference.

The concept of national development, whose basic propositions take account of the interests of the representatives of all nations and nationalities residing in Georgia, should coordinate the efforts in this direction of the Georgian Communist Party, all republic and local authorities, the work force and public organizations.

The task is to ensure the active enlistment in the national creative process of the representatives of all nations and nationalities, find the optimum balance of interests of the indigenous nations and interethnic interests, enhance the very concept of patriotism and infuse it with realities of the present day and categories common to all mankind.

In a word, it is a question of precisely determining at the present stage of development of our statehood the place of each citizen of Georgia, regardless of his national affiliation, in the strengthening of the republic's political, economic and cultural sovereignty.

It needs to be said candidly that there are forces which are afraid of the processes of democratization and glasnost. They are not interested in overcoming the current difficulties in interethnic relations and are afraid of losing their privileges. This applies to both representatives of our party apparatus and certain groups of the population incorporating people of various nationalities. They see as the sole way out a destabilization of the social and political situation. They are choosing for this the simplest path—playing on national emotions and shamelessly using this to split society and ignite a separatist mood, which has recently been manifested increasingly clearly in brazen extremism.

It was not fortuitous that at the time of the complication of the situation both in Kvemo Kartli and the Abkhaz

Autonomous Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast we were constantly being urged to adopt extreme measures, and demands were made for the imposition of a state of emergency and a curfew. In a word, had we acceded to this, we would have had to have abandoned democratic principles and political levers of a solution of problems and handed over the reins of control of the social and political situation to the military. It has to be considered also that all these provocations were played out to a virtually identical script. It needs to said plainly and unambiguously that neither in Kvemo Kartli nor the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic nor the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast were there any real grounds for the outbreak of ethnic conflicts. All these conflicts were manifestly provoked by nationalists and separatists, destructive forces and the ambitious persons and instigators who do not care a fig for the interests of their own people, of other nations even less. We have expressed our high-minded political evaluation of these events repeatedly at republic and all-union level.

The international community is following with rapt attention the national processes currently under way in our country. I refer primarily to the republics of the Baltic and the Transcaucasus. Sober politicians and political scientists of many countries are voicing well-founded fears that the world, which has for many years been struggling for the observance of human rights, could turn its back on the centrifugal movements and forces which under different conditions enjoyed the particular support of the West for, in their opinion, these forces are impeding the processes of perestroyka and democratization and in fact setting as the goal the replacement of one authoritarian principle with another and introducing extremism in interethnic relations. And this in no way corresponds to the ideals of the world democratic community. They consider all this a dangerous phenomenon in a sense for themselves also.

We cannot fail to take account of all this and fail to consider the history of a number of Near East countries and do not have the right not to look into their political aims in depth. This is particularly necessary today, when the sovereignty of the republic is increasingly acquiring truly real content and the prospects of immediate, direct relations with foreign states are being mapped out. Each ill-considered step dictated merely by emotions could prove catastrophic on this path.

Our concept of national development must show to all that discrimination against anyone's rights on a national or any other basis never has been and never will be allowed in Georgia. We do not only simply recognize this position but consider it a way of life and cornerstone of relations with the world. Thus did our distant and near forefathers think, so do we also think, and have by this, I believe, contributed and are continuing to contribute to the enrichment of values common to the world. Individual seditious and tendentious publications of both the central and other press are incapable of shaking these traditions, this historical inertia of ours.

It should be remembered also that the principle of the citizens' unconditional respect for constitutional provisions is firmly pursued today in all civilized states. The majesty of the law is inviolable. If we aspire to a free, democratic, humanitarian society, we are obliged to concern ourselves right now with the legal education of the people, particularly the youth.

Respect for the constitution, the law and public order should be part of the flesh and blood of each person. This by no means signifies that our constitution and our legislation are not in need of serious, fundamental alteration and the consideration of the new realities. A special commission of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet made up of highly qualified specialists and prominent authoritative people of the republic is working actively in this field. But while the current basic law remains the law, it must operate without exceptions and without limitations, and each citizen, to whatever political and moral beliefs he adheres, must respect and fulfill its demands.

It is difficult otherwise to imagine the normal existence of a civilized society.

The Georgian Communist Party: Paths of Qualitative Renewal

Acute debate is under way around the party currently. Determination of its place and role in the renewed structure of administration and the social and political and socioeconomic life of the republic has become the most pertinent task. Nor is our republic any exception. Keen arguments are increasingly extending to all strata and social groups of society, the primary party organizations and the work force. The spread and spectrum of opinions are very wide.

We must at the plenum today express our opinion on all these issues. This is all the more necessary now—on the threshold of the elections to the Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies.

During the preparations for our plenum members of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau met with workers representing the scientific, technical and artistic intelligentsia, enterprise managers, secretaries of primary party organizations and party committees, members of the bureaus and senior officials of the Tbilisi and Rustavi and a number of other gorkoms and raykoms [city and rayon party committees] and members of the Central Committee. A keen and substantive discussion was conducted at plenums of the city and rayon committees of the capital's party organization. Many practicable proposals which deserve attention were expressed. A creative approach to the solution of problems was displayed.

What kind of conclusions may be drawn from these opinions?

They show primarily that a qualitative ideological and organizational and structural renewal of the republic Communist Party is necessary.

The communists and primary party organizations are aware of their high responsibility for the present and future of the republic and are insistently seeking their place in the processes occurring in social life.

The exchange of opinions confirmed also the fact that the symptom of the decline in the authority of the republic Communist Party and the prestige of the communists and the weakening of trust in them should be sought not only in the tragic events of 9 April but much earlier, in the crimes of the totalitarian-repressive and command- administrative systems, the depth of which has been conclusively laid bare by the restructuring processes.

At the same time no one has a right to forget that it was healthy forces in the Communist Party which halted the country's slide toward catastrophe. It was they who formulated the new political thinking and opened the way to the processes of renewal and cleansing, glasnost and democratization. It is for this reason that we consider the Georgian Communist Party the political force which is capable of extricating society from the crisis situation.

We must be firmly assured that members of the Georgian Communist Party—well-known public figures, scientists, artistic persons, the genuine labor nucleus of the working class and rural workers—are and will be a significant force in the sociopolitical struggle for Georgia's genuine sovereignty.

A tendency to counterpose the Communist Party to the processes of perestroyka, democratization and, what is most important, the national movement is emerging in a part of society. This is sometimes caused, possibly, by emotional strain and is a tribute to the current situation or, on the other hand, simply political myopia and irresponsibility. In all cases such a tendency is only harmful.

Mention should also be made here, however, that a veiled attempt to counterpose the party to these processes can be observed among executives also. The reason is merely the fact that it is extremely difficult for them to reconcile themselves to the loss of their customary privileges and the unquestioning fulfillment of their individual decisions. In a word, they are in the grip of a feeling of nostalgia for the command-administrative system. And this is characteristic of the country as a whole. It is not today hard to predict what serious consequences may be entailed by such a policy and what tremendous ordeals civil peace and harmony could face.

Thus not only the party is in need of critical self-analysis and self-cleansing. Such a task confronts the whole social organism and all its formal and informal structures, and, consequently, joint work is needed. It is necessary to advance concertedly and in a united front on the bureaucrats, retrograde persons, careerists, smart operators and corrupt elements. We should recruit fighters for this struggle not only on the basis of affiliation to this political platform or the other and not per official and social position but by proceeding from the criteria of high morality, competence, patriotism, devotion to radical democratic perestroyka and fidelity to the ideals of the republic's real sovereignty.

Many secretaries of party organizations and the communists are insistently positing the question of the initiation right now of a republic-wide debate on the most acute and urgent issues. Without this it is impossible to make further progress at the pace at which the restructuring of the social consciousness and its renewal and the establishment of new realities is going.

The results of the debate could, it is commonly held, be collated at the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress, the date of which should be brought forward as much as possible. In this connection we submit the proposal that the 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress be held early, this April, with the following agenda:

1. Report of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee on the course of perestroyka and the tasks of the party organizations;

2. Status of the Georgian Communist Party;

3. Report of the Georgian Communist Party Auditing Commission;

4. Elections of Georgian Communist Party executive bodies and delegates.

We deem it expedient that the delegate election procedure and determination of the date of the congress be entrusted to the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau.

What questions should be discussed in the course of the precongress debate primarily, what fundamental positions should be determined?

In our opinion, it is necessary first of all to precisely and clearly tell the people and the republic Communist Party about the kind of Georgia we wish to see in the near and distant future, by what paths and methods we intend to achieve the charted goal—the real state, political and economic sovereignty of the republic—and what we see as the basis of consolidation of national and civic forces.

These problems affect the vital interests of all strata and groups of society without exception and the entire multinational population of the republic. The directions of the restructuring of the Georgian Communist Party, its status and structure and the political steps which it takes following the formation of the new, democratic and genuinely popular parliament will depend to a considerable extent on our position also.

We deem it expedient that our plenum adopt a statement in connection with the upcoming elections to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies. It will evidently be necessary to create an editorial commission to draw up such a statement.

The exceptional situations and nonstandard social and political processes have required that the raykoms and gorkoms and primary party organizations approach with different criteria the new political realities born of democratization and glasnost. The first experience of this creative approach is boldly making its way into the life of many party committees and party organizations.

It is essential to support these innovations in every possible way, collate them and, what is most important, widely disseminate them. There is no doubt that our party activists are capable of working in the new way, being with the people and living their life. This is, there's no denying, not easy. Much time, effort and, it may be said, self-sacrifice are required for service of the people. But since we have undertaken this, we must bear this heavy burden honestly.

The complex social and political situation is raising exactingness toward the personnel increasingly. Cadre policy should be immediately and radically reviewed. We need to formulate the optimum criteria of an evaluation of party officials' professional qualities and extend by all measures the democratization of the system of the selection and assignment of personnel. The communists, work force and the masses at large must elect their leaders publicly.

There is already some movement in this direction, but wholly insufficient. We expect specific new proposals on this score from the party committees, members and candidates of the Central Committee and commissions of the party committees. I would also like to hear the thoughts of the participants in the plenum here. In a word, these should be fundamentally new forms and methods of the management of personnel policy and interethnic relations worthy of perestroyka.

It is necessary to precisely and faultlessly determine the role and place of the republic Communist Party and its social and legal status and the mechanism of relations with the CPSU. We must express our position in respect of individual propositions of the party program and a multiparty system.

This applies primarily to the renunciation of the monopoly of political power and support for the idea of constructive political pluralism in the country and the republic.

An extensive discussion and exchange of opinions is currently under way in respect to Article 6 of the Constitution. I would like in this connection to express my position candidly. The incorporation of this article in the constitution has in its time, we believe, done nothing to strengthen the prestige and authority of our party and the communists. On the contrary, it is has created certain difficulties and a crisis situation at the perestroyka breakthrough and renewal stage. In my opinion, the party itself must unambiguously express its opinion and its political wishes on this issue and find the appropriate political forms of relations with the people and service of their ideals.

Many communists and nonparty people are voicing the opinion that each community action movement and social and political formation should, unless their aims are contrary to the constitution, have the right not only to express their opinion but also defend it in the organs of power via their representation. They believe that it is such an approach which should be made the basis of future parliamentarianism in the republic. In the opinion of the majority of communists, this is a most important step toward the creation of a state based on the rule of law.

They are proposing the revision of a whole number of fundamental propositions of the CPSU Program currently in effect which, in their opinion, do not correspond or are at times even contradictory to the development of social and political processes and the demands of democratic renewal and fail to take account of national interests.

What can be said in this connection?

I believe that all these proposals, which are dictated by concern for the authority and enhanced role of the Georgian Communist Party in society, may, following comprehensive discussion at our plenum, be put on the agenda of the upcoming 28th Georgian Communist Party Congress. They will here constitute—in the event of the plenum's approval—the political part of the republic Communist Party's election platform.

The main thing now is not to spur on events artificially and not adopt hasty and ill-conceived decisions. This is an extremely complex matter. The fate of the entire republic and our entire people and their future are directly linked with this. We must know not only all the arguments "for" but also the considerations which speak against this.

Political boldness and political recklessness are entirely different, mutually exclusive categories. We should seek our path and formulate and develop social and political structures which are optimal for our state arrangement. We will in some things overtake other republics, possibly, in others, lag behind. This is nothing to be frightened of, the main thing is, I repeat, not artificially prompting phenomena. Equally pernicious here are both the expectation of readymade prescriptions from the center and their circulation and the blind duplication of the experience of the party organizations of certain republics.

At the same time we must struggle resolutely against a disparagement of the role of the republic Communist Party, whoever may attempt this. Nor will exceptions be made for the country's central authorities either. In official party documents the republic communist parties are called party organizations. Naturally, were this only a question of terminology and imprecision in the name, it would hardly be worth calling attention to this. Unfortunately, this is not the case. In the guise of loyalty to centralism some people are endeavoring to identify the status of the republic communist parties with that of oblast and kray organizations.

We simply cannot agree with such a position.

Responsibility to Georgia does not give us the right to abandon realistic thinking and a realistic approach to problems. We must take account of our centuries-old experience and current demands, our political traditions and the multinational character of the republic. Political pluralism must proceed from the indisputable fact that the Georgian Communist Party was and will henceforward remain the main force uniting all the nations and nationalities residing in Georgia. It must be more vigorous in pursuing an honest, clear, objective and high-minded policy on the nationality issue and spare us interethnic conflicts and clashes.

As historical experience shows, for a full-fledged political and economic model the appropriate political and economic basis is needed. It must have not only legal form but also real content. According to the current constitutions, Georgia has had and has now all the attributes of state sovereignty, but in fact, however, the prerogatives of its state and political institutions have been ignored and do not now always reflect the actual situation.

Economic independence by no means signifies economic exclusiveness, the creation of an autarkic economy and national isolation. On the contrary, it requires the utmost strengthening of traditional economic and production relations and their rationalization and active participation in world market relations as the quality of the commodities rises.

The main thing that the transition to economic independence will do is ensure that the living standard of the republic's population depend directly on the quality of our work. Therefore if we wish to live better, we must work better and learn better.

The republic's aspiration to political and economic independence is an essential political process, and no one and nothing can stop it. The task may be formulated merely thus: how, within what timeframe and by which paths to accomplish this highest aspiration of the nation.

Obviously, all these most complex questions require thorough analysis, republic-wide debate, possibly. We have supported and will continue to support the all-around democratization of social life and the democratic discussion of all problems and questions. We impose our opinions on no one, by power methods even less. We will endeavor to persuade people and attract them to our positions only by arguments and facts.

I would like such a position to be adopted by other public organizations and movements also. Democratization and glasnost make high demands on people's morality and their conduct and the spoken or printed word. Unfortunately, this has not always been taken into consideration in day-to-day life. There are many instances of such. We cannot put down to our political credit baseless confrontation, unjust criticism and provocative appeals and slogans. We need to shun political arrogance and display restraint, political maturity and balance and must not by our behavior cast a shadow on the whole republic and the people and betray genuine democratic values.

Particular cautiousness, exceptional accuracy and a correct interpretation of events are required of the mass media. They are today really free, really democratic and contributing to the restructuring of thinking considerably better. It should always be remembered that pluralism does not mean either the abandonment of our own position or a swing from one extreme to another. Each publication and each speech should serve a positive, noble goal and in no event artificially inflame tension. Unfortunately, this principal demand is not always observed in our press.

Democracy and glasnost categorically demand of us mastery of the art of parliamentary polemics and parliamentary struggle. The first, most serious test is at the threshold—the upcoming elections to the republic Supreme Soviet, the autonomous republic supreme soviets and the local soviets of people's deputies.

A highly contradictory, complex social and political situation has taken shape. The attempt of certain forces to weaken at all costs the party organizations' participation in the election campaign, more, to remove them from this process, is becoming increasingly brazen. There are loud calls for an outright boycott of the elections. In a word, a sharp polarization of opinions over the principles and paths of the formation of power is being observed in society.

All this requires timely comprehension. Each party organization and its committee must have its own election platform unfailingly taking into consideration local specifics and actual problems.

We need to actively enter into a dialogue with the People's Front, the Rustaveli Society and other public associations and movements in order to formulate mutually acceptable, constructive approaches. The last session of the republic Supreme Soviet showed that fruitful cooperation with people adhering to alternative, polar views even is perfectly possible. We do not have the right to let slip the initiative and must endeavor by all measures to accomplish the party's program goals.

Perestroyka and democratization, the daily expansion of the republic's sovereignty and the affirmation of pluralism are creating all the conditions for the even more decisive and larger-scale approach to the tasks of Georgia's national-state development, the constructive and consistent solution of the most distressing problems of politics, economics and interethnic relations and for our people and all of society to be led along the path of renewal.

We believe that today's plenum will impart dynamism to this movement.

Central Asia

Uzbekistan Cuts Off Supplies to USSR

LD1804065590 Moscow TASS in English 0639 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Tashkent April 18 UZTAG-TASS—In an effort to stabilise the domestic market, Uzbekistan said it will temporarily cut off supplies of most of its products to the rest of the Soviet Union beginning on Friday.

The Uzbek Government announced drastic cuts in exports of locally-produced goods, including furniture, TV sets, cars and electrical appliances.

The government banned or limited exports of some vegetables, fruit and dried fruit from the republic until June 1.

It also imposed maximum allowed norms for food and industrial products sent through the mail.